

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
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**THE RHETORIC OF CONSERVATISM: INTEL-
LECTUAL RECONSTRUCTION OF CHINESE
IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY 1990S**

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STATEMENT

I declare that I have created the thesis by myself. All sources and literature used have been duly cited. The work was not used to obtain another or the same title.

LEI, Letian

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My sincere thanks go to my parents, who financed my studies for the past three years, supervisor Přemysl Houda, Jan Vondráček, all authors who inspired this work, the courage and persistence of humankind, and the universe full of free wills.

ABSTRACT

Through in-depth interpretations of a series of intellectual, political, and cultural texts and their contexts, the thesis aims to reveal the ideological turn of conservatism in the People's Republic of China during the early 1990s, on the four dimensions of authoritarian politics, sociocultural tradition, market economy, and national identity. The thesis further points out that this turn not only established the decisive return of conservatism in modern Chinese history but also coincided with the general evolutionary trends of revolution and reaction in modern world history.


KEYWORDS

China; Conservatism; Ideology; 1990s; Intellectual History

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION





Student Protesters Enter Morningside Park in the Spring of 1968 © Hugh Rogers

“Marxism is sophisticated, comprising many principles, but in the final analysis, they can all be brought back to one single sentence: to rebel is justified.”

Mao Zedong, “Speech Marking the 60th Birthday of Stalin,” 21st December 1939, Yan’an.¹

“We want stability this year, next year, throughout the 1990s, and in the next century. Stability is China’s highest interest. Everybody who wants our motherland to prosper should never forget this.”

“Editorial: Welcome to the 1990s with Confidence,” *People’s Daily*, 1st January 1990.

PREFACE

a. ORIGINS OF PROBLEMS

SUSPICIOUS PHENOMENA

Compared with the enormous astonishments within academia following the forced relocation of the Central European University to Vienna due to the political pressures from the new “regent” [cf. Miklós Horthy], “Mr. Right” Orbán Viktor Mihály, the preparation for the first overseas campus of Fudan University in Budapest – a project within the China-Central and Eastern European “17+1” cooperation mechanism² – seems to be a silent revolution that no one paid attention to. No evidence shows any causal link between these two events. However, a mystery effectively emerges: a conservative Carmelite Monastery criticizes liberal institutions at home for being hostile foreign agents while fervently engaging with a “communist” regime abroad. In a 2014 speech, Orbán praised Singapore, China, and Russia as “the stars of international analyses.”³ What exactly do they have in common?

The Sino-Hungarian relationship might be considered trivial, but the mystery becomes even bewildered when it comes to the Sino-Russian relationship. It is declared that these two neighboring countries have reached a historic peak of “the best ever in five centuries” for their “shared views and coordinated actions on a variety of international agendas of common concern”⁴. Some still remember that half a century ago, the option of a “surgical nuclear strike” was placed on the table of the Kremlin’s policy towards China⁵ while the Maoists in Zhongnanhai were preparing for a total war against the “imperialist” Moscow as a “Tsarist reprint”. Lin Biao, then Mao’s designated

¹ Cited in Tsinghua University High School Red Guards, “Second Essay: Long Live the Revolutionary Spirit of the Proletariat (4th July 1966),” *Red Flag*, vol. 11, 1966.

² Xi Jinping, “Concentrate Our Hearts and Work Together, and Join Hands to Compose a New Chapter of Cooperation: The Keynote Speech at the 9th China-CEEC Leaders’ Summit.” *Xinhua News Agency*, 9th February 2021, Beijing.

³ Csaba Tóth trans., “Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the XXV. Bálványos Free Summer University and Youth Camp, 26th July 2014, Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő),” *The Budapest Beacon*, 29th July 2014.

⁴ Xi Jinping and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the Development of a Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership in the New Era.” *Xinhua News Agency*, 5th June 2019, Moscow.

⁵ Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes.” *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 66, no. 4 (1972): 1175-1202.

successor, delivered a political report at the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1969: Khrushchev “transformed the world’s first *dictatorship of the proletariat* into a dark, fascist, bourgeois dictatorship...since Brezhnev came into power, the Soviet revisionist renegade group...even more frantically practiced social imperialism...sending hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy Czechoslovakia and carrying out armed provocations against our Zhenbao Island were merely two of their ugly performances recently...intending to form a ‘socialist family’ under the new tsar’s rule, namely, a colony under social imperialism, just like Hitler’s Nationalsozialistische Europapläne...”⁶

Putin does not need any accusation of his “revisionism” from the antirevisionist left since his regime is not disguised as the USSR but outright appears to be a successor of the Romanovs’ orthodoxy. How has it become possible for a “Leninist”⁷ authority, i.e., the CPC, to accommodate a spiritual inheritor of the very tyranny that forced Lenin into exile?

On 11th April 2018, the UN Security Council conducted three rounds of voting on three draft resolutions on Syria’s chemical weapons (CW) issue.⁸ The British Permanent Representative to the UN, Dame Karen Pierce said: “in respect of Karl Marx, I think he must be turning in his grave to see what the country that was founded on many of his precepts is doing in the name of supporting Syria by condoning the use of CW on Syrian territory.”⁹ Russia’s support for the Assad regime was due to its reactionary position to any bottom-up regime change, which Foreign Minister S. V. Lavrov articulated in his condemnation of Marx’s inspirations: “without a doubt, the 1917 Revolution and the ensuing Civil War were a terrible tragedy for our nation. However, all other revolutions were tragic as well...in addition to the slogans of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, [they] also involved the use of the guillotine, and rivers of blood.”¹⁰ As a conservative (member of United Russia), Lavrov can express his conservatism coherently, connecting history and reality. But this might be stark a hot potato for the “communist” China: if at all, how could it justify its position by referring to Marxism? On the contrary, the CPC’s General Secretary Xi Jinping publicly complimented United Russia that “has been actively committed to uniting and leading the Russian people...promoting domestic political stability and economic development, improving people’s livelihood and Russia’s international status. It has received extensive support from Russian society...the CPC cherishes its friendship with United Russia...”¹¹

Still, the cases of Hungary and Russia might be considered culturally unspecific. However, within the Sino sphere, the contradiction between what Beijing seemingly claims to be and what it actually does is no less appreciable. The 4th Chapter of the *Communist Manifesto*, titled “Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties”, explicitly indicates how

⁶ Lin Biao, “Political Report for the 9th National Congress of the CPC.” 1st April 1969, Beijing.

⁷ According to the Constitution of the CPC revised in 2017, Leninism remained one of the official ideologies: the Party “takes Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, [and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics including] Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Important Thought of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as its guide for action.”

⁸ Among them, China voted in favor of the Russian proposal and abstained from voting on two of America’s proposals. Because the United States and Russia vetoed each other, none of them was passed.

⁹ Simon Rite, “‘Marx Would Be Turning in His Grave’ – Britain’s UN Envoy Appears to Think She’s Debating Soviets.” *RT*, 11 April 2018.

¹⁰ Sergey Lavrov, “Историческая перспектива внешней политики России,” *Россия в глобальной политике*, March 3, 2016.

¹¹ “Xi Jinping Sends a Congratulatory Letter to the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of United Russia,” *Xinhua News Agency*, 1st December 2021.

a Marxist political party should deal with non-Marxist political parties in specified European countries. In France, the Communists should “ally with the Social-Democrats¹² against the conservative and radical bourgeoisie...”¹³ In Switzerland, they should support the Radicals, which “consists of antagonistic elements, partly of Democratic Socialists, in the French sense, partly of radical bourgeois.”¹⁴ In Poland, they should support the party that “fomented the insurrection of Kraków in 1846.”¹⁵ In Germany, they should fight with the bourgeoisie “whenever it acts in a revolutionary way, against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy, and the petty bourgeoisie.”¹⁶

One and half-century later, in advanced “capitalist”¹⁷ societies such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, where bourgeoisies dominate, what political parties does the CPC support and oppose? In Singapore, instead of supporting the center-left Workers’ Party, Beijing closely collaborates with the right-wing People’s Action Party, which has dominated this city-state since its proclamation of independence in 1965 [cf. one-party dominant system]. In Hong Kong special administrative region (SAR), while criticizing the “pro-democracy camp” that consists of liberal democrats and leftists who advocate for universal suffrage for being “destabilizing” the society, Beijing’s rule has relied upon the “pro-establishment camp” that consists of nationalist and economic conservatives since the handover in 1997. In the ROC (Taiwan), Beijing has been adamantly opposing the center-left Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)¹⁸ and approaching the center-right Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT)¹⁹, especially since the former took office for the first time in 2000.

ENOUGH IS ENOUGH

This thesis is not inventing but following a concise and arguably the sole reasonable explanation to the paradoxes mentioned above: China today in its current advocacies of the so-called “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (SwCC) is by no means *communist* – if left-wing is indispensable in the term’s definition. Since the mid-1989, Beijing has adopted a developmental pattern that it once fiercely fought against – the authoritarian capitalism of Chiang’s KMT. The early 1990s era was a crucial turning point in reshaping the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s ideology from liberalism to conservatism²⁰ and the post-Cold War new normal.²¹

Though the thesis primarily focuses on analyzing a variety of selected academic and political *texts* in Chinese around and beyond 1989, it also aims to go deeper into broader *contexts*, Chinese and foreign, which lead to China’s early encounters with modernity during the late 19th century. Both

¹² According to Engels’ note in the English edition (1888) of the *Communist Manifesto*, the Social-Democracy party was represented by Ledru-Rollin, Louis Blanc, and the *Réforme*, signifying “a section of the Democratic or Republican Party more or less tinged with socialism.”

¹³ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto,” trans. Samuel Moore, in cooperation with Frederick Engels. *Marx/Engels Selected Works* (MESW), Vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), pp. 98-137.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ This has been identified by the CPC itself, cf. “one country, two systems”.

¹⁸ DPP is a member of the Liberal International.

¹⁹ KMT is a member of the International Democrat Union and the Centrist Democrat International.

²⁰ A more recognizable reference here would be the Cambodian People’s Party (a member of the right-wing Centrist Democrat International), which publicly (and abruptly) transformed from Marxism-Leninism to national and economic conservatism under a monarchy.

²¹ See also Nursultan Nazarbayev, who, by a leap of faith, transformed from the Chairman of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (QKP) to the Chairman of Nur Otan (lit. Radiant Fatherland), a party in international partnership with United Russia.

the KMT and the CPC – the partisan twins of China’s 20th century – were the political results of one intellectual process of introducing external modernity into China. They were indeed inspired by republicanism and communism initially, but it turned out that mission rather than ideologies ultimately drove both. Communism in China was not to solve problems within modernity as it was originally in Europe but emerged as an attempt to modernize China. When the attempt failed, the Party, with its institutional ascendancy over the state, had continued its commitment and pursuits for modernity, of course, in a different direction this time.

b. COMMON GROUND OF CPC AND KMT

The fin-de-siècle republicans and early 20th century communists in China generally received a Western education, either directly or through the intermediaries such as Japan and the semi-colonialized cities alongside the Chinese coast. This reflects the externality of Chinese modernity and perhaps also explains why their instrumental demand for materializing external modernity in China sooner or later overwhelmed ideological debates. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China (ROC), was a congregationalist educated in the United States. The 14 Chinese representatives²² at the 1st National Congress of the CPC in 1921 were also cultural elites of a promising generation: with an average age of 28, seven studied abroad (five in Japan, one at Columbia, one at Moscow Sun Yat-sen University²³), and four studied at Peking University (PKU). Li Hanjun (b. 1890) was capable in Japanese, German, French, and English.²⁴

Another two participants of the Congress were Dutch H. J. F. M. (H.) Sneevliet (pseud: Maring)²⁵ and Russian W. A. Neumann (pseud: Nikolski) [B. A. Нейман] from the Comintern. The Congress itself was secretly held in the Concession française de Changhaï. The intimacy between colonization and revolution was a widespread phenomenon. Marx's transformation from a sort of Hegelian liberal²⁶ to a socialist or communist happened right after he moved to Rue Vaneau, Paris and started reading Henri de Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier.²⁷ Marx's Francophilia per se was also a result of the Napoleonic conquest of Rheinland that turned his father Heinrich Marx enlightened. It was no coincidence that Deng Xiaoping lived in France for six years, Ho Chi Minh for ten years, Pol Pot for four years, and Zhou Enlai for two years, during which they either became ideological communists or joined the French Communist Party. Chen Duxiu, the General Secretary²⁸ of the CPC until 1927, sighed in 1915: "if the world did not have France, we would still be living in extreme darkness!"²⁹

Two years before the birth of the CPC, the Chinese Revolutionary Party of Sun Yat-sen was reorganized into the KMT, also in the Concession française de Changhaï.³⁰ Compared with its prototype, the Revive China Society founded in 1894, Honolulu³¹ inspired by the republican polity of America, the reorganized KMT (1919) now significantly leaned towards left-wing socialism. In fact, the representative of Comintern A. A. Joffe [Ио́ффе], then representative plenipotentiary of

²² This includes the absent CHEN Duxiu, who was represented by BAO Huiseng.

²³ The Moscow Sun Yat-sen University (1925-1935) belongs to a series of "Sun Yat-sen University" including the Sun Yat-sen University (Guangzhou, Guangdong) and the National Sun Yat-sen University (Kaohsiung, Taiwan) that are both currently in operation.

²⁴ Li was influenced by Japanese Marxist Hajime Kawakami and socialist Sakai Toshihiko when studying at the University of Tokyo.

²⁵ Related to Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, he was also the founder of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI).

²⁶ Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right." *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, 7 and 10 February 1844, Paris.

²⁷ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The German Ideology: Critique of Modern German Philosophy According to Its Representatives Feuerbach, B. Bauer and Stirner, and of German Socialism According to Its Various Prophets." *MESW*, Vol. 5.

²⁸ From 1921 (1st Congress) to 1922 (2nd Congress), it was called "Secretary of the Central Bureau"; from 1922 to 1925 (5th Congress), it was called "Chairman of the Central Executive Committee".

²⁹ Chen Duxiu, "The French People and Modern Civilization." *La Jeunesse*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1915): 29.

³⁰ Chinese Nationalist Party (corporate legal person), *Brief Biography of the Party*. Archived in the KMT Party History Museum of the Cultural Communication Committee of the KMT Central Committee (foundation), Taipei.

³¹ *Ibid*.

the USSR to the ROC, directly financed the KMT's reorganization.³² The representatives of the 1st National Congress of the KMT in 1924 were also a cohort of pioneers. The Congress elected 24 central executive members and 17 alternate central executive members. Here are some pacesetters: eight studied in Japan (Wang Jingwei and Zhang Zhiben at Hosei, Liao Zhongkai at Chuo, Ju Zheng and Dai Jitao at Nihon, Ding Weifen at Meiji, Li Dazhao*³³ at Waseda, Yu Shude* at Kyoto), one at London, one at Columbia, three at PKU (Tan Pingshan*, Zhang Guotao**³⁴, Fu Rulin), Yu Fangzhou* at Nankai (Tianjin).

In the 1st and 2nd (1926) National Congresses of the KMT, the communists participated in the KMT as “individuals” while reserving their CPC memberships.³⁵ This policy made the KMT more like a coalition instead of a party with strict disciplines.³⁶ The KMT, till 1927, as a left-wing alliance against reactionary warlords, was thus a mixture of republicans, socialists, and communists. Prominently, Mao Zedong served as the KMT's publicity director from October 1925 to May 1926.³⁷ The two parties shared a discourse of striving for a “national revolution” without specifying its nature.³⁸ For conservatives within the KMT, particularly the far-right Western Hills Group, the national revolution was merely aimed to reunify China, in order to restore a unitary, powerful state with a centralized and if necessary, even authoritarian authority nationwide.³⁹ For far-left Trotskyists⁴⁰ within the CPC, the national revolution was barely a primary stage towards a communist China, and if feasible, to the liberation of all humankind through world revolution.⁴¹ Trotsky warned: “if the KMT...establishes a one-party dictatorship...so that the Communist Party fully obeys its will”, this move would be “essentially a counterrevolutionary attempt, and it will inevitably split a trend of fascism from within.”⁴²

Trotsky's prediction has been proven to be visionary. After Sun Yat-sen, the mediator, died in March 1925, left-right contradictions within the KMT rapidly intensified, resulting in the April 12 Purge in 1927⁴³, during and after which the communists were persecuted. The right-wing nationalist dictator Chiang Kai-shek later controlled the ROC and established a one-party regime, which lasted on the Chinese mainland till the CPC took over and established the PRC in 1949, and in Taiwan till President Lee Teng-hui transformed the KMT into a center-right party and turned the ROC (Taiwan) into a liberal democracy during the 1990s.

³² Cf. Sun Yat-sen and Adolph Abramovich Joffe, “Joint Manifesto of Sun and Joffe.” January 26, 1923, Shanghai.

³³ The asterisk indicates their CPC memberships.

³⁴ The dual asterisk indicates their CPC memberships and their representations in the 1st Natl. Congress of the CPC.

³⁵ Chen Duxiu, “Report for the 3rd National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” June 1923, Guangzhou.

³⁶ It was also known as the First United Front or the KMT-CPC Alliance.

³⁷ “According to the resolution of the 111th Central Executive Committee Meeting of the KMT (5th October 1925) ...” see ed. Pang Xianzhi, *Mao Zedong Chronicles (1893-1949)*, Vol. 1. (Beijing: People's Publishing House and Central Literature Publishing House, 1993).

³⁸ Sun Yat-sen, *Declaration of the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang*. 23rd January 1924, Guangzhou.

³⁹ Cf. Dai Jitao, *The National Revolution and the Chinese Kuomintang* [1925] (Chongqing: China Cultural Service Agency, 1941).

⁴⁰ Before 1928, the radicals within CPC were not yet self-identified as “Trotskyists” but simply against the Comintern's instruction to cooperate with KMT. After the Shanghai massacre of 12 April 1927 against the communists, they started realizing the Comintern's policy was based on the Stalinist doctrine of “socialism in one country”.

⁴¹ Chen, Duxiu, “Letter to Wu Tingkang: Opposing the Communist Party and Youth League to Join the KMT (6th April 1922).” Ed. Ren Jianshu, *Selected Works of Chen Duxiu*, Vol. 2 (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2009).

⁴² Leon Trotsky, “Letter to the Politburo of BKII(6) (31st March 1927).” *Коммунистическая оппозиция*, т. 2, стр. 224-225. Trans. Shi Yongqin, *Trotsky on the Chinese Revolution (1925-1927)* (Xi'an: Shanxi People's Press, 2011).

⁴³ Official term by the KMT: First Purification of the Party; official term by the CPC: April 12 Counterrevolutionary Coup d'état.

T1.1: Doctrinarian Evolution of the KMT

Period	Name	Position	Leader	Ideology
1894-1919	/ ⁴⁴	Centre	Sun Yat-sen	Tridemism ⁴⁵
1919-1927	KMT	Centre-left		(Socialized) “Neotridemism” ⁴⁶
1927-1975		Far Right	Chiang Kai-shek	Chiangist Tridemism ⁴⁷
1975-1988		Right	Chiang Ching-kuo	
1900s-		Centre-right	/ ⁴⁸	Liberalized Chiang’s Tridemism ⁴⁹

Tabulation: author.

The thesis demonstrates how the metamodel of Chiang Kai-shek’s authoritarianism did not fade away since then, but resurrected during the early 1990s mainland, by examining the structural similarity between the political discourses of the post-1927 KMT and the post-1989 CPC, namely, the four pillars of conservatism (vis-à-vis liberalism and communism) that occurred in China facing the unprecedented challenge of modernity:

- (a) Political authoritarianism: China’s premodern, centralized autocracy shall be preserved for stability during modernization.
- (b) Sociocultural conservatism: China’s premodern sociocultural hierarchies, e.g., Confucianism, shall also be maintained during modernization.
- (c) Economic liberalism: China’s modernization relies on industrialization, market, modern science and technology instead of (a) and (b).
- (d) Nationalism that is conservative based on (a), (b), and (c): China’s modernization is at the same time the nation’s rejuvenation.

In the 1930s, Professor Tsiang Tingfu (PhD in History at Colombia) argued that the most urgent issue for China was the existence of the state, not what kind of state is desirable, “for having a good government, we must start from having a government.”⁵⁰ This argumentation was a harbinger of S. P. Huntington’s thesis in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) that “the existence of the order is more important than what kind of order it is” in the developing world, which later inspired Chinese conservatives in the 1980s.⁵¹ Tsiang was non-partisan. However, he served as the ROC ambassadors to the US and the USSR, and the Permanent Representative to the UN, his view thus fairly represented the Chiang’s regime. As Tsiang stretched, the state must have a capacity to mobilize its populace and foster national identity; what China – “like a broken tent in the storm”⁵²

⁴⁴ Chronologically, the Revive China Society (1894-1905), the Chinese United League (1905-1912), the KMT (1912-1913), and the Chinese Revolutionary Party (1914-1919).

⁴⁵ Also known as the Three Principles of the People, viz., nationalism, democracy, and livelihood, a replica of Lincoln’s “government of the people, by the people, for the people” (Gettysburg Address, 1863) [“There is no proper translation yet, I translated it as: the people have (of), the people rule (by), and the people enjoy (for). What advocated by Lincoln are what advocated by me: nationalism, democracy, and livelihood!” (Sun Yat-sen, “The specific methods of the Three Principles of the People,” June 1921)], essentially referring to a sort of (American) republicanism, cf. George Washington’s role.

⁴⁶ Leaning to the principle of the livelihood of the people, sometimes interpreted as democratic socialism, and nationalism being reinterpreted, containing left-wing element of anti-imperialism. Cf. Sun Yat-sen, *Declaration of the 1st National Congress of the Chinese Kuomintang* (1924).

⁴⁷ Focusing on the principle of nationalism, containing right-wing element of national conservatism.

⁴⁸ Lee Teng-hui from 1988 to 2000 [disputable], and Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 to 2016.

⁴⁹ Cf. contemporary GOP, CDU/CSU, and other members of the IDU.

⁵⁰ Tsiang Tingfu, “The Intellectual Strata and Politics.” *Independent Review*, vol. 51, 21st May 1933.

⁵¹ Peter R. Moody, *Conservative Thought in Contemporary China* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 151-152.

⁵² Tsiang Tingfu, “On Autocracy and Reply to Mr. Hu Shih.” *Independent Review*, vol. 83, 10th November 1933.

– needed was the increase in its total economic scale and equitable distribution thereupon, and in the end “wait for democracy to come.”⁵³

However, from a leftist perspective, the picture was diametrically opposite. Right after Chiang’s anticommunist coup d’état in April 1927, TASS published a statement:

“Chiang Kai-shek’s revolutionary career is over. He, as a revolutionary, has died...He has become a counterrevolutionary and an enemy of the Chinese workers. Chiang Kai-shek used to be my father and a revolutionary friend. He has come to the reactionary camp. Now he is my enemy.”⁵⁴

Its author Chiang Ching-kuo [Н. В. Елизаров], Chiang Kai-shek’s eldest son at the age of 17, was studying at Moscow Sun Yat-sen University (MSYSU), an institution collaborated by the Sun’s KMT and the Soviet Union. In an open letter from Ching-kuo to his birth mother, published in *Pravda*, he further wrote: “In front of the Chinese people, I am so ashamed of having such a father. Not only do I have no respect or love for such a father, but I also wish I could kill him. I heard many people say that Chiang Kai-shek is propagating Confucius’ doctrines concerning filial piety, courtesy, righteousness, integrity, and shame...Mom, do you remember who beat you, grabbed your hair, and dragged you from the second floor to the downstairs? Was not Chiang Kai-shek himself? ...This is his so-called filial piety and courtesy.”⁵⁵ “You must have heard that Chiang Kai-shek burned with gasoline thousands of outstanding soldiers fighting for the revolutionary cause to death. You must have seen that Chiang Kai-shek massacred the communist party’s members. Chiang Kai-shek’s hands have been stained red by the blood of Chinese workers and peasants – the dearest people of mine.”⁵⁶ “My motherland, the Soviet Union, is like a lighthouse on the sea with strong winds and waves, illuminating the course of struggle and victory for the oppressed people all over the world.”⁵⁷

Communists such as Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong denounced Chiang’s regime as “comprador and feudal fascist”⁵⁸. This accusation can be divided into two, (a) Chiang was comprador because of his capitalist economic policies, including commercial exchanges with foreign powers [bourgeois-class attribute], and (b) Chiang was feudal for his authoritarian sociopolitical governance, especially embodied in his one-man, one-party rule, as well as the New Life Movement (1934-1949) as a revival of traditional morality [landlord-class attribute]. Based on its proletariat-class attribute, the CPC’s alternative was to lead an economically socialist [independent from empires] and politically “neo-democratic” China. Mao wrote on the eve of the final victory of the WWII: “a China that is not poor and weak but rich and strong is connected to a China that is not a colony or semi-colony but independent, not semi-feudal but free and democratic, not divided but unified.”⁵⁹

⁵³ Tsiang Tingfu, *Memoirs of Tsiang Tingfu*, trans. Xie Zhonglian (Shanghai: Oriental Publishing House, 2011), p. 154.

⁵⁴ *The People’s Tribune* (Hankow), 24th April 1927. Cited in Yu Miin-ling, “Jiang Jingguo’s Student Year in the Soviet Union as Reflected in the Russian Archives.” *Collection of the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica*, vol. 29 (1998): p. 123.

⁵⁵ Chen Shouyun, *Decrypt Chiang Ching-kuo* (Taipei: Showwe, 2011), p. 35 [23rd January 1935].

⁵⁶ Chen Shouyun, p. 36 [23rd January 1935].

⁵⁷ Chen Shouyun, p. 38 [23rd January 1935].

⁵⁸ Zhou Enlai, “On China’s Fascism: New Despotism,” [16th August 1943] *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984).

⁵⁹ Mao Zedong, “On Coalition Government: Political report at the 7th National Congress of the CPC.” 24th April 1945.

However, is the market economy inevitably causing “post-colonial asymmetric dependency” or rather than interdependencies? Is an economic model both effective and egalitarian possible? Is it indispensable to completely exterminate China’s hierarchical, monarchic, and patriarchal traditions, once and for all, for its modernization? If so, could China get rid of them irreversibly through a regime change? These imperative conundrums were not conscientiously solved during the 1930s and 1940s. In fact, they resurged during the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting the failure of Mao’s large-scale radical experiment that Deng considered to be “serious mistakes”.⁶⁰

Despite those issues of controversy, the two parties still shared a closet modern ideology – nationalism, being left or right. The CPC’s criticism against the KMT was based on a prediction that the KMT would lead China into “darkness”, while the CPC was committed to making China modernized, prosperous, democratic, and “bright”.⁶¹ The original motivation of the same category of Chinese elites who initiated both parties was identical: modernizing China from stagnant and autocratic to prosperous and democratic, for which the means is secondary. The Chinese communists were communist primarily because they believed that communism was the correct instrument, not that they believed in communism as a metaphysical ideology; the same is true for republicans. Thus, when republicanism and Maoism failed to make China either prosperous or democratic, the KMT and CPC readily changed their courses.

China’s ideological overlap during the 1920s also explains, as Zhou Enlai in the 1930s accurately noticed, the anomalous phenomenon that the Chiang regime preferred to “pretend” to be a faithful successor of Sun Yat-sen instead of coining something like “Chiangism”. “Sun Yat-sen’s thought has some reasonable elements and more revolutionary views, especially in his later years when he approached the communist party. After adopting certain methods of the Russian [October] Revolution, his tridemism became revolutionary [neotridemism]. However, Chiang Kai-shekism is another set of things that can only be called Chinese fascism.”⁶²

What happened to the KMT after 1927 – a dramatic conversion from center-left to “fascism” – was silently done without changing the name of the party or even its official ideology on paper. With the KMT’s precedent, the CPC maintained its nominal continuity after 1978 and 1989. On the one hand, such partisan nominal continuity could be seen as a pragmatic strategy for avoiding potential disturbance; as Deng said, “denying such a great historical figure [Mao] means denying an important part of the PRC’s history, which will lead to ideological confusion and political instability”⁶³; on the other hand, it shows a sort of ideological replaceability within as well as between the two parties.

Thereupon, it came up with no surprise that just one year after Ching-kuo came back to China in 1937, ending his 12-years life in the Soviet Union, he rejoined the then “fascist” KMT and became the de facto successor-designate of his father. The ROC ambassador to the USSR who negotiated this return was exactly Tsiang Tingfu, the Chiang apologist who wrote in his memoir: “Ching-kuo

⁶⁰ *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China* (The 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC on 27th June 1981).

⁶¹ Mao Zedong, “The Destiny of Two Chinas: Opening Speech at the 7th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (1945).”

⁶² Zhou, Enlai. “On China’s Fascism.”

⁶³ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “The Overriding Thing Is Stability (26th February 1989).”

told me his ambitions about China's future, I advised him not to propose his ideals...[but] try to learn about the problems facing China and causes whereof, then propose solutions whereon."⁶⁴

Coincidentally, the reign of Ching-kuo (1978-1988) in Taiwan and that of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989) on the mainland largely overlapped. Given the precedent of Ching-kuo, Deng's former classmate and communist comrade at MSYSU, Deng's conversion to the right was no shock.

⁶⁴ Cited in Chen Shouyun, p. 40.

“To write his biography, Mao Zedong chose Edgar Snow, a member of the U.S. Communist Party;⁶⁵ Jiang chose Kuhn, a member of the U.S. business elite.⁶⁶ An investment banker with a zeal for science, high culture, and business, Kuhn personifies the new ideology that has swept through China since 1989...Nothing better symbolizes Jiang and his cohort’s transition to a *right-wing* developmental dictatorship; every year, they carefully chip away at their socialist heritage.”

Bruce Gilley, “In China’s Own Eyes: Jiang Zemin on Jiang Zemin,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2005.

“There is a saying in China that ‘be quiet and make money’...which I consider the best!”

Jiang Zemin, Meeting with Reporters from Hong Kong i-CABLE News Channel, 27th October 2000.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The most straightforward contribution of this thesis might be the use of “right-wing” in describing the post-1989 position of the CPC in the ideological spectrum, even though this is no original discovery. As the quotation above indicates, some insightful observers have affixed this label to the CPC quite a long time ago.⁶⁷ First of all, it is necessary to at least recognize the universal applicability of the modern ideological spectrum that the French Revolution formulated – the left for republic and the right for monarchy. The Communist Party of China must conform to this original setting, no matter how it emphasizes its *Chinese* particularities, as neither *communisme* nor modern political *party* was “made in China”, but as crucial components of external modernity introduced to China. Sophistry like “left and right in the Chinese [or any other particular ethnocultural] context” is simply untenable.⁶⁸ Only with a firm standing that there is only one left-right political spectrum, which is the one in the 1789’s sense, identifying conservatism⁶⁹ underneath various discursive ambiguities, i.e., “rhetoric” becomes possible. According to 1789’s benchmark, capitalism is not necessarily right-wing, depending on whether the political representation of the bourgeoisie has been realized; socialism is not necessarily left-wing, depending on whether the word is being used as a conservative defense of hierarchy.

⁶⁵ Cf. Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (London: Left Book Club, Victor Gollancz, 1937).

⁶⁶ Cf. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2004).

⁶⁷ Although there was an issue of the pragmatics of “socialism” in Bruce Gilley’s above statement: outside the American context, socialism is not always the opposite of right-wing.

⁶⁸ A typical text would be, “In China, the political labels ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ mean the reverse of what they do in America with respect to ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ views. Leftists are conservatives; they seek to retain the pure socialist system and political controls promulgated by Mao Zedong. Rightists are liberals, who seek to change the system to be more in line with the free-market economies and open democratic government of the West.” (Robert Lawrence Kuhn, p. 83). It has to be clear that the left and right cannot somehow interchange according to ethnocultural context: conservatives cannot be “left”, if they are conservative, they must be labelled as right-wing; rightists are unnecessarily “liberal” or “democratic”, they could also be autocratic, without even respect to bourgeois property!

⁶⁹ In this thesis, “right-wing” and “conservative” are mutually replaceable.

Secondly, this thesis does not and cannot challenge the immutable historical fact that Dr. K. H. Marx was a straightforward critic of Prussian authority,⁷⁰ a strong supporter of Polish liberation from foreign oppressors,⁷¹ a guested comrade welcomed by the short-lived French Second Republic,⁷² and an active dissident who offended the whole old Europe, consisting of “Pope and Tsar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.”⁷³ Given his exhaustive political record, it is technically impossible to classify Marx as “right-wing”, and that is by no means a purpose of this thesis. The same is, to a large extent, true for Lenin and Mao.

However, when it comes to theoretical abstractions such as “Marxism”, “Leninism”, and “Mao Zedong Thought”, there is much room for deliberate revisionism. Throughout the 20th century history of communism, accusations of revisionism repeatedly occurred: Leon Trotsky accused Joseph Stalin betraying Lenin, then Mao accused Nikita Khrushchev betraying Lenin,⁷⁴ then Enver Hoxha accused Mao... while none of these “betrayers” admitted what they were accused for. Party theoreticians spared no effort to combine “principles” and “innovations” in order to construct a seemingly coherent narrative of “ideological development”. However, from an empirical-inductive approach, the metanarrative that the CPC has an uninterrupted tradition cannot be justified.

T1.2: Power Transitions within the CPC

Period	Congress	Leader	Aftermath
1921.7-1927.7	1 st - 5 th	CHEN Duxiu	Forced to step down
1927.7-1927.8	5 th	ZHANG Guotao	Expelled
1927.8-1928.7	6 th	QU Qiubai	Repudiated; Rehabilitated (1982)
1928.7-1931.6 ⁷⁵		Xiang Zhongfa	Turncoat
1928.7-1929.1		CAI Hesen	/
1929.1-1929.11		LI Lisan	Persecuted (1967); Rehabilitated (1980)
1929.11-1930.3		ZHOU Enlai	/
1930.6-1930.9		LI Lisan	Persecuted (1967); Rehabilitated (1980)
1930.9-1931.1		QU Qiubai	Repudiated; Rehabilitated (1982)
1931.1-1931.9		WANG Ming	Forced to step down
1931.9-1935.1		BO Gu	
1935.1-1938.9		ZHANG Wentian	
1938.9-1956.9-1966.8	7 th -10 th	MAO Zedong	1 st Revised (1976); 2 nd Revised (1978)
1956.9-1966.8	8 th	LIU Shaoqi* ⁷⁶	Persecuted (1969); Rehabilitated (1980)
1966.8-1971.9	9 th	LIN Biao*	Treason

⁷⁰ K. Marx, “On Freedom of the Press,” (May 1842, originally in the *Rheinische Zeitung*; collected in *MECW*, vol. 1, pp. 132-181).

⁷¹ K. Marx, “Communism, Revolution, and a Free Poland” (Speech Delivered in French, Commemorating 2nd Anniversary of Krakow Uprising, Brussels, February 22, 1848).

⁷² K. Marx, “The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850,” (January – October 1850, originally in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung Revue*; collected in *MESW*, vol 1, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969).

⁷³ K. Marx and F. Engels, “Preamble,” *Communist Manifesto*.

⁷⁴ And to a limited extent also Stalin; the relationship between Mao and Stalin was delicate. “Compared with his mistakes, Stalin’s merits were greater. His main aspect was rightful, and his mistakes were second.” (*People’s Daily* Editorial Department and *Red Flag* Editorial Department, “About Stalin: The Second Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU.” September 13, 1963). The mistakes mentioned were about Stalin’s Chauvinism, for instance, claiming the Soviets should be proud that the USSR defeated Japan in the WWII, which wiped out the humiliation of Imperial Russia’s failure in the Russo-Japanese War (cf. J. V. Stalin, “Stalin’s Address to the People.” September 2, 1945). Stalin’s nationalist tendency was not only noted by Trotsky and Mao; in fact, the KMT’s 1930s propaganda also labelled the USSR under Stalin was as aggressive as Imperial Russia towards China and accused the CPC of being a treasonous “foreign agency” manipulated by Moscow.

⁷⁵ Xiang Zhongfa was the CPC’s leader *de jure*, not *de facto*, during this period of time.

⁷⁶ The asterisk indicates that they were appointed by Mao Zedong.

1973.8-1976 -1976.9	10 th 7 th -10 th	WANG Hongwen* MAO Zedong	Imprisoned 1 st Revised (1976); 2 nd Revised (1978)
1976-1978.12	11 th	HUA Guofeng*	Forced to step down
1978.12- 1980.2-1987.1 1987.1-1989.6 -1990.3	11 th -13 th 12 th 13 th 11 th -13 th	DENG Xiaoping HU Yaobang** ⁷⁷ ZHAO Ziyang** DENG Xiaoping	/ Forced to step down Forced to step down /
1990.3-2002.11	14 th -15 th	JIANG Zemin**	/
2002.11-2012.11	16 th -17 th	HU Jintao**	/
2012.11-	18 th -	XI Jinping	/

Tabulation: author.

In a strict sense, three *coups* occurred since Mao's death in September 1976.

- (a) Right after Mao's death (October 1976), Mao's designated successor Hua Guofeng arrested the Maoist "Gang of Four" – Mao's closest allies and his widow.
- (b) Two years later (December 1978), the "No. 2 Capitalist Roder" Deng Xiaoping returned to power, and Hua was forced to step down.
- (c) Zhao Ziyang's fall (June 1989) paved the way for Jiang Zemin, whom Deng anointed as his successor, replacing Zhao.

The thesis focuses on the aftermath of the latest event of an "abnormal"⁷⁸ power transition within the CPC, i.e., during the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee of the CPC (23rd-24th June 1989), Zhao Ziyang was forced to step down due to his "incompetency" in Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign (ABLC), which led to the 1989 Tiananmen Protest. This event marked the maturation of by far the longest-standing political program [Dengism or SwCC] of the CPC.

In the 14th Congress of the CPC (1992), this post-1989 consensus was added to the Party Constitution in the name of "Deng Xiaoping Theory on SwCC". During the 15th Congress in 1997, "Deng Xiaoping Theory" and "SwCC" were separated, and the latter became a collection. Hereafter, as "guiding ideologies", Jiang Zemin's "Important Thought of Three Represents" (16th, 2002), Hu Jintao's "Scientific Outlook on Development" (18th, 2012), and "Xi Jinping Thought on SwCC for a New Era" (19th, 2017) were added into the Party Constitution within the collection of "SwCC", which is still an ongoing program.

T1.3: Genealogy of the CPC's Official Ideologies (19th National Congress Edition, 2017)⁷⁹

Marxism	Two "Achievements" of "Sinicized Marxism" ⁸⁰	
<u>Marxism-Leninism</u>	<u>Mao Zedong Thought</u>	Socialism with Chinese Characteristics incl. a. <u>Deng Xiaoping Theory</u> b. Important Thought of Three Represents c. Scientific Outlook on Development d. <u>Xi Jinping Thought on SwCC for a New Era</u>

Tabulation: author.

⁷⁷ The dual asterisk indicates that they were appointed by Deng Xiaoping.

⁷⁸ Having said that, from a holistic view, "normal" power transitions are not the majority events throughout the CPC's first centenary.

⁷⁹ "General Program," *Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party* (Revised and adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 24th October 2017).

⁸⁰ Although "Mao Zedong Thought" is considered "Sinicized Marxism", the term "Sinicizing/Sinicized Marxism" has appeared only since 1980s.

To be precise, the thesis' goal, determining whether post-1989 CPC is left-wing or right-wing, is effectively to figure out whether SwCC is left-wing or right-wing. The CPC's position is ultimately defined by nothing else but its latest and concurrent ideology – e.g., for now, it is “Xi Jinping Thought on SwCC for a New Era”. From a historicist perspective, the CPC's ideological evolution might be clearer in a chronological manner: Marxism-Leninism till 1921, Mao Zedong Thought from 1921 to 1978, SwCC from 1978 to the present could be further periodized: Deng Xiaoping Theory from 1978 to 1989, Important Thought of Three Represents (Jiang Zemin) from 1989 to 2002, Scientific Outlook on Development (Hu Jintao) from 2002 to 2012, and Xi Jinping Thought on SwCC for a New Era from 2012 to present.⁸¹ This historicism was expressed publicly by Jiang Zemin: “the drastic and profound changes have reached an unimaginable degree in the past over 100 years...to study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought...the core content is [actually] the theory of building SwCC...in contemporary China...to uphold Deng Xiaoping Theory is to *truly* uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.”⁸²

According to this logic, a member of the CPC should be, first of all, a Dengist or a “socialist with Chinese characteristics”, is “automatically” considered as also Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist. S/he does not need to examine her/himself in accordance with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, as long as s/he identifies with SwCC. Those official ideologies before SwCC, i.e., of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, are, in effect, historicist decorations that remind people of what the CPC used to uphold. The trick of the CPC upholding SwCC and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism simultaneously without self-contradiction is that the Dengists have redefined the latter. For instance, “Mao Zedong Thought” in Dengist contexts is not the thoughts of Mao Zedong (1893-1976) but only the “correct” part of Mao's thoughts, namely, those consistent with SwCC. Thus, the “Mao Zedong Thought” that Dengists uphold is defined as “Mao Zedong (1893-1957) Thought” instead of what it used to mean and usually means outside China, which is associated with Cultural Revolution. Mao's “leftist, incorrect arguments...must be completely separated from [the connotation of] Mao Zedong Thought”⁸³. Similarly, “Mao's tragedy lies in that when he was making mistakes...he thought his theory and practice were Marxist”⁸⁴. The “Marxism” that Dengists uphold is defined as neither the thoughts of Karl Marx nor the “Marxism” consistent with the “Mao Zedong Thought” from 1957 to 1976 [“doctrine”⁸⁵], but the Dengist interpretation consistent with SwCC [“that developed according to practice”⁸⁶].

Similar to the KMT, the CPC follows an unwritten rule in modern China that under long-term one-party domination, factional politics override partisan politics, i.e., the party's position depends on which faction from within prevails in a period of time. And to maintain such a condition of domination, whichever faction that actually rules would claim its legitimacy from inheritance – no matter how incoherent that claim might be.

⁸¹ Considering (a) the discursive hierarchy within the CPC's nomenclature, i.e., with persona is superior to without it, “ism” is superior to “thought”, “thought” is superior to “outlook”, so on and so forth, according to the leader's power, influence, or reputation, and (b) as Mao Zedong Thought is widely referred as Maoism outside China, it is also possible and perhaps even more in situ to translate SwCC's components as simply as Dengism, Jiangism, Huism, and Xism.

⁸² Jiang Zemin, *Report for the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 1997.

⁸³ *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China* (1981).

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Resolution on Major Achievements and Historical Experiences of the Party's Centennial Struggle* (2021).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

The KMT's ideology evolved from republicanism upon its inception, to center-left socialism in the early 1920s, right-wing authoritarianism after 1927, and center-right conservative liberalism since the 1990s.

T1.4: Ideological Factions within the KMT

Left	Liberal	Right
SOONG Ching-ling ^{RCCK} HE Xiangning ^{RCCK} LIAO Zhongkai ^{Left KMT} LI Dazhao ^{CPC} MAO Zedong ^{CPC} ZHOU Enlai ^{CPC}	SUN Yat-sen ^{Revive China Society} SONG Jiaoren ^{Tongmenghui} HUANG Xing ^{Huaxinghui} CHEN Gongbo ^{reorganizationist} CHEN Tianhua ^{Tongmenghui} MA Ying-jeou	CHIANG Kai-shek CHEN Lifu ^{Central Club} CHIANG Ching-kuo DAI Jitao ^{Western Hills Group} ZOU Lu ^{W. H. G.} DAI Li ^{Blue Shirts Society}

Tabulation: author.

The CPC, being initially far left, has accommodated the whole political spectrum over time as well.

T1.5: Ideological Factions within the CPC

Left	Liberal	Right
MAO Zedong ZHOU Enlai JIANG Qing ^{Gang of Four} WANG Hongwen ^{GoF} YAO Wenyuan ^{GoF} ZHANG Chunqiao ^{GoF} KANG Sheng LIN Biao HUA Guofeng ^{Fanshi}	ZHAO Ziyang ^{Reformist} HU Yaobang ^{Ref.} XI Zhongxun ^{Ref. Veteran} HU Qili ^{Ref.} LI Rui XIE Tao REN Zhongyi TIAN Jiyun ^{Ref.} BAO Tong	DENG Xiaoping JIANG Zemin ^{Shanghai Clique} CHEN Yun ^{Conservative Veteran} BO Yibo ^{Con. Veteran} LI Peng ^{Con.} YAO Yilin ^{Con.} WANG Zhen ^{Con. Veteran} ZHU Rongji WEN Jiabao

Tabulation: author.

The terminology “big tent” or “catch-all” in political science is generally applicable to both the CPC and the KMT; however, it must not fall into the ahistorical trap. Diachronically, both parties had an explicit prevailing faction (usually with a charismatic leader, e.g., Sun, Chiang, Mao, Deng, as its core) that dominated the Party, the ideological position of which was therefore identifiable. The practical difficulty of such identification is that whoever was in charge would claim his legitimacy from inheriting the Party's original orthodoxy and that he did not deviate from the Party's founding doctrine.

If a bird walks like a duck and swims like a duck and quacks like a duck, that bird is probably a duck (James Whitcomb Riley). Chiang's claim that his reign was in accordance with Sun's republicanism has become beyond the pale, though not long ago, it used to be at the core of the official indoctrination in all aspects of socialization under the KMT's rule. In 1975, Deng was still identified as a “rightist”⁸⁷ by the Maoist Gang of Four. After Mao's death in 1976, the Gang of Four were arrested. In 1981, the Dengist CPC criticized Cultural Revolution for being “far-left”⁸⁸. The CPC stopped identifying itself as “left-wing” anymore. In its current Party Constitution, the only place mentioning “left” and “right” is that the Party shall “oppose all erroneous tendencies of the Left and the Right, be wary of the Right, but mainly avoid the Left.”⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Cf. The campaign of Criticize Deng, Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend (from November 1975 to July 1977).

⁸⁸ *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China*, 1981.

⁸⁹ “General Program,” *Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party* (Revised and adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017).

Is “socialism” definitely left-wing?

No, it is a contesting term. An editorial by the CPC in response to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1963 went as follows: “Marxist-Leninists worldwide believe that Yugoslavia is not a *socialist* country; the League of Communists of Yugoslavia has betrayed Marxism-Leninism and the people of Yugoslavia, is a traitor to the international communist movement, and is a running dog of imperialism. The leaders of the CPSU believe that Yugoslavia is a *socialist* country; the League of Communists of Yugoslavia stands on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, is a fraternal party, and is a force against imperialism.”⁹⁰

The left-right political spectrum was fixed in the 1789’s sense, but the pragmatics of “socialism” has been a mess. Given various contexts, it is impossible to say that socialism, especially when it is pre-described by adjectives, is fixed with the political left. “Everyone can be a socialist today, even Bill Gates: it suffices to profess the need for some kind of harmonious social unity, for a common good and for the care of the poor and downtrodden.”⁹¹ In fact, the perplexed usage of “socialism” could be dated back to at latest the early 19th century – not long since its creation in the 18th century. The reason why Marx and Engels gave up the term “socialism” and intentionally chose “communism” for self-identification was exactly that in the German context, the French ideology “socialism” was totally misinterpreted: “the French Socialist and Communist literature was thus completely emasculated...to the absolute governments, with their following of parsons, professors, country squires, and officials, it served as a welcome scarecrow against the threatening bourgeoisie.”⁹² This so-called “deutsche oder „wahre“ Sozialismus” was “against liberalism, against representative government, against bourgeois competition, bourgeois freedom of the press, bourgeois legislation, bourgeois liberty and equality.”⁹³ Apparently, this type of socialism was a reactionary combination of royalism and clericalism. In German context, right-wing socialism has taken different forms since the mid-19th century: Bismarckian “Staatssozialismus”⁹⁴, the 1890’s “Nationaler Sozialismus”, “Prussianist”⁹⁵ socialism claimed by Oswald Spengler, “Deutscher Sozialismus” coined by Werner Sombart⁹⁶, Hitler’s “Nationalsozialismus”⁹⁷, and Erich Honecker’s “Realsozialismus” (originally “Реальный социализм [Real’nyy sotsializm]” by Brezhnev) and “Sozialismus in den Farben der DDR” – considering the Trotskyist and Maoist accusations. The political report of the 9th National Congress of the CPC delivered by Lin Biao pointed out that Brezhnev was a “new Tsar.”⁹⁸ If this description were not corresponding to the historical reality, the state historians of contemporary Russia would have found no way to connect the Romanov’s ghost around Kremlin with Soviet nostalgia.

⁹⁰ *People’s Daily* Editorial Department and *Red Flag* Editorial Department, “Is Yugoslavia a *Socialist* Country? The Third Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU.” 26th September 1963.

⁹¹ Slavoj Žižek, “Sinicisation,” *London Review of Books*, Vol. 37, No. 14, 16th July 2015.

⁹² K. Marx and F. Engels, “Chapter III. Socialist and Communist Literature,” *Communist Manifesto*.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Bismarck as a “socialist” also designed and enforced the “Sozialistengesetze [Gesetz gegen die gemeingefährlichen Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie],” showcasing an ironic scene of “socialists against socialists”.

⁹⁵ Cf. Oswald Spengler, *Preußentum und Sozialismus* (C. H. Beck: München, 1919). In the book, Spengler defended William I and Bismarck as Prussianist “socialists”.

⁹⁶ Cf. Werner Sombart, *Deutscher Sozialismus* (Charlottenburg: Buchholz & Weisswange, 1934).

⁹⁷ Other smaller parties associated with the Völkische Bewegung that posed “socialism” in their names included the Deutschsozialistische Partei (1918-1922), Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung (1924-1925), etc. While the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (1931-1933) was left-wing.

⁹⁸ Lin Biao, “Political Report for the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.”

Thus, the paronomasia of “socialism” comprises two contradictory intentions – left-wing radicalism and right-wing conservatism. This is why Lavrov denounced the October Revolution for its deconstruction of the existing order while defended socialism as a form of restored order: “the people supported them [socialist ideas], because wide masses gravitated towards social organization with reliance on the collective and community principles.”⁹⁹ This is exactly why Marx and Engels questioned the reactionary usage of socialism: “nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge.”¹⁰⁰ The conservative usage of “socialism” is not a phenomenon limited to particular languages – German, Russian, Chinese, etc., in England and France, the *Légitimistes* and “Young England”¹⁰¹ represented the Clerical Socialism or Feudal Socialism. The in-born ambiguity of socialism is not an issue of translation but that of interpretation. According to the etymology of “socialism”, it shall be understood in the 18th century context in which it was originally coined, but nobody can actually prevent from it being used for, e.g., the New Kingdom of Egypt.

The conceptual history of “socialism” in China has been a similar process of reinterpretations – left-wing and right-wing in constant contests. An early text of right-wing socialism in China was the ten-point testament of Li Yuanhong (1864-1928), President of the ROC (1916-1917; 1922-1923). Li Yuanhong’s Progressive Party (1913-1916) was a united conservative party vis-à-vis the republican KMT during the ROC’s early era. Given the fait accompli of the Republican Revolution, Li Yuanhong did not advocate restoration to monarchy, but he believed that “the revolution was the last resort; hopefully, it had been done once and for all, so that our people could recuperate their vitality as soon as possible.”¹⁰² He also suggested not to “rashly destroy the existing social organization and family structure, so to prevent extremisms,”¹⁰³ and not to “forget the fundamental and particularly important spirit, morality, and ethics of China for thousands of years.”¹⁰⁴ His testament was not only an apparent conservative political vision but also conservative pragmatics of “socialism”, as he wrote: “considering the current situation at home and abroad, it seems that national socialism should be adopted [in China].”¹⁰⁵ No matter what his “national socialism” referred to specifically – likely the Bismarckian *Staatssozialismus*, it was clear that his socialism could be in no way leftist.

Having said that, the right-wing usage of “socialism” is not always for political purposes; the term is vague in itself and might be unintentionally understood conservatively even by scholars. Cai Yuanpei wrote in the preface to the Chinese translation of Thomas Kirkup’s *History of Socialism*: “China has socialism already. As Confucius said, ‘the princes of the states should not worry about the lack of wealth, but the uneven distribution of wealth...if the distribution of wealth is even, there would be no sense of poverty...with harmony in the society the reign would be lasting’¹⁰⁶.”¹⁰⁷

This 1918 text, written when socialism was primarily intellectual and introductory in China, shows a premodern, hierarchical interpretation of socialism had emerged. Confucius’ position was in

⁹⁹ Sergey Lavrov, “Историческая перспектива внешней политики России.”

¹⁰⁰ K. Marx and F. Engels, “Chapter III. Socialist and Communist Literature,” *Communist Manifesto*.

¹⁰¹ Notes from *Communist Manifesto*: The Legitimists were those who supported the Bourbon against Orleans (1830-1848); “Young England” was a paternalistic faction with the Tory Party.

¹⁰² Li Yuanhong, *Last Words* (1928), point 7.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, point 4.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, point 6.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, point 8.

¹⁰⁶ Disciples of Confucius (ed.), *Analects*, Book XVI, “Ke She”, Chapter I. 10.

¹⁰⁷ Cai Yuanpei, “Preface to *History of Socialism*,” *La Jeunesse*, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 1.

defense of the feudal or medieval order based on paternalistic and monarchic politics, thereby opposite anything left-wing.

The ideological transition of “socialism” from left-wing to right-wing in China was first not made by the CPC (before and after 1978, Mao vs. Deng), but by the KMT in 1927 (Sun vs. Chiang). The third principle of Sun’s tridemism, i.e., “livelihood”, was alternatively translated as “socialism”. In Sun’s late years, he indeed showed a left-wing tendency in reinterpreting the third principle of his tridemism, which was characterized by the CPC as a “neotridemism” vis-à-vis the original “bourgeois tridemism [republicanism]”. The KMT’s 1920s collaboration with the CPC, as known as the First United Front, was its best footnote.¹⁰⁸

By contrast, Chiang’s claim of “socialism” in the 1930s was suspicious after the 1927 coup against communists. The only explanation is that his anticommunist “socialism” was right-wing, contrary to Sun’s version. In contradiction to the incorrect generalization that Chiang’s KMT was pro-capitalist and the CPC was anti-capitalist, he had a rather antagonistic relationship with what the CPC refers to as the “national bourgeoisie”¹⁰⁹ being oppressed by the KMT of “cronyism”, even during the golden decade (1927-1937).¹¹⁰ In fact, Chiang’s KMT was not only against laissez-faire but also containing semi-fascist faction (e.g., Blue Shirts Society)¹¹¹ and anti-American sentiment (Dai Li, et al.).¹¹² Clearly, all these in the name of “socialism” showed the reactionary, right-wing nature, instead of any progressive, left-wing element of Chiang’s KMT.

Ethical Claim: Neutrality

Those “revisionism” accusations – including the CPC’s accusation of the KMT’s “Confucianization” under Chiang Kai-shek from its previous republicanism led by Sun Yat-sen – had two dimensions that must be distinguished. Firstly, they were *value-free* descriptions of the degeneration processes of revolutionary regimes. Secondly, they were *normative* charges to these degenerations. It shall be claimed that this thesis defends only the first dimension of those accusations; as an academic work, it is in a position neither to praise nor to denounce these conservative turns, including the early 1990s one within the CPC. Instead, for academic purposes, attention is being paid to the factual multi-facets that had been neglected in those political accusations. For instance, why did those degenerated regimes still claim to be revolutionary, unlike what happened after Thermidor? Was degeneration inevitable? How, if at all, historical materialism was entangled with reactionary rhetoric? Several ideas are of imperative importance for further explorations.

Is dictatorship definitely “communist”?

No, dictatorship is a form, while communism is a telos. The Saudi Arabian regime is a dictatorship, which has nothing to do with communism, atheist blasphemy, or anarchist lèse-majesté. The most

¹⁰⁸ The left-wing interpretation of Sun’s tridemism had actual political consequences, e.g., Sun’s widow Song Ching-ling (1893-1981) served as the Vice President of the PRC from 1959 to 1975 and as the founder of the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (RCCK).

¹⁰⁹ It, alongside the peasants, workers, and “urban petite bourgeoisie”, was represented as the four small stars in the national flag of the PRC.

¹¹⁰ Parks M. Coble, Jr., *The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927-1937* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1986), pp. 263-264; Hannah Pakula, *The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and the Birth of Modern China* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), p. 160.

¹¹¹ Maria Chiang, “China,” Cyprian P. Blamires, ed., *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia*, vol. 1: A-K (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2006), p. 128.

¹¹² Jonathan Fenby, *Chiang Kai Shek: China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005), p. 414.

typical form of dictatorship throughout human civilization is autocracy or theocracy, which in the 1789's sense is simply right-wing. As common sense, most dictatorships in human civilization have been defined as right-wing.

An enlightened communist polity by its very nature must indeed be a dictatorship as it “forces people to be free”, but this particular form of dictatorship is extraordinarily unique and rare compared with theocracy and autocracy that dominated human history. A prototype of far-left dictatorship could be found in Maximilien Robespierre's words: “virtue, without which terror is destructive; terror, without which virtue is impotent. Terror is only justice prompt, severe and inflexible; it is then an emanation of virtue.”¹¹³ “Terror as virtue” or “dictatorship [of the proletariat] as democracy” is distinguished from terror and dictatorship as means of maintaining an existing order including monarchy, patriarchy, and hierarchy. Dictatorships in a Robespierrean sense were uniformly short-lived: the Reign of Terror (5.9.1793-28.7.1794), Paris Commune (18.3-28.5, 1871)¹¹⁴, Lenin (7.11.1917-21.1.1924), Pol Pot (5.1.1976-7.1.1979), etc.

Upon the establishment of the PRC, the new regime's nature was defined as neither socialist nor communist but “new democratic” or interchangeably, “people's democratic”. Therefore, the Chinese Civil War from 1945 to 1949 was not theorized as a *socialist* or *communist* but a *democratic* revolution against the authoritarian KMT regime. The PRC began with a CPC-led left-wing coalition government formed by representatives from multiple political parties or none. Since the “socialist transformation of ownership of the means of production” was declared to be completed in 1956, non-communist opposition against the CPC was weakened.¹¹⁵ In the early 1960s, Mao further started considering the CPC itself was becoming impure and privileged given its “revisionist” tendencies from 1956 to 1966, which eventually led to Cultural Revolution against rightists *within* the CPC leadership. In terms of the cruelty of persecution, the “early three years” (1966-1969) best fits the precedents of Robespierrean Terreur,¹¹⁶ cf. the Red August (1966) and Commune populaire de Shanghai (February 1967).

A truly authentic “communist” dictatorship as a left-wing dictatorship, being the opposite of essentially premodern right-wing autocracies that have been pervasive through human history, has a strict definition. From Mao's view, which to a large extent also represented the views of Trotsky and Hoxha as well, the Soviet Union during the most time¹¹⁷ of its existence was simply a replica of Imperial Russia, a “fascist dictatorship”, “new Tsar”, etc.¹¹⁸

Are laissez-faire, stratification, and economic takeoff necessarily right-wing?

¹¹³ Maximilien François Marie Isidore, “Report upon the Principles of Political Morality Which Are to Form the Basis of the Administration of the Interior Concerns of the Republic,” (Philadelphia, 1794).

¹¹⁴ “Well and good, gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.” See “PostScript, 1891 Introduction by Frederick Engels: On the 20th Anniversary of the Paris Commune,” *The Civil War in France*.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Anti-Rightist Campaign from 1957 to 1959.

¹¹⁶ Regarding the periodization of the PRC from 1949 to 1978, again, cf. *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China*, 1981.

¹¹⁷ There has been controversy over when exactly the reactionary turn was, in particular, on whether and to what extent Stalin was reactionary.

¹¹⁸ Lin Biao, *Political Report for the 9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (1969) and Zhou Enlai, *Report at the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (1973).

No. In the primary stage of capitalism,¹¹⁹ laissez-faire was even left-wing or liberal vis-à-vis aristocracy. For instance, with the support of the Whigs, the UK abolished the Corn Laws in 1846 despite opposition from the Tories. The fact that laissez-faire is “bourgeois” does not lead it to a fixed “right-wing” position in various contexts. Most autocracies in human civilization, such as the pre-1689 England and pre-1789 France, lack Lockean protection of property rights. Reasonably, Marx and Engels wrote that communists would fight with the bourgeoisie “against the absolute monarchy, the feudal squirearchy”¹²⁰. Only when the Lockean protection of property rights is given in society does the advocacy for laissez-faire become an effort to maintain the status quo, thereby being conservative.

Confucian classism or “four occupations”, viz., scholar-officials>peasants>craftsmen>merchants, is a typically conservative classification of subjects. The monarchy needs literate bureaucrats for governance, agriculture for food, handicraft for necessities, and commerce for exchange. The state discourages people from engaging in business because it does “produce” anything. A typical misunderstanding is associating two sides of the coin of modernization (stratification and economic takeoff) with right-wing (dictatorship or democracy). It is true that numerous cases of modernization, including the Chinese one, have combined the two. However, most premodern regimes that delivered none or little modernization were also right-wing according to the 1789’s definition. Inefficiency could be due to egalitarian policies or, in most cases, lack of capitalism or “market economy” as an essential element of modernity.

Most observers who argue that Deng led China in a right-wing direction by citing his policy of economic liberalization ignored the specific context in which laissez-faire vis-à-vis an authoritarian state is actually progressive. It was true that compared with Mao’s left-wing economic policy, China’s 1978 turn towards a market economy was conservative. But a planned economy, e.g., the USSR that Mao referred to as “far-right”¹²¹, could be a premodern Leviathan. And Deng’s insistence on economic liberalism in the early 1990s regardless of his opponents’ opposition, compared with the synchronous right-wing programs – political authoritarianism, sociocultural conservatism, and conservative nationalism, was relatively liberal. The conservative turn in the early 1990s China was not aimed to simply restore its feudal monarchy, but essentially a developmental course aiming at modernization, with economic liberalism as an iconic commitment to breaking with premodernity.¹²²

“Chinese state-owned enterprises contribute 23-28 per cent of GDP...But *dirigisme* is nothing new for capitalism...even KMT-controlled Taiwan, where state-owned enterprises contributed nearly one quarter of the country’s GDP as late as the 1980s.”¹²³ The degree of state intervention in its economy is not a proper criterion of the state’s position in the left-right spectrum. Otherwise, Bismarck and other Junkers were “leftist”, the KMT’s “crony capitalism” were “leftist”, the state-owned Saudi Aramco that monopolies Saudi Arabian economy were “leftist”, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that control one third¹²⁴ of Iranian economy were “leftist”. Apart from left-

¹¹⁹ Given the neoliberal domination worldwide since the 1980s, one may argue the primary stage of capitalism is still the present tense.

¹²⁰ Karl Marx and F. Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, Ch. IV. “Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties”.

¹²¹ *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China* (1981).

¹²² The Dengist CPC describes the Soviet-type economic planning as a “close, rigid, and outdated road” (cf. Hu Jintao, *Political Report for the 18th National Congress of the CPC*, November 8, 2012).

¹²³ Eli Friedman, “Why China Is Capitalist,” *Spectre*, July 15, 2020.

¹²⁴ Frederic Wehrey, “The Rise of the Pasdaran,” RAND Corporation, 2009.

wing *dirigisme* of la Montagne¹²⁵, state interventionism has appeared in two right-wing scenarios: oppression of the rising bourgeoisie by the landlord class in the late feudal era; modern dictatorship's corporatist control over the economy. Disrespect for the protection of private property rights Lockean classic liberalism, could possibly be Rousseauian but, as a matter of fact, has been primarily Hobbesian throughout human history.

Is a “Chinese conservatism” or “conservatism in China” possible?

It is not only possible but also normal. The defense of hierarchy of all kinds, be paternal, tribal, religious, ideological, racial, national, ethnic, sexual, class, developmental, civilizational, electoral, able, ageing, capable, intellectual, physical, mental, occupational, etc. is at the core of conservatism as a universal dogma. The one-fifth of the human species inhabiting a geographical area called China is by no means a subject to be exempted from this dogma.

The quantity of studies on Edmund Burke, Benjamin Disraeli, and Michael Oakeshott is overwhelming. Continental thinkers such as Joseph de Maistre, Carl Schmitt, and Fyodor Dostoevsky also have received long-standing attention. Chinese conservatism, somehow or other, has long been overlooked in academia, despite its tremendous impacts on China's modern history. Outside the Anglo-Saxon sphere, conservatisms typically have less emphases on individual liberties and more commitments to communitarian loyalties; the Chinese variant is no exception.

In this thesis, conservatism refers to not only the center-right liberal conservatism as a variant of conservatism appeared in the very recent times of modern history and limited to a small proportion of the global population, but a range of right-wing ideologies from moderate to extreme. However, it does not refer to a premodern condition, e. g., monarchy, which is conservative but not a conservatism. Monarchism is a conservatism because it is a rational defense instead of a preexisting condition. This categorization makes it possible to outline three waves of Chinese conservatism.

The *first* wave was royalism vis-à-vis republicanism in defense of the late Qing dynasty from the second half of the 19th century to the early 20th century, represented by Empress Dowager Cixi, Li Hongzhang, Zhang Zhidong, et al. The 1911 Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen interrupted it. The *second* wave was Chiangism in the name of “tridemism” that betrayed Sun's republican tridemism vis-à-vis communism, which ruled the Chinese mainland from 1927 to 1949 and Taiwan from 1945 to the 1990s, represented by Dai Jitao, Chen Lifu, et al. It was interrupted by the 1949 Revolution led by Mao Zedong on the Chinese mainland and terminated by the 1990s democratization in Taiwan. The *third* wave is Dengism in the name of “SwCC” vis-à-vis leftism since 1978 and vis-à-vis liberalism since the early 1990s on the Chinese mainland, represented by Jiang Zemin, Wang Huning, et al.

In fact, outside the Chinese mainland, conservatism has prevailed in all other political entities of ethnic Chinese: Hong Kong (from British colony to pro-establishment camp) and Macau (from Portuguese colony to pro-establishment camp) SARs, Taiwan (from Japanese colony to KMT), Singapore (from British colony to PAP), and some 20% population of Malaysia (from British colony to MCA as part of the ruling coalition).

The first and second waves of Chinese conservatism have been established academic consensuses. The difficulty in identifying the 1990s Chinese conservatism is its “discursive ambiguity” or “rhetoric”. This thesis applies the rhetorical structure within the rhetoric of conservatism summarized

¹²⁵ Edward Berenson, *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1830-1852* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 308.

by Albert O. Hirschman (*The Rhetoric of Reaction*) to examine various discourses in early 1990s China and beyond.

Left-wing rhetoric also follows three patterns: (I) “Synergy Illusion”, (II) “Imminent Danger” or urgency, and (III) “History Is on Our Side”. For instance, “we must now (II) take resolute action to overthrow the existing autocracy, in order to have a (I) democratic and prosperous society, as eventually the end of history will be reached worldwide (III).”

While right-wing rhetoric also follows three patterns: (I) perversity, (II) futility, and (III) jeopardy. For instance, “even if the revolution [regime change] succeeds, we cannot achieve the better condition we expect (II), because change may lead to not an improvement but deterioration (I), thus we would lose what we have achieved (III).”

Samuel P. Huntington’s three “theories of conservatism” are also applicable. The first theory is “aristocratic”¹²⁶, defining conservatism as an ideology representing the materialistic interests of the aristocrats, just like liberalism is for the bourgeois. Huntington correctly pointed out that because “the United States lacks a feudal tradition”¹²⁷, the “aristocratic” approach does not apply to the American context: even the GOP cannot accept a form of monarchy or royalism, from which this country had broken when it was given birth. However, the “aristocratic” conservatism applies to a large number of cases, including China. The second theory is “autonomous”¹²⁸, defining conservatism as a set of spiritual values such as order shared by people of all kinds. In mainland China which experienced two revolutions, words such as “feudalism, status, the ancien régime, landed interests, medievalism, and nobility” have derogatory connotations and are thus pragmatically unpreferable. In the early 1990s rhetoric of Chinese conservatism, words such as “stability” and “order” were of high frequency. The third theory is “situational”¹²⁹, meaning conservatism is neither fixed interest nor fixed value but repeated efforts against fundamental challenges to the existing system in various historical contexts. According to Huntington, the situational approach “h most adequately and completely explains the manifestations in history of the Burkeian ideology”¹³⁰. However, what China once encountered – preserving an existing system that is radical itself, could not be regarded as conservative.

¹²⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” *The American Political Science Review* 51, no. 2 (1957): p. 454.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 455.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 456.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The originality of this thesis is based on the fact that research on this specific topic and in such a pertinent manner written in Chinese and English languages is by far empty. Notwithstanding, there have been myriad monographs, journal papers, and general articles on related themes. The pieces of literature presented are much selected, not complete.

The first recorded text was David Bachman's informative report titled "China's Politics: Conservatism Prevails" (September 1989), which, as he acknowledged, was "being written at a time of great uncertainty in China, and many of its conclusions are highly tentative."¹³¹ Having said that, Bachman was arguably the first to use the term conservatism to describe this turning point. He noticed that the "conservative leaders", e.g., then premier Li Peng, "had no trouble...in accepting new authoritarianism",¹³² a conception Chinese theorists drew from the experiences of anti-communist, right-wing dictatorships in post-WWII East Asia, "Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong."¹³³ Harry Harding went further in a 1993 conference, attempting to define this wave of Chinese conservatism from three aspects: economy, politics, and international affairs. According to Harding, the conservatives prefer a "traditionalist socialist economy...[with] greater egalitarianism", "highly authoritarian sentiment", and "suspicion...with developed Western nations".¹³⁴ His overall intuitive descriptions were correct, but there were obvious ambiguities (presumably caused by what the title of this thesis refers to as "rhetoric") from within, e.g., how could egalitarianism and conservatism (in defense of hierarchy) be in the same direction? Could socialism be conservative outside the American context? Could suspicion with the West also be radically left-wing?

In 1999, the third as well as last edition¹³⁵ of Maurice Jerome Meisner's *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic* was published, the sixth part of which was titled "Deng Xiaoping and the Origins of Chinese Capitalism: 1976-1998" covered the reactions to 1989 Tiananmen protests. As Meisner observed: "the cultural iconoclasm that the Chinese Communists had inherited from their May Fourth predecessors...would now give way to a conservative nationalism that celebrated the traditional cultural and historical heritage...Manifestations of this conservative cultural nationalism included...[an] international conference held in 1994 to celebrate the 2545th birthday of Confucius...an 'International Association of Confucian Studies' in Beijing – which, appropriately, selected as its honorary president Lee Kuan Yew, the neo-Confucian dictator of Singapore."¹³⁶

This thesis divides Meisner's observations into two interconnected but different dimensions: (a) sociocultural conservatism and (b) conservative nationalism. This thesis also covers what the post-1989 CPC's embracement of the hardcore right-wing strongman Lee Kuan Yew manifested: (c) political authoritarianism and (d) economic liberalism. By Deng Xiaoping Theory, "he [Jiang] can only mean the combination of rapid capitalist development and political dictatorship."¹³⁷

¹³¹ David Bachman, "China's Politics: Conservatism Prevails," *Current History* 88, no. 539 (1989): p. 257.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

¹³⁴ Harry Harding, "China at the Crossroads: Conservatism, Reform or Decay?" *The Adelphi Papers*, vol. 33 (Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era: Part I Papers from the IISS 34th Annual Conference), 275 (1993): p. 36.

¹³⁵ First edition in 1977; Second edition in 1986.

¹³⁶ Maurice Jerome Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), pp. 525-526.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 536.

In 2005 when Bruce Gilley's "In China's Own Eyes"¹³⁸ was published, the 15 years of Jiang, who took office after 4th June 1989, was over. With a settled situation in China, it became possible for Gilley to claim Jiang's "right-wing"¹³⁹ nature. Peter Moody's *Conservative Thought in Contemporary China* (2007) further consolidated the established academic consensus.

The most thematically relevant monograph was Els van Dongen's *Realistic Revolution: Contesting Chinese History, Culture, and Politics after 1989*,¹⁴⁰ based on her 2009 PhD dissertation at Leiden, titled *Goodbye Radicalism! Conceptions of Conservatism among Chinese Intellectuals during the Early 1990s*. Dongen referred to Xiao Gongqin¹⁴¹ and Chen Lai¹⁴² as representative intellectuals, examining how conservatism was academically interpreted and debated, thereby mapping the early 1990s conservatism as about not only power but also truth, with a solid intellectual foundation.

Compared with Dongen's works, this thesis is not purely intellectual historiography. For the intellectual part, it focuses on Wang Huning as a unique, "politicalized" intellectual. It also examines numerous non-academic texts, aiming to illustrate how China's early 1900s conservatism, as initially intellectual on paper, became incorporated into Chinese ideology, adopted and implemented as a political program through state apparatus thereafter. Academic interests in Wang boomed¹⁴³ after 2017 when he became the fifth-ranked politician in China, while Joseph Fewsmith had marked him as early as 1995: "another Shanghainese whose ideas might be described as neoconservative is Wang Huning, a political scientist at Fudan University."¹⁴⁴

In Ian Buruma's recent article on *Die Presse*, he wrote: "was [Beijing's crackdown on protests] really a victory for communism? In fact, what emerged...was...Deng Xiaoping's version of authoritarian capitalism."¹⁴⁵ He further connected to international cases thereafter: "[In 2001, Putin's] Russia was moving more in the direction of Deng Xiaoping's China, albeit a less successful version...Something similar happened in the Central and Eastern European countries. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is the most vocal ideological advocate of 'illiberal democracy'...We should have known that from the start. Singapore offered a perfect example of authoritarian capitalism."¹⁴⁶ Although this thesis is not intending to be international historiography, it was inspired by Buruma's inference that the early 1990s conservatism in China was not particular, exceptional, abrupt but, in fact, part of a seemingly far more drawn-out landscape across the modern world.

Another comparative perspective focuses on the position of conservatism in China's own modern history. In the Chinese mainland, monarchism or the *first* wave of conservatism, emerged during the second half of the 19th century. In 1927, republicanism was replaced by Chiangism or the *second* wave of conservatism: right-wing one-party dictatorship till 1949. Only since 1978 has

¹³⁸ Bruce Gilley, "In China's Own Eyes: Jiang Zemin on Jiang Zemin," *Foreign Affairs* (2005): 150-154.

¹³⁹ See the heading quotation in "Theoretical Framework".

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Els van Dongen, *Realistic Revolution: Contesting Chinese History, Culture, and Politics after 1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

¹⁴¹ Els van Dongen, *Dissertation*, pp. 84-136. Xiao Gongqin (b. 1946), "neoconservative" historian and "neo-authoritarian" political scientist, professor at Shanghai Normal University.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 193-245. Chen Lai (b. 1952), Confucian philosopher, professor, and dean of the Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning [namely classics] at Tsinghua University.

¹⁴³ Cf. Haig Patapan and Y. Wang (2018), Yi Wang (2018), Niv Horesh and Ruike Xu (2017), etc.

¹⁴⁴ Joseph Fewsmith, "Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 7 (1995): p. 638. See also Barry Sautman (1992) and Chen Feng (1997).

¹⁴⁵ Ian Buruma, "Der illiberale Kapitalismus als Modell für Autokraten," *Die Presse*, 7th July 2019.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

conservatism become a desirable ideology again after Maoist far-left experiments, and the *third* wave of conservatism, namely the early 1990s conservatism to the present, became possible.

Mary Clabaugh Wright's *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism* (1957)¹⁴⁷ suggested that Chinese conservatism had died with the failure of its *first* wave, i.e., Tongzhi Restoration (ca. 1862-1874). Thereafter China entered into "phrases of revolutions", e.g., 1911 Revolution, 1949 Revolution, Cultural Revolution.¹⁴⁸ Such a typically left-wing periodization was common amongst the American Sinologists of her generation. Was she unaware of the resurrected Chinese conservatism of Chiang's KMT, i.e., the *second* wave? No, just two years earlier, she published a paper titled "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology". Therefore, by deliberately describing Tongzhi Restoration as the last stand of "Chinese" conservatism, she was actually implying her approval of the PRC's representation of China over the ROC's representation of China due to her pro-CPC standing. Wright died in 1970; otherwise, she could have had an opportunity to revise her position and write a new paper that should be titled "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of CPC Ideology", i.e., the *third* wave.

¹⁴⁷ Mary Clabaugh Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-Chih Restoration, 1862-1874* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).

¹⁴⁸ Cf. the first volume of her unfinished series, *China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900-1913* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

STRUCTURE

Apart from an introduction (1st Chapter) and a conclusion (7th Chapter), this thesis' body consists of five parts, from the 2nd Chapter to the 6th Chapter.

The 2nd Chapter outlines the 1980s *contexts* of Chinese academia and politics: the removal of Maoism, ABLC, and the early formation of Dengism. It demonstrates the overall picture that after the far-left Maoism¹⁴⁹ was removed in December 1978 (3rd Plenary Session of the 11th National Congress), liberalism and conservatism became possible again in China. The situation was contestable under Deng's leadership, liberalism or "bourgeois liberalization" became a significant force amongst scholars and CPC's high-ranking officials, e.g., Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, while right-wing conservatism also reemerged. Conservatism prevailed after the June 1989 purge (4th Plenary Session of the 13th National Congress) against liberals inside and outside the CPC.

Hereafter, the thesis dips into various academic and political *texts* in four aspects to answer its major research question: what ideological implications did the early 1990s political and academic texts deliver? Underneath various discursive ambiguities, which the author refers to as "rhetoric" in the thesis' title, it was conservatism in four aspects – political, sociocultural, economic, and nationalist. This part amounts to 70% of the thesis.

The 3rd Chapter focuses on the political aspect of the early 1990s conservatism, namely political authoritarianism, by analyzing Wang Huning's works. Although he, in effect, stopped publishing in 1995, his works therebefore were already sufficient to unveil his role in shaping the CPC's post-1989 transformation. The Chapter explains why his advocacy for authoritarianism was for a conservative, right-wing, and autocratic Ancien Régime instead of a left-wing, Maoist, or Robespierrean Terreur (1793-1794), as he unequivocally referred to post-WWII anti-communist regimes such as KMT's Taiwan, South Korea, Lee's Singapore, and one-party dominant Japan as China's models. Wang personally disdained the libertarian lifestyle he witnessed in America. However, when it comes to moral issues, his argument was rather functionalistic (e.g., in a consequentialist format, "to main social stability it is necessary to uphold certain cultural order") than normative (e.g., in a teleological format, "socialism is against individualism"). The topic of "Confucianism vs. modernism" was marginally mentioned in Wang's works, but overall, as a political scientist, his focus was political.

The 4th Chapter focuses on the sociocultural aspect of the early 1990s conservatism, namely sociocultural conservatism¹⁵⁰ vis-à-vis Mao's radical egalitarianism and 1980s liberalism. It examines the revival of Confucianism in the intelligentsia and the restoration of social hierarchies (property, gender, performance, intelligence, occupation, etc.), following a controversial documentary, *River Elogy* (1988). It identifies the ABLC, including its post-1989 continuation, as by its nature an effort to restore a sociocultural conservatism, which was an overturn of China's decades-long Occident-centric reception since the 1911 Revolution.¹⁵¹ The Chapter is dedicated to texts concerning the

¹⁴⁹ 1949-1978 is a heterogeneous period that could be periodized into at least three parts, 1949-1966 ("the first seventeen years"), 1966-1976 (Cultural Revolution), and 1976-1978 (Hua Guofeng). Each of them could be further periodized, e.g., 1966-1969 as the climax of Cultural Revolution (cf. *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China*).

¹⁵⁰ An alternative term is "social conservatism", primarily in the Christian context. The term "sociocultural conservatism" indicates not only the religious-secular dimension but also the intercultural dimension.

¹⁵¹ It is needed to distinguish between cultural regionality and cultural modernity: Chinese or Oriental is not a synonym for conservative, nor is Western or Occidental a synonym for progressive. When the 1911 Revolution took place, most

utterly delicate relationship between Chinese tradition and external modernity as direct reactions to those 1980s texts on the same theme and as indirect continuations to contextual intervals in China's modern history.

The 5th Chapter focuses on the economic aspect of the early 1990s Chinese conservatism, namely economic liberalism, by examining the systematization of Dengism after 1989, viz., the consummation of the fundamental framework of SwCC. At its core was the slogan “Time is Money, Efficiency is Life.” Many observers have viewed Deng's economic liberalism as evidence of China's turn to capitalism, which was not incorrect. However, in comparison with other aspects of his program, the economic one was rather liberal and a continuation of the 1980s policies.

The 6th Chapter focuses on the nationalist dimension of the early 1990s conservatism, namely conservative nationalism¹⁵². Over time, nationalism has been combined with various forms of ideologies from Left to Right. So did its Chinese variant: Sun's civic nationalism, Chiang's conservative nationalism, and Mao's proletarian (inter) nationalism. The commonest misperception was that the 1990s version of nationalism was a replica of Mao's far-left one. Both were indeed assertions of China's independence vis-à-vis the center of the world system. However, Deng-Jiang's nationalism was one that incorporated its materialistic demands with the capitalist world system, while Mao's was a force against the imperialist system. According to the combined policies, Deng-Jiang's nationalism was rather a replica of Chiang Kai-shek's. The KMT's right-wing authoritarian miracle in post-WWII Taiwan shocked a whole generation of mainlanders, including Jiang, who in their youth used to be, if not communists, but at least, democrats against Chiang's dictatorship.

Besides the major research question covered from the 3rd Chapter to the 6th Chapter, the minor one, accounting for the remaining 30%, primarily in Introduction, Conclusion, and the 2nd Chapter, attempts to situate China's early 1990s turn of conservatism in broader backgrounds: both in China's modern history and in the world history of modernity.

parts of Europe were still under monarchies. The Cultural Revolution was a political movement motivated by extremely radical ideals for liberty, equality, and fraternity.

¹⁵² An alternative term is “national conservatism”. The term “conservative nationalism” underscores that nationalism could also be liberal (i.e., civic nationalism), or left-wing, e.g., “La patrie en danger” (1792). “Conservative nationalism” refers to a variant of nationalism, or the nationalist aspect of conservatism, instead of a variant of conservatism that covers all aspects as “national conservatism”.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Wang Huning's Works

T1.6: Résumé of Wang Huning (b. 1955)

1981-1989	Fudan	Department of International Relations		Assistant-, Associate-, Professor
1989-1994				Director
1994-1995		Law School		Dean
1995-1998	CPC	Central Policy Research Office ¹⁵³	Political Group	Director
1998-2002				Vice Director
2002-2007			Director	
2007-2012		Central Secretariat		Secretary
2012-2017		Politburo		Member
2017-	Standing Committee			

Tabulation: author.

Wang's curriculum vitae could be divided into three parts: academic (1981-1995), advisory (1995-2007), and political (2007-). Since 1995 when he left Shanghai for Beijing, Wang stopped public publishing and even appearing. As a scholar, he published more than ten monographs and 70 papers, translated articles, interviews, book chapters, etc. Wang joined the CPC in 1984, but no evidence shows that at that point had entered the revolving door. From 1981 to 1989, he went through a conventional but impressive academic career from a lecturer and associate professor to a professor at the Department of International Politics, Fudan University. From 1989 to 1994, he served as the same Department's Director. This promotion was a signal for him to hold a position in public service for the very first time. In 1994, he became the first Dean of the newly established Fudan University Law School. From 1995 onwards, he left Fudan, Shanghai and joined the Central Policy Research Office (CPRO) of the CPC Central Committee, Beijing. Since coming into the "central", he went through a bureaucratic but steady political career till the 19th National Congress, 2017, when he was elected to be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee. Wang is now ranked 5th within the CPC, after Xi Jinping (President), Li Keqiang (Premier), Speakers of the NPC ("House"), and the CPPCC ("Senate").

Most of Wang's works are publicly accessible, though seemingly a few have been removed from China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI). For instance, a paper titled "Reflections on 'Cultural Revolution' and Political System Reform"¹⁵⁴ was not available on CNKI, presumably due to the "sensitivity" of the topic concerning the Cultural Revolution. However, this paper is available through other means, e. g., the service of "document delivery" by the Hunan Library, which is open to the public. Nonetheless, when searching "Wang Huning" as the name of the author in the online catalogue of Hunan Library, it showed "empty," meaning the keyword of "Wang Huning" was set as a subject of censorship.

Despite these technical issues, through carefully collecting these works item by item in the hope of not missing anything, an arguably complete list of literature authored and translated by Wang Huning is attached to Bibliography. The list includes not only papers published in academic periodicals but also diaries, essays, translations, memoirs, and selected collections. For instance, *America against America* (1991) was in its style similar to Tocqueville's *De la démocratie en Amérique*,

¹⁵³ The CPRO is a ministerial institution, and a primary think tank of the CPC.

¹⁵⁴ Wang Huning, "Reflections on 'Cultural Revolution' and Political System Reform," *Scientific Socialism*, no. 11 (1986): 72-75.

consisting of Wang's notes during his visiting scholarship at the University of Iowa and the University of California, Berkeley from 1988 to 1989.

One major work that was unavailable is Wang's master's thesis, titled "From Jean Bodin to Jacques Maritain: On the Evolution of Western Bourgeois Theories of Sovereignty" (1981, Fudan). However, Wang later published a journal paper titled "On the New Development of Modern and Contemporary Sovereignty Theory"¹⁵⁵, which could be regarded as a condensed version, and a monograph titled *National Sovereignty* (1987), which could be regarded as an extended version.

Collected/Selected Works

Wang's works are mainly analyzed in the 3rd Chapter. Other primary sources include published collected and selected works of prominent political leaders of the CPC during the 1980s and 1990s: Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, Chen Yun, Deng Liqun, Wang Zhen, Li Tieying, et al. In particular, the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (SWDXP)*, especially Volume II and III, the *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (SWJZM)*, especially Volume I, II, and III, and the *Selected Works of Chen Yun (SWCY)* are widely cited in the thesis. These official publications have been circumspectly edited, but there is no better alternative as yet. Predictably, many more will be released in the future.

Audiovisual Materials

The 4th Chapter analyzes the documentary *River Elegy* (1988) and the sitcom *I Love My Family* (1993-1994). *River Elegy* reflects the intellectual condition and the public sphere in 1980s China. *I Love My Family* demonstrates the actual life of ordinary people in the early 1990s, especially their mentalities, ethical norms, and the societal change brought by the marketization. Several songs are also analyzed in the 6th Chapter regarding Chinese nationalism. Apart from the elitist construction of nationalism, the national community connects national identity through sharing symbols such as popular music.


Propaganda and Others

Another category of primary sources is propaganda, which includes newspapers and magazines of the CPC such as *People's Daily*, *Qiusi (Red Flag)* before 1988, *Guangming Daily*, etc., and collections of articles and edited "educational materials" published as books during the early 1990s. These propagandas are mainly but not exclusively analyzed in the 4th Chapter.

Regulations, decrees, official documents, laws and others belong to another category of primary sources, which connected to government-led socialization. This category includes four Constitutions of the PRC (especially 1982 one), political reports of the CPC's National Congresses (especially since 1956), the Party's three "historical resolutions" (especially 1981 one), public speeches by prominent leaders, amendments to the Party's Constitution, decrees and regulations issued by national authorities, etc. The 6th Chapter focuses on the 1982 Constitution of the PRC, Chiang Kai-shek's *The Destiny of China* (1943), the formative literature of the PEC *Outline for the Implementation of Patriotic Education* (1994), collective memories of the Nanjing Massacre, and official historiographies of the WWII.

¹⁵⁵ Wang Huning, "On the New Development of Modern and Contemporary Sovereignty Theory," *CASS Journal of Political Science*, no. 1 (1985): 39-46.

CHAPTER II
CONDITION OF CHINA DURING THE 1980S



“During Cultural Revolution after our home was destroyed...I was labeled as a family member of the gangsters¹⁵⁶ by Kang Sheng¹⁵⁷’s wife, Cao Yi’ou. At that point, I was less than 15 years old. They said I was heinous enough to be shot a hundred times! I thought, one hundred times is no different from one time. Of what am I afraid, after a hundred times of death?”

Xi Jinping, “I Am the Son of Loess,” *National New Books Information*, vol. 12 (2002).

“EMANCIPATE OUR MIND”

Leon Trotsky may have been the first, but definitely not the last to think of Thermidor as a metaphorical antecedent of the degenerative coups and self-coups in revolutionary movements.¹⁵⁸ Within two years after Mao’s death in September 1976, three factions – the Maoist Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng’s Fanshi faction, and Deng Xiaoping’s Qiushi faction – within the CPC fiercely competed for power, during which two coups subsequently took place.

COUP D’ÉTAT OF 6TH OCTOBER 1976

Charles Bettelheim, then the President of l’Association des amitiés Franco-Chinoises wrote in his 1977 letter of resignation: “...the events that occurred after the death of Chairman Mao made me deeply worried...about the future of China’s socialism after the arrest of the four leaders [Gang of Four] who played a major role in Cultural Revolution...In the publicly published materials, I see no Marxist analysis at all, but only slander and scandal...showing that the concurrent leadership of the CPC is unable to carry out any serious critique of these four people...now revisionism has prevailed, the campaign of Criticizing Deng [Xiaoping] has been abandoned, the opinion that production is above revolution has prevailed. Discipline and order are being praised...These are the



Jiang Qing: “revolution is no crime!”
AP Archive.

judgements I am forced to make by what is happening in China today...It is impossible to predict under what conditions and how long will it take for China to return back to the road of revolution.”¹⁵⁹

Bettelheim’s intuition has been proven accurate. The coup against the Gang of Four, Mao’s most trusted allies during the Cultural Revolution, marked not only the end of Maoism in China but also that of China’s ever-revolutionary 20th century. The public trial of Jiang Qing, Mao’s widow and the head of the Gang of Four, on 25th January 1981, went particularly dramatically. When the President of the Court declared “the defendant Jiang Qing is sentenced to death...” Jiang Qing interrupted

¹⁵⁶ Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun, was denounced as a “gangster” by Maoists during Cultural Revolution.

¹⁵⁷ Kang Sheng [Константин], originally named Zhang Zongke, was a high-ranking (4th upon his death in 1975) Maoist.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going*, trans. Max Eastman (Pathfinder, 1937).

¹⁵⁹ Charles Bettelheim, “Resignation Letter to l’Association des amitiés Franco-Chinoises,” *China after Mao’s Death* (Beijing: China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, 1979), pp. 7-10.

him, calling out: “revolution is no crime!” Then the President continued: “...with reprieve for two years, and *civiliter mortuus* for life.”¹⁶⁰

One may compare the role of Wang Dongxing as the director of the Central Security Bureau (CSB) of the CPC¹⁶¹ during the October 1976 Coup (hereinafter 1976 Coup) with that of Joseph Fouché in the Coup d'état of 9 Thermidor. The difference was that Mao died before the coup, while Robespierre was executed afterwards. Fouché later served as the Minister of Police for several postrevolutionary and reactionary regimes: Directory, Consulate, and Empire.

Similarly, in the 1st Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC (August 1977), Wang Dongxing was promoted to be the Vice Chairman of the CPC, ranked fifth within the Party, only after Hua Guofeng (Chairman), Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, and Li Xiannian in the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). Deng Xiaoping's status was partially restored – he came back as de facto the third most influential politician in China. However, this new balance of power reached in August 1977 was unstable.

Hua Guofeng (b. 1921), as the appointee in Mao's testament, on the one hand, through a coup supported by senior statesmen, arrested the Gang of Four, including Mao's widow Jiang Qing and other “unrepentant” Maoists who “manipulated” the Cultural Revolution, marking a “less revolutionary” and “more constructive” stage of politics. On the other hand, his power was so fragile that he had to seek support from elderly veterans of Mao (b. 1893)'s generation, such as Ye Jianying (b. 1897), Deng Xiaoping (b. 1904), Chen Yun (b. 1905), Li Xiannian (b. 1909), et al.

The 1976 Coup against the Gang of Four formed a short-lived political alliance of *les Thermidoriens* (Hua Guofeng and non-Maoist veterans) that quickly fell apart. The post-Terreur period, from Thermidor 1794 to Brumaire 1799, was not a fully or immediately conservative period, given the republican spirit in the Constitution of the Year III (1795). The PRC's *Directoire*, from 1978 to 1989, was also a politically turbulent time during which factionalism and coups prevailed before it eventually entered the early 1990s authoritarian order – *le Consulat*.

COUP D'ÉTAT OF DECEMBER 1978

Hua Guofeng attempted to form his own factional authority within the Party, namely the Fanshi¹⁶² faction consisting of himself, Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian.¹⁶³ However, the 3rd Session of the 11th National Congress of the CPC (December 1978) marked the ultimate victory of the Qiushi faction led by Deng Xiaoping against the Fanshi faction.

Two concurrent series of events, academic and political, contributed to the Qiushi faction's victory. Qiushi stands for “seek truth from facts”, an idiom originally from the *Book of Han* (ca. 111 CE)¹⁶⁴ then famously reinterpreted by Mao during the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee

¹⁶⁰ “FILE Member of Gang of Four Dies,” AP Archive.

¹⁶¹ It functions to protect the personal safety of the main leaders of the CPC, of the PRC and of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Wang's career as Mao's personal guard could be traced back to 1947 during the civil war.

¹⁶² Fanshi stands for “whatever” in Hua Guofeng's slogan that “we will resolutely uphold *whatever* policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow *whatever* instructions Chairman Mao gave.” This slogan firstly appeared in the editorial of *People's Daily* (7th February 1977).

¹⁶³ Amongst them, during the 1st Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC (August 1977), Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing were members of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau (as known as Politburo Standing Committee, PSC) of the CPC; Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian were members of the Central Political Bureau (CPB) of the CPC.

¹⁶⁴ Ban Gu, Ban Zhao, Ban Biao et al., *Book of Han*, Vol. 53, “Biography of Liu De”.

of the CPC (November 1938).¹⁶⁵ It is noticeable that both Fanshi faction and Qiushi faction attempted to legitimize their advocacies by claiming they inherited Mao's legacy, although neither was truly Maoist. Such, at least from a nominalist perspective, *artificial* continuity between Mao and his successive generations of leadership that initiated had remained a main characteristic of the CPC's official political discourses.

Qiushi faction's attack against the Fanshi faction started from an epistemological "debate on the criteria of truth" in academia. On 11th May 1978, the *Guangming Daily* published an essay titled "Practice Is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth". Its author, a professor in philosophy at Nanjing University, Hu Fuming argued that truth must be verified by "practice" (empirical evidence) instead of written doctrine that is labeled as truth, implicitly criticizing the Fanshi faction's policies for being "rigid". This essay was reprinted in *People's Daily* one day after.

Later this year, during the 11th CPC Central Committee Working Conference from 10th November to 15th December, the Qiushi faction launched a series of political attacks against the Fanshi faction. The Working Conference was originally designed to discuss agricultural development and economic plan, but on 12th November Chen Yun's speech accusing the concurrent leadership failed to redress some legal cases "manipulated" by the Gang of Four changed its direction. On 25th November, Hua Guofeng eventually admitted his fault for "not solving the remaining issues of Cultural Revolution thoroughly", marking the Fanshi faction's collapse. One may also compare this scene with the Fall of Maximilien Robespierre: during an address to the National Convention (9 Thermidor, 27th July 1794), Robespierre and Louis Antoine de Saint-Just were overthrown by the majority of the Convention. The difference was that the case of Hua Guofeng was less brutal – unlike guillotined Robespierre, Hua calmly retired afterwards.¹⁶⁶ In 1988, the CPC's primary theoretical journal *Red Flag* changed its name to *Qiushi*.

The rest of this story has been narrated as a shining milestone in the official historiography of the PRC: during the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC (18-22 December), it was declared that China would implement the "Reform and Opening Up" policy. This policy, as the name suggests, was embodied in two aspects: (a) reforms in rural and urban areas (agricultural and industrial sectors) to promote economic competition towards a market-oriented economy, and (b) opening up to foreign trades, investments, and commercial exchanges in various forms.

The "opening-up" immediately resulted in the historic Sino-American Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The Communiqué was reached on 16th December 1978 (two days before the 3rd Plenary Session) and took effect on 1st January 1979 (nine days after the 3rd Plenary Session), ending America's derecognition of the PRC since 1st October 1949. After a failed attempt of assassinating Deng, Maoist American citizen Bob Avakian, Chairman of the Revolutionary Communist Party (USA), was arrested and deported from the United States to France.

Maoists were systematically eliminated from official positions of all levels within China, alongside the Boluan Fanzheng [eliminating chaos and returning to normal] movement. To use Chen Yun's words: those disobedient "young people 'with horns on their heads and thorns on their bodies'

¹⁶⁵ Mao Zedong, "The Issue of Independence within the United Front." 5th November 1938.

¹⁶⁶ Hua Guofeng's retirement from political life was a gradual process under the 11th Central Committee of the CPC. The 3rd Plenary Session marked the end of Hua's policy but not his career; he remained as the Chairman of the CPC. Hua Guofeng later presided over the 4th (September 1979) and 5th (February 1980) Plenary Sessions. During the 6th Plenary Session (June 1981), his request to resign was passed. Hu Yaobang became the General Secretary of the CPC, and Deng Xiaoping became the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.

promoted during Cultural Revolution”¹⁶⁷, viz., revolutionary youth appreciated by Mao, such as Wang Hongwen (b. 1935), one of the Gang of Four, must not be promoted. Far-leftists “who started their political careers from rebels, with strong gang [factional, cf. Gang of Four] ideology, involved in beating, smashing, and looting”¹⁶⁸ were considered hidden dangers within the Party.

CHINA SINCE 1979

From the outside, in the 1980s, China was *sui generis*: it remained “communist” in its name but had no association with any other “communist” countries. China refused to participate in the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow as part of the America-led international boycott. The Sino-Vietnamese War from 17th February to 16th March 1979 was a proxy war between the US-backed Deng’s China and the USSR-backed Lê Duẩn’s Vietnam. Hoxha’s Albania, the only “comrade” during the Maoist era, started accusing China of being revisionist. Tito’s Yugoslav at least tended to be non-align (cf. Non-Aligned Movement), while the Dengist “China’s relationship with the capitalist United States was better than that with the Soviet Communists.”¹⁶⁹



The Arrival Ceremony for the Vice Premier of China (Deng) on 29th January 1979. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.

Inside China, especially in coastal cities, politicians, academics, and students gradually became informed about what the outside world was like. In late 1978, Wang Huning, who later became China’s Andrei Zhdanov or Mikhail Suslov, started his postgraduate studies in International Politics – an alleged “bourgeois” discipline that was once abolished during Cultural Revolution – at Fudan University, Shanghai. Wang’s publications during his early scholastic career include (a) book reviews on Rousseau (81), Machiavelli (83), and Sartre (83); (b) introductions to Harold D. Lasswell (83), Arbert Somit (83), and David Easton (85); (c) translations of Ignace Feuerlicht (83), Al Tănase (84), Moshe M. Czudnowski (84), Abel Jeannièrè (85), Robert A. Dahl’s *Modern Political Analysis* (87) and Raymond Aron’s *Les étapes de la pensée sociologique* (88).¹⁷⁰

All these literature that were once banned suddenly appeared again, conceivably, triggering an undercurrent within the Chinese intellectual circles. A popular narrative to describe this moment goes: “Deng’s China *opened* its gate and ushered in all kinds of *Western* thoughts [that led to June Fourth].” But was the literature written in the 19th century Berlin, Bruxelles, Köln, Paris, and London, by a Renaissance man, who was well-educated enough to be capable of Latin, ancient Greek, German, French, and English, still not Western enough?¹⁷¹ Was a regime that upheld this man’s “ism” as the “universal truth” and denounced Confucianism as the “scum of feudalism” more Chinese or more Western?

Hence, a more proper way to address Deng is that he *reopened* a gate for (a) the non-Marxist part of Western thoughts, of which, being liberal or conservative, most compared with Marxism were

¹⁶⁷ Chen Yun, *Selected Works of Chen Yun (SWCY)*, vol. III (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995), “It Is a Top Priority to Promote Young and Middle-Aged Cadres (8th May 1981).”

¹⁶⁸ *SWCY*, vol. III, “Thousands of Young and Middle-Aged Cadres Should Be Promoted (2nd July 1981).”

¹⁶⁹ *SWDXP*, vol. III (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001), “Answers to Questions from American Journalist Mike Wallace (2nd September 1986).”

¹⁷⁰ Wang’s first foreign language was French, which he acquired from 1972 to 1977 at East China Normal University.

¹⁷¹ Regarding Marx’s competencies in classical languages, cf. “Certificate of Maturity for Pupil of the Gymnasium in Trier (September 24, 1835),” *Marx/Engels Collected Works (MECW)*, Vol. 1, p. 643.

relatively conservative – the only meaningful exception was postmodernism, and for (b) Chinese traditions that naturally constitute the cornerstone of Chinese conservatism – its hierarchical attributes. To be precise, Deng did not “open” but “reopen” the Chinese gate of ideological pluralism – otherwise, how was Marxism introduced into China as early as the 1920s?¹⁷²

Within the CPC’s leadership, the Qiu Shi faction further split into two factional tendencies: “reformism”, represented by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and “conservatism”, represented by Chen Yun and Li Xiannian,¹⁷³ which were in constant contests from 1978 to the early 1990s. Their advocacies and representatives in academia, as part of the 1980s ideological pluralism in Chinese politics and intelligentsia, need to be examined in a broader context of the 20th century China.

¹⁷² The first Chinese version of the *Communist Manifesto* was translated by CHEN Wangdao from its Japanese version in 1920. Incidentally, Chen later (1952) became the President of Fudan University.

¹⁷³ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “China Can Only Take the Socialist Road (3rd March 1987).”

“On the construction site of the Dongfanghong¹⁷⁴ Oil Refinery in the outer suburbs of Beijing, a sweaty construction worker...squatted for lunch behind the scenes of the stage inside the cafeteria and hurriedly opened the newly arrived *Reference News*. On the front page was the report of President Allende’s death in battle. After reading it, he could not help crying. That construction worker was me. What did a Chinese coolie have to do with the Chilean President? That was the internationalism of my generation.”

Bei Dao, “Chilean Notes,” *Green Lamp* (Nanjing: Jiangsu Literature and Art Publishing House, 2008).

“BOURGEOIS LIBERALIZATION”

In addition to the two contesting factional tendencies “reformism” and “conservatism”, the 1980s Chinese politics was also institutionally parallel between the PSC of the Party’s Central Committee and the Central Advisory Commission (CAC) of the Party as “a transitional form of organization”¹⁷⁵ from 1982 to 1992. The members of the PSC were typically of a younger generation (born in the 1920s) and, more importantly, chosen by the CPC’s veterans of Mao’s generation, who served as “advisors” in the CAC. Thus, the General Secretary and other PSC members were *de jure* the Party’s leaders, while the CAC Chairman and other members were *de facto* “more authoritative than the CPC’s Central Committee”¹⁷⁶. The PSC may be compared with *le Conseil des Cinq-Cents*, and the CAC was similar to *le Conseil des Anciens* during *le Directoire*.

The 1980s PSC was seemingly more in favor of “reformism”, with two liberal General Secretaries, Hu Yaobang (1980-1987) and Zhao Ziyang (1987-1989). However, (a) they both were selected by Deng as the CAC’s Chairman (1982-1987), and (b) there were also conservatives in PSC (e.g., Li Peng) as well as reformists (e.g., Xi Zhongxun, though marginalized) in the CAC. The primary difference between the PSC and CAC was institutional rather than ideational.

“Conservatism” in the 13th PSC (1987-) could be found in Li Peng and Yao Yilin, but it was ultimately led by Chen Yun, who served as the CAC’s Chairman from 1987 to 1992. Both Deng and Chen were prominent members of the Qiushi faction against the Gang of Four and the Fanshi faction. However, Chen was in favor of restoring the planned economy of the “17 years” (1949-1966), particular the PRC’s first five-year plan (1953-1957) he directed, which was destroyed during Cultural Revolution, not a market economy as Deng and other reformists envisioned. According to Chen, a socialist economy should be composed of two parts: planned economy and market regulation. “The first part is primary; the second part is the subordinate but necessary.”¹⁷⁷

The economic vision Chen expressed after Mao, at best a Chinese version of gulyáskommunizmus, was “remarkably consistent with his idea...in the mid-1950s”¹⁷⁸. That was a good old time for

¹⁷⁴ Dongfanghong stands for “a red sun in the East”, metaphorically referring to Mao Zedong.

¹⁷⁵ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Speech at the First Plenary Meeting of the Central Advisory Committee (13th September 1982).”

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *SWCY*, vol. III, “Plan and Market (8th March 1979).”

¹⁷⁸ David Bachman, “Differing Visions of China’s Post-Mao Economy: The Ideas of Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhao Ziyang,” *Asian Survey* 26, no. 3 (1986): p. 293.

Chen: “during the formulation and implementation of China’s first five-year plan in the 1950s, we [China and the USSR] cooperated very well with each other.”¹⁷⁹ For conservatives, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang went too far in the direction of “bourgeois liberalization”.

The term “bourgeois liberalization” was first coined by Deng in December 1980: the Party needs to “criticize and oppose the tendency to worship capitalism and advocacy of bourgeois liberalization...anarchism and extreme individualism... carry forward the spirit of patriotism and improve national self-esteem and national self-confidence.”¹⁸⁰ Although the political movement directed named after “bourgeois liberalization”, i.e., ALBC was launched in early 1987 and went down in the second half of the year, “bourgeois liberalization” was the theme behind each struggle between “conservatives” and “reformists” throughout the period from 1978 to early 1990s. The first struggle was in 1983.

ANTI-SPIRITUAL POLLUTION CAMPAIGN

The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign (ASPC) during 1983 was a liquidation of liberal tendencies that had emerged since 1979. The campaign itself, led by Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen and other conservative veterans, was short-lived, roughly from October to December, but its significance was lasting. “Spiritual pollution” as an alternative expression of bourgeois liberalization has disappeared since then, but its antonym “spiritual civilization” is frequently used term in public materials even today.¹⁸¹ The term “spiritual pollution” was never clarified. It roughly included (a) humanism (especially humanist interpretation of Marxism) in academia, (b) literary and artistic works criticizing the Party’s leadership, as well as (c) science fiction, popular music, broadly defined pornography, shawl hair, bell-bottoms, etc.

On 15th August 1980, an article titled “Is Humanism Necessarily Revisionism? A Reevaluation,”¹⁸² was published in *People’s Daily*, arguing that humanism is compatible with Marxism and should be advocated. The article was one of many liberal interpretations of Marxism guided by the Qiushi faction’s ideology, aiming to tone down the violent Jacobinism during the Cultural Revolution, which the article referred to as “a recognition of medieval inhumanity”¹⁸³. However, its authors, the new cohort of editors of *People’s Daily* who replaced Maoists, at the moment could not have realized that the struggle between “reformism” and “conservatism” split from the Qiushi faction had already begun, and this article would later be considered as “spiritual pollution”.

Marx’s critique of capitalism originated from *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in which he found that in capitalism, “the appreciation of things is proportional to the devaluation of men”¹⁸⁴. In this sense, “Marxism is the most thorough humanism”¹⁸⁵. Marx’s humanism, in its spirit, is left-wing (a) “posthumanism”¹⁸⁶, which cannot be confused with (b) “pre-humanism” – what the emerging bourgeoisie of the Renaissance opposed, and (c) bourgeois humanism itself. Having intellectuals realize it or not at that moment, the conservative critique of humanism turned

¹⁷⁹ *SWCY*, vol. III, “China and the Soviet Union Should Live in Harmony (24th December 1984).”

¹⁸⁰ *SWDXP*, vol. II, “Implement the Adjustment Policy to Ensure Stability and Unity (25th December 1980).”

¹⁸¹ Cf. the establishment of the Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization in 1997.

¹⁸² Ru Xin (pseudonym), “Is Humanism Necessarily Revisionism? A Reevaluation,” *People’s Daily*, 15th August 1980.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Jean Baudrillard’s *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (1976).

the Maoist critique of humanism upside down. For them, not only was posthumanism unacceptably “far-left”, but humanism advocated by reformists was also too radical.

Poet Ye Wenfu (b. 1944)’s poems were also identified as “spiritual pollution”. His masterpiece “General, You Can’t Do This” was written when “it was reported that after a senior general who had been ‘cruelly persecuted’ during Cultural Revolution returned back to his position as a leader, he ordered to demolish a kindergarten to build a villa for himself”¹⁸⁷. Ye wrote: “I have never thought of criticizing you. Because maybe it was your hand that held a machine gun firing violently against the old world, snatched away the whip on my spine... You declared: children, we are now liberated... Then, I am barefoot, little feet stepping on your deep and large foot sockets, walked into the new China...”¹⁸⁸ But now “you” have forgotten “the oath when joining the Party... [and the] author of *The Communist Manifesto*...”¹⁸⁹ Understandably, the conservatives accused Ye’s poems of being a “toxic legacy” of the Cultural Revolution launched against “revisionism”, i.e., privileged bureaucrats’ betrayal of the egalitarian spirit of 1949 Revolution, as Ye described in his poems.

When the campaign transcended academia and the arts and involved restrictions on ordinary people’s daily life, it became unpopular. The whole campaign lasted from October 1983 to February 1984; its climax was even shorter, ca. from October to December 1983, because of Hu Yaobang’s intervention. Nonetheless, the ASPC was a significant attack against *le Directoire*. Both liberalism in Chinese society and conservatives’ dissatisfaction with Hu Yaobang continued to grow, which led to student activism in 1986 and ensuing Hu’s fall.

STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN 1986

On 4th December 1986, astrophysicist Fang Lizhi (b. 1936, CPC member), Vice President of the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC), said during a public speech: “I think democracy is not given from the top down but earned by people themselves.”¹⁹⁰ The next day, ca. 4,000 students of USTC and Anhui University marched on the streets, demanding for political representation.

Soon, the wave of student activism spread to neighboring Shanghai. Students of Tongji, Jiao Tong, Fudan, East China Normal University, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and others started demonstrations. Their slogans included “Fight for Democracy and Freedom”, “Down with Dictatorship”, and “Be Free or Die”.¹⁹¹ On 9th December, Fang Lizhi and Guan Weiyan (b. 1928, CPC member), President of USTC, openly supported students’ demands.

As demonstrations continued on 18th December, Jiang Zemin, then the Mayor of Shanghai, was invited to talk with students. On 23rd December, *People’s Daily* published an editorial calling for a “stable and united political situation”¹⁹². Local authorities adopted a mild appeasement policy toward the students, and the situation gradually subsided by the end of December.

The student movement per se, which lasted less than a month, was not of a large scale, but it had a profound impact. As the first student movement since the end of the Cultural Revolution, in

¹⁸⁷ Ye Wenfu, “General, You Can’t Do This,” *Poetry Periodical*, vol. 8 (1979).

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Memorabilia of USTC, 1986. USTC Archives.

¹⁹¹ Anhui Provincial Chronicle Compilation Committee, *Anhui Province Chronicle: Events*, 1986.

¹⁹² “Editorial: Cherish and Develop a Stable and United Political Situation,” *People’s Daily*, 23rd December 1986.

many ways, it resembles the CPC-led student activism against Chiang's dictatorship in the 1940s. In fact, both Jiang Zemin and Guan Weiyan involved themselves in the latter and thus joined the CPC.

During the movement, state media fairly reported students' words and deeds; peaceful demonstrations were respected, and no student was sentenced or expelled. Given the 1986 antecedent, the larger-scaled student protests two years later were a logical evolution. In April 1989, students in Beijing could not have expected their similar actions to be criminalized later.

The factional politics within the CPC's leadership tilted in the conservative direction. In January 1987, General Secretary Hu Yaobang was forced to step down, but he remained popular amongst reformists as well as liberal students and intellectuals. The CAC's conservative veterans [*anciens*] supported Deng Liqun (b. 1915), who favored a planned economy, to be the new General Secretary, but Deng eventually selected Zhao Ziyang, another reformist. ALBC, or 1987 conservative reaction (ca. from February to May), was thus also short-lived due to Zhao's intervention – similar to the ASPC.

JUNE FOURTH INCIDENT

On 15th April 1989, Hu Yaobang died of a heart attack. Students of PKU, Tsinghua, and other universities in Beijing started gathering around the Monument to the People's Heroes in Tiananmen Square. Soon, they further demanded the government solve social issues such as inflation, unemployment, corruption, and accountability due to market reforms, as well as freedom of the press, freedom of association, and democracy.

In the history of the PRC, a precedent for political demonstrations through mourning activities was the April 5th Tiananmen Incident in 1976, during which, also in Tiananmen Square, a large number of people mourned Premier Zhou Enlai, who died in January 1976. Since Zhou was a moderate figure who paid more attention to economic development and people's livelihood rather than “class struggle” during the Cultural Revolution, in the name of a memorial, people were actually expressing their dissatisfaction and tiredness with the radical egalitarians Gang of Four and with *la Terreur*. Mao and the Gang of Four judged the incident as “counterrevolutionary” and deprived Deng (*de facto* leader of the incident)'s positions inside and outside the Party.

Just as the April 5th incident in 1976 was the precursor to the end of *la Terreur*, the mourning for Hu Yaobang in April 1989 was the precursor to the end of *le Directoire*. On 18th April, thousands of students gathered at the Xinhua Gate (entrance of Zhongnanhai), demanding a dialogue with CPC's leaders, especially conservative Premier Li Peng. The Beijing Workers' Autonomous Federation (BAAF) was organized by self-identified “victims”¹⁹³ of market reforms. The Beijing Students' Autonomous Federation (BSAF) was also established on 23rd April,¹⁹⁴ which became the *de facto* commander of a series of students protests thereafter.

On 26th April, *People's Daily* published an editorial titled “We Must Take a Clear Stand against Unrest,” also known as “26th April Editorial”, accusing the demonstrators of plotting to overthrow the CPC-led authority.¹⁹⁵ The editorial represented the conservatives' view, but not necessarily the

¹⁹³ Han Minzhu and Hua Sheng, ed., *Cries for Democracy: Writing and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 271.

¹⁹⁴ Corinna-Barbara Francis, “The Progress of Protest in China: The Spring of 1989,” *Asian Survey* 29, no. 9 (1st September 1989): p. 904.

¹⁹⁵ “Editorial: We Must Take a Clear Stand against Unrest,” *People's Daily*, 26th April 1989.

intention of students, many of whom remained supportive to the Party.¹⁹⁶ Within the Party, reformists including Zhao Ziyang sympathized the students and regarded their demands as in line with “reforms”. The contradiction between Zhao and Li escalated since May,¹⁹⁷ which delayed the coming of the eventual crackdown on 4th June.

T2.1: 13th PSC (till 1989)’s Attitudes towards Crackdown

Opposed	Unreported	Supported
ZHAO Ziyang (1 st ranked) HU Qili (4 th)	QIAO Shi (3 rd)	LI Peng (2 nd) YAO Yilin (5 th)

Tabulation: author.

Amongst the PSC’s five members, the situation was deadlocked: Zhao and Hu Qili were against a crackdown, of which Li and Yao Yilin were in favor. However, amongst veterans, the real authority, the consensus was clearer: a forceful crackdown should be taken place.

T2.2: Veterans’ Attitudes towards Crackdown

Opposed	Unreported	Supported
XI Zhongxun	WAN Li DENG Yingchao SONG Renqiong PENG Zhen	DENG Xiaoping CHEN Yun YANG Shangkun LI Xiannian WANG Zhen BO Yibo

Tabulation: author.

Deng made the most decisive resolution of ordering troops. On 20th May, Deng decided to replace Zhao with Jiang Zemin without informing Zhao and Hu Qili; the same day, Li Peng issued martial law order in Beijing. Though only a few were aware of it, *le Directoire* was already over. Only after the bloodshed on 4th June, had China declared a new era: *le Consulat*. During the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee of the CPC (from 23rd to 24th June 1989), Zhao and Hu Qili were forced to step down, while Jiang became the General Secretary.

¹⁹⁶ Zhao Dingxin, *The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001), p. 155.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

“It was a principle that satisfied Deng Xiaoping’s obsessive fear of chaos, which he indiscriminately identified with both Mao’s Cultural Revolution and the post-Maoist democracy movements.”

M. J. Meisner, *Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic*, p. 540.

“Take but degree away, untune that string, And, Hark! what discord follows....”

W. Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*.

FORMATION OF DENGISM

Deng claimed himself to be both “reformist” and “conservative”¹⁹⁸, meaning being in favor of both a market economy and a one-party state, unlike the reformists who wanted both or conservatives who wanted neither. “It is true that I am a reformist, but I am also against bourgeois liberalization. If opposing bourgeois liberalization is conservative, then I can also be described as a conservative.”¹⁹⁹ However, the two General Secretaries Deng appointed during the 1980s, i.e., Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, were both reformists who “have stumbled on the issue of bourgeois liberalization.”²⁰⁰ Only after 1989 had Deng concluded that his successors must firmly oppose democratization.

MARKET ECONOMY

Deng redefined Marxism and socialism. “What is socialism, and what is Marxism? Our past answer to it was not really correct. Marxism is paying the most attention to the development of productive forces.”²⁰¹ The “superiority” of socialism is that “it develops faster than capitalism” and that it “first develops productivity.”²⁰² Therefore, Marxism is not what Mao and the Gang of Four claimed “rebel is justified” or “class struggle” according to “the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat”, but an effective model of economic growth.

Opposing the disorderly Cultural Revolution and advocating economic development was a proposition shared by the Qiushi faction. Between reformism and conservatism, the debate was whether China should restore the planned economy or reform towards a market economy. To Mao, the planned economy that China transplanted from the USSR during 1950s was a hierarchical, bureaucratic system that bred revisionism and turned the Soviet dictatorship of proletarians into a “fascist” dictatorship, and what China should avoid through Cultural Revolution. For conservatives, this was what they aimed to restore after Cultural Revolution. While for reformists and Deng, the problem was that although a planned economy can ensure a stable order and considerable growth, given

¹⁹⁸ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “China Can Only Take the Socialist Road (3rd March 1987).”

¹⁹⁹ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Two Basic Points of Our Country’s Principles and Policies (4th July 1987).”

²⁰⁰ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Uphold Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution (23rd November 1989).”

²⁰¹ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Build a Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (30th June 1984).”

²⁰² *SWDXP*, vol. II, “Socialism First Develops Productivity (April-May 1980).”

its performance in the Eastern Bloc, it had been proven not as effective as the market economies. Thus, it had shown no superiority or desirability vis-à-vis market economies in China's neighbors. Therefore, Deng declared that "there is no fundamental contradiction between socialism and market economy...years of practice have proved that...planned economy constrains the development of productivity."²⁰³

ONE-PARTY STATE

For Deng, whether a polity is desirable depends on not it is egalitarian or "proletarian", but (a) whether it ensures the "stability"²⁰⁴ of the state, (b) whether it "enhances the unity of the people and improves people's livelihood"²⁰⁵, and (c) whether the economy "develops sustainably"²⁰⁶. Conceivably, a right-wing developmental dictatorship may perfectly meet all three criteria: order, unity, and livelihood. In fact, many right-wing developmental dictatorships meet all three criteria. As long as a polity meets all three criteria, it is desirable. According to Deng's criteria, the Maoist regime that failed to improve people's livelihood was obviously undesirable; more importantly, an illiberal regime that meets all three criteria is more desirable than a liberal regime that does not. "The main goal of China is to develop, get rid of backwardness, strengthen the country and gradually improve the people's livelihood. For achieving them there must be a stable political environment, without which, nothing can be done."²⁰⁷

Deng noticed the contradiction between planned economy and effective development as well as the one between democracy and production. He said when meeting with George H. W. Bush: "if there are demonstrations today, demonstrations tomorrow, demonstrations every day, 365 days a year, then there will be no economic construction at all."²⁰⁸ With Jimmy Carter, he said the same: "if some people take to the streets today, some people take to the streets tomorrow, with a population of one billion, 365 days a year, there will be events every day, how can life be possible? Will people still have the energy to work?"²⁰⁹ Democracy also increases risks and harms investors' confidence: "China cannot allow random demonstrations. If demonstrations are held every day for 365 days a year, nothing will be done, and foreign funds will not come in."²¹⁰ There is no contradiction between a right-wing, pro-business dictatorship and economic development: "if we take stricter standing in this aspect [political stability], foreign investments to China will not decrease. On the contrary, foreign businessmen will feel more at ease."²¹¹ Foreign businessmen may still be hesitating, as they not long ago had witnessed Mao's left-wing dictatorship that was devastating to foreign interests in China, so the CPC "must articulate it clear at home and abroad that we are strengthening control for stability, for better reform and opening up, and for modernization"²¹², in a word, in line with their interests.

²⁰³ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "There Is no Fundamental Contradiction between Socialism and Market Economy (23rd October 1985)."

²⁰⁴ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "How to Evaluate a Country's Political System (27th March 1987)."

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "Nothing Can Be Done without a Stable Political Environment (29th June 1987)."

²⁰⁸ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "The Overriding Thing Is Stability (26th February 1989)."

²⁰⁹ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "Nothing Can Be Done without a Stable Political Environment (29th June 1987)."

²¹⁰ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "China Does not Allow Disorder (4th March 1989)."

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² *Ibid.*

Another source of Deng's fear over democracy, which he shared with the "conservatives", was Cultural Revolution. All who agreed on the crackdown in 1989 considered the democratic movements during the 1980s consistent with the logos of Cultural Revolution. To use Deng's words, the "pernicious influence of anarchism"²¹³ of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four "messed up our party, government, society, and poisoned many young people"²¹⁴, the post-Maoist pro-democracy movements were driven by "ideological system of the Gang of Four [of anti-orderism]"²¹⁵. According to Deng, the first post-Maoist pro-democracy movement, Beijing Spring (1978-1979), was organized by "those who do not work, those who often make troubles, those who are deeply poisoned by the Gang of Four's ideology...extreme individualism and anarchism." The same applied to his comment on the last major post-Maoist pro-democracy movement, viz., the Fourth June Incident in 1989. On the one hand, he criticized "bourgeois liberalization" as the reason for protests; on the other hand, he considered these protests to be as far-leftist as Cultural Revolution. Thus, the position in the political spectrum left for Deng and "conservatives" can only be the Right.

Deng said to Jimmy Carter: "if China replicates your multiparty system and trias politica, it will definitely be a turbulent situation."²¹⁶ The "turbulent situation", on Deng's account, would lead to a "civil war". He said to George H. W. Bush: "we have experienced Cultural Revolution and have witnessed its consequences with our own eyes...if now a billion people engaged in multiparty elections, there would definitely be a chaotic 'all-out civil war' like in Cultural Revolution. Civil war is not necessarily with guns; fists and sticks are enough to be fierce."²¹⁷

Deng's refusal of bourgeois democracy applies to Hong Kong and other countries in general. As a "communist", Deng questioned the struggle for universal suffrage in the capitalist and then colonized Hong Kong: "is universal suffrage necessarily beneficial for Hong Kong? I do not think so...Recently, the Governor of Hong Kong, David Wilson, said that the implementation of universal suffrage should proceed step by step. I think his view is more practical. Even with universal suffrage, there must be a gradual transition."²¹⁸

Nonetheless, Deng did not rule out democracy as a product of economic development, "we want to develop socialist democracy, but we can't do it in a hurry...democracy is our goal, but the state must remain stable."²¹⁹ He expected that by the mid-21st century, "the mainland will be able to implement universal suffrage...[currently] we have a population of one billion with insufficient education, the conditions for universal direct elections are immature."²²⁰

As a revolutionary, Deng, in the 1980s and 1990s, must remember the rhetoric of Chiang's KMT, of Tsiang Tingfu, what he fought against during the 1930s and 1940s, and how the CPC rebuked: "those who oppose democracy have come up with a kind of new rhetoric: democracy is desirable, but our people are not desirable...they lack education and self-independence...if we implement democracy rashly, it will produce bad results...they think realizing democracy is not for today, but

²¹³ *SWDXP*, vol. II, "Adhere to Four Cardinal Principles (30th March 1979)."

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ *SWDXP*, vol. II, "Neither Democracy nor the Rule of Law Can Be Weakened (28th June 1979)."

²¹⁶ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "Nothing Can Be Done without a Stable Political Environment (29th June 1987)."

²¹⁷ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "The Overriding Thing Is Stability (26th February 1989)."

²¹⁸ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "Speech at Meeting with Members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (16th April 1987)."

²¹⁹ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "The Overriding Thing Is Stability (26th February 1989)."

²²⁰ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "Speech at Meeting with Members of the Basic Law Drafting Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (16th April 1987)."

years later; they hope to realize democracy after the Chinese people have become as educated as to the peoples in Euromerican bourgeois democracies...”²²¹

When this text was published as part of the CPC’s *Xinhua Daily* editorial on 25th February 1939, was the 35-year-old Deng inspired by its advocacy for democracy? It was perhaps even harder for the 35-year-old Deng to imagine that he would become a defender of this rhetoric of conservatism half a century later.

The KMT’s *Peace Daily* published an editorial on 26th December 1945: “the CPC is cheating people with so-called universal suffrage and secret ballot. We all know that of 80% Chinese people are not even able to write down their names...this is almost an insult to our people.”²²² Then, the CPC’s *Xinhua Daily* rebuked: “the conclusion that the Chinese people are not yet able to practice democratic election and shall continue be to be “disciplined politically” by them...attempting to delay the implementation of democratic elections, was, indeed, ‘an insult to our people’.”²²³

Deng’s 1980s rhetoric was an antecedent of Chinese communists arguing against democracy by citing China’s socioeconomic underdevelopment. Jiang Zemin said himself knew well about America’s democracy, but he expected the Americans to “understand that a country’s democracy must be linked to the country’s economic development level, historical and cultural traditions, and the education level of the general populace.”²²⁴ It really seems like he failed to do so when he was once amongst the student protesters in demonstrations against Chiang’s dictatorship and thereby joined the CPC in 1946 at the age of 19! Zhu Rongji, then the Premier (1998-2003), said: “the per capita income of the US is 20 times that of China, the ratio of university graduates to the US’ total population is even higher than the ratio of the illiterate plus the primary school graduates to China’s total population...if you talk about human rights to a very poor people, perhaps what they are more interested in is not direct elections, but the rights to education, subsistence, development, cultural



Wen Jiabao (right) with Zhao Ziyang at Tiananmen Square, ca. 4:50 a.m. on 19th May 1989.

life, and medical care...impatience [in improving human rights] does not deliver.”²²⁵ Wen Jiabao, the Premier afterwards (2003-2013), said he believed that “China’s democratic system will develop step by step in accordance with China’s national conditions. This is also unstoppable by any force”²²⁶, although currently “we do not yet have the conditions to implement direct elections, because...first of all, people are not well educated...the maturation of American democracy from 1776 to 1960s also took a long process.”²²⁷ Thank goodness: taking “bourgeois democracy” as the benchmark, the “socialist” China is in a historical, experienced process behind, not in a futuristic, experimental vision beyond.

²²¹ Filed in Xiao Shu (Chen Min), *The Editorial Selections from Xinhua Daily and Liberation Daily: The Forerunner of History—A Solemn Promise Half A Century Ago* (Shantou: Shantou University Press, 1999), p. 38.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

²²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 195-198.


²²⁴ Associated Press Archive, “China: Jiang Zemin Optimistic about Prospects for Trip to the USA,” 25th October 1997.

²²⁵ White House Television, “President Clinton and Premier Zhu at a Press Conference (1999),” 8th April 1999.

²²⁶ Wen Jiabao, “Premier Wen’s Speech at Harvard: Turning Your Eyes to China,” Q&A, 10th December 2003.

²²⁷ Wen Jiabao, “Annual Press Conference: Answering Questions from Chinese and Foreign Journalists,” 14th March 2012.

CHAPTER III
WANG HUNING'S CONTRIBUTIONS





A Photography of Wang Huning © SCMP (2017)

“People living today often complain that our predecessors who made China like this were incompetent. Hopefully, the Chinese in the future will not complain that once again. This is my ultimate wish.”

Wang Huning, *Political Life* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1995).

EMERGENCE OF “CENTRALIZED MODERNIZATION”

Professionalism was unfamiliar to 1980s China, after a highly politicalized period of the Cultural Revolution, during which goodness overwhelmed truthiness and ideology overwhelmed science. A typical feature of academic professionalism is the quantity and quality of academic publications. As a professional scholar – an occupation resurrected not long before, Wang Huning's publications during the 1980s were numerous.

One periodical paper that has withstood the trial of time was titled “Analysis of Political Leadership in the Process of Modernization.”²²⁸ “Political leadership,”²²⁹ he wrote, “determines whether the largest and most majestic modernization project [of China] in human history will succeed.”²³⁰ China's modernization was a constantly emerged thesis amongst Chinese intelligentsia since the late 19th century. It was repropounded in the mid-1980s, proving that previous attempts, including Mao Zedong's utopian experiment, all failed, both in the technoeconomic and sociocultural senses. “Wherever the political leadership can effectively and reasonably allocate social resources, the economic development is relatively fast.”²³¹ Mao's revolutionary leadership was not a positive exemplar – otherwise, Wang's idea of pursuing an “effective and reasonable” political system was needless to be proposed.

The paper's main argument was that (a) China should adopt a political system that can avoid wasting human and material capitals, and (b) such a political system was suggested to be a “centralized” one. From these two principles, no left-wing or progressive prospect could be inferred. It was true that the Maoist regime, like *la Terreur* of Jacobins, was also a “centralized” reign in format, as Wang seemingly suggested. However, what Wang actually referred to was not a replica of Mao's at all. The companionship between “centralization” and left-wing in contemporary political discourse is utterly ahistorical – it was the right-wing Ancien Régime historically associated with despotism. More importantly, on Maoist account, not maximized utility and efficacy but equality – even shared poverty – was the primary goal of the political system. When judging whether a polity is left-wing or not, the paramount criteria is not the state's degree or function but its purpose. For maximized growth of socioeconomic productivity, the polity is not merely a medieval autocracy but, on the other hand, impossible to be left-wing.

²²⁸ Wang Huning, “Analysis of Political Leadership in the Process of Modernization.” *Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)*, no. 2 (1988): 19-25.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

The opposite of “centralized modernization” is “decentralized modernization”²³². Wang argues that efficiency and democracy cannot coexist, “there is a dilemma in between.”²³³ “From the dynamics of the political process, efficiency means a certain restraint on democracy, and democratization means a certain restriction on efficiency.”²³⁴ Wang then cited several cases to support his argument, “since WWII, some emerging countries and regions have made amazing achievements in modernization.”²³⁵ Through these cases, it is disclosed that the obscure difference between “centralization” and “authoritarianism”, between “effective modernization” and capitalist mechanism of the market economy could be – if any.

²³² Ibid., p. 21.

²³³ Ibid., p. 20.

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

²³⁵ Ibid., p. 20.

“The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government, but their degree of government.”

Samuel Phillips Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

LEARN FROM FOUR ASIAN TIGERS AND JAPAN

Deng Xiaoping's dramatic return to power in 1978 marked an economic policy that differed from Mao, Hua Guofeng, and Moscow – something must go beyond the whole self-claimed “socialist world” (regardless of various accusations of revisionism from within) in the Cold War context. During his visits to Japan and Singapore, Deng openly expressed his admiration for market efficiency in these two countries. The question for Wang Huning, as well as many of his scholastic contemporaries, was not “whether” but “what” to learn from the Four Asian Tigers (FATs) – the Republic of Korea, Republic of China (jurisdiction in Taiwan), British Hong Kong, Republic of Singapore – and Japan. This question concerned, in short, whether a synchronic development of both marketization and democratization could be achieved in the course of industrialization.

In his diary, Wang recorded a thesis he supervised: “graduate student Mr. J's thesis *Governmental Reengineering from Plan to Market* consists of two parts: the role of *individuals* and that of the *state* in this transformation...it discussed Hegel's concept of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* [civil society].”²³⁶ J's thesis could be seen as a typical attempt to the mentioned question. Wang believed that the *individuals* “must”²³⁷ be of “autonomous and free personality...an independent one”²³⁸ in accordance with a market economy. However, when it comes to whether the *state* should also be an entity independent from individuals, society, army, party, media, and market, his words became vague: “the issue...is more complicated... at present, [it] has not been determined...”²³⁹

Indeed, the issue of the *state* was not determined yet academically and politically in the 1980s, but Wang certainly had his own academic standing point, which was adopted politically along with his promotion to Beijing after 1989. On his standing point, as he wrote in his diary: “the thesis is on how to transform a postrevolutionary society to an orderly society.”²⁴⁰ What does an “orderly” society look like? Wang's 1986 comments on the FATs and Japan bear quoting at length: “from the ruins of a defeated country, Japan has become one of the world's top economic powerhouses after more than two decades of hard work...the FATs have achieved globally recognized achievements in economic development within a short period.”²⁴¹

Wang's description of the economic aspects of the FATs and Japan was undoubtedly accurate. He also believed that their economic successes were thanks to their “centralized” political system. In the case of Japan, “although it amended the constitution after WWII, established a constitutional monarchy and implemented a democratic system, its polity has been actually...maintaining a high

²³⁶ Wang Huning, *Political Life* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1995), “2nd January”.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Ibid.

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., “24th April”.

²⁴¹ Wang Huning, “Analysis of Political Leadership in the Process of Modernization,” p. 20.

degree of concentration and consistency...since 1955, the LDP has never lost power...[Japan's political condition that] its polity has been *conservative* and stable and its politics has been consistent for a long time...has enabled it to distribute social resources.”²⁴² Amongst the FATs, there was no constitutional system at all: “South Korea has long been controlled by the military, Taiwan has a one-party rule, and Hong Kong's political system is colonial...wherein democratic election had never existed.”²⁴³

Wang's description of the political aspects of the FATs and Japan was undoubtedly accurate as well. However, the implications he delivered here, explicitly and inexplicitly, are prodigious. First of all, Wang explicitly used the word “conservative” in a commendatory manner to portray the LDP. His description was absolutely correct,²⁴⁴ in fact, the LDP was a founding member of the Conservative International (IDU) in June 1983, alongside the GOP, Margaret Thatcher, Jacques Chirac, and Helmut Kohl.²⁴⁵ The marvelous was that Wang Huning, who joined the CPC in 1984 – two years before he wrote this paper, flagrantly appraised “conservative” and stability as desirable political characteristics and appreciated the Japanese polity of decades-long right-wing rule for being able to “distribute social resources effectively.”

On Wang's account, Japan's long-term right-wing rule was its advantage vis-à-vis other major democracies. Wang appreciated Japan's refusal to the joint G7 sanction on China after the 1989 crackdown: the conservative “[Japan] worries about the uncertainty accompanied with the democratic process, which will negatively affect Japan [’s economic interests in China],”²⁴⁶ while the advantage of FATs was that they were not even democracies. Indeed, FATs were all right-wing authoritarian rules. Wang, perhaps intentionally, avoided naming the “military” that ruled South Korea and the ruling party in the “one-party” Taiwan – Chiang's KMT, which the CPC launched a two-decades revolution (1927-1949) and then a three-decade communist experiment (1949-1976) to fight against! The ROK and ROC were twins – vis-à-vis DPRK and PRC – in the Western Pacific during the Cold War – protected by the United States and authoritarian capitalistic at home.

T3.1: List of Presidents of the ROK (1948-)

Period	President	Party	Position
1948-1960	Syngman Rhee	Liberal Party (S.K.)	Far Right
1960-1961	Yun Posun	Democratic Party (S.K., 1955)	Centre Right
1961-1979	Park Chung-hee	Democratic Republican Party (S.K.)	Far Right
1979-1980	Choi Kyu-hah ²⁴⁷	Independent	/
1980-1988	Chun Doo-hwan	Democratic Justice Party (S.K.)	Far Right
1988-1993	Roh Tae-woo	New Korea Party	Right
1993-1998	Kim Young-sam		Centre Right
1998-2003	Kim Dae-jung	Democratic Party (S.K., 2000)	Centre
2003-2008	Roh Moo-hyun	Uri Party	Centre Left
2008-2013	Lee Myung-bak	Liberty Korea Party	Right
2013-2017	Park Geun-hye		
2017-2022	Moon Jae-in	Democratic Party of Korea	Centre Left
2022-	Yoon Suk-yeol	People Power Party	Right

²⁴² Ibid., p. 21.

²⁴³ Ibid., p. 21.

²⁴⁴ Cf. Table 7.1.

²⁴⁵ The LDP's membership in IDU was from 1983 to 1997.

²⁴⁶ Wang Huning, *Political Life* (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1995), “6th February”.

²⁴⁷ Choi Kyu-hah was in power *de jure*, not *de facto*. Therefore, Kim Dae-jung was regarded the first liberal President of South Korea.

Tabulation: author.

T3.2: List of Presidents of the ROC in Taiwan

Period	President	Party	Position
1950-1975	Chiang Kai-shek	KMT	Far Right Right Centre Right
1975-1978	Yen Chia-kan		
1978-1988	Chiang Ching-kuo		
1988-2000	Lee Teng-hui		
2000-2008	Chen Shui-bian	DPP	Centre Left
2008-2016	Ma Ying-jeou	KMT	Centre Right
2016-	Tsai Ing-wen	DPP	Centre Left

Tabulation: author.

By 1988 when Wang's paper was published, both Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were military. Wang's description of South Korean politics was indeed accurate. However, what Wang did not mention was that South Korean politics was not only "military", but also right-wing, if not far-right, and hawkishly anti-communist. Likewise, Wang accurately described post-War Taiwan as a "one-party" rule, but attentively not point out the right-wing, anti-communist nature of the KMT during Chiang's reign. This was extraordinary artistry of writing – the author's intention must be revealed through others' sharp-eyed interpretations. Such artistry of text was within a context of fabricated discourses.

Wang joined the CPC in 1984, but apparently the CPC then was no longer "communist", at least in the Maoist sense.²⁴⁸ However, it was, obviously, impossible for Wang to claim the failure of communism vis-à-vis far-right capitalist dictatorship bluntly and unequivocally, as the CPC still authoritatively claims its "continued" legitimacy from the ideological origin its establishment to the present. Such a whole set of bizarre and grotesque discursive landscapes continued to shape everything afterwards.

Wang indirectly mentioned the political condition of Singapore, which was unsurprisingly another long-term right-wing one-party state. If there were anything new, it must be a professed hereditarianism.

T3.3: List of Singaporean Prime Ministers

Period	Prime Minister	Party	Position
1959-1990	Lee Kuan Yew	People's Action Party	Right
1990-2004	Goh Chok Tong		
2004-	Lee Hsien Loong ²⁴⁹		

Tabulation: author.

Wang's citation of British Hong Kong as an example of good governance – a colony of no partisan politics at all, to be clear, was not only anti-democratic but also, whether by right or not, a defense of colonialism.²⁵⁰ This defense was in contradiction to Maoist leftist nationalism; in fact, it can hardly be accommodated with nationalistic sentiment in any ideological position, being conservative, liberal, or radical. It was to recognize not democracy that never existed or the rule by *British*,

²⁴⁸ Cf. how communism was transformed from immediate action to an indefinitely postponed future in the CPC's post-Maoist official discourse, especially the Dengist idea of the "primary stage of socialism".

²⁴⁹ Lee Hsien Loong is Lee Kuan Yew's oldest son.

²⁵⁰ Cf. Bruce Gilley's retracted paper, "The Case for Colonialism", *Third World Quarterly*, 2017 (Republished in *Academic Questions*, June 2018, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 167-185). On his account, colonialism is a conservative structure of governance. In fact, anticolonialism may be conservative as well (e.g., Chiang's KMT), not being against the conservative structure of governance during colonization but the colonizers or governors.

but the socioeconomic structure during the British rule of authoritarian capitalism that could be, and ideally should be operated by the *Chinese* instead.

Apart from the FATs and Japan, Wang also cited Brazil as a model: “Brazil once became a leader in the economic development of Latin America...[it] has been under military rule by those who came to power through a coup since 1964, which enabled it to distribute social resources militarily.”²⁵¹ Wang’s list could have been endless. The Aliança Renovadora Nacional’s *right-wing* dictatorship was amongst a broader trend in the post-War Iberian world, to name an archetypal few: Francisco Franco, António de Oliveira Salazar, Augusto Pinochet, Fulgencio Batista, et al. Here again, as a nominal “communist”, Wang did not and would never mention their hard-core anti-communist faces – conceivably not due to incomprehension, but for conscious purpose.

In conclusion, Wang wrote: “the centralized modernization model can concentrate powerful political forces, which is a necessary guarantee for modernization... most of the succeeded modernizations were those with centralized decision-making power.”²⁵² The value-free word “centralized” that Wang used was indeed bewildering, is it right-wing or left-wing, to what does it actually refer? It could be easily understood by comparing the 1930s debate between the KMT’s Tsiang Tingfu and liberal intellectual Hu Shih. Wang Huning’s description of the 1980s debate best corresponds to what happened in the 1930s: “some scholars assert that a state in rapid modernization cannot be accompanied with democracy, while the opposition argues that democratic leadership can largely mobilize the people to deal with problems occurred in economic development.”²⁵³

²⁵¹ Wang Huning, “Analysis of Political Leadership in the Process of Modernization,” pp. 20-21.

²⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

“We have witnessed what amounts to a cultural revolution, comparable to the one in China if not worse, and whereas the Chinese have to some extent overcome their cultural revolution, I see many signs that ours is getting worse all the time...”

Paul Oskar Kristeller, “A Life of Learning,” *The American Scholar* 60, no. 3 (1991): p. 348.

MORAL CRITIQUE OF AMERICAN COUNTERCULTURE

Within the context of the 1980s Sino-American strategic quasi-alliance vis-à-vis Moscow, Wang Huning lived in the United States from 1988 to 1989 as a visiting professor at the invitation of the American Political Science Association.²⁵⁴ During his stay, he became



Wang Huning (Leftist) Accompanies with Jiang Zemin (Rightist), Possibly on 24th June 2001.

a confidant of Jiang Mianheng (b. 1951), who was doing PhD in Electrical Engineering at Drexel University, Philadelphia. Incidentally, Jiang Mianheng is the eldest son of Jiang Zemin, Deng’s successor, after 4th June 1989. Wang Huning’s political career was closely associated with the CPC’s Shanghai Committee in the 1980s. Not only did Jiang Zemin, who served as the Mayor and Party Secretary of Shanghai, become the CPC’s General Secretary, but other younger officials in Shanghai, such as Zeng Qinghong (b. 1939) and Wu Bangguo (b. 1942) were also promoted to the PSC during the 1990s and 2000s. This climactic faction with Jiang Zemin as its core has been labelled as the “Shanghai Clique”²⁵⁵ within the CPC, which determined China’s politics for two decades thereafter. Wang Huning, the éminence grise’s intellectual thoughts were embodied in all aspects of Shanghai Clique’s policies and beyond.

Wang Huning published a collection of essays on his experiences in the United States titled *America against America* afterwards. The book consisted of eleven chapters, covering America’s landscapes, constitutional tradition, national character, standardization and social management, technology, interest groups and multiparty politics, campaign and bureaucratic system, corporate governance, higher education, and think tanks. Although the book was not intended to be academic, it basically stuck to a value-free tone. Most of its content was either introductory or affirmative. Only in the last chapter, titled “Undercurrents of Crisis”, did Wang unobtrusively propose his perception of America’s societal problems.

“The best things are in America, so are the worst things.”²⁵⁶ On Wang’s account, the best thing, in a word, was the high socioeconomic productivity in America. “Education and technology do not produce any material product but create the future.”²⁵⁷ While the worst thing, in a word, was the “moral slippage” in America, such as “hordes of prostitutes on the street.”²⁵⁸ Are non-marital sex,

²⁵⁴ Wang Huning, *America against America*, p. 8.

²⁵⁵ Cf. an early reference of the term, David Bachman, “China in 1994: Marking Time, Making Money,” *Asian Survey* 35, no. 1 (1995): p. 37.

²⁵⁶ *America against America*, p. 100.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 314.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

homosexuality, and pornography acceptable? “These self-evident issues in the past have now become disputable.”²⁵⁹ Due to deeply rooted individualistic culture, “Americans lost the ability to live with others,” he wrote, “I personally reckon this would become a serious societal problem.”²⁶⁰ Many young American couples are “way too selfish”²⁶¹, as they do not pay attention to the education of their children. “Two thousand years ago Aristotle said, ‘family is the cell of society’...this cell is decomposed in America...too traditional family is disadvantaged to individual development but is too loose family advantaged for social progress?”²⁶² Wang believed that the decomposition of family or familial estrangement is “unhelpful for a *harmonious society*,”²⁶³ one solution to which was the “neoconservatism that emphasizes the function of family”.²⁶⁴ However, Wang judged that neoconservatism could hardly work due to the systematically individualistic societal mechanism in America. Wang’s ideal was a structural guarantee against familial estrangement, the exemplar of which was “Singapore, which attempts to reduce the social instability caused by modernization by promoting Confucianism.”²⁶⁵

The term “harmonious society” Wang coined here became the keyword of a nationwide propaganda campaign during the mid-2000s (first proposed in the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC, September 2004) as part of the Scientific Outlook of Development, the official ideology of Hu Jintao Administration, in which Wang served as a theoretician.



Hu Jintao talks with Barack Obama on 26th June 2010, G20 Toronto Summit. Behind: Wang Huning. The White House.

From Wang’s point of view, familial estrangement is the culprit that led to a series of social problems: many American youths cannot do the math, “[as the American conservatives pointed out] lack of values, discipline, and goals,”²⁶⁶ some teenagers run away from home due to family tensions, “if most people are of the Beat Generation, how can the society progress?”²⁶⁷ Essentially, he concluded: “in a society full of individualism and privacy, harmony is impossible.” The opposite to America’s failure was “Japan, the developmental success of which was thanks to its ‘complete educational mechanism’ for the youth.”²⁶⁸

In addition to the “youth problems”, Wang also cited the proliferation of drugs, rampant underworld, plenty of homeless people, and African and indigenous minorities as the “undercurrents of crisis” in America. These public security issues cannot appear in Wang’s ideal society. To deal with these problems, Wang quoted the magnum opus of Allan David Bloom, an eloquent intellectual of Straussian conservatism, *The Closing of the American Mind*,²⁶⁹ which, “allegedly, was recommended by President Reagan”²⁷⁰. Bloom argued that the prevalent cultural relativism was

²⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 98-100.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 344.

²⁶¹ Ibid., p. 345.

²⁶² Ibid., p. 347.

²⁶³ Ibid., p. 348.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 351.

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 354.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 356.

²⁶⁹ Cf. Allan David Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987).

²⁷⁰ Wang Huning, op. cit., p. 379.

“nihilism”, questioning correctness and classics, and the youth are becoming of “self-centeredness”. Bloom’s ideal education shall foster the fundamental values of the Western tradition, and the students shall read Plato, Shakespeare, Kant, *Анна Каренина*, *Le Rouge et le Noir*, instead of Camus’ *L’Étranger* and feminism. Wang commented: “if the value system collapses, how can the social order sustain?”²⁷¹ There would be no inheritance without education, and if the education “were to be democratic and chosen by people, the new generation would unlikely have any belief...everybody thinking about social stability and development might deal with this issue first.”²⁷²

Wang was amongst the few Chinese intellectuals to first recognize the significance of *The Closing of the American Mind* before its Chinese edition was published in 1994. To a certain extent, Wang politically enforced its spirit “with Chinese characteristics”, while Gan Yang (b. 1952), a doctoral pupil of Allan David Bloom at Chicago (John U. Nef Committee on Social Thought), intellectually developed such appreciation for it.

“Amongst our most basic ethics, such as no lie, no killing, no arson, and no stealing, which is originated from modern society? A truly benign modern society does not lie in the formation of a set of modern morals that are completely different from the traditions but in traditional morals that are being well maintained in modern life...Unfortunately, since the May Fourth Movement, China had been advocating an incredibly chaotic and unfounded moral proposition: as we wanted to enter a modern society, we must obtain a new set of morals that are completely different from our traditional one...In reality, the basic ways of behaving in rural China had remained extreme traditional, from the revolutionary period to the reform and opening up, and even until the 1990s.”²⁷³

In this text, Gan Yang applied the Straussian critique of modernity well to the Chinese case. Strauss warned of the danger of modernity, calling classical republican exponent Machiavelli a “teacher of evil”. “Bloom sharply criticized the fashionable ‘multiculturalism’ in Western academia for having no intention to learn from non-Western cultures but exporting the popular ‘cultural studies’ like gender studies, race studies, and homosexuality studies, viz., the ‘academics of political correctness’ in the United States, to non-Western countries...which is precisely a ‘bestowing’ mentality, ‘a disguised form of a new imperialism’ and ‘the Peace Corp mentality’.”²⁷⁴

In light of Bloom’s philosophy of education, Gan Yang served as the first dean of the Liberal Arts College of Sun Yat-sen University, the students of which learn classical Chinese²⁷⁵, Latin and ancient Greek, and Confucian literature such as *Shijing* (ca. 11th to 7th century BC). The May Fourth Movement was, precisely, the direct juncture of the birth of the CPC. Communism in China, as in other places²⁷⁶, was initially accompanied by anarchism – Mao Zedong was among the first Chinese anarchists. Gan Yang pointed out the fact that the Chinese radicalisms of the 20th century, to a large extent, were political results of a handful of coastal urbanized/colonialized, Westernized/Russianized, or “modernized” cultural elites. At the same time, the rural China that accounts

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 379.

²⁷² Ibid., pp. 383-384.

²⁷³ Gan Yang, “Family at the Center of Moral Reconstruction,” *21st Century Business Herald*, 29th January 2012.

²⁷⁴ Gan Yang, “Introduction,” *Political Philosopher Strauss* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2002).

²⁷⁵ Classical Chinese, in a broad sense, is defined as the literary Chinese before the May Fourth Movement, equivalent to Latin.

²⁷⁶ To name a few: François-Noël Babeuf, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Auguste Blanqui [Blanquisme], Peter Kropotkin, Ba Jin, Stanislav Kostka Neumann et al.

for the vast majority was unattached to those avant-garde ideological trends imported from abroad. Even worse, both republicanism and communism they translated, introduced, and transplanted to China, had failed to “modernize” – as they dreamed – the majority of Chinese people. Those revolutions failed to change China’s agricultural nature. Thus, most people still stuck to their pre-modern lifestyle, which best explains why the CPC’s conservative turn in the 1990s did not receive any massive, revolutionary resistance – radicalism was never really rooted in this country.

Gan Yang wrote: “what has the greatest destruction on our moral foundation” cannot be mistaken, is “capitalism.”²⁷⁷ Morality in capitalist societies “must be an external thing...formed in the pre-capitalist era, in the history of human civilization for thousands of years.”²⁷⁸ Here it comes to how socialism could be right-wing – critique of capitalism could be conservative. In Gan Yang’s ultra-conservative advocacy for a familist “Confucian socialism”, the critique of capitalism, to wit, modernism, is essentially premodernism, not postmodernism that inspired by Marxism and anarchism. Thus, in the Marxist historical materialist paradigm of “feudalism---capitalism---socialism”, feudalism and socialism, right and left, are being tacitly merged.

Nonetheless, Gan Yang’s deeds cannot be reduced to pure sophism. “The moral model in the Maoist era was Lei Feng because he embodied the best of Chinese tradition and Confucian ethics.”²⁷⁹ Mao never thought in this way, it was Gan Yang who intentionally interpreted this, to use the Straussian term, “esoteric” way – the Maoists destroyed the Temple of Confucius, Qufu in 1966. This feat was equivalent to smashing the St. Peter’s Basilica Church in the Vatican. *Tel Quel*, the birthplace of French intellectual anticapitalism in the name of postmodernism, declared its support for Maoism in 1971. To Mao and his French disciples, Lei Feng’s altruism, selflessness, and sacrifice were symbols of communism, not of Confucianism. Nevertheless, most Chinese people’s perception of Lei Feng, may as Gan Yang interpreted it, was based on the traditional values they were familiar with instead of something initially written in French. Being contradictory to the Smithian market logic, the spirit Lei Feng signifies is enough to attract anti-capitalists from both sides of the political spectrum.

Gan Yang perhaps went way too far in the direction of medieval idylls, although he claimed that his advocacy was to “form a healthy conservatism that is suitable for today”²⁸⁰. Wang Huning, on the other hand, insisted on a “developmental” conservatism, wherein economic growth is highly valued. He had no intention to build up a Qing dynasty in the name of communism, primitive both technologically and socially.²⁸¹ The reason why he criticized American individualism was not because he found himself mentally disgusted, but that he found potential alternatives – Japan and Singapore. The modern histories of the two till the 1990s, and even to the present, could be characterized as monstrous successes of conservatism. Wang saw a possible prospect of China with both high-tech and a high degree of social safety – the latter comes at the cost of individual privacy. His 1980s prospect has turned into reality.

The book was titled *America against America*, but its last section of the last chapter was oddly all about Japan. “Japan’s economic invasion of the United States far exceeded the Pearl Harbor incident.”²⁸² America that was “based on individualism, hedonism, and democracy, is losing to a

²⁷⁷ Gan Yang, “Family at the Center of Moral Reconstruction.”

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Gan Yang, “Kang Youwei and the Issue of Conservatism,” *21st Century Business Herald*, 18th August 2018.

²⁸¹ This mentality has to do with Chinese nationalism as well as modernism – if the former is not within the latter.

²⁸² Wang Huning, op. cit., p. 385.

system of collectivism, sacrificialism, and authoritarianism.”²⁸³ However, many Americans believed that the Japanese cultural atmosphere is “underdeveloped”, impliedly meaning inferior, and would not accept it. To Wang’s understanding, cultural divergence, instead of trade disputes or geopolitics, was the “deepest and most irreconcilable dimension”²⁸⁴ in the U.S.-Japan tensions during the 1990s. Wang ended with a sentence resonating now: “next century, there must be more nations to challenge America. Only then will Americans reflect on themselves.”²⁸⁵

Again, it is needful to state that most contents of *America against America* were dedicated to introducing, if not appraising America’s modernist achievements to China, until the very last chapter that has been intensively examined above. The American and Japanese societies surely shared more in common than China with America or Japan in the late 1980s. Wang Huning, as a Dengist, overwhelmingly supported China to catch up with the advanced capitalist countries in terms of socioeconomic productivity, and this fundamental proposition fixed his commendatory tone on America’s market-oriented system vis-à-vis, for instance, the Soviet model. Highlighting Wang’s critique of the cultural aspect of American society aims to figure out the *direction* of his intention to modify textbook-like capitalism somewhat (if the term capitalism is not entirely defined by or as a synonym of America) – either conservative or progressive. His ideal, Japan, was obviously the former.

Since the Perry Expedition, pre- or post-WWII, Japan had exemplified an invincible epic of conservatism. The post-WWII Japan that Wang analyzed in this book was based on the right-wing LDP’s consecutive ruling without institutional exclusion, which the US-drafted 1947 Constitution prohibited. Therefore, the supports for LDP can only be explained by a conservative culture or mentality, which Wang looked for. The right-wing historical revisionism of 20th century China that emerged in post-Maoist China was formed in comparison with Japan and the FATs. This was a right/left ideological distinction; it had nothing to do with East/West, Japan/America, socialism/capitalism, or underdeveloped/developed. The Japanese are not conservative; the conservatives are conservative. The more historical pre-WWII Japan that was not analyzed by political scientist Wang was more complicated, as it challenged both the republican and communist revolutions in China – the latter was of imperative importance for the CPC’s historical legitimacy.

As for the American “societal problems” Wang listed, it seems that he was either not informed by the 1960s origins of them or intentionally avoided mentioning them due to, again, self-censorship. In *Forrest Gump* (1994), Gump, after playing ping-pong in China, was invited to a TV show:

Host: Here he is, Forrest Gump. Right here. Gump, have a seat. Forrest Gump, John Lennon.

Lennon: Welcome home.

Host: Can you tell us, um, what was China like?

Gump: In the land of China, people hardly got nothin’ at all.

Lennon: *No possessions?*

Gump: And in China, they never go to church.

Lennon: *No religion too?*

Host: Hard to *imagine*.

²⁸³ Ibid., p. 389.

²⁸⁴ Wang Huning, “The Contradictory Structure of Japan-U.S. Relations in the 1990s: Surface and Deep,” *Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)*, no. 3 (1992): p. 26.

²⁸⁵ Wang Huning, *America against America*, p. 390.

Lennon: Well, *it's easy if you try*, Dick.

This scene illustrated three characters: left-wing Lennon, “neutral” Dick, and conservative Gump. Lennon’s lines correspond to the lyrics of *Imagine*, an icon of 1960s utopianism: “Imagine there’s no heaven/It’s easy if you try/.../And no religion too/.../Imagine no possessions/...” While the figure of Gump represented “the Burial of the Counterculture”²⁸⁶, and even projected the Gingrich Revolution against President Clinton, which was manifested in the legislative agenda named *Contract with America*, especially the Personal Responsibility Act that discourages illegitimacy and teen pregnancy.



Ultra-linkse studenten op binnenplaats Sorbonne winkeltje ingericht met portretten Mao-Lenin-Marx, 21 mei 1968. Eric Koch / Anefo. Nationaal Archief.

Maoism inspired two types of trends within the post-WII “West”: (a) in developing dictatorships; for instance, José Manuel Barroso was a leader of PCTP/MRPP²⁸⁷ in the fight against the Salazarist Estado Novo, who perceived the CPC’s victory over the KMT as a prototype of their revolution, and (b) in developed democracies, for instance, Jens Stoltenberg joined the Red Youth²⁸⁸, advocating for feminism and pacifism. Similar to Stoltenberg’s case, the 1960s American radicals’ motive to destroy social hierarchies made what Wang referred to as “a culture of democracy and hedonism”.

It has to be stated that both trends that Barroso and Stoltenberg represented were based on misperceptions of Maoism. The main cause of these misperceptions could be concise if not economic reductionist: in the 1960s, China, Portugal, and Norway were economically in three parallel worlds. The communist revolution in China was more comparable to a scenario of the leftist victories in the post-WWII Spanish and Greek civil wars instead of peaceful democratization. And the post-materialist interpretations of Maoism by Herbert Marcuse and *Tel Quel* were purely intellectual. However, despite their different contexts, the spirit of Maoist texts was explicitly left-wing, and that spirit contradicted the 1990s CPC. Lee Teng-hui, who transformed the KMT into a center-right party and Taiwan into a democracy, recalled his experience in the United States:

“My years at Cornell from 1965 to 1968 made an indelible impression on me. This was a time of social turbulence in the United States, with the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War protest. Yet, despite that turbulence, the American democratic system prevailed. It was also the time I first recognized that full democracy could engender ultimately peaceful change, and...I returned to my homeland determined to make my contribution toward achieving full democracy for our society.”²⁸⁹

Lee Teng-hui’s words unveiled a mind-blowing hidden cycle throughout 20th century China. When Taiwan democratized in the 1990s – indirectly inspired by Maoism, the Chinese mainland, in effect, turned back to the 1930s. While the KMT no longer dictated the ROC in Taiwan, as Marxist

²⁸⁶ Thomas B. Byers, “History Re-membered: Forrest Gump, Postfeminist Masculinity and the Burial of the Counterculture,” *MFS Modern Fiction Studies* 42, no. 2 (1996): 419-444.

²⁸⁷ Partido Comunista dos Trabalhadores Portugueses/Movimento Reorganizativo do Partido do Proletariado was a far left, Maoist, anti-revisionist political party founded in 1970 and was active during the Carnation Revolution.

²⁸⁸ Geir Salvesen, *Thorvalds verden* (Oslo: Schibsted, 1994), pp. 398-399. Red Youth (Bokmål: Rød Ungdom; Nynorsk: Raud Ungdom) was a Norwegian youth league of the far-left Red Party founded in 1963.

²⁸⁹ Lee Teng-hui, “With the People Always in My Heart (9th June 1995),” Office of the President, ROC.

Sinologist Arif Dirlik observed, the CPC had “followed a trajectory similar to that of the KMT in the 1930s.”²⁹⁰ Wang Hui wrote in 1994 that within the post-1989 context, “Confucian capitalism and contemporary China’s ‘reformist socialism’ [viz., Dengism or SwCC] became two expressions of the same thing.”²⁹¹ The utopia was broken away: it might be easy if you try to *imagine* no possessions and no religion too, but it is hard to *materialize* that.

²⁹⁰ Arif Dirlik, “June Fourth at 25: Forget Tiananmen, You Don’t Want to Hurt the Chinese People’s Feelings – and Miss Out on the Business of the New ‘New China’!” *International Journal of China Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, June/August 2014, p. 307. By “New China” Dirlik meant the PRC, and the “New ‘New China’” was to suggest that the revolutionary PRC had been overturned.

²⁹¹ Wang Hui, “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity,” *The Quarterly Changbi* 48 (1994). Republished in *Whither China: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 161-198.

“The Lee Kuan Yew regime enforced various fascist laws, decrees and regulations to deprive the Singaporean people of their civil rights...”

“The Asian-African Journalists Association’s Secretariat Passed a Resolution to Support the People’s Struggles in All Countries,” *People’s Daily*, 26th April 1966.

“The social order in Singapore is good. They control it strictly. We should learn from their experiences and manage it even better.”

Deng Xiaoping, “Speeches in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai and Other Cities (1992),” *SWDXP*, Vol. III.

“Their [Lee Kuan Yew and Deng Xiaoping] great achievements are always worthy of our commemoration. [Applause]”

Xi Jinping, “Speech at the National University of Singapore (7th November 2015).”

SINGAPORE MODEL AND LEE’S “SOCIALISM THAT WORKS”

This section deals with Singapore itself as a conservative case and Wang Huning’s perception of it. The case of Singapore on Wang’s account was more or less similar to that of Japan but even more ethnically proximate to China. The widespread fascination with the Singapore Model in the post-Maoist Chinese academia was understandable: Singapore represented a truly modernized prospect for China. A few words by Wang Huning in 1993 reflected such sentiment and hope: “What would be China’s future? Singapore is a modernized, [ethnically] Chinese society, which has encountered various challenges brought by *Western* culture and is looking for ways to fight it. This process is enlightening for all Chinese societies.”²⁹²

Wang hinted that Singapore stands for China’s future, not only in the sense that it was economically advanced but also in the sense that it was politically and socioculturally unique. Its uniqueness, to be precise, was that it stuck to a traditional way to mitigate the “side effects”²⁹³ of modernization. Like America, Singapore also got what Wang referred to as “youth decadence”²⁹⁴, for instance, “young people in fancy clothes wandering the streets with nothing to do” and homosexuality “introduced from the *West*”, however, “homosexual parades like in America are not tolerated in Singapore.”²⁹⁵

It is conceivable that Singapore’s homosexual phenomena were possibly influenced by those in America, but the contradiction was not in between imagined *West* and *East* but between conservatives and liberals – it was ideological, not ethnocultural. Homosexuality and other kinds of what Wang referred to as “societal diseases” such as lack of social responsibility and working spirit were not “Western” – they were targeted by those conservative defenders of “Western civilization” as well, but simply “liberal” – if not anarchic. Regrettably, Wang’s text was amongst a far more prevalent discursive trend in early 1990s China, misleadingly connecting the geographical and the

²⁹² Wang Huning, “Tutor’s Notes,” *Debate in the Lion City* (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1993), p. 238.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

ideological, constructing a pervasive and populist myth of oriental socialism [conservatism!] versus occidental capitalism [liberalism!], which cannot stand up to scrutiny.

This myth was not originated in China – an “oriental” state that once radically enforced communism, a hypermodern “occidental” ideology – but was introduced to the Dengist China as part of the “advanced experiences in social management” from capitalist countries, including Singapore. The Singaporean government believed that it was necessary to restore and promote Confucian values, in order “to eliminate the unhealthy trends of *Western* indulgence and individualism”²⁹⁶. Wang observed during his stay in Singapore that an official textbook titled *Confucian Ethics* was “indoctrinated in primary schools...and adopted by middle schools nationwide since 1985.”²⁹⁷ For example, the Confucian apothegm “the emperor is the emperor, the vassal is the vassal, the father is the father, and the son is the son”²⁹⁸ was reinterpreted as “[in our society] the leaders should behave like a leader, the employees should behave like an employee, the fathers should behave like a father, and the son should behave like a son.”²⁹⁹ According to this logic, it can also be inferred that men should behave as a man and women should behave as a woman. Such efforts to strengthen and stereotype hierarchical social roles were claimed to be in line with a sort of Sino-ness of Singapore, but actually they were in line with the sociocultural conservatism of the right-wing PAP that ruled Singapore since its independence. Furthermore, the PAP initiated a governmental program of welfare housing suitable for “three generations living under one roof”³⁰⁰ to maintain and encourage family-oriented relationships. All these measures, from a Maoist point of view, can be exaggerated into one word – fascism³⁰¹. But Wang was distinctly impressed; he wrote: “ethics and morality incarnate the essence of Chinese culture...[in Singapore] many young people still live with their parents and talk to their parents out of courtesy when they go out at night.”³⁰² What orderly heaven compared with the post-1960s mess by which Wang shocked in America!

“Young people [in China] do not really understand Confucianism...its presence in China’s cultural atmosphere is justified and cannot be eliminated by human forces. It’s not only an ideological system but also a reflection of lifestyle...order, being political, economic, or social, is ultimately spiritual. Before a spiritual order is formed, no actual order can be solid. This is the most valuable point of Confucianism. A world cannot be without order, nor can it be without ethical order...as Confucianism emphasizes. The problem is not what kind of content is used to construct order, but the need for the order itself.”³⁰³

Do not be confused: the PAP was by no means a religious fundamentalist against the *West*. In fact, Singapore was a strategic ally of America and a founding member of the anti-communist ASEAN within the context of the Vietnam War, belonging to the *Western* camp during the Cold War. Lee Kuan Yew, the soul of the PAP, was proud that he made the third-world Singapore a first-world

²⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 229.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 229.

²⁹⁸ Disciples of Confucius (ed.), *Analects*, Book XII. “Yen Yuan”, Chapter XI. 2.

²⁹⁹ Wang Huning, op. cit., p. 230.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 231.

³⁰¹ This conclusion could also be reached in French radical theories, cf. Michel Foucault’s Preface to *Anti-Oedipus* (1972), in which he wrote the book was “an *Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life*.”

³⁰² Wang Huning, op. cit., p. 236.

³⁰³ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, “1st March”.

country within half a century.³⁰⁴ The PAP was against not the *West*, but radicalisms, e.g., Maoism, both intellectual in the first-world West and actual in the third-world China.

“Abruptly, he [Deng] asked, ‘What do you want me to do?’ I was astonished. I had never met a communist leader who was prepared to depart from his brief when confronted with reality...”³⁰⁵ What Lee Kuan Yew asked Deng to do was to stop financing communists or “exporting revolutions” [against “fascist” regimes] in Southeast Asia. Deng readily agreed – unlike what Hua Guofeng said to Lee when demanded by the same issue two years ago: “I do not know the details, but wherever communists fight, they will win.”³⁰⁶ Lee realized that the CPC had decisively changed its course since Deng came back into power. “A few weeks later I was shown articles on Singapore in their *People’s Daily*...Singapore was described as a garden city...we were no longer ‘running dogs of American imperialists’.”³⁰⁷

Deng never concealed his appreciation of the Singapore model. In 1920, the 16-year-old Deng visited British Singapore on his travel to Marseille, and during the subsequent years in France, he became a communist. Fifty-eight years later, when the 74-year-old Deng revisited the Republic of Singapore, after witnessing the “dramatic transformation” there, he told Lee: “If I had only Shanghai, I too might be able to change Shanghai as quickly [as you].”³⁰⁸ Deng was indicating that he would transplant the Singapore model to China, the only problem was the magnitude. Deng’s profound transformation from a communist to a right-wing strongman like Lee could be explained through his own words on another occasion: “in fact, when we went to France, we just had the idea of ‘saving China by industry’...I wanted to learn some Western technologies and come back to develop China through industrialization.”³⁰⁹

Throughout the 20th century, what changed was not Deng’s initial motivation but the means to materialize it. When Deng realized the contradiction between Maoism or egalitarian ideology in general and efficient industrialization, he proposed the maxim that “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth” – alongside its vernacular version, known as the “cat theory”: “black cat or white cat, if it catches a mouse, it is a good cat” (1962). Singapore’s practices worked, therefore, became truthful. Deng was not alone within the post-Maoist CPC leadership, nor was he amongst his generation, including those of the KMT such as Chiang Ching-kuo – the “mouse” for them was the same thing: a modernized China. However, Deng’s “cat theory” from the 1970s Maoist point of view:



A caricature portrait of Deng Xiaoping © Zhu Zizun

“If we let ‘that capitalist roader who refuses to repent within the party’ [Deng] do so, let capitalist ‘white cat and black cat’ come out together...our cause of socialism will be ruined, and our dictatorship of the proletariat will become a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.”³¹⁰

³⁰⁴ This was embodied in the title of the second volume of his memoir “From Third World to First”.

³⁰⁵ Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), pp. 599-600.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 600.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 602.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 602.

³⁰⁹ Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the CPC (ed.), *Biography of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1974)*, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Zhonghe Publishing, 2014), pp. 33-34.

³¹⁰ Jin Zhibai (pseudonym), “The Difference between Socialism and Capitalism Cannot Be Obliterated: Refuting the Cat Theory,” *Red Flag*, no.4 (1976): pp. 32-36.

Lee Kuan Yew was an authoritarian character who knew well about the “dictatorship of the bourgeoisie”. He wrote in his biography that strict and even cruel punishment helps reduce crime – even in 1944, when foods were extremely scarce, Japan-occupied Singapore was still in order, which should be attributed to people’s fear.³¹¹ Lee believed that capital punishment must not be abolished in Singapore due to respect for “Asian values”, but was his advocacy “Asian” or conservative, ethnocultural or ideological? James Fitzjames Stephen, a Victorian English conservative, defended capital punishment in a similar manner: “some men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that, if they committed murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror.”³¹²

Lee’s measures against liberals and communists were indeed horrible. He was a defender of “preventive detention”. A demonstrative case was Operation Coldstore in 1963; 113 left-wing politicians, journalists, union members, and college students were detained without trial. The PAP’s party-state was then established. Another case was Operation Spectrum in 1987; 22 intellectuals and professionals were detained without trial and accused of being “with a view to establishing a Marxist state”³¹³. Whether they were communists or liberal intellectuals remains controversial.

Noticeably, for a rather long period, Lee deemed himself a “socialist” – another example of conservative pragmatics of “socialism” in the English-speaking context. Lee’s British education did not prevent him from interpreting conservatism as socialism. The PAP was originally a left-wing party in close cooperation with the Communist Party of Malaya, which was illegal under British colonial rule. At that point, the PAP was claimed to be socialist and anti-colonialist, but not communist. In 1961, the right-wing faction led by Lee and the left-wing faction led by Lim Chin Siong within the PAP broke away, Lim initiated Barisan Sosialis [Socialist Front], which was denounced as a “communist” party by Lee. The Socialist Front, or the center-left Workers’ Party since 1988, had never won a general election in Singapore. It is worth noting that Lee firmly insisted that the PAP was “socialist” even after the 1961 split.³¹⁴ The PAP thus stayed in the Socialist International, until the Labor Parties of the UK and the Netherlands jointly moved to expel it in 1976, criticizing its authoritarian records at home. From Lee’s perspective, socialism is not necessary to be democratic or left-wing. Lee expressed what Deng expressed in his “cat theory” as early as 1955: “[People] are not interested in ‘isms’...whoever can work to improve their ordinary conditions of life gets their loyalty and allegiance.”³¹⁵

Lee’s “socialism that works” was in many ways a discursive prototype of Dengist SwCC. He emphasized “efficiency” and “control” in his socialism: “a socialist is one who believes that state planning and control would bring about the greatest benefit to the community as a whole.”³¹⁶ The “greatest benefit” is not distributive, but productive, being in accordance with the capitalist logic

³¹¹ Cf. Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew*, Vol. 1 (Times Editions, 1998), Chapter 7.

³¹² James Fitzjames Stephen, “The Classification and Definition of Particular Crimes,” *A General View of the Criminal Law of England* (London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co., 1863), p. 99.

³¹³ Teo Soh Lung, *Beyond the Blue Gate: Recollections of a Political Prisoner* (Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2010), Appendix 2, p. 371.

³¹⁴ Cf. Lee Kuan Yew, *Socialist Solution for Asia: A Report on the 1965 Asian Socialists’ Conference, Bombay* (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1965) and *One Hundred Years of Socialism* (Singapore: Ministry of Culture, 1964).

³¹⁵ Singapore Legislative Assembly, *Debates: Official Reports*, 1955-1963, 21st November 1955, column 1018.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 25th November 1955, column 1540.

of competition: “I believe in socialism because I believe it is one of the most *effective* ways of mobilizing human resources.”³¹⁷

To Lee’s understanding, effective socialism cannot be liberal: Western liberals encourage people to demand rights and welfare shamelessly, while in Singapore, people do not seek public assistance unless they have no way otherwise,³¹⁸ Japanese workers focus on productive efficiency and made remarkable achievements, while British industry sadly declined due to the Union’s sabotage.³¹⁹ The “secret” to make socialism effective was thus unveiled – a social virtue of collectivism in defense of the existing hierarchical order. The PAP institutionally nurtures such collectivism in family, school, and workplace to contain individualism, so in this sense, Lee was a collectivistic “socialist” rather than an individualistic “capitalist”. Political scientists do not approve Lee’s right-wing use of socialism and label the PAP a conservative party.³²⁰ This phenomenon is thought-provoking – the commoditization of interpersonal relations in modernity is faced with both radical and conservative rejections.

The intimacy between the post-1989 CPC and the PAP has grown solid. On 3rd October 1990, the PRC and Singapore established a diplomatic relationship. In 1992, the CPC sent a “Chinese Study Group on Spiritual Civilization” to Singapore. In 1993, their report titled *The Spiritual Civilization in Singapore* was published by the *Qiushi*-supervised Red Flag Press. Deng was amongst the three politicians Lee Kuan Yew admired most – the other two conservatives were Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill.³²¹ Lee, an “old friend of the Chinese people”³²² and China Reform Friendship Medalist who “deeply engaged in China’s reform and opening up”³²³, had an in-depth insight about the Dengist China. “They are deeply concerned about the instability under a multiparty system, which would cause the central government to lose its control over the provinces, like the civil wars amongst warlords in the 1920s and [sic] 1930s.”³²⁴ “I think it is impossible to impose some foreign standards that are completely inconsistent with its past to China. The same is true for turning China into a Western-style democracy. There has been no democracy in its 5000-year recorded history; all rulers were representatives of the emperor. If you were against them, you would die...”³²⁵

Lee pointed out what the CPC officials rhetorically avoided pointing out due to their nominal identity, viz., the Dengist defense of dictatorship was in accordance with conservatism instead of

³¹⁷ Lee Kuan Yew, “Text of Speech by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Special Conference of the Socialist International Congress, Uppsala, on Wednesday April 27, 1966, at Goteborg’s Nation, Uppsala University.” Archived in *National Archives of Singapore*, National Library Board.

³¹⁸ Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First*, p. 106.

³¹⁹ Lee Kuan Yew, “May Day message”, May 1st, 1984. Cited in *Lee Kuan Yew on China and the World* (Beijing: CITIC Press Group, 2013), p. 108.

³²⁰ Cf. Richard Robison, “The Politics of ‘Asian Values’,” *The Pacific Review* 9, no. 3 (1996): 309-327.

³²¹ Han Fook Kwang, Zuraidah Ibrahim, Chua Mui Hoong, Lydia Lim, Ignatius Low, Rachel Lin, and Robin Chan, *Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going* (Singapore: Straits Times, 2011), pp. 389-390. Cited in *Lee Kuan Yew on China and the World*, p. 176.

³²² The CPC granted Lee this title on 10th November 1980 during his second visit to China (cf. “The Government Held a Grand Ceremony and Zhao Ziyang Hosted a Banquet to Welcome Lee Kuan Yew and other Distinguished Guests from Singapore,” *People’s Daily*, 11th November 1980); before that Lee was pejoratively referred to by the mouth-pieces.

³²³ “List of China Reform Friendship Medalists,” *Xinhua News*, 18th December 2018.

³²⁴ Lee Kuan Yew, “Speech Given at the World Chinese Entrepreneurs Convention, Singapore, August 10th, 1999.” Cited in *Lee Kuan Yew on China and the World*, p. 17.

³²⁵ Lee Kuan Yew, “Interview with the Public Broadcasting Service, May 5th, 2001.” Cited in *Lee Kuan Yew on China and the World*, p. 17.

communism. The disorders followed by the 1911 Revolution paved the way to Chiang's one-party right-wing dictatorship – a betrayal of the KMT's republican commitment. When Lee referred to “some foreign standard foreign standards that are completely inconsistent with China's past”, he was perhaps also implying Marxism. It is true that “there has been no democracy in China's 5000-year recorded history”, but has there been communism? In Dengist rhetoric, Marxism should be “Sinicized”, and SwCC was such a Sinicization, even if this revision could make it opposite. Lee told the truth that Dengist authoritarianism was in obvious contradiction to liberalism and leftist revolutionary terror; it was ultimately monarchist based on a bred-in-the-bone tradition.

“To a party, country, or nation, if everything sticks on its original doctrines, its ideology becomes rigid, and superstition prevails, then it cannot go forward, its vitality will cease, and itself will perish.”

Deng Xiaoping, “Emancipate Our Minds, Seek Truth from Facts, Unite and Look Forward,” 13th December 1978.

ACCOMMODATION TO HISTORICAL MATERIALISM

As Chiang could have claimed his legitimacy from Sun Yat-sen, and Brezhnev could have claimed his legitimacy from Lenin, theorizing a right-wing developmental dictatorship into historical materialism seems to be a mission possible. This task requires a state-of-the-art technique. In short, Wang’s strategy was de-ideologicalizing historical materialism.

“Marx then believed that the capitalist *mode of production* [Produktionsweise] had already reached its zenith and that the *forces of production* [Produktivkräfte] must break through the shackles of the outdated Produktionsweise, so he focused on changing the Produktionsweise and breaking the outdated *superstructure* [Überbau]. Lenin, Stalin...[and] Mao paid attention on the Produktionsweise and its reforms, which was the reason behind some mistakes. Deng Xiaoping...proposed that the Produktivkräfte should be the core...”³²⁶

According to this text, Deng was the man who truly understood Marxism, even more so than Marx himself. Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao all made “mistakes” due to their misunderstanding, because they attempted to abolish the existing Produktionsweise and Überbau. However, without abolishing the existing Produktionsweise and Überbau, can historical materialism still be revolutionary or at least left-wing?

Deng’s revisionist historical materialism acknowledged the legitimacy of capitalist Produktionsweise and even feudalist, right-wing Überbau as long as they can contribute to the development of Produktivkräfte, viz., GDP. From this point of view, Deng’s appreciation of Lee becomes totally understandable: the practices [“the sole criterion for testing truth”] of Singapore’s capitalist economy [Produktionsweise] under a precapitalist sociopolitical structure [Überbau] resulted in marvelous economic growth [Produktivkräfte]. Therefore, Lee’s right-wing regime was not a target of revolution – Deng stopped financing communists in the whole Southeast Asia but a model of the “communist” China.

Using historical materialism to revolt against revolutions was not a 1980s invention. It first appeared in the resolution of Liu Shaoqi’s political report for the 8th National Congress of the CPC (1956): “the primary Negation in our country is the one between people’s demands for establishing an advanced industrial country and the reality of a backward agricultural country, between people’s needs for rapid economic and cultural development and the current economic and cultural conditions that cannot meet people’s needs...between the advanced socialist system [Überbau] and the backward Produktivkräfte...”³²⁷

³²⁶ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, “7th March”.

³²⁷ *Resolution on the Political Report* (8th National Congress of the CPC, September 27th, 1956).

To resolve this Negation [transforming China from a backward agricultural country to an advanced industrial country], “we must adopt correct policies in economic, political, and cultural aspects, unite all possible forces at home and abroad, and use all favorable conditions to accomplish this great task.”³²⁸ This was reasonable and practical advocacy; however, it cannot guarantee a revolutionary or left-wing nature of the CPC as well as the PRC. Should a market be restored if capitalist Produktionsweise is more effective than the planned economy of no competition but egalitarian distribution? In order to “united all possible forces...abroad”, should China ignore the “new Tsar’s” aggression and stop supporting North Vietnam? If the federalist [conservative] cultural structure helps maintain stability in a market economy, should Confucianism be restored? What would be the difference between communist PRC and anticommunist Chiang’s ROC?

Mao disapproved of Liu Shaoqi’s statement. In 1958, he reasserted his position that China’s primary Negation was between capitalism and socialism, between those CPC officials who wanted to turn China into a capitalist dictatorship and the massive revolutionary people, in a word, between right and left. Soon after, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were denounced by Maoists as “no. 1 capitalist roader” and “no. 2 capitalist roader” within the CPC, respectively. Liu was prosecuted to death during the red terror in 1969, while Deng managed to get through it.³²⁹ In 1978, Deng returned back to power. In 1980, Liu was rehabilitated. In the 6th Plenary Session of the CPC’s 11th National Congress (1981), Dengists simply reorganized Liu’s words in 1956:

“[Since 1956] the primary Negation in our country has been in between people’s growing material and cultural needs and backward social production.”³³⁰

Deng had a clear understanding of the relationship between his doctrine and Marx’s doctrine. In 1979, Deng was already 75 and lost almost all his hearing. He mocked himself: “Marx sits in heaven...He sees what we are doing, and he does not like it. So, he has punished me by making me deaf.”³³¹ Apparently, his revisionism was not rooted in Marx’s literature but from somewhere else – what Deng referred to as “practice”, namely, the evolutionary reality that contradicted Marx’s revolutionary predictions. A fragment of Wang Huning’s diary in 1994 unveiled the true sources of the post-Maoist conservatism in China:

“Discussed Karl Popper’s *The Poverty of Historicism* in class...*utopian engineering* often brings about drastic changes in society. If such drastic changes cannot be consolidated in the end, they would bring negative results to society. Along with the historical development in China, people gradually realized the fact that such a giant society cannot be changed overnight to become brand-new but needs gradually progress. Regarding [China’s current] reforms, it is impossible to come up with a whole set of plans at once but needs to ‘cross the river by feeling the stones.’”³³²

What “drastic changes” or “utopian engineering” did Wang refer to – 1911 Revolution, 1949 Revolution, Cultural Revolution, 1989 protests, or all? Anyhow, Wang expressed an explicit mentality of conservatism: China cannot make another “mistake” that “would bring negative results to society”.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ When asked what he had done during la Terreur, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès answered: “J’ai vécu [I survived].”

³³⁰ *Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China*, 1981.

³³¹ Cited in *The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin*, p. 100.

³³² Wang Huning, op. cit., “12th April”.

Wang used a backwards-looking, instead of radical rhetoric to defend China's suspended democratization: "discussed the model and path of the development of China's democratic politics in today's doctoral class...Every society has its own evolutionary logic...we need to discover new political values from our own cultural traditions so that the development [of democracy] can be closely integrated with our social and cultural characteristics..."³³³ "The political system and structure of the past cannot be changed all at once, nor does it need to be completely changed. Too rapid or excessive reforms would damage social stability...[which is] harmful to any society. 'More haste, less speed'³³⁴..."³³⁵

From the views of Marx, Lenin, and Mao, the problem with "bourgeois democracy" was not that it was not particular and traditional enough, but exactly the opposite, that it was not universal and avant-garde enough. Hegel's concept of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* refers to a "bourgeois" or "civil" society in which the bourgeois are "citizens"; it is separated from the *state*. The very foundation of this independent public domain is an emerging class of bourgeois liberated from the various political dominations of the feudalist society in the Middle Ages. However, in Hegel's terminology, the absolutist order in feudalist society is a form of *family*, not a form of *state*, and that

family---civil society---state (Hegel)
right---center---left (1789)
feudalism---capitalism---communism (Marx)

constitutes an evolutionary hierarchy in the realization of Geist as well as the evolution of history. Therefore, the *state* in the Hegelian sense means not only a mighty, centralized Leviathan of control seemingly as *family* but also the fulfillment of historical progress contrary to *family*; it is the perpetual polity at the end of history.

Logically, in Marx's revolutionary, far-left reinterpretation of Hegelian philosophy of history, "in place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an *association*, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."³³⁶ This communist *association* represents an end of history, corresponding to Hegel's *state*. However, what Hegel provided here was merely an instrumental framework; it was then the Junghegelianer, i.e., Hegelsche Linke, including Marx, who interpreted Hegel's philosophy of history in a way that the prospect of the ideal *state* is an immediate imperative of practice in the name of liberation, which terribly demands a holistic abolishment of the existing order: "their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions."³³⁷ Exactly on this point, Wang revised Marx's anticipation that "this principle can be realized upon the time when the revolution occurs or right after a transitional period...[but] in reality, the actual process is much more complicated...has been vastly different from Marx's theoretical assumption...it cannot be built overnight, especially in a giant society like China, the historical, social, and cultural conditions determine a gradual process to realize it."³³⁸

³³³ Ibid., "28th November".

³³⁴ Disciples of Confucius (ed.), *Analects*, Book XIII. "Tsze Lu", Chapter XVII.

³³⁵ Wang Huning, "A Comparative Analysis of Social and Political Development after the Revolution," *Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)*, no. 4 (1987): p. 82.

³³⁶ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, "Chapter II. Proletarians and Communists".

³³⁷ Ibid., "Chapter IV. Position of the Communists in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties".

³³⁸ Wang Huning, "Political Development in Socialist Society: Marx's Conception," *Academic Quarterly of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences*, no. 2 (1992): p. 79.

Wang's position actually came back to Althegeelianer, i.e., Rechtshegelianer that was in favor of the existing Prussian state. The post-1989 China was on the road towards the Weimar Constitution, not after. To achieve such a republic, China needs not another elitist 1911 Revolution, but an accumulated middle-income class [bourgeoisie], which would then demand more politically from the bottom up, "...it is estimated that for a long period of time, 'economicalized politics' will be the main trend in China..."³³⁹ "Only when the *economy* develops to a certain level can it provide the necessary material foundation for a certain political form. The effective results of true [irreversible] political development must be based on that development. This actual process...is of imperative importance to understand China's political development."³⁴⁰

Only with a substantial foundation of Produktivkräfte, can a liberal Überbau become sustainable. Is this Marxism or François Guizot's 19th-century motto "Enrichissez-vous" against the demand for universal suffrage? Wang, in another place, expressed concerns about the reversibility of dramatic social change led by [one or] a few charismatic leaders after reading Nietzsche:

"[His] goal was to establish a new order, which is ultimately pinned on Übermensch...The question is whether such a new order can be established, perhaps [the society] has its own evolutionary logic, no matter how hard human work, it remains the same in the end."³⁴¹

As early as 1994, Wang already noted that not only the communist order had been proved to be reversible, but the republican order could also be reversible in countries where the socioeconomic and sociocultural conditions are not matured enough to sustain it.

"Since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, some countries imitated the Western system and failed to form an effective political system, which brought disastrous consequences and greatly affected social progress and stability...China's democratic model must adapt to the conditions of China's *history, society* and *culture*."³⁴²

The countries Wang referred to could possibly be former Yugoslav, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan. He had not seen Putin, Viktor Orbán, Law and Justice yet. Apart from (a) orderly democracies as the minority amongst all 29 states, including East Germany and Kosovo, that gained independence after 1989, there have been three undesirable scenarios: (b) ethnic conflicts, (c) democratic disorders, and (d) orderly autocracies. One country may experience all b, c, and d. Most importantly, the orderly autocracies that ended ethnic conflicts and democratic disorders, without exception, have been right-wing. The Russian conservatism emerged from within this context. Lavrov wrote: Russia "that went through a historical period of encouraging artificial transformations abroad, firmly proceeds from the preference of evolutionary changes that should be carried out in the forms and at a speed that conforms to the traditions of a society and its level of development."³⁴³

³³⁹ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, "7th January".

³⁴⁰ Wang Huning, "Political Systems in Developing Countries: History and Current Situation," *Academic Quarterly of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences*, no. 3 (1993): p. 120.

³⁴¹ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, "14th April".

³⁴² Ibid., "12th February".


³⁴³ Sergey Lavrov, "Историческая перспектива внешней политики России."

“School and social education shall focus on the inculcation of national ideology and the stimulation of *Volksggeist* and must enable an academic culture to be useful for the national economy and the people’s livelihood.”

Chiang Kai-shek, *The Destiny of China* (1943).

ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Long before Vladislav Surkov coined the term “sovereign democracy [суверенная демократия]” in defense of “Russian conservatism”, Wang became an unequivocal proponent of souverainisme vis-à-vis both bourgeois and proletarian internationalisms. The Russian conservatism of the 21st century originated directly from the state failures during the 1990s, e.g., mismanaged economy and declined livelihood, social disorders and moral anomie, and a sense of deprivation from a great power to a third-rate country. Wang felt the same way after watching a Russian film titled *Интердевочка* [*Intergirl*] in 1994:



Xi Jinping Meets Putin in Astana, 8th June 2017. First from Xi’s Right: Wang Huning. Xinhua.

“It was about a Russian girl who works as a hospital nurse while engaging in sexual business, later married to a Swede. After moving to Sweden, she missed her motherland very much. I was touched. The citizens of such a great power have gone to this point. Several majestic Russian songs were played in the film, delivering a tragic feeling...when a country is not strong and has no status in the world, the unluckiest things go to its own citizens.”³⁴⁴

Being a Chinese, Wang’s thoughts on nationalism marvelously converged with contemporary Russia’s national conservatism. The other day in 1994, after watching the TV broadcast of the International Women’s Basketball Championship, he wrote: “...you deeply feel a sort of psychological identification, an unexplainable Chinese sentiment. In fact, in most Chinese people’s blood is a deeply rooted nationalism...In the process of modernization, it seems that we should pay attention to such psychological power, and we shall activate it...to the appropriate point.”³⁴⁵

Nationalism was not a new theme in modern China, but it was new that in the history of the PRC, nationalism officially appeared in a *right-wing* form for the first time. If Putin’s nationalism is a nostalgia for Imperial Russia (1721) and the USSR under the “new Tsar”, then the Chinese nationalism since the early 1990s, a drawn-out version, has been a nostalgia for Imperial China from 221 BC to the mid-19th century. It encourages a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”³⁴⁶, economically, technologically, and militarily, after its fall in the “century of humiliation”. “Our responsibility is to activate a new vitality that can mobilize the entire nation and fully invigorate the *Volksggeist* and promote the fundamental social values.”³⁴⁷ For instance, “a nation must hold its own

³⁴⁴ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, “7th February”.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., “10th June”.

³⁴⁶ This term was first proposed at the 13th national congress of the CPC (1987) and reiterated since the 15th national congress of the CPC (1997) every congress.

³⁴⁷ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, “25th June”.

grand ceremony, which is the best way for it to sense its own integrity and greatness. Its various members are often scattered in daily life or in small groups and do not strongly sense the whole³⁴⁸.³⁴⁹

“Humiliation” was not coined for exaggeration but as a self-perception that truly occurred in many Chinese minds. What went wrong with this nation? In 1938 when Japanese fascists had occupied most of China’s populous territory and the US was still not yet in the war, Tsiang Tingfu wrote in his magnum opus *Outline of Modern Chinese History*:

“For nearly a hundred years, the Chinese nation has had only one question: can the Chinese be modernized? Can we match with the Westerners? Can we utilize science and machinery...If so, our nation will have a bright future; if not, our nation will have no future.”³⁵⁰

Wang wrote in his memoir of Yin Zhihao (1914-1994), a Chinese entrepreneur of construction in Taiwan: “the most intolerable thing to him is probably the stereotype that the Chinese are incompetent...he repeatedly said that the Chinese are smart and capable and that China is not inferior to other nations...a natural expression of his emotions without any pretentiousness. Only those who have been stumbling and rolling through China’s turbulent 20th century can understand...”³⁵¹

Wang’s appreciation of Yin Zhihao as a competent capitalist and Chinese nationalist represented the CPC’s 1990s transformation towards its opposite. In this narrative, Yin is no longer an exploiter but a contributor to the revival of the Chinese nation. This narrative was exactly the one of Chiang’s KMT that the CPC fought against since the 1920s: China’s primary concern was a “national struggle” instead of a “class struggle” that would damage the interests of China as a nation within no distinction. The prototype of this narrative could even be traced back to the Chinese royalists of the late Qing dynasty, who viewed Meiji Japan and the Second Reich as models: what China needed was not a social, cultural, or political revolution, but progress in economy, technology, and military.

As a research topic in Wang’s works, national sovereignty appeared a decade before the resurgence of Chinese nationalism in the early 1990s. His 1981 master’s thesis was titled “From Jean Bodin to Jacques Maritain: On the Evolution of Western Bourgeois Theories of Sovereignty”. The reason why he focused on two French authors might be practical: he studied French (1972-1977) and worked as a French translator (1977-1978). The evolution from Bodin to Maritain, from the birth of souverainisme to the intellectual trend to deconstruct sovereignty in the 20th century that inspired by Kantianism or other forms of liberal cosmopolitanism (Hans Kelsen, Harold Laski, Léon Duguit)³⁵² from Wang’s view, was a process of degeneration. He viewed the latter as “the ideology of hegemonic and monopolistic capitals restricting third world countries’ national sovereignty”³⁵³ and perceived the jurisprudential debate between anti-souverainisme and souverainisme as essentially a political struggle between the powers and the third world,³⁵⁴ without referring to the divergence between liberalism and conservatism within a country.

³⁴⁸ Cf. Martin Heidegger on They [das Man], fallingness [Verfallen], and authenticity in *Sein und Zeit*.

³⁴⁹ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, “1st October”.

³⁵⁰ Tsiang Tingfu, *Outline of Modern Chinese History* (Chongqing: Youth Books, 1939), “General”.

³⁵¹ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, “31st August”.

³⁵² Wang Huning, “On the New Development of Modern and Contemporary Sovereignty Theory,” *CASS Journal of Political Science*, no. 1 (1985): pp. 39-41.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44.


Wang was in defense of sovereignty, but he warned that “if every specific cultural entity demands political sovereignty...there might be more challenges.”³⁵⁵ While opposing ethnic demands for greater recognition (e.g., Tibetan nationalism), China should defend its sovereignty over human rights, which “has become pretexts of some Western countries interfering other countries’ domestic affairs...it is a political struggle to maintain a nation’s independence and autonomy.”³⁵⁶ Wang’s words apparently depicted a national conservatism, or conservative nationalism (vis-à-vis its leftist and liberal variants), in which Chinese nationalism overwhelms ethnic nationalisms, national sovereignty overwhelms civil rights, so on and so forth. Lavrov expressed the same souverainisme in a much more straightforward manner: “the well-known Thirty Years’ War that gave birth to the Westphalian system of international relations, whose principles, primarily respect for state sovereignty, are of importance even today.”³⁵⁷

³⁵⁵ Wang Huning, “Cultural Expansion and Cultural Sovereignty: Challenges to the Concept of Sovereignty,” *Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)*, no. 3 (1994): p. 14.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁵⁷ Sergey Lavrov, “Историческая перспектива внешней политики России.”

CHAPTER IV
CIVILIZATIONAL REFLECTIONS ON CHINA



“Another important intellectual current in the mid-1990s was a revival of neo-Confucianism. Although its proponents did not refer to Marxism-Leninism, the Jiang leadership found their views more in tune with its goals than either the neo-Maoists or the liberals...with its emphasis on the group, authority, and education...avoid the immorality and individualism of Western capitalism.”

Merle Goldman, “Politically-engaged Intellectuals in the 1990s,” *The China Quarterly* 159 (1999): p. 704.

“Family is just such an important, integral part of any society. And China has got a grand history of honoring family that is an important tradition, an important part of your culture. And I hope my country, as well, has a – is known for a strong tradition of family. That is a concept that is not owned by a particular country; it is universal.”

George W. Bush, “Answering Questions from Students: Speech at Tsinghua University,” 22nd February 2002.

BACK TO CONFUCIUS

In 1996, the local education authority approved the name change of “Changtang Middle School”, located in Changtang town, Shaoxing prefecture, Zhejiang province, East China. The new name was “Du Yaquan Middle School”. This event was trivial but by no means random; it embodied China’s holistic, rapid, and intensive retrieval of its dusty traditions since the early 1990s.

In 1873, Du Yaquan was born in a wealthy family of Changtang. Initially studied Confucian classics in the hope of becoming a “scholar-official” or bureaucrat of the empire, China’s loss in the First Sino-Japanese War (1895) changed his mind: Confucianism that had dominated China for over two thousand years could not deliver technological, economic, or military advancements in the unprecedented world made by industrial revolutions. He started learning modern natural sciences and introduced Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic trends to China.

Du’s defense of Chinese traditions in the 1910s and 1920s was thus, not out of ignorance of cutting-edge modern technology or unexamined adherence to Confucianism. On the contrary, it was based on his insights on the “decadence” of materialistic and individualistic modern civilization reflected in WWI.

During the New Cultural Movement, his most prominent opponent was Chen Duxiu, the founder of the CPC. Their debate was not on whether China should accept external modernity in the name of “Western ideas”, but on whether China should thoroughly be “Westernized” (Chen-edited magazine *La Jeunesse*) or find a way to reconcile tradition and modernity, the Chinese and the Western



The Commercial Press (Shanghai), *The Eastern Miscellany*, Volume 11, No. 1 (1914).

(Du-edited magazine *The Eastern Miscellany*). Chen’s proposition ultimately led to an inevitable universalism, i.e., communism, while Du’s proposition represented a particularism of Chinese traditions, i.e., sociocultural conservatism. Their divergence can be found in even the languages they deliberately chose to use for the foreign names of their respective magazines: French of the nation known for its impetuous revolutions or English of the nation known for its prudent preservation.



Qunyi Books (Shanghai), *La Jeunesse*, Volume 2, No. 1 (1916). PKU Library.

The contradiction between “Western ideas”, including Marxism, anarchism, and liberalism and “Chinese traditions”, including Confucianism, was not only tangible but also profound upon the founding of the CPC, which per se was based on a “Western idea”, and this contradiction was extremely radicalized during Cultural Revolution. The CPC’s turn to embrace its former enemies during the early 1990s in the names of “Sinicizing Marxism”, “theoretical innovation”, and “keep up with the times” can only be explained as a self-betrayal.

The renamed Changtang Middle School was merely a footnote of this grand self-betrayal. Intellectual interests in Du Yaquan surged during the early 1990s. The *Selected Works of Du Yaquan*³⁵⁸ was published in 1993. In a 1994 academic paper titled “Reevaluation of Du-Chen Debate on Eastern and Western Cultures”, the author Gao Like, professor of History at Zhejiang University, openly defended Du’s proposition: “research on Du has been left out in the academic circles for a long time...At the turn of the century, reviewing the tortuous journey of exploring Chinese modernity, Du’s conciliation of Eastern and Western cultures is a precious intellectual heritage” that “deserves rediscovering for reference.”³⁵⁹ What explicitly is this “reference” for?

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In 1966, Maoists were burning the plaque “The Teacher of All Ages” of the Temple of Confucius.

In 1994, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee scripted the Temple and Cemetery of Confucius and the Kong Family Mansion (TCCKFM) in Qufu, Shandong province of China, as a World Heritage Site. In 1997, TCCKFM was listed in the “100 sites for patriotic education” by the Central Publicity Department of the CPC. In 2002, Hanban, or Confucius Institute Headquarters, was found.³⁶⁰

Clearly, the CPC, since the 1990s has obtained a different definition of “patriotism” to that of the previous CPC as a force of sociocultural radicalism. During the New Cultural Movement, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, and other communists were fiercely against Confucianism as a conservative mentality. The Cultural Revolution turned their dreams into action: the TCCKFM,

³⁵⁸ Cf. Du Yaquan, *Selected Works of Du Yaquan* (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 1993).

³⁵⁹ Gao Like, “Reevaluation of Du-Chen Debate on Eastern and Western Cultures,” *Modern Chinese History Studies*, vol. 88, 1994 (4): p. 144.

³⁶⁰ The 1990s revival of Confucianism and, in a broader sense, traditional culture resulted in the establishment of new academic institutions: School of Chinese Classics, Wuhan University (2010, developed on an ungraduated program in 2000); School of Confucianism, Renmin University of China (2005); Tsinghua Academy of Chinese Learning (2009); Advanced Institute for Confucian Studies, Shandong University (2012, developed on a center for Confucian studies in 2005); etc. The Ru Zang [Confucian Canon] project started in 2003, aiming to compile all classical works of Confucianism.

as a very symbol of oppression, was physically destroyed by Maoists. From a left-wing perspective, how could a very symbol of ideological oppression to the majority of Chinese people for over two thousand years be considered “patriotic”? The CPC finally turned its nationalism from left to right: China should now be proud of its past and to a certain extent, follow the way in its past. Du’s thoughts became, understandably, “a precious intellectual heritage” within this context.

First of all, Du’s thesis that there is a need to “reconcile” Eastern and Western cultures, e.g., Confucianism and Marxism, indicated an impossibility of, e.g., turning China into a communist state because the two are essentially different entities; in order to modernize China, foreign ideologies should be accommodated, instead of replacing Chinese culture. While for Chen, there is no room for compromise, it is not only possible but also needful to replace Chinese traditions with “modern cultures” at the price of eliminating the Chinese traditions. Chen wrote: “the new and the old, are like water and fire, ice and charcoal, absolutely cannot be reconciled...if we are determined, then everything should be like the West.”³⁶¹

Secondly, Du also argued for equal status of Chinese traditions, which was for Chen unacceptable. The Western ideas, in particular, Marxism, due to their superiority, can and should entirely replace Chinese traditions. How could “slavery” and “autonomy”, “conservative” and “progressive”, “seclusion” and “enterprising”, “closed” and “cosmopolitan”, “fictitious” and “utilitarian”, and “imagination” and “science”³⁶² be equal?

Thirdly, for Du, the process of China accepting external, modern culture should be a gradual one, accompanied by examinations of those foreign, novel ideas from China’s perspective. In contrast, for Chen, this process, i.e., “ethical revolution”³⁶³, should be done as soon as possible, once and for all, so that the Chinese would no longer have to suffer from their inherited, existing sociocultural order.

The divergence between Chen and Du was a “cultural war” between republic and monarchy, left and right, communism and conservatism, revolution and reaction. In contrast with Chen, the Francophile’s “if the world did not have France, we would still be living in extreme darkness”, Du wrote: “amongst modern states, Britain is an exemplary country both open and conservative...in the transition from the old to the new, prudence is preferred.”³⁶⁴

Gao Like unveiled the true motivation behind the intellectual interests in Du Yaquan of his and, in general, of Chinese academia since the early 1990s: “the historical experiences of the FATs and Japan have proven that the modernization of the Eastern nations is by no means a process of ‘Westernization’ at the expense of their traditions”³⁶⁵. Cecil Clementi, the Governor of Hong Kong from 1925 to 1930, suggested that the Confucian ethics in China was “probably the best antidote to the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevism, and is certainly the most powerful course”³⁶⁶.

In other words, the ultimate concern behind intellectual interests in Du Yaquan was purely political, of mainland China’s future. In order to modernize China, is Chen’s left-wing approach really better than Du’s conservative, right-wing one? This question could be further rephrased in an even more

³⁶¹ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 154.

³⁶² Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 145.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

³⁶⁴ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 162.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

³⁶⁶ Cited in Wing Sang Law, *Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), pp. 106-107.

penetrating manner: were the CPC's left-wing sociocultural policies of déconfucianisation³⁶⁷ since the 1949 Revolution against Chiang's regime legitimate?

A year after the leftist Cultural Revolution was launched in 1966, Chiang initiated the rightist Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (CCRM) in Taiwan. In response to Maoist anti-traditionalism, the CCRM was aimed to "promote traditional culture"³⁶⁸. Mao called the youth to rebel against the old, whereas Chiang called them to be "proud of being Chinese, responsible to the nation and the state [ROC]..."³⁶⁹ In a 1970 speech, he said: "we dare to assert that no one can destroy Chinese culture! Its spirit of national independence...will eventually extirpate the communist gangsters and Maoist traitors...ethics and culture in the Gangsters-occupied mainland are now in extreme danger of extinction...everybody should be not only anti-communist, anti-Maoist vanguard, but also the pioneer of Cultural Renaissance."³⁷⁰



Chiang Kai-shek [bottom middle] was participating in a ceremony of worshipping Confucius. CNA.

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Chinese intellectuals like Gao Like certainly cannot, would not, and did not speak in the indecent way as Chiang did, publicly questioning the legitimacy of the CPC. But the sociocultural conservatism they expressed on the sly was well adopted by the CPC through its early 1990s self-reconstruction of its ideological legitimacy from one side to the other.

Chiang claimed: "tridemism is nothing other than the confluence of Chinese culture; our national revolution of tridemism is in defense of the Chinese nation's culture...I believe the essence of tridemism...are the cornerstones of traditional Chinese culture."³⁷¹ Since the early 1990s, CPC, in effect, has replaced "tridemism" with "SwCC": "We should enhance national self-esteem, self-confidence, and self-improvement...especially amongst the youth."³⁷² "To build the culture of SwCC...we must...inherit our excellent historical and cultural traditions...The culture of SwCC...originates from the 5000-year history of the civilization of the Chinese nation...We should adhere to the principle that our own culture is primary while taking foreign cultures for our purposes of usage."³⁷³ "The Socialist spiritual civilization [SSC] is an important feature of SwCC. We must...inherit the excellent traditions of national culture...the Chinese civilization is encyclopaedical and profound, with a time-honored history, and has made great contributions to the progress of human civilization...The CPC is deeply rooted in the Chinese nation."³⁷⁴

The CPC since the 1990s has followed the same structure of narrative as the KMT since the 1930s: (a) the party has a mission to rejuvenate ["Renaissance"] China's tradition, (b) which must be combined with external modernity, viz., modern science and technology, and (c) under the guidance of the party's rule in an artificial, interpretable, context-specific name [tridemism or SwCC]. This was expressed by Chiang's KMT as "strengthen the education of tridemism, firm the will to

³⁶⁷ Cf. la déchristianisation of France (1789-1801).

³⁶⁸ Central Committee of the KMT, *Measures for Promoting the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement*, 1967.

³⁶⁹ Chiang Kai-shek, *A Letter to Youth*, 1968.

³⁷⁰ Chiang Kai-shek, *Speech at Sun Yat-sen's Birthday and Grand Ceremony of Chinese Cultural Renaissance*, 1970.

³⁷¹ Chiang Kai-shek, *Commemoration of the Completion of Chinese Culture Hall at Chung-Shan Building*, 1966.

³⁷² Jiang Zemin, *Report for the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 1992.

³⁷³ Jiang Zemin, *Report for the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 1997.

³⁷⁴ Jiang Zemin, *Report for the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 2002.

fight [against communists], and promote traditional culture.”³⁷⁵ In the process, the party aims to not replace China’s tradition, but the opposite, as its royal representative to revive it. The “principle that our own culture is primary while taking foreign cultures for our purposes of usage” was a replica of that during the royalists’ Tongzhi Restoration, i.e., Zhang Zhidong’s maxim “The Chinese is metaphysical, the Western is instrumental”, or that of Chiang in 1970, i.e., “to carry forward our inherent culture and absorb the cultures of the world”³⁷⁶. Based on this principle, Western metaphysical ideologies such as republicanism and communism, the founding ideologies of Sun’s KMT and Mao’s CPC, are both inapplicable for Chiang’s KMT and Deng’s CPC. Thus, the genealogy of three waves of (sociocultural) conservatism in China’s modern history, from the late Qing dynasty to the present, becomes recognizable.

Regarding (a), revivalism or the “mission” of the party, Chiang said in 1970: “given what China has shown in constructing a culture in the past, we believe they at the end of the day will definitely recover from the blow and recreate a valuable culture...the CCRM is to remind us: recover from the blow!”³⁷⁷ Jiang said in 2002: “The Chinese civilization...has made great contributions to the progress of human civilization. In the great struggle of the contemporary Chinese people, it is bound to...create a more splendid, advanced culture.”³⁷⁸ “From the day it was founded, the CPC has set the solemn mission of realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation (GRCN).”³⁷⁹

What went wrong with the Chinese culture so that it had to suffer from a “blow” since the mid-19th century? Here it comes to (b) why Chinese conservatives were not simply Confucians but combined with the “Western instrumental”. From a conservative and realist perspective, the problem of premodern China was not about the political, social, or cultural as on progressive and idealist account, but technological, economic, and military. Chiang said in 1968: “our nation’s construction should take the scientific development as the top priority”³⁸⁰. Jiang said in 1997: “science and technology are the primary productive forces, and technological progress is the decisive factor for economic development.”³⁸¹

Therefore, what under the banner of “back to Confucius” in the 1990s was not and could not be a restoration of the two thousand years old Confucian structure, which lacks market-oriented economic activities and modern science-driven technological advancements. Confucianism ultimately cannot replace the role of (c), political leadership. For Chinese conservatisms – royalism, Chiang’s tridemism, or SwCC, to maintain or restore Confucianism, was about the social, political, and cultural hierarchies, leading to a conservative modernization instead of a radical one, being republican or communist.

Not surprisingly, the latest historical resolution passed by the CPC, of which Wang Huning was the drafter-in-chief, reads: “Ideological management is building the heart for the country and the soul for the nation. Cultural self-confidence is...the most fundamental, deepest and most lasting force in developing a country and a nation...The excellent Chinese traditional culture is an outstanding advantage of the Chinese nation...We implement the inheritance and development of

³⁷⁵ Central Committee of the KMT, 1967.

³⁷⁶ Chiang Kai-shek, 1970.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Jiang Zemin, 2002.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Chiang Kai-shek, 1968.

³⁸¹ Jiang Zemin, 1997.

Chinese excellent traditional culture project [cf. CCRM]...The Xi Jinping Thought on SwCC in the New Era...is the essence of Chinese culture and Chinese spirit...”³⁸²

³⁸² CPC Central Committee, *Resolution on Major Achievements and Historical Experiences of the Party's Centennial Struggle*, 2021.

“The century-old colony of Hong Kong has become what it is today, and China is much bigger. Of course, China needs to be colonized for 300 years to become like today’s Hong Kong. I even have doubts if 300 years is enough.”

Liu Xiaobo, “Interview with Liu Xiaobo,” *Liberation Monthly* (Hong Kong), December 1988.

CULTURAL RADICALISM: *RIVER ELEGY* (1988)

The mentality of the 1980s Chinese liberal intellectuals was manifested in the six-episode documentary *River Elegy*, shown on China Central Television (CCTV) on 16th June 1988. Being shown on China’s national television, it was initially regarded as an official indication of political correctness. The liberals within the CPC, such as Zhao Ziyang and Yang Shangkun, also openly praised *River Elegy*. However, the CPC’s conservatives found it unacceptable; after watching it, Wang Zhen said: “even though the General Secretary [Zhao] praised it, I cannot approve it, I would rather be expelled from the Party.”³⁸³ After 4th June 1989, along with the fall of Zhao, *People’s Daily* and other CPC’s mouthpieces started attacking *River Elegy*. The divergent attitudes towards *River Elegy* were not purely sociocultural or intellectual but essentially political and ideological.

The context of *River Elegy*, as it indicated, was that “many things in China [today] seem to have to be restarted from the May Fourth Movement,”³⁸⁴ during which, Western ideologies, including Marxism, were introduced to China and even practiced in China thereafter. However, Chinese tradition was somehow too deeply rooted to be eradicated, and in the 1980s China still remained backward, both in economic and technological terms and socio-politically. *River Elegy* suggested that China should abandon its “hydraulic empire” tradition associated with the Yellow River and Great Wall, and embrace the marine civilization represented by the newly established Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) nearby Hong Kong. “In 1980, the Shenzhen SEZ was established. It announced to the world that China’s thousand-year inland civilization finally came to the edge of the sea, turned back its face to the land, to look at the ocean.”³⁸⁵

However, *River Elegy*’s call for “learn from the FATs” was rather “selective”. It actually suggested that Deng’s economic reform could be seen as the first step, but there must be more to follow, political and sociocultural; it took an opposite standing to the political authoritarianism and sociocultural conservatism in the FATs. “[The reality that] 73.79% of [Chinese] citizens expressed ‘agree’, ‘basically agree’, and ‘no objection’ to the view that ‘it is better to not intervene in political matters’ ... is bound to hinder the process of democratization seriously.”³⁸⁶ “The whole set of Confucianism... [as] a single unity of thought, weakened the development of pluralism...”³⁸⁷

Therefore, *River Elegy* outlined a prospect that was not really identical to the FATs that it referred to as models, but a holistic solution that comprises liberalism in all aspects of China. Criticisms of

³⁸³ Biography of Wang Zhen’s Writing Group, *Biography of Wang Zhen* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2008), “Wang Zhen Angrily Criticized *River Elegy* in His Later Years”.

³⁸⁴ Su Xiaokang, et al, *River Elegy*, Episode 6.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid.

River Elogy amongst the CPC's leaders could be further divided into two groups: Dengists who supported the economic one but not the others, and those even more conservative, tending to reject all of them, including economic liberalism (Wang Zhen, Deng Liqun, et al).³⁸⁸

Deng's initial attitude towards *River Elogy* was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, *River Elogy*'s supportive standing on Deng's economic reforms, especially embodied in its eulogization of Shenzhen SEZ, was in line with his vision of China. It was Deng, who appointed the General Secretaries Zhao Ziyang to promote reform and opening up, and Zhao publicly praised *River Elogy*. However, on the other hand, *River Elogy*'s appreciation to democracy and participatory politics in general, and sociocultural liberalism embodied in a strong sentiment of anti-Confucianism, were not mainly Deng's intentions. As a result, Deng decided to be silent on *River Elogy*.

Only after Zhao was forced to step down did Deng realize his profound divergence with Zhao and the irreconcilable difference between his conservative vision with liberalism in general. *River Elogy* explained Chinese people's political indifference due to political movements in the past decades, "people still have lingering fears."³⁸⁹ But was not its call for democracy also in the left-wing direction for more political participation? *River Elogy* took an example of Chiang's regime to criticize [right-wing] dictatorship: in 1943, Madame Chiang "discussed the American workers' strike during a dinner with Roosevelt and his wife at the White House. Roosevelt asked how the Chinese government would deal with such a strike. Madame Chiang peacefully stroked her neck with a long, colored nail and made a graceful gesture of decapitation, which shocked all the Americans during the dinner."³⁹⁰

This was exactly the situation of post-WWII Taiwan as one of the FATs that *River Elogy* referred to as an exemplar, the way they treated communists before 1949, the "fascism" Maoists fought against, and the political scenario of Dengism: people should not be interested in politics, being free election or Maoist populist movements, but focus on their own businesses to improve their livelihood. Those who were more loyal to the developmental path of the FATs were Dengists rather than *River Elogy*'s liberals who criticized their authoritarian aspects.

When it comes to the sociocultural liberalism *River Elogy* advocated for, a propagandist criticism in August 1989 can tell a lot: "Confucianism drove Japan's Meiji Restoration; the recent rise of the FATs was all related to Confucianism...why cannot Confucianism serve socialism? *River Elogy*'s authors saw only the shortcomings of Confucianism but not the advantages of Confucianism; therefore, unconsciously became followers of the Gang of Four".³⁹¹ Although this text was likely written at the invitation of the CPC's publicity department, it might have expressed its author, a professor at Beijing Normal University, Confucian Zhao Guangxian's individual attitude towards *River Elogy*. Both the royalist Meiji Restoration and right-wing, authoritarian FATs were exemplars of conservative modernization. If Confucianism were to "serve" socialism, where could this "socialism" be positioned in the political spectrum? Right.

Zhao Guangxian accurately pointed out the commonality of *River Elogy*'s liberalism and Maoists' communism: both attempted to wholly replace Chinese traditions with metaphysical ideologies

³⁸⁸ For the political struggle between the two factional tendencies after 1989 and how Dengism eventually prevailed under Jiang's leadership in the early 1990s, cf. the 5th Chapter.

³⁸⁹ *River Elogy*, Episode 6.

³⁹⁰ Ibid.

³⁹¹ Zhao Guangxian, "Commentary on *River Elogy* from a Historical Perspective," *Guangming Daily*, 23rd August 1989.

imported from the West. However, *River Elegy* and some of its criticisms, more or less confused the opposite two: Mao and Confucius, or Robespierre and Louis XVI, or Lenin and Nicholas II. “History has proved that to carry out modernization according to the ruling mode of an inland culture can also accommodate some achievements of modern science and technology; even satellites can go to the sky, atomic bombs can explode. However, it cannot fundamentally endow the entire nation with a strong civilizational vitality.”³⁹² *River Elegy* suggested the Maoist rule as within the logos of the “mode of inland culture”, which cannot explain the Maoist attempt to destroy Confucianism, the fundamental pillar of the “mode of inland culture”. The “strong civilizational vitality” cannot be found in not only Maoist left-wing dictatorship, but also what *River Elegy* referred to as models of modernization, namely, right-wing dictatorships that also followed the “mode of inland culture”.

³⁹² *River Elegy*, Episode 6.

“Suppressing the revolutionary student movement is an illegal and criminal act... It is absolutely not allowed to shoot at revolutionary teachers and students, nor is it allowed to intimidate with empty guns... If revolutionary students hit the police, the police are not allowed to fight back.”

Chairman Mao and the CPC Central Committee, “Instruction from the CPC Central Committee,” 22nd August 1966.

MICRO RESTORATION OF SOCIAL HIERARCHIES

a. AGAINST STUDENT ACTIVISM

Conservative governments need to deal with Chinese students vigilantly; they have demonstrated how disobedient they could be throughout China’s modern history. The 1895 petition to the throne for constitutionalizing the monarchy led to a 103-day reform that failed after a reactionary coup. The May Fourth Movement in 1919 contributed to the birth of the CPC. The December 9th Movement in 1935 and other CPC-led student protests during the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) led to the collapse of the right-wing KMT dictatorship. During the Red August 1966, Maoist red guards stormed schools and executed teachers and principals. The far-left articles written by Liang Xiao [two schools], the most known pseudonym during the Cultural Revolution, standing for the “PKU and Tsinghua Groups of Grand Critique”, were published in *People’s Daily*, *Guangming Daily*, and other prominent CPC mouthpieces.

On 25th January 1967, while Chinese students were paying homage to Lenin’s tomb in Red Square, they were beaten by the police. *People’s Daily* then published an editorial titled “Warmly Welcome the Glorious Return of the Antirevisionist Fighters!” “When facing the fascist mobs, you were not afraid of danger and fought a resolute and heroic struggle against the enemy. You have shown the proletarian revolutionary rebel spirit of the Chinese youth nurtured by Mao Zedong Thought.”³⁹³ The beaten students, after “fascist brutality”, wrote: “bastards Brezhnev and Kosygin, prick up your dog ears and listen...we will smash your dog heads...and completely, cleanly and teetotally eliminate revisionism from the whole world...Smash the dog heads of Brezhnev and Kosygin! Proletarians of the world unite! Long live the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat!”³⁹⁴

Allegedly, “500,000”³⁹⁵ people in Shanghai held rallies and demonstrations, protesting against the Soviet Union’s “heinous crimes” and “fascist atrocities of bloody suppressions”³⁹⁶ of Chinese students. “The *young* revolutionary Red Guards sternly warned the *old* bastards such as Brezhnev and Kosygin: anyone who suppresses the student movement will have no good end, and anyone who betrays the revolution will have no good end...we must rebel against not only a handful of

³⁹³ “Warmly Welcome the Glorious Return of the Antirevisionist Fighters!” *People’s Daily*, 1st January 1967.

³⁹⁴ “Chinese Students in Europe Sent a Message of Solidarity to Firmly Support the Revolutionary Actions of Chinese Students in Iraq,” *People’s Daily*, 1st January 1967.

³⁹⁵ “Strong Protest against the Heinous Crime of the Soviet Revisionist Group’s Bloody Repression of Our International Students, 500,000 Revolutionaries in Shanghai Held Powerful Rally and Demonstration,” *People’s Daily*, 1st January 1967.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

capitalist roaders within the CPC but also imperialism, modern revisionism, and reactionaries in all countries. Rebellious to the end is the victory!”³⁹⁷

The pro-democracy student protests in 1986 and 1989 were continuations of such a revolutionary tradition. After 1989, the CPC, which was born from student activism and campaigning through student protests, came up with various measures against student radicalism. Deng claimed: “we could not be focusing on development [with student radicalism]. We already had experienced Cultural Revolution. If such trouble occurs [again], a new Cultural Revolution will emerge.”³⁹⁸

According to *The Code of Conduct for College Students (Trial)* issued on 17th November 1989, students should not engage in activities that “endanger social order” and “undermine stability and unity”³⁹⁹, “comply with the Constitution and the laws and regulations...and oppose anarchism”⁴⁰⁰ and “extreme individualism”⁴⁰¹, and “individual interests must be subordinated to national and collective interests”⁴⁰². Students should also “respect teachers and older people”⁴⁰³, and not “stay overnight with people of the opposite sex in dormitory”⁴⁰⁴.

The Code of Daily Conduct for Middle School Students issued in 1994, which was, according to itself, “the specific embodiment of the Chinese nation’s traditional virtues in the daily behavior of middle school students”⁴⁰⁵, stipulated that the students should “behave humbly, respect for the elderly”⁴⁰⁶, “respect faculty members, greet them proactively. Stand up when answering questions from teachers; stand up and use both hands when accepting delivery. Be honest with teachers”⁴⁰⁷, and “obey [school] management”⁴⁰⁸; “respect parents’ opinions and teachings”⁴⁰⁹, “greet parents when going out and arriving home, and do not stay outside without parental consent”⁴¹⁰, “respect and help parents, grandparents, maternal grandparents, care for elders and siblings”⁴¹¹, “[middle school students’ different] opinions towards elders should be presented politely, without being temperamental or contradicting”⁴¹²; and “preserve cultural relics and monuments”⁴¹³. *The Code of Daily Conduct for Elementary School Students* issued in 1991 contained 60 codes, most of which overlapped with those for middle school students.

Throughout the history of Chinese student activism, most student movements occurred in the universities of most foreign influences, be communism or liberalism. According to Deng, the most prominent “mistake” during the 1980s was “education. We did not pay enough attention to the

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

³⁹⁸ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “China Can Only Take the Socialist Road (3rd March 1987).”

³⁹⁹ The National Education Council of the PRC, *The Code of Conduct for College Students (Trial)*, code 1.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid., code 2.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., code 4.

⁴⁰² Ibid., code 4.

⁴⁰³ Ibid., code 8.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid., code 13.

⁴⁰⁵ National Education Council of the PRC, “Notice of the National Education Council on Officially Issuing *The Code of Daily Conduct for Middle School Students*,” 11th March 1994.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., Appendix, code 10.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., Appendix, code 11.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid., Appendix, code 24.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid., Appendix, code 29.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid., Appendix, code 30.

⁴¹¹ Ibid., Appendix, code 31.

⁴¹² Ibid., Appendix, code 32.

⁴¹³ Ibid., Appendix, code 36.

political and ideological education of young people.”⁴¹⁴ The first-year undergraduates of PKU (1989 fall onwards) and Fudan (1990 fall onwards) were required to participate in one-year “military-political training”,⁴¹⁵ thus the standard study period for them was subsequently extended from four years to five years. It was self-evident that this program that ended in 1992 aimed to prevent what happened in 1989.

The early 1990s was also an era of intensive legislations reacting to the 1989 protests. Deng called for “close attention to legislation, including laws and regulations, on assemblies, associations, marches, demonstrations, press, and publications. The illegal ones shall be banned.”⁴¹⁶ According to the *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations* passed on 31st October 1989, “to hold assemblies, processions and demonstrations, an application must be filed with the competent authority, and a permit must be obtained”⁴¹⁷, “citizens cannot initiate, organize, or participate in assemblies, parades, and demonstrations in places other than that of their residence”⁴¹⁸, “in the event of unforeseen circumstances...police on the spot can change the marching route of the parade when it is impossible to proceed according to the permitted route”⁴¹⁹, etc.

The *National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China* passed on 22nd February 1993 stipulated that the first and foremost amongst “the acts that endanger national security” is “conspiracy to subvert the government, split the country, overthrow the socialist system”⁴²⁰, and “national security organs may inspect the equipment and facilities such as electronic communication tools of organizations and individuals”⁴²¹.

The martial law in “certain areas of Beijing” implemented on 20th May 1989 was lifted on 11th January 1990. The martial law in Tibet was implemented on 7th March 1989 and was lifted on 1st May 1990. The *Martial Law of the People’s Republic of China* passed in 1996 stipulated that martial law allows “prohibiting or restricting assemblies, processions, demonstrations, street speeches, and other gatherings...strikes, market strikes, and school strikes, implementing control over news... communications, postal services, and telecommunications...exit and entry, and opposing any act against martial law”⁴²².

These legislations indefinitely suspended Article 35 of the 1982 Constitution, which stipulates that “the citizens of the People’s Republic of China have the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession and demonstration”. The first expression of the Article, which came after the democratic revolution against the Chiang’s KMT, was Article 5 in the PRC’s *de facto* Provisional Constitution *Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference* (1949) made by the CPC, 12 pro-democracy parties, and nonpartisans: “the people of the People’s Republic of China have the right to freedom of thought, speech, publication, assembly, association, communication, person, residence, movement, religious belief and demonstration.” In the 1954 Constitution, its expression was Article 87: “the citizens of the People’s Republic of China have

⁴¹⁴ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “China Does not Allow Disorder (4th March 1989).”

⁴¹⁵ “Second Chinese College Sends Freshmen for Year of Army Training,” *Associated Press*, 21st September 1990.

⁴¹⁶ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “China Does not Allow Disorder (4th March 1989).”

⁴¹⁷ *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and Demonstrations* (1989), Article 7.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 15.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 21.

⁴²⁰ *National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China* (1993), Article 4.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, Article 11.

⁴²² *Martial Law of the People’s Republic of China* (1996), Article 13.

the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession and demonstration. The state provides necessary material facilities to ensure that citizens enjoy these freedoms.” In the 1975 Constitution, this principle was reiterated in Article 28. The new Article 13 further legalized “big talk, big release, big debate, big-character poster [four bigs]”, encouraging participatory, deliberative democracy. The 1978 Constitution combined the two in its Article 45. On 10th September 1980, the left-wing populist “four big” was deleted, showing the Qiusi faction’s triumph. The post-1989 legislations restricting political participation of the people were clearly not a turn to the “left”, but the exact opposite, based on the deletion of the “four bigs”, a further reaction to the republican spirit that the 1982 Constitution inherited from 1949 Revolution.

What is the relationship between Dengism [SwCC] and Chiangism [Chiang’s Tridemism]? History is always strikingly similar. There have been two periods of martial law in modern China, the one from 1949 to 1987 in Taiwan imposed by the Chiang’s KMT against Maoism, and the one from 1989 to 1990 on mainland imposed by the CPC that swift from Maoism to Dengism.

“I feel like I’m back in the old society.”

Mr. Fu, *I Love My Family*,
Episode 43.

b. *I LOVE MY FAMILY* (1993)

The sitcom *I Love My Family* (1993-1994) was directed by Ying Da (b. 1960), who studied director and performance at the University of Missouri and thus brought sitcom into China. The sitcom, which was inspired by *The Cosby Show* (1984-1992), received phenomenal popularity in China. Situated in a family of six in Beijing, it illustrated various types of characters in the Chinese society and demonstrated a truthful picture of family relationships, neighborhood, and daily life in the context of market-oriented reform in the early 1990s.

Mr. Fu is a 66-year-old retired deputy bureau-level cadre with three offspring: 42-year-old son Zhiguo, 30-year-old son Zhixin, and 23-year-old daughter Xiaofan, a graduate student of Literature. Zhiguo, a deputy division-level cadre, and his 38-year-old wife Heping have a 12-year-old daughter Yuanyuan. Like American sitcoms targeting the middle class, the Mr. Fuses is a middle-class family. However, the fact that they live in Dongcheng, a district of Beijing’s urban core where Tiananmen and Forbidden City are located, implies the objective privilege they enjoy due to Mr. Fu’s status.

The Mr. Fuses is wealthy enough to hire a housemaid, or “home attendant”. Conceivably, the housemaid comes from the underdeveloped parts of China. The first housemaid, ca. 20-year-old Zhang, has a Sichuanese accent from China’s southwest rural area. After Zhang left, the second housemaid, 18-year-old Xue, has an accent of the populous, landlocked province of Henan where agriculture dominates. The places where they were born determined that they cannot receive tertiary education as Xiaofan of a similar age does.

Intentionally or not, the sitcom emphasized the theme of the master-servant relationship. One day, Cui, the housemaid of the Mr. Fuses’ neighbor, comes to the Mr. Fuses’ home. Zhang is mopping the floor.

Cui: Take a rest, Zhang.

Zhang: But the floor is not yet clean.

Cui: The clean floor is of the Mr. Fuses; the tired body is of yourself...How much do they pay for you?

Zhang: 100.

Cui: Ay [despise].

Zhang: Plus, bonus! Anyway, I am not for their money but for their kindness.

Cui: What can kindness offer? With kindness, would you do it for free? And how kind are they? On such a beautiful Sunday, they all go out for a family trip and leave you alone at home mopping the floor...you do know much about the laws, I tell you: we workers have the right to rest [laugh]...nowadays nobody works like you, even labor prisoners take holidays and carry out a variety of colorful cultural and sports activities. Are we countryside people worse than labor prisoners?

Zhang: Nevertheless, we eat their food, live in their homes, and take their money.
 Cui: Who is feeding whom? [laugh] How can you have no class consciousness at all! [laugh] Shopping, cooking, washing, cleaning, you do them all yourself. They are exploiting you [laugh]...what a pity that you didn't study in school, knowing anything of Marxism-Leninism [laugh]...thankfully, I ignited the fire of revolution for you today [laugh]...
 Zhang: Forget about it...isn't "those who do not work shall not eat" also what the bearded guy said? [laugh]⁴²³

According to the Marxist labor theory of value, private employment has *surplus value* [Mehrwert], which the owner of capital exploits from the proletarians' work. Thus, the capitalists "who do not work shall not eat", and the workers who create Mehrwert shall enjoy all of their creations. Though Zhang's employment is not tangibly profitable, she, without capital but labor force to sell in the labor market, is indeed proletarian. The Mr. Fus is indeed bourgeois in the sense that it obtains capital. The Mr. Fus does not engage in much business, but the employment of servants by the landlords who inherit instead of "exploit" wealth through entrepreneurship is also a form of exploitation. Marx's 'those who do not work shall not eat' that should lead to deprivation of the wealth of the rich becomes a call for proletarians to work diligently in Zhang's usage.

After Zhang left, the Mr. Fus found 60-year-old "Aunt Li" as a temporal housemaid. Li is an "old-fashioned" housemaid. She refuses to sit together with the Mr. Fus' on the sofa but sits aside on a chair. Yuanyuan asks her to sit next Mr. Fu for dinner, Li says: "how can a servant eat at the table? I go to the kitchen for the leftovers..."

Mr. Fu: Old aunts still obey those norms...I feel like I'm back in the old society (China before 1949) [laugh].
 Zhiguo: Dad, I have to remind you that recently you've been missing the old society a lot.
 Mr. Fu: I miss it in a critical way. In the old society, the working people's virtue 'enduring hardship first and enjoying the last' should be fully approved. Oppression and exploitation are not good, though...If Li really doesn't want to eat at the table, then don't force her.⁴²⁴

A coin always has two sides: without having the "virtue" instead of "class consciousness" widespread amongst the working people, how could oppression and exploitation be normalized and thus sustained? Instead of being eliminated by revolutions, the norms in the old society invisibly remained in the Chinese society, not only in Li's mind but also in Mr. Fu's mind and many others. One day, Mr. Fu received a letter.

Mr. Fu: It is from one of my distant sisters; you should call her aunt.
 Heping: I did not know that we even have a relative in the US.
 Mr. Fu: Speaking of which, she is also a tragic figure. [laugh] Back then, she went to Taiwan with her KMT's husband and later fled to the US. What a pity. [laugh]
 Heping: What a pity of living in the US. [laugh]
 Mr. Fu: ...I, joined the CPC, she, married to a KMT's man. The reality has proven that her choice was wrong. [laugh] I'm living my old age in peace; she's living abroad helplessly [laugh]...⁴²⁵

⁴²³ *ILMF*, Episode 39.

⁴²⁴ *ILMF*, Episode 43.

⁴²⁵ *ILMF*, Episode 65.

In the letter, surprisingly, Mr. Fu's sister proposed to visit the Mr. Fus. In previous letters, Mr. Fu introduced to her how well he is now living.

Mr. Fu: Well, I just exaggerated our family's conditions a little bit. [laugh] She said her daughter is studying at Harvard and her son is a boss in San Francisco; so, I said my daughter is doing PhD at Stanford [laugh], and my son is super rich in Hainan [laugh]...Moreover, I described my home as opulent [laugh], two units, seven to eight rooms [laugh], full of hardwood furniture [laugh] and imported appliances, three home attendants [laugh] plus a majordomo.⁴²⁶

The Mr. Fus decided to ask Mrs. Hu, who was born as a gege⁴²⁷ of the Qing dynasty, to showcase how the old noble family works. Heping acts as a servant.

Yuanyuan: Maid He, I do it myself, no bother to you.

Mrs. Hu: Don't be so courteous when talking to a servant. We shall say: "Maid He, go down" [laugh]...He, where is your eyesight? Having seen that I could not reach the dishes, shouldn't you have moved the plate to me?

Heping: What are your own hands for? [laugh]

Mrs. Hu: Shut up! Should my hands be doing this? How dare you talk back to your master! Majordomo Hu, take her down, hit her 20 times, and deduct half her monthly salary. [laugh] Is my performance a bit overdone?

Heping: Not overdone, just fit. [laugh] Thanks to your guidance, I have now become a sincere supporter of our new society! [laugh]⁴²⁸

In reality, the rediscovery of ancestry and resurgence of clan hierarchy were trendy in early 1990s China – in fact, they never faded away in the societal structure of mentality. Heping comes from Beijing's outskirts, while Zhiguo is a local. Her family's attitude towards privacy is in stark contrast to that of the Mr. Fus. One day, Heping receives a letter that is sent to Yuanyuan.

Heping: I have to open it.

Zhiguo: You know it is illegal.

Heping: How can it be illegal? This is my home! Yuanyuan is my daughter!

Zhiguo: I see, this is a tradition of your family...no wonder your mother memorized what I wrote in the love letters to you back then. [laugh]⁴²⁹

Heping's dietary preferences also confirm her family status.

Zhiguo: Your mother just called, asking if you would like to eat fried dough drops at noon.

Heping: You should have told me earlier...

Zhiguo: I didn't know you were keen on this kind of food. Do you know what Beijingers call it? "The joy of the poor". [laugh]⁴³⁰

Nonetheless, Heping does not give up her investigation of the dignity, honor and superiority associated with her ancestry.

⁴²⁶ *ILMF*, Episode 65.

⁴²⁷ It refers to an imperial-born princess of an emperor in the Manchurian royalty.

⁴²⁸ *ILMF*, Episode 65.

⁴²⁹ *ILMF*, Episode 91.

⁴³⁰ *ILMF*, Episode 89.

Heping: Do you know who I am? [laugh] I'm a descendant of the exploitative class. [laugh] Don't spread it out, nothing glorious. [laugh]

Zhiguo: Are you sure? How can you be a descendant of the exploitative class? You look like the exploited class. [laugh]

Heping: That is all because, in history, you, the working people, were unwilling to be exploited by us, today uprisings, tomorrow rebellions...thus tossed us into what we are today [laugh]...According to the newly edited *Clan Genealogy of the Hes*, I am the thirteenth-generation descendant of the treacherous court official He Shen⁴³¹ [laugh]...How rich the Hes was? "...our family's property was more than the government's revenue in ten years" [laugh]...I feel sad, what a huge family property, but nothing left for me...

Zhiguo: That was from the exploitation of working people.

Heping: I do care *how* it came from. Anyway, it was *of* my family, and I inherited nothing. How can I feel at ease?⁴³²

The reestablishment of private ownership and the revival of feudalist ideology converged to form the normative landscape in early 1990s China. One day, Yuanyuan found a bracelet, seemingly of the dead Mrs. Fu.

Zhiguo: If my mom had a bracelet this big, she wouldn't have been in the revolution.

Mr. Fu: Why not...you mom was from a scholarly family, a nobility. Nobility, understand? [laugh] It means super rich, landlord, namely, class enemy, counter-revolutionary [laugh]. In the old society, they exploited the people with so much money that they did not even know how to spend them. [laugh]

Yuanyuan: They should ask me for help, I can spend them all. [laugh]⁴³³

According to Mr. Fu's memory, the bracelet is part of Mrs. Fu's dowry, a chest of treasures he could not find anymore. The Mr. Fuses started searching for it.

Heping: If we find the chest of treasures... I'll hire two people to serve you.

Housemaid: Serve me? What do I do then?

Heping: You do not need to do anything, lying on your bed every day, eating delicacies, just like the landlords in the past. [laugh]

Yuanyuan: What about me?

Heping: What is your biggest dream?

Yuanyuan: I want to be the captain of the Young Pioneers...

Heping: No problem, I buy you the primary school, not to mention the captain, I let you become the Principal! [laugh]

Yuanyuan: I will fire my headteacher first. [laugh] I also want to meet some Hong Kong celebrities.

Heping: No problem, I will buy you Hong Kong then. [laugh]⁴³⁴

Another early 1990s trend was the rise of the nouveau riche, with their professional competency and economic capital, for instance, Mr. Hu, the neighbor of Mr. Fu, and the retired chief engineer of Mr. Fu's beau. The nouveau riche contradicts the traditionally privileged bureaucrats.

⁴³¹ He Shen (1750-1799) is a synonym of corruption in Chinese.

⁴³² *ILMF*, Episode 89.

⁴³³ *ILMF*, Episode 105.

⁴³⁴ *ILMF*, Episode 105.

Mr. Fu: Having obtained a doctorate in the US, Hu was so arrogant that sometimes he even looked down on me as a leader...He's also been spreading rhetoric that I was bureaucratic behind me.

Zhiguo: Was that true?

Mr. Fu: What's true or not? Criticizing the leadership per se is wrong. Although I was not really his leader. [laugh] For a time, he was even my leader.⁴³⁵

Mr. Fu does not defend egalitarianism but the hierarchy based on "revolutionary merits"; therefore "criticizing the leadership per se is wrong". Nonetheless, the class Mr. Fu represented is inevitably in decline, considering the rapid materialistic realization brought by the economic boom. One day, Mr. Fu finds Mr. Hu is eating prawns.

Mr. Fu: Heping, tomorrow you go to the bank and withdraw 200 to buy prawns. He can afford it, can't I? [laugh]

Heping: Why are you competing with Mr. Hu? Can we compare with the Mr. Hus? He has inventions, patents, royalties, consultancies...what do we have?

Mr. Fu: We do not have...but my pension can afford at least two pounds of prawns! [laugh]

Heping: Are you sure? Today he eats prawns, you decide to buy prawns; the other day, he may eat crabs. Would you buy crabs? Another day he may eat soft-shelled turtles...why are you competing with him? [laugh]⁴³⁶

With Deng's calls for "respect for knowledge and intellectuals", "science and technology are primary productive forces", "education should face modernization, face the world and face the future", those bureaucrats who prefer arrangement and plan rather than free competition are being phased out.

Heping: Anyone can do it, free competition. [laugh]

Mr. Fu: Free competition? How can I compete with him? Who is the leader?⁴³⁷

Both Mr. Fu and Zhiguo are of the declining bureaucratic class. One day, Yuanyuan invites his classmate Wen to visit the Mr. Fuses.

Wen: Given your temperament and demeanor, you must have been a *high-ranking cadre*, right?

Mr. Fu: Well, it cannot be said in that way, though...after all, we are all serving the people. [laugh] Yuanyuan, I see your classmate is quite smart.

Wen: ...Yuanyuan, I really admire you for having such a great grandfather...my grandfather, when he was alive, was a *beggar*. How can mine compare with yours? [laugh]

Mr. Fu: Well, it cannot be said in that way though...in the old society, the poor begged for food, that was because...

Wen: In the old society, he was fine. He begged for food in 1962. [laugh]

Mr. Fu: 1962? That was because of some mistakes in our work.

Wen: Yuanyuan, do you see the gap? When your grandfather makes a mistake, mine has to beg for food. [laugh]⁴³⁸

⁴³⁵ *ILMF*, Episode 49.

⁴³⁶ *ILMF*, Episode 71.

⁴³⁷ *ILMF*, Episode 100.

⁴³⁸ *ILMF*, Episode 97.

1962 refers to the Great Chinese Famine caused by Mao's radical egalitarian Great Leap Forward. Apparently, Wen's family was rich before 1949 and is becoming rich again.

Wen: You go to work every day; are you a so-called white-collar worker?

Zhiguo: In a sense, yes.

Wen: Don't you have any other competencies? [laugh]

Zhiguo: What do you mean?

Wen: Don't you know what people nowadays are saying: the capable are bosses, the incompetent are hawkers, the lowest go to work. [laugh]

Zhiguo: ...What does your father do?

Wen: Shall I tell the truth or lie?

Yuanyuan: Lie!

Wen: My dad is a junk collector.

Zhiguo: ...I see, a junk collector surely can't educate somebody decent...wait, you tell me the truth, what does your father really do?

Wen: I dare not say; I am afraid that you will be anxious [laugh]...He's doing so well that you would be anxious.

Zhiguo: Why should I be anxious if he is doing well? [laugh]

Wen: You two are peers; he is doing better than you, aren't you anxious?

Zhiguo: How well is he doing? Is the Wangfujing Hotel of your family?

Wen: Almost, he is a cofounder. [laugh] There are hotels, as well as villas, country clubs, golf courses...⁴³⁹

Market destroys feudalist family relations; more importantly, these changes are irreversible, unlike the reversible "revolutionary" progress and liberation made by revolution [regime change]. Mr. Fu experienced both 1949 "liberation" and Cultural Revolution. Neither has changed his patriarchic belief. Zhiguo and Heping still live with Mr. Fu. "Whose house is this? This is mine! I have worked and contributed my whole life. This is the treatment given to me by the government. Why do you stay here? It is for you to take care of me, help me with my work, and make me happy...If I'm not happy, it's your fault. I'm telling you, I'm a little bit unhappy now. [laugh]"⁴⁴⁰ Family is the place where morality is passed on. Not surprisingly, Zhiguo and Heping inherited the medieval way of parental education.

Yuanyuan: I'm worried that the teacher may tell you something about my behaviors at school [during the parent-teacher conference], for which you are not prepared. [laugh]

Zhiguo: We are well prepared: broom, belt [laugh], washboard...⁴⁴¹

Nevertheless, this would soon become the past, thanks to the revolutionary changes to the productive forces and production relations that irreversibly eliminate dependency and foster individualism. Heping and Zhiguo plan to move out. Heping says: "we cook whatever we want to eat and buy whatever we do not want to cook. On Sunday, we sleep until 12:00 noon...How wonderful! [laugh]" Zhiguo agrees: "our expectations are not demanding. How come they have not been realized 40 years after *liberation*? [laugh] When I go to work, I follow my leader's instructions. When I go home, I have to follow my father's instructions of my father...I used to be a horse, but I am a

⁴³⁹ *ILMF*, Episode 97.

⁴⁴⁰ *ILMF*, Episode 73.

⁴⁴¹ *ILMF*, Episode 104.

human now.⁴⁴² Family and patriarchy are in disintegration, not by another anti-feudalist revolution, but market. Mr. Fu is surprised, if not shocked, but he cannot do anything to change the situation.

Heping: He [Zhiguo] is, anyhow, you son.

Mr. Fu: Really? Do I even have a son? [laugh]

Zhiguo: Dad, what are you talking about? If you do not have a son, who am I?

Fu. Fu: How do I know who you are? [laugh]⁴⁴³

Nonconventional ideas about family and morality emerge, especially amongst the well-educated youth, such as Xiaofan. She was assigned a research topic of homewrecker. Mr. Fu asks if it is possible to change the assigned topic. Xiaofan says: “yes. Other topics are drug addiction, trafficking, prostitution [laugh], corruption, bribery, abortion, underage girls losing chastity [laugh], sexual perversion, homosexuality, mistress and sugar daddy, older unmarried men and women, psychopath, juvenile delinquents, which one do you think is suitable? [laugh]”⁴⁴⁴

The Mr. Fuses suspects that Xiaofan is in a teacher-student relationship with her married professor. They pretend to be supportive of homewrecker, so that Xiaofan would admit her relationship.

Zhixin: Love transcends marriage. Life is once, during which love can't be missed...dad, do you agree? I see; your mindset is feudalistic...

Mr. Fu: Who said I am feudalistic? I am the most liberated! [laugh] I think homewrecker is not necessarily wrong...If you want to know the taste of pears, you must taste them yourself. I heard that a girl in the UK went to live with chimpanzees in primeval forest for years...

Xiaofan: I didn't expect you to think so radically. If I were researching prostitution, would you suggest I experience it myself? [laugh]⁴⁴⁵

Imperial China's millennial tradition of emphasizing children's education and career is being resurrected, accompanied by occupational stratification. Workers, peasants, and soldiers, typically with limited or no education and skill, are no longer considered the most honorable. Children of the petty bourgeoisie are taught to study hard and get good grades for their own benefit, which, according to Dengism, ultimately benefit society as a whole.

Yuanyuan: Mom, this is my exam paper for philology; please sign your signature.

Heping: 72 points (out of 100)?

Yuanyuan: Don't worry, there are even worse ones than mine. [laugh] I got 72 points, and you are in such anxiety. Could the parents of those with 62 points still be alive? [laugh]

Heping: I don't care about whether they are alive... You are about to take the entrance exam for middle school...

Housemaid: Madam, what would you like to eat today?

Heping: Waiting a minute... Yuanyuan, what do you want to be when you grow up? Do you want to be, like her, a housemaid? [laugh]⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴² *ILMF*, Episode 73.

⁴⁴³ *ILMF*, Episode 73.

⁴⁴⁴ *ILMF*, Episode 25.

⁴⁴⁵ *ILMF*, Episode 25.

⁴⁴⁶ *ILMF*, Episode 101.

While the vast part of China that the housemaids represent has less or no educational opportunity, in Beijing, stratification within the education system (so-called “key schools”) starts emerging, which later would evolve into elite schools like Eton College, Lycée Henri-IV, and Theresianum. Yuanyuan is likely to go to the No. 250 Middle School.

Zhiguo: How can we let Yuanyuan go to that school? I heard that students there have relationships in the 7th grade, cohabitately illegally in the 8th grade...when they get in the 10th grade, some go to school with their children [laugh]...

Yuanyuan: If I can't get into a good middle school, I can't get into a good university; if I can't get into a good university, I can't get a good job; and if can't get a good job, I can't find a good partner. [laugh]⁴⁴⁷

The master-servant, bureaucracy-technology, plan-market, inheritance and exploitation, urban-rural cleavages, and generation gaps appeared in the sitcom come to a peak in its O. Henry ending. Zhixin [lit. “for the new”], in contrast with his brother Zhiguo [lit. “for the country”], is the only member of the Mr. Fus who engages in private business. Zhixin went to Hainan, a newly declared Special Economic Zone.

Mr. Fu: Heping, you, as well as your husband, didn't get rich, should therefore learn from Zhixin [laugh]...Back then, Zhang was unwilling to be a housemaid anymore, so she followed Zhixin to Hainan. This time, they come back, Zhang as Zhixin's secretary, you as our housemaid, both serve the people⁴⁴⁸...serve our family. [laugh]

Housemaid: Both serving your family, I would like to become a secretary instead.

Heping: Zhang as a secretary is nothing different from you being a housemaid. She just makes tea for Zhixin, carries his luggage, etc.⁴⁴⁹

It turned out that it is Zhang who has become an entrepreneur, and Zhixin became Zhang's secretary, making tea for Zhang and carrying her luggage.

Yuanyuan: Zhang, you look different now.

Zhang: Am I becoming exquisite? That is because I was born to be beautiful, though when I was a housemaid at yours, I was being oppressed and exploited [laugh]...May I ask where the washroom is?

Yuanyuan: You mean the toilet? I'll take you to...

Heping: Is her the Zhang as we know? Why doesn't she even know where the toilet is? Was not that place for her to clean back then? [laugh]

Mr. Fu: The villain gets thriving; the poor get rich. [laugh]⁴⁵⁰

For the Mr. Fus, Zhixin is born to be superior to a servant. Nobles being angry at the poor for them getting rich is obviously not a phenomenon only in China. Its reappearance in the early 1990s China demonstrates how the old things in the old society are with strong vitality that revolution failed to clear up, and why the emerging “new social class” is relatively progressive vis-à-vis the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, just as it was before 1949. By the 1990s, China was never out of the profoundly hierarchical structure of the “old society” through revolutions; ironically, the “old society” started to dissolve in a reactionary atmosphere.

⁴⁴⁷ *ILMF*, Episode 104.

⁴⁴⁸ “Serve the People” was a slogan during the Maoist era.

⁴⁴⁹ *ILMF*, Episode 117.

⁴⁵⁰ *ILMF*, Episode 117.

“We would have a better system if we gave every man over the age of 40 who has a family two votes because he’s...more likely to vote in a serious way than a capricious young man under 30.”

Lee Kuan Yew, “A Culture Is Destiny,” *Foreign Affairs* 73 (1994): p. 119.

“CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS” AND “ASIAN VALUES”

To identify SwCC, apart from the pragmatics of “socialism”, is to identify the “Chinese characteristics”. Initially, Deng used the “Chinese characteristics” to defend his theory of the “primary stage of socialism”: though Mao’s egalitarianism was in accordance with the “universal truth” of Marxism, what China needs is a “Sinicized” Marxism that is in accordance with China’s specifics, viz., the underdeveloped condition. The PRC has to spend one century from the 1950s to the mid-21st century on the primary stage of socialism, not to mention the more advanced “middle” or “final” stage of socialism thereafter; communism is an extremely distant target that, in effect, has nothing other than imagination to do with the alive.

Deng’s original definition, being reactionary to Maoism, was widely accepted in 1980s China for both liberals and conservatives. For liberals, Deng’s idea paved the way for the restoration of the free market, and the next step must be “bourgeois democracy”. They seemingly neglected (a) the fact that in China, a market existed before 1949, but democracy did not, and (b) the possibility that Deng’s revisionism would go further in its conservative direction, opposing not only Maoism but also liberalism. China is surely not yet prepared for communism – nor is even the most developed country; but is China already prepared for democracy?

T4.1: Receptions of External Modernity in Chinese Mainland

Period	Discourse	Implication
ca. 1600	Trivial Plagiarism of Sinitic Civilization ⁴⁵¹	Internal
ca. 1850	Useful Barbarian Technique ⁴⁵²	External but Inferior
1860s-1890s	Instrumental Western Scholarship (IWS) ⁴⁵³	Equal but Unmetaphysical
1890s	Western Scholarship ⁴⁵⁴	Equal and Metaphysical
1900s	New Scholarship	Superior but Uncivilizational
1910s-1920s	New Culture ⁴⁵⁵	Superior and Civilizational
1927-1949	IWS ⁴⁵⁶	Equal but Unmetaphysical
1949-1978	Marxism-Leninism	Universal and Perpetual
1978-1989	Western Capitalism ⁴⁵⁷	Superior and Civilizational
1990-	IWS	Equal but Unmetaphysical

⁴⁵¹ Cf. Confucians Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692), Huang Zongxi (1610-1695), et al.

⁴⁵² Cf. Wei Yuan, *Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms* (1843).

⁴⁵³ Cf. Tongzhi Restoration (Zhang Zhidong, et al.).

⁴⁵⁴ Cf. Zheng Guanying, *Words of Warning to a Prosperous Age* (1893), Chapter III “Western Scholarship”.

⁴⁵⁵ Cf. New Cultural Movement (Chen Duxiu, et al.).

⁴⁵⁶ Cf. Chiang Kai-shek, *The Destiny of China* (1943).

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. Liu Xiaobo, *The Fog of Metaphysics* (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1989).

Tabulation: author.

In the late 1980s, Maoism was no longer the main threat to Dengism, while liberalism emerged as an eloquent challenger that endangered the CPC's rule in 1989. During the early 1990s, the rhetoric of "Chinese characteristics" swift from a defense of pre-socialism to that of pre-liberalism. As an advocacy of particularism, "Chinese characteristics" has been less and less used against Maoist universalism and more and more used against liberal universalism.

In a peer-reviewed journal paper titled "A Political Philosophical Analysis on the Misconception of Western Universalism and the Justifiability of Chinese Characteristics," the author wrote that universalist discourse is currently "the main challenge facing"⁴⁵⁸ SwCC, but even within the West universalism is disputable. In defense of SwCC, China could "draw on the criticisms of modern universalism by Edmund Burke" and "Leo Strauss"⁴⁵⁹. "The opposition between universalism and Chinese characteristics boils down to the opposition between a doctrinairism that ignores practice and a prudent spirit of *seeking truth from facts* [Qiushi]."⁴⁶⁰

Calling liberals "dogmatic" is no invention. During the Bourbon Restoration, two political factions competed for the Presidency of the Council of Ministers: l'ultraroyalisme represented by Charles X and liberal *doctrinaires*. The name "*doctrinaires*" was initially used in derision by an adversary pen, referring to the opposite of "practical affairs". The post-1989 CPC's appropriation of the contemptuous sense of "doctrinairism" shows that the defense of SwCC can be interchanged with that of royalism.

The search for Chinese particularities has been a systematic program. In defense of the anti-universalist "Chinese characteristics", it was needed to prove that the Chinese civilization has been particular from the beginning and coherent since then. In the field of archaeology, the Xia-Shang-Zhou Chronology Project (1995-2000) and subsequent Chinese Civilization Origin Project in several phases (2001-2003; 2004-2005; 2006-2008; 2011-) were launched, aiming to verify the mythologies of China's initial dynasties and political entities of the Era of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors (ca. 3162 to 2070 BC) and the Xia Dynasty (ca. 2070 to 1600 BC) without contemporaneous written records, in order to prove the historical narrative that Chinese civilization lasted for "5,000 years".

Though Ancient China is amongst the "cradles of civilization", it is not the oldest one. In addition to the "5,000 years" narrative, another prevailing narrative is that the Chinese civilization has been "uninterrupted". One proof is the long-term State Ritual to the religious character Yellow Emperor (ca. 2711-2598 BC). The Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor has been repaired in successive dynasties since Qin (221-206 BC). In 1993, the PRC started repairing it. Since 2004, the State has held national rituals in the Mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor every year. This was a restoration of Chiang's tradition since 1935, after a period of the CPC's leftist rejection of it.

China's leftist intellectuals (Lu Xun) and communists (Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, et al.) in the 20th century have long held a negative view of Chinese characters. They argued that abolishing Chinese characters through Latinization, transforming Chinese from a logogram to a phonogram, would help ordinary people become literate. Thus, the abolition of Chinese characters is left-wing, anti-privilege, egalitarian, and universalist. Mao stated in 1951: "the Chinese characters must be

⁴⁵⁸ Li Mingkun, "A Political Philosophical Analysis on the Misconception of Western Universalism and the Justifiability of Chinese Characteristics," *Social Sciences Abroad*, 2018 (4): p. 85.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 90.

reformed, towards the common direction of Pinyin [official Latinization for Standard Mandarin Chinese created in the 1950s] of world languages.”⁴⁶¹ The CPC-led *simplification* of Chinese characters since the 1950s, resulting in “simplified Chinese”, was the first step towards the eventual abolition of Chinese characters. These were examples of standardized (left) and further simplified (right) Chinese characters:

雄—宏、雪—ヨ、餐—步...

The opposite to “simplified” Chinese driven by communism is “traditional” or orthodox Chinese advocated by conservatives, especially in KMT’s Taiwan and colonial Hong Kong and Macao. During the 1980s, the ideology behind the simplification of Chinese characters was challenged by the fact that the places where Chinese was not “reformed” were apparently more modernized than the Chinese mainland. Similarly, the political abolition of Chinese characters in communist Vietnam and North Korea did not help them “surpass” Japan and South Korea. Further simplification of Chinese characters was not only permanently terminated but also considered to be excessive, nihilistic, and even unpatriotic de-Sinicization. Students have been taught to cherish and be proud of Chinese characters.⁴⁶²

Patronymic reform was another “cultural revolution” driven by communism. Traditionally, an offspring’s surname should inherit that of the father, and a married woman should, if not replace her surname with that of her husband, at least add her husband’s surname before hers. For instance, Chiang Kai-shek’s wife Soong May-ling was called Mrs. Chiang or *Chiang* Soong May-ling. The incumbent Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR Cheng Yuet-ngor is called *Lam* Cheng Yuet-ngor. In contrast, Mao’s wife Jiang Qing has never been referred to as “Mrs. Mao” or “Mao Jiang Qing”. Xi Jinping inherited his father Xi Zhongxun’s surname, but his two elder sisters inherited his mother Qi Xin’s surname. Chinese mainland has appeared to be the most progressive in gender equality compared with other Chinese societies. Unfortunately, this is nominal, not substantial. Li Changchun, in charge of the CPC’s Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization (CGCBSC)⁴⁶³, wrote: “women’s liberation must be based on the development of productive forces”⁴⁶⁴. Without economic development as a foundation, no actual progress in gender equality can be realized. For instance, the acceptance of homosexuality in Hong Kong and Taiwan is much higher than that on mainland China, and the same is true when it comes to different regions in Chinese mainland – more developed, more acceptable.

Likewise, traditional holidays, cultural heritage, literacy of classics...in all aspects, sociocultural tradition has been better preserved in Japan and the FATs compared with that in the Chinese mainland. The Chinese Communists’ rejection of sociocultural traditions was motivated by a desperate desire for modernity, but it backfired. Ironically, over the same period of time, revolution against

⁴⁶¹ Cited in “Quotes of Chairman Mao”, *People’s Daily*, 20th December 1977.

⁴⁶² Ministry of Education, *High School Textbook: Ideological and Political Education*, vol. 3, Cultural Life (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 2018), p. 64.

⁴⁶³ Established in 1997 as a ministry-level unit affiliated with the CPC’s Central Committee, it has been more powerful than the CPC’s Publicity Department and reflected the CPC’s 1990s ideological turn of “building spiritual civilization”. Its incumbent director is Wang Huning.

⁴⁶⁴ Yong Chun (pseudonym), “Thoughts after Watching Monkeys,” *Dahe Daily*, 30th July 2013.

conservatism failed to bring what it aimed for – modernity, while conservative modernization against revolution realized modernity.

In 1994, Lee Kuan Yew elaborated his insights on the “fundamental difference between *Western* concepts of society and government”⁴⁶⁵ and that of East Asia, by which he referred to China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, namely, “the individual exists in the context of his family”⁴⁶⁶. Lee argued that collectivism (hierarchical instead of egalitarian), paternalistic “virtuous politics”, communitarianism instead of individualism, Confucian familism, and corporatist instead of competitive distribution as the main components of “Asian values”. His account has been echoed by Malaysian right-wing strongman Mahathir Mohamad, although Lee’s summarization was originally for Confucianism instead of Islam, and other Muslim leaders have not shown particular interest in “Asian values”.

“Asian values” and Chinese characteristics are morphologically consistent: they refuse to accept universal accounts of human rights, democracy, etc., by asserting particularities. However, these values are not ethnical; they are shared across ethnicities and borders. Some described “Asian values” as “hard work, strong families, home ownership and morality. I happen to believe in all that myself”⁴⁶⁷, said Chris Patten, the last Governor of British Hong Kong, a Tory. The opposite of “Asian values” is not “European values”, “American values”, or “Western values”, but “liberal values”. Lee made it clear: “the erosion of the moral underpinnings of a society and the diminution of personal responsibility”⁴⁶⁸ was based on a post-WWII idea that “everybody would be better off if they were allowed to do their own thing and flourish.”⁴⁶⁹ The *West* was not born with this idea. In fact, this idea has been challenged by conservatives in the West. When Lee said no to “be Westernized”, but “yes” to be “modernized...in the sense that they have accepted the inevitability of science and technology and the change in the lifestyles they bring”⁴⁷⁰, what he really meant was “liberalization” in social, cultural, and political spheres. This standing has been a pillar of Chinese conservatism in all its three waves: royalism, Chiangism, and SwCC.

How could morality be a patent of Orientals? “Asian values” has been “hailed as a model for the future by market-oriented neo-conservatives in the West.”⁴⁷¹ Reagan paternalistically criticized “a modern-day secularism” and asked, “how far are they willing to go in giving to government their prerogatives as parents?”⁴⁷² “But no one seems to mention morality as playing a part in the subject of sex. [applause] Is all of the Judeo-Christian tradition wrong? Are we to believe that something so sacred can be looked upon as a purely physical thing with no potential for emotional and psychological harm, and isn’t the parents’ right to give counsel and advice to keep their children from making mistakes that may affect their entire lives? [applause]”⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁵ Lee Kuan Yew and Fareed Zakaria, “A Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” *Foreign Affairs* 73 (1994): p. 113

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴⁶⁷ Berton Woodward and Charles P. Trumbull (ed.), *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol. 1 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1 January 1995), p. 468.

⁴⁶⁸ “A Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” p. 112.

⁴⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁴⁷¹ Richard Robison, “The politics of ‘Asian values,’” *The Pacific Review* 9, no. 3 (1996): p. 309.

⁴⁷² Ronald Reagan, “Remarks to the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals.” (The “Evil Empire” Speech) March 8, 1983, Orlando, Florida.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

Reagan would disdain moral relativism and “critical theory” as Lee did: “Man needs a certain moral sense of right and wrong. There is such a thing called evil, and it is not the result of being a victim of society.”⁴⁷⁴ Reagan would agree with Lee’s contempt for the welfare state, as well as what Xi suggested that China must “avoid falling into the middle-income trap like some Latin American countries that blindly try to ‘catch-up in welfare’ and avoid lack of social vitality like some Nordic countries that practice ‘pan-welfareism’”⁴⁷⁵. Collectivism, communitarianism, and defense of the state are descriptive, not normative; they may be egalitarian or hierarchical, and in the latter case, they are conservatism. Lee’s suggestions to America were: “First, you must have order in society. Guns, drugs and violent crime all go together, threatening social order. Then the schools; when you have violence in schools, you are not going to have education, so you’ve got to put that right. Then you have to educate rigorously and train a whole generation of skilled, intelligent, knowledgeable people who can be productive.”⁴⁷⁶

According to Xi, China and ASEAN should “jointly safeguard and promote Asian values.”⁴⁷⁷ It proved what Lee said: “Westerners have abandoned an ethical basis for society, believing that all problems are solvable by a good government, which we in the East never believed possible.”⁴⁷⁸ Nonetheless, Lee’s words shall be revised a little bit: in mainland China, some did believe what a Westerner named Karl Marx believed that “all problems are solvable by a good government”, but no longer by the time when Lee said so.

⁴⁷⁴ “A Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” p. 112.


⁴⁷⁵ Xi Jinping, “Promote the High-quality and Sustainable Development of China’s Social Security Undertakings,” *Qiushi*, no. 8 (2022).

⁴⁷⁶ “A Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” p. 114.

⁴⁷⁷ Xi Jinping, “Share a Fate and Build a Home Together: Speech at the Summit Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations,” 22nd November 2021.

⁴⁷⁸ “A Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” p. 112.

CHAPTER V
MATURITY OF DENGISM





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“China needs to be developed; it has been poor for thousands of years. Now it is the time, we cannot wait anymore.”

Deng Xiaoping, “Speeches in Zhuhai (1992).”

SOUTHERN TOUR IN 1992

Deng had been looking for his successor since 1979, but “neither stood still”⁴⁷⁹. The accused “incompetence” against “bourgeois liberalization” of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang was also a mistake of Deng, who appointed them as the General Secretaries. The June Fourth Incident led to not only Zhao’s fall, but also harm to the credibility of reformists including Deng. The conservatives’ warning in 1983 and 1986, on the other hand, seemed farsighted. In the aftermath of 1989, especially during the Anti-Peaceful Evolution Campaign (APEC), the conservatives attempted to challenge Deng’s economic liberalization, which they considered to be the dangerous soil or companion of political liberalization.

Within a period, the conservative veterans even drew Jiang Zemin on their side. The 5th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee of the CPC concluded a resolution on 9th November 1989, which apparently applied Chen Yun’s idea that China’s economic system shall be a “planned economy and market regulation combined”⁴⁸⁰. It proposed that the existing non-state-owned “foreign trade companies shall be banned or revoked, and private foreign trade operations shall be prohibited”⁴⁸¹, and to “appropriately increase the scope and proportion of mandatory plans”⁴⁸², so on the so forth.

Under Gao Di, the new President of *People’s Daily*, appointed after June Fourth Incident⁴⁸³, a series of articles in defense of the planned economy were published: “a socialist economy is...necessarily a planned economy...that is, the conscious implementation of a planned and proportional development of the national economy”⁴⁸⁴ “bourgeois liberalization...focuses on attacking...the planned economy”⁴⁸⁵ “market economy means...implementing capitalism”⁴⁸⁶ etc.

These articles adopted a rhetoric that might be seen as similar to the Gang of Four, but they were not. Gao Di wrote that Cultural Revolution was “a serious mistake”⁴⁸⁷ and “the guiding ideology of the Party since the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee has been completely correct”⁴⁸⁸. Gao defended the “socialist” Soviet Union’s “achievement”, that from 1951 to 1983, it

⁴⁷⁹ *SWDXP*, Vol. III, “The Priority of the Third Generation of Leadership (16th June 1989).”

⁴⁸⁰ The 13th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, *Resolution on Further Governance, Rectification and Deepening of Reform*, 9th November 1989.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*

⁴⁸³ The former President (from December 1985), Qian Liren, was dismissed for his sympathy for the students.

⁴⁸⁴ Wu Shuqing, “Two Issues of the Combination of Planned Economy and Market Regulation,” *People’s Daily*, 5th October 1990.

⁴⁸⁵ Nie Dajiang, “Firmly Establish the Socialist Belief,” *People’s Daily*, 12th October 1990.

⁴⁸⁶ Gao Di, “Socialism Will Definitely Replace Capitalism,” *People’s Daily*, 17th December 1990.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

“developed much faster than the United States”⁴⁸⁹. According to Mao, (a) the USSR from this period of time was not “socialist”, and (b) the economic development during which was “exploitation”!

Thus, the factional force Gao Di presented was by no means antirevisionist Maoism, but precisely what Mao fought against since the late 1950s – the Soviet Model. While Dengism, was to a certain extent, a restoration of what Mao fought against before 1949 – Chiangism, the “practice” of which after WWII was an exemplar of the “East Asian Model” that Deng praised. “Some neighboring countries and regions have been developing faster than us. If we do not develop or develop too slowly, it would become problematic when the ordinary people compare us with them.”⁴⁹⁰

The ideological backslide from 1990 to 1991 within the CPC has been known as the “debate on whether the market economy is socialist or capitalist”. One side claimed that the market economy is capitalist, thereby, should not be adopted, while Dengists claimed the opposite. The nature of the controversy was not of “socialism” and “capitalism” but of plan and market. The USSR, Yugoslavia, and other satellite states were planned economies but not socialist on Mao’s account. Neither Chen Yun’s idea of “planned economy with market regulation” nor Deng’s idea of a “socialist market economy” would be considered “socialist” by Mao. As far as “socialism” is concerned, there have been three definitions: (a) Mao’s socialism as equality of results, which is counterproductive, (b) Moscow’s socialism as a planned economy with nonegalitarian revisions [“material stimulus”], which generates exploitation, and (c) Deng’s socialism as maximized efficiency, which requires a market.

Notwithstanding, the core of the controversy, with or without a market, was of imperative importance. Without Deng’s reassertion of the market economy in the aftermath of 1989, the trajectory of China, as well as Vietnam and Laos that followed it, would not have been similar to the FATs and Japan. On 17th January 1992, Deng sat off from Beijing by special train to Southern China. He visited Wuchang (Wuhan), Changsha (18th), Shenzhen (19th-21st), Zhuhai (23rd-29th), Shunde (Foshan), Guangzhou (29th), Yingtian (30th), Shanghai (31st-20th Feb.), Nanjing, and Bengbu (20th). After retiring from Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Deng was de jure an ordinary member of the CPC, but de facto, he was still the paramount leader. During the Southern Tour, Deng inexplicitly warned that he might replace Jiang if he continued rejecting marketization. Though Jiang was the new Chairman of the CMC, the Military largely remained controlled by Deng, especially the uncompromising Dengist, Yang Shangkun (First Vice Chairman of the CMC). Deng reiterated that the market reform implemented by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang was not the reason why they had to step down, and the new leader must be “adhering to the principle of reform and opening-up”⁴⁹¹.

These cities Deng selected to visit were located on China’s southeast coast, closest to Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Deng’s vision was to turn China into a world factory, an “export-oriented economy”⁴⁹² based on export substitution. China provides cheap labor to attract foreign direct investment – this is a typical process of producing surplus value. However, the “practice” of the FATs was a strong defense of classical economics and modernization theory, or “capitalism”, the opposite of dependency theory (Raúl Prebisch, I. Wallerstein, et al.) and import substitution:

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ *SWDXP*, Vol. III, “Speeches in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai and Other Cities (1992).”

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

they transformed from the periphery to the core within the world-system. Deng concluded that “we shall attract more foreign investment, they will certainly benefit, but in the end, it will be our own benefit.”⁴⁹³

Perhaps, what was more important than the failed prediction of the Marxist-Leninist political economy on the international system, in driving Deng’s Southern Tour, was the fear that he shared with Chinese elites since the late 19th century of a nightmare – China could not be modernized. The post-1989 conservatives’ refusal of commerce reminded him of the natural economy that dominated premodern China and the Sea Ban restricting foreign trade during the Ming and Qing dynasties. “Without the four modernizations [in agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology], China would not have its rightful place in the world.”⁴⁹⁴ Deng affirmed that “it is correct to emphasize stability [as Chen Yun did]...but stability cannot solve all problems.”⁴⁹⁵ The pro-plan conservatives wanted stability at the expense of economic efficiency, which Deng, as a pro-market conservative, disagreed with: “the stable political environment we have now reached is...necessary, but not enough. The most important is the speed of economic growth...so that people see the actual benefits brought by political stability”⁴⁹⁶.

In November 1992, Gao Di was revoked as President of *People’s Daily*. During the 14th National Congress of the CPC held from 12th to 18th December 1992, Deng’s name was enshrined in the Party Constitution: the Party should uphold not “SwCC” but “Deng Xiaoping Theory on SwCC” (not anyone else’s version of SwCC) as its guiding ideology. The market economy, in the name of “socialist market economy”, was declared to be China’s economic system, “making the market play a fundamental role in resource allocation under the national macro-control”⁴⁹⁷. For the distribution of income, “efficiency first, taking into account fairness”⁴⁹⁸.

In the CPC’s official discourse, 1992 marked the “maturity” of Dengism. However, when precisely the conservative faction dissolved was disputable within the range from 1992 to 1995. The core members of the conservative faction passed away one after another before Deng (1997): Li Xiannian (1992), Wang Zhen (1993), and Chen Yun (1995). *The New York Times* reported: “many Chinese have felt in recent years that the future direction of reform [marketization] could rest on which of the two most senior leaders, Mr. Deng or Mr. Chen, would survive the other.”⁴⁹⁹ A firm Dengist official, name undisclosed, told *The New York Times* that “there was a sense of relief...if Deng had died first...I think we would have been facing three years of stagnation of the whole process of reform.”⁵⁰⁰ As a faction split from the Qiushi faction, the anti-market “conservatism” was politically over.

On the one hand, the triumph of Dengism in 1992 ensured that China’s post-1989 developmental path has been more liberal than that of the ex-Eastern Bloc. The economic freedoms, i.e., freedoms

Chen Yun, Who Slowed China’s Shift to Market, Dies at 89

By PATRICK E. TYLER
 BEIJING, April 11 — Chen Yun, a conservative Communist Party official who was a leading voice in the 1980s against the reforms, died at 89 on Monday. He was born in 1904 in Zhejiang province. Mr. Chen, who was the son of a scholar, studied at the elite Yenching University in Beijing. He was a member of the Politburo, the top decision-making body in the Communist Party, from 1982 to 1989. He was also a member of the State Planning Commission, the body that set the national economic plan. Mr. Chen was known for his cautious approach to reform. He was a strong supporter of the market economy, but he was also a strong supporter of the socialist system. He was a member of the Politburo, the top decision-making body in the Communist Party, from 1982 to 1989. He was also a member of the State Planning Commission, the body that set the national economic plan. Mr. Chen was known for his cautious approach to reform. He was a strong supporter of the market economy, but he was also a strong supporter of the socialist system.



Chen Yun

⁴⁹³ *SWDXP*, Vol. III, “The Priority of the Third Generation of Leadership (16th June 1989).”

⁴⁹⁴ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Revitalizing the Chinese Nation (7th April 1990).”

⁴⁹⁵ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Summarize Experience and Use Talents (20th August 1991).”

⁴⁹⁶ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “International Situation and Economic Issues (3rd March 1990).”

⁴⁹⁷ Jiang Zemin, *Report for the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 1992.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*


⁴⁹⁹ Patrick E. Tyler, “Chen Yun, Who Slowed China’s Shift to Market, Dies at 89,” *The New York Times*, 11th April 1995.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

required by the market, e.g., the freedoms concerning mobility, travel, study abroad, migration, domestic and international trade and investment, which were almost non-existent in the ex-Eastern Bloc (except exchange from within), became the daily basis of the Chinese people. On the other hand, did not the Chinese have all these economic but not political freedoms under Chiangism?

The CAC was also disbanded in 1992, marking the end of the dualist power structure during the 1980s and the PSC's return to being the Party's top decision-making body. By then, Deng was already 88 years old. He urgently needed to ensure his political legacy not to be reversed after his death. Given the CPC's history of power transitions, no successor can be unconditionally trusted. According to the 1982 Constitution, the PRC's presidency is limited to two terms, five years for each. Jiang became the President in March 1993 and would serve until 2003 in a "trinity"⁵⁰¹. But before Jiang's inauguration, Deng had appointed Jiang's successor already: during the 1st Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the CPC (19th October 1992), Hu Jintao (b. 1942) was (s) elected as a member of the 14th PSC. Compared with his colleagues born in the 1920s,⁵⁰² Hu's age made him a political trustee. Hu's undeclared but widely regarded role was verified afterwards: he served as the PRC's President from 2003 to 2013. In this sense, Deng's era did not end with his death in 1997; Jiang and Hu were Dengs with Deng himself.

C5.1: GDP Annual Growth: China vs. World, 1992-2012



Charting: author. Source: World Bank.


⁵⁰¹ "Trinity" stands for the ternary structure of the PRC's top *nominal* leadership since Jiang: General Secretary of the CPC, President of the PRC, and President of the Central Military Commission of the CPC/PRC.

⁵⁰² The other six members were JIANG Zemin (b. 1926), LI Peng (b. 1928), QIAO Shi (b. 1924), LI Ruihuan (b. 1934), ZHU Rongji (b. 1928) and LIU Huaqing (b. 1916).

“[As] the most favored destination for foreign investment...the allure of China is not only its inexpensive and inexhaustible supply of labor but also the lack of independent labor movements...”

Mary E. Gallagher, “‘Time Is Money, Efficiency Is Life’: The Transformation of Labor Relations in China,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39, no. 2 (2004): p. 36.

“TIME IS MONEY, EFFICIENCY IS LIFE”



Deng’s economic reforms started in the agricultural sector, which around 90% of Chinese people still relied upon by the late 1970s. “The proportion of non-agricultural population in urban areas to total population was about 12%”.⁵⁰³ In 1979, the “household responsibility system” was adopted, which recognized the farmer’s economic freedom of profits and losses. Under the system, farmers paid state taxes (eventually abolished in 2006), and the remaining income is attributed to themselves.

A prototype of the system was Liu Shaoqi’s policy during the early 1960s, after the Great Famine caused by Mao’s egalitarian experiment of agricultural collectivization in “people’s communes”. Liu’s policy was to recognize the farmer’s ownership of the nominally state-owned land [plots], allowing free exchange based on what the individual farmers own and need. Mao considered Liu’s policy a restoration of capitalism, leading to Liu’s persecution during Cultural Revolution. In Mao’s vision, socialist agriculture must avert inequality. Under the household responsibility system, there will emerge rich and poor farmers; then the rich will own lands and hire the poor. Exploitation, which Mao’s socialism cannot tolerate, hereby becomes inevitable. While in people’s communes, the members’ private plots, livestock, fruit trees, etc., are all reclaimed into the community; they eat in “people’s canteens” as much as they want and work as much as they can. Thus, inequality would have been eliminated thoroughly. However, in reality, people ran out of food and other necessities, whereas their production was not sufficient, causing declined livelihood, food shortages and famine.

The slogan “Time Is Money, Efficiency Is Life”, first proposed in 1981 and affirmed by Deng in 1984,⁵⁰⁴ has been so widespread and “Sinicized” that only a few in China know that the aphorism “Time Is Money” was originally suggested by not Deng but a foreigner named Benjamin Franklin⁵⁰⁵. The slogan characterized the Dengist doctrine: the essence of his socialism is not equality but efficiency. The economic reforms “made great achievements first in rural areas.”⁵⁰⁶ Deng’s reforms expanded to the industrial sector. Small private businesses, self-employment, and employment were allowed. The 3rd Plenary Session of the 12th CPC Central Committee in 1984 declared

⁵⁰³ National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China, *New China 50 Years Series Analysis Report*, 1999.

⁵⁰⁴ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “To Well Manage the Special Economic Zone and Increase the Number of Cities Open to the Outside World (24th February 1984).”

⁵⁰⁵ Benjamin Franklin, *Advice to a Young Tradesman, Written by an Old One* (1748).


⁵⁰⁶ CPC Central Committee, *Resolution on the Reform of the Economic System*, 1984.

that “the full development of the commodity economy is an insurmountable stage of socioeconomic development and a necessary condition for realizing China’s economic modernization”⁵⁰⁷.

Economic liberalization, according to Jeffrey Sachs’ blueprint of “shock therapy”⁵⁰⁸, includes three pillars: (a) domestic and international marketization of price, (b) fiscal and financial austerity, and (c) privatization. These were also the goals of China’s urban economic reform outlined in 1984: “appropriately expand the scope of floating price and free price within a certain range, so that price can more sensitively reflect changes in social labor productivity and market supply and demand”⁵⁰⁹, “remove obstacles, create conditions, and provide legal protection for the development of collective and individual economies”⁵¹⁰. Even though China proceeded with these measures gradually, it did have experienced all the side effects that came with it: short-term hyperinflation and high unemployment.

The whole process of China’s marketization of domestic prices took six years, from 1984 to 1990. China initially adopted the so-called “dualist price system”, meaning the state prices the planned means of production, and the market prices the unplanned means of production. In 1988, the abolition of the dualist price system was announced. “Inflation began to accelerate at the end of 1987, and by mid-1988, it was raging out of control...the result was profound discontent,”⁵¹¹ China’s CPI increased by 7.2% in 1987, 18.8% in 1988, and 18.3% in 1989. In March 1989, Deng admitted that inflation “has brought difficulties to the country and the people”⁵¹², causing social turbulence that has been regarded as one of the reasons for the 1989 protests. The government took austerity measures in 1985, 1988, and 1989 to 1991.

C5.2: China’s Inflation Rate of Average Consumer Prices (Annual Percent Change), 1980-



Charting: IMF DataMapper. Source: IMF.

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ It was conducted in certain 1990s ex-Eastern Bloc states by Leszek Balcerowicz, Yegor Gaidar, et al.

⁵⁰⁹ CPC Central Committee, *Resolution on the Reform of the Economic System*, 1984.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹¹ Barry Naughton, “Inflation and Economic Reform in China,” *Current History* 88, no. 539 (1989): p. 269.

⁵¹² *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Keep the Tradition of Hard Work Alive (23rd March 1989).”

The 3rd Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the CPC in 1993 declared: “small state-owned enterprises may be contracted, or leased, or to be reorganized into a joint-stock cooperative system, or to be sold to collectives or individuals.”⁵¹³ Since then, state-owned enterprises had been, in the official lexicology⁵¹⁴, “reformed, reorganized, transformed, and strengthened through scientific management, enabling quite a number of enterprises to operate according to the mode of the modern enterprise system in terms of system and internal management and operation mechanism, and joint-stock enterprises have developed rapidly.”⁵¹⁵

Massive privatizations took place in the late 1990s, during which the pro-market “Eiserner Kanzler” Zhu Rongji (1998-2003) played a critical role. “I met with Mr. George H. W. Bush in London...the first thing he asked me was whether the privatization has been doing well...I said we do not engage in ‘privatization’ but ‘shareholding reform’...he said no matter how you describe it, as long as we both agree on it. [laugh]”⁵¹⁶ In 1978, China’s state-owned enterprises accounted for 77.6%, the rest were collective enterprises; in 1998, state-owned enterprises produced only 21.6% of the gross industrial output value, and the number of private enterprises increased from zero to 18.9%.⁵¹⁷

Consequentially, the estimated total actual unemployment rate rose from 3-4% in 1993 to 8-9% in 1999.⁵¹⁸ In the first quarter of 1997, “934 protests and/or strikes by workers were documented”⁵¹⁹. From 1998 to 2000, “at least 10 million”⁵²⁰ employees of state-owned enterprises were estimated to be laid off. The CPC’s mouthpiece *China Daily* reported that “about 10 million laid-off workers were seeking reemployment”⁵²¹ in September 2002. Liu Huan’s 1997 song *Cong Tou Zai Lai* [start all over again], a “charity record” broadcasted on China Central Television, was an iconic testimony of the societal impacts of China’s 1990s privatization: “hard work in the past half my life/going into a storm tonight/I can’t go with the waves/for my loved ones/no matter how hard it is, keep strong...” The song was, ironically, awarded a prize by the CPC’s Central Publicity Department in 1999. It was certainly a piece of “socialist spiritual civilization” for mitigating social conflicts. Without Zhu’s reforms, it would not be possible for the PRC in 2001⁵²² to join the WTO, the successor of the GATT, which was the cornerstone of the capitalist world during the Cold War.⁵²³ This was a major accomplishment of Zhu’s premiership.

While state-owned enterprises were privatized, health care and housing were also commoditized. In September 1992, the State Council suggested that “different levels of medical prevention and

⁵¹³ CPC Central Committee, *Resolution on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic System*, 14th November 1993.

⁵¹⁴ Officially, the “socialist market economy” consists of not public and “private” economies but public and “non-public” economies.

⁵¹⁵ NBS, *New China 50 Years Series Analysis Report*.

⁵¹⁶ Zhu Rongji, The 4th Press Conference of the 9th National People’s Congress, 15th March 2001, Beijing. Printed in “Conference of the Fourth Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress,” *Zhu Rongji Meets the Press* (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁵¹⁷ NBS, *New China 50 Years Series Analysis Report*.

⁵¹⁸ Lee Hong Yung, “Xiangang, the Chinese Style of Laying off Workers,” *Asian Survey* 40, no. 6 (2000): p. 924.

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 919.

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 925.

⁵²¹ Cited in Eva P. W. Hung and Stephen W. K. Chiu, “The Lost Generation: Life Course Dynamics and Xiangang in China,” *Modern China* 29, no. 2 (2003): p. 205.

⁵²² The PRC became an observer of the WTO in 1995.

⁵²³ Earlier this year, Lithuania and Moldova also joined the WTO, following Croatia, Albania, Georgia (2000), Estonia, and Latvia (1999). China was ahead of ex-Eastern Bloc countries such as Armenia (2003), Ukraine (2008), Russia (2012), and Kazakhstan (2015). Belarus, Serbia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and others are still not WTO members.

health care institutions should have different charge grades...service companies or industry groups may be established...medical research institutes and universities should invest in the economic construction...⁵²⁴ In July 1994, the State Council issued the *Resolution on Deepening the Reform of Urban Housing System*, aiming to change the distribution of housing as a kind of social welfare to the distribution of monetary wages based on work performance. Later, the proportion of “self-owned” housing in cities and towns dramatically increased nationwide. In July 1998, the State Council declared the end of the in-kind distribution of housing.

After 1989, China continued and even accelerated its process of economic liberalization since the late 1970s. The CPC called for “learning from the experiences of all countries, including capitalist developed countries, that reflect the general rules of socialized production and market economy.”⁵²⁵ It committed to “protect all legal income and property of legal persons and residents, encourage urban and rural residents to save and invest, and allow factors of production such as capital belonging to individuals to participate in the distribution of income.”⁵²⁶ In November 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), suspended since June 1949, restored operation.⁵²⁷ The SSE Index was launched in 1991. In December, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange started operation. The Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange (1990) and the Dalian Commodity Exchange (1993) were also established. In October 1992, the China Securities Regulatory Commission was founded. On 29th March 1993, the National People’s Congress approved a constitutional amendment, which changed the original Article 15 that “the state implements a planned economy on the basis of socialist public ownership” to “the state implements a socialist market economy” and deleted the original stipulation that “sabotage of national economic plans is prohibited”.⁵²⁸ On 1st January 1994, the dualist price system of the RMB exchange rate was abolished.⁵²⁹ On 10th May 1995, the *Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks* was promulgated, establishing the corporate legal person status of commercial banks...

The societal results brought by China’s economic liberalization also affirm the continuity before and after 1989. The growth trajectories of GDP and GNP per capita from 1980 to 2000 show the economic homogeneity within this period of time. The Engel Coefficient dropped from over 57% in the late 1970s to 53.3% in 1985, below 50% in 1994, and 44.5% in 1998.⁵³⁰ As a result of Mao’s egalitarian policy of bridging the urban-rural gap, China’s urban population (regardless agricultural/industrial sector) to the total population decreased from 18.3% in 1964 to 17.5% in 1976.⁵³¹ From 1980 to 1990, the ratio increased from 19.4% to 26.4%, and this tendency continued steadily rising to 35.9% in 2000.⁵³² China’s export volume reached \$9.75 billion in 1978 and \$183.76 billion in 1998, an increase of 17 times with an average annual growth rate of 15.8%.⁵³³ China’s import value reached \$10.89 billion in 1978 and \$140.17 billion in 1998, an increase of nearly 12

⁵²⁴ State Council of the PRC, *Several Opinions on Deepening the Reform of the Health Care System*, 23rd September 1992.

⁵²⁵ *Resolution on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic System*.

⁵²⁶ Ibid.

⁵²⁷ The Warsaw Stock Exchange resumed in 1991. The Prague Stock Exchange (closed in 1948) resumed in 1993. The Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (1992), the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange (1993), and the Russian Trading System (1995) were also found.

⁵²⁸ *Amendment to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China* (1982), Article 7.

⁵²⁹ State Council of China, *Resolution on the Reform of the Financial System*, 25th December 1993.

⁵³⁰ NBS, *New China 50 Years Series Analysis Report*.

⁵³¹ United Nations Population Division, *World Urbanization Prospects: 2018 Revision*.

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ NBS, *New China 50 Years Series Analysis Report*.

times with an average annual increase of 14.5%.⁵³⁴ From mid-1980s to late 1990s, the average annual growth rate of China's actual use of foreign capital was 32.9%.⁵³⁵ Behind the statistics were a series of SEZs and equivalents: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen (1980), Hainan province (1988), and Pudong, Shanghai (1990).

Pudong [east of the Huangpu river] is a district on Shanghai's east coast, which is traditionally less developed than the west of the Huangpu river due to China's inward-looking, agriculture-based economic structure. Deng intended to make Pudong a new symbol of China's continuing economic liberalization after the 1989 crackdown and assigned Jiang's cohort to implement his idea. "Now the international community is worried if we are going to renationalize [the economy], we have to do several things to show that our policy of reform and opening-up remains unchanged"⁵³⁶.

Pudong, Shanghai, and the Yangtze Delta at large, since the 1990s have indeed grown as a pole of China's economic growth, alongside with the Pearl River Delta based on the Shenzhen SEZs since 1980s. The Shanghai Tower, the second tallest skyscraper worldwide, located in Lujiiazui, China's Wall Street, Pudong, Shanghai, is a testimony of landmark. Those in the CPC's Shanghai Committee (hereinafter "Committee") who architected Pudong's economic miracle of authoritarian capitalism later became the core members of Jiang's cohort in PSC: Jiang himself as the Mayor of Shanghai (1985-1987) and Secretary of the Committee (1987-1989), Zhu Rongji as the Mayor of Shanghai (1987-1991) and Secretary of the Committee (1989-1991), Wu Bangguo as the Secretary of the Committee (1991-1994), Zeng Qinghong as the Vice Secretary of the Committee (1986-1989), Huang Ju as the Mayor of Shanghai (1991-1995) the Secretary of the Committee (1994-2002), et al.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.

⁵³⁶ *SWDXP*, Vol. III, "The Priority of the Third Generation of Leadership (16th June 1989)."

“China’s succession looks increasingly technocratic, with coastal elites likely to dominate the political scene after the death of the few remaining members of the revolutionary generation.”

David Bachman, “China in 1994: Marking Time, Making Money,” *Asian Survey* 35, no. 1 (1995): p. 39.

MARKET AND TECHNOCRACY

The Shanghai Clique gradually dominated the CPC after the revolutionary veterans passed away in the 1990s. Deng’s criteria for selecting successors can be summed up in three points: (a) firmly Dengist, (b) well-educated, preferably in STEM, (c) knowing management and economics. Market and technology were the keys to China’s modernization. Rhetorically, Deng’s maxim “science and technology are primary productive forces” was an extension of Marx’s “science and technology are productive forces”.⁵³⁷ What he really referred to, however, was the technological development of the Post-WWII Japan, despite which was achieved under the right-wing LDP’s sociopolitical schema. “In the 1950s, China was not so far behind Japan in terms of technology. But we were closed for 20 years...and Japan became an economic powerhouse during this period.”⁵³⁸ In 1995, China announced a national strategy of “rejuvenating the country through science and education”⁵³⁹.

If Deng’s technicist policy were to be “Marxist”, then Mao’s anti-technicist policy has to be “non-Marxist”. The Maoist slogan was “in the wrong direction, more knowledge is more reactionary”. The USSR was technologically more advanced than China, but Liu Shaoqi’s proposal to maintain a sound relationship with it was condemned as traitorous by Maoists, as the USSR was “fascist”. Fairly, Maoism inspired the New Left in the West. Was not Hitler’s Germany the best footnote for “in the wrong direction, more knowledge is more reactionary”? In the 1960s context, was not America’s bombardment in Vietnam against communists another sin? The postmodernists went even further: modern technology is barbarian, regardless of direction. Enlightenment led to Nazism; science is totalitarianism (*Dialektik der Aufklärung*). Even moderate leftist Habermas, who defended the Enlightenment as an unfinished project elaborated a technoskepticism in terms of the societal impact of technological development and instrumental rationality on the “public sphere”. The break between Marxism and modernity was so stark that the former came to seize the territory of humanities in Western academia. Marx must have had no clue that his theory would become pervasive in literary critique instead of political economy one day.

The bohemian lifestyle of the hippies reflects natural tiredness of high-speed industrialization and a post-materialistic appeal. However, for the not-yet-industrialized China, Mao’s anti-intellectualism was at the expense of starvation, scarcity, and stagnant development. One of the measures Mao took was to abolish the national college entrance exam based on academic performance, from which the students of wealthy families benefited, letting students with the most disadvantaged

⁵³⁷ *SWDXP*, Vol. III, “Science and Technology Are Primary Productive Forces (5th and 12th September 1988).”

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁹ CPC Central Committee and State Council, *Resolution on Accelerating the Scientific and Technological Progress*, 6th May 1995.

socioeconomic conditions (as well as the most honorary for being proletarians) get enrolled. Those students had difficulty understanding university-level courses as they lacked the necessary education. Students and teachers were encouraged, sometimes forced, to study and teach in part-time mode so that the occupational hierarchy would be destroyed by occupational interchangeability, which further deteriorated academic quality. After all, quality was nothing comparable with equality.

Mao's policies of education and technology were essentially counterproductive. While for Deng, it was all about productivity. One pillar was the market, or what Mao referred to as *capitalism*, or what the New Left referred to as *consumerism*, and the other was technology. It was never enough for Deng to emphasize the importance of technology. Not only did Deng restore the national college entrance exam, but he also promoted young cadres with solid educational backgrounds.

Technocracy was not an exclusive feature of Shanghai Clique. It also applied to Hu Jintao and other members of his faction Tuanpai. Preferably, the Dengist leaders may have been equipped with managerial sciences, which unfortunately were less available during Mao's era. As disciplines such as economics, law, management, political science, public policy, and administration were restored after Mao, over the past few decades, the educational background of PSC (14th-19th) members has gradually shifted from engineering to management.

T5.1: Educational Backgrounds of PSC Members, 14th to 19th

14 th (1992)	Jiang Zemin (electrical engr. - SJTU)* ⁵⁴⁰ , Li Peng (hydraulic engr. - MPEI ^{CCCP}), Qiao Shi (literature ⁵⁴¹), Li Ruihuan (architecture), Zhu Rongji (electrical engr. - Tsinghua), Liu Huaqing (military ^{CCCP}), Hu Jintao (hydraulic engr. - Tsinghua)
15 th (1997)	Jiang Zemin*, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, Wei Jianxing (mechanical engr., business admin. ^{CCCP}), Li Lanqing (business admin. - Fudan)*
16 th (2002)	Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo (electrical engr. - Tsinghua)*, Wen Jiabao (geotectonics), Jia Qinglin (electrical engr.), Zeng Qinghong (automatic control)*, Huang Ju (electrical engr. - Tsinghua)*, Wu Guanzheng (automatic control - Tsinghua)*, Li Changchun (electrical engr.)*, Luo Gan (mechanical engr. - TU Freiberg ^{DDR})
17 th (2007)	Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo*, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Li Changchun*, Xi Jinping (chemical engr., econ. ⁵⁴² - Tsinghua), Li Keqiang (law, econ. - PKU), He Guoqiang (chemical engr.), Zhou Yongkang (petroleum geology)*⁵⁴³
18 th (2012)	Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang (Korean, econ. - Kim Il-sung Univ. ^{DPRK})*, Yu Zhengsheng (missile engr.), Liu Yunshan (mgmt.)*, Wang Qishan (history, econ.), Zhang Gaoli (econ.)*
19 th (2017)	Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu (EMBA), Wang Yang (econ., mgmt. - USTC), Wang Huning (French, poli. sci. - Fudan), Zhao Leji (phil. - PKU, econ., pol. sci.), Han Zheng (econ.)

Tabulation: author.

T5.2: Educational Backgrounds of Non-PSC Politburo Members, 14th to 19th

⁵⁴⁰ The asterisk indicates that they are widely regarded as associated with the Shanghai Clique.

⁵⁴¹ Literature stands for Chinese language and literature.

⁵⁴² Under the designation of LL.D., his dissertation titled "A Tentative Study on China's Rural Marketization" (2001) may be considered to be more of public policy and economics, instead of law.

⁵⁴³ The strikethrough indicated that they have been expelled from the CPC due to corruption and other reasons.

14 th	Ding Guangen (transport engr. - SJTU), Tian Jiyun (admin.), Li Tieying (physics - MFF UK ^{CSR}), Yang Baibing (military), Zou Jiahua (mechanical engr. - BMSTU ^{CCCP}), Chen Xitong (literature - PKU) , Jiang Chunyun (pedagogy), Qian Qichen (admin. ^{CCCP}), Xie Fei (econ.), Tan Shaowen (textile engr.)
15 th	Chi Haotian (military), Zhang Wannian (military)
16 th	Wang Lequan (admin.), Wang Zhaoguo (mechanical engr.), Hui Liangyu (admin., econ.)*, Liu Qi (metallurgical engr.)*, Wu Yi (petroleum engr.), Zhang Lichang (business admin.), Chen Liangyu (enr., public policy - Univ. of Birmingham^{UK})* , Guo Boxiong (military)* , Cao Gangchuan (military ^{CCCP}), Zeng Peiyan (electrical engr. - Tsinghua)*
17 th	Wang Gang (phil.), Liu Yandong (chemical engr., sociology, pol. sci.), Li Yuanchao (math, mgmt., law), Xu Caihou (military)* , Bo Xilai (history - PKU, journalism)
18 th	Ma Kai (econ.), Liu Qibao (econ.), Xu Qiliang (military), Sun Chunlan (mechanical engr., mgmt., pol. sci.), Sun Zhengcai (agronomy), Li Jianguo (literature), Zhang Chunxian (mechanical engr., mgmt.), Fan Changlong (military, mgmt.), Meng Jianzhu (enr., business admin.), Guo Jinlong (physics), Hu Chunhua (literature - PKU, econ.)
19 th	Ding Xuexiang (mechanical engr., mgmt.), Wang Chen (journalism), Liu He (econ., MPA - Harvard ^{US}), Li Xi (literature, EMBA - Tsinghua), Li Qiang (mechanical engr., sociology, EMBA - PolyU ^{HKSAR}), Li Hongzhong (history, econ.), Yang Jiechi (English, IR - LSE ^{UK} , history), Yang Xiaodu (pharmacy, law), Zhang Youxia (military), Chen Xi (chemical engr.), Chen Quanguo (econ., mgmt.), Chen Min'er (literature, law), Guo Shengkun (mining engr., mgmt.), Huang Kunming (DPA - Tsinghua), Cai Qi (econ.)

Tabulation: author.

Overall, the rise of the Shanghai Clique in the 1990s marked the end of veteran politics based on “revolutionary merits”. The past revolutionary merits cannot guarantee a cadre’s unswerving revolutionary spirit. Trotsky noted that Stalin was someone who betrayed the revolution, and what enabled him to do so were exactly his revolutionary merits. Maoists also noted that “Stalin’s declaration that...class struggle had not existed in the Soviet Union after the collectivization of agriculture...was incorrect...before Stalin’s death...some cadres had already degenerated into the bourgeoisie.”⁵⁴⁴ Appropriately, Mikhail Suslov labeled Maoism as a neo-Trotskyism. According to the “revolutionary merits unreliability theorem”, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, the 1967 February Countercurrent (Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, et al.) that opposed Cultural Revolution at its beginning, and the Qishi faction were all revisionists. However, Mao’s own sources of power were ultimately nothing but unparalleled revolutionary merits against other cadres, without which the far-left Gang of Four could not be promoted by himself, and the cult of his personality could not be nurtured since the 1950s.

By the 1990s, revolutionary merit was no longer the primary source of power within the CPC; it was not irreversible, either. Both Trotsky and Mao noted that the revolution was betrayed by not only a few veterans who held enough revolutionary merits but also a social class that supported the new order. “The privileged stratum in Soviet society consisted of the degenerated bureaucrats and bourgeois intellectuals among the leading cadres of party and government organs, enterprises and farms”⁵⁴⁵. These people were not privileged due to the (a) revolutionary merit they did not

⁵⁴⁴ “Editorial: On Khrushchev’s Fake Communism and Its Lessons in World History: The 9th Commentary on the Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee,” *People’s Daily*, 14th July 1964.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

possess, but (b) cultural capitals they earned through the pre-Soviet and Soviet system, as (c) economic capitals were eliminated.

Technocracy as an alternative source of power thereby came in this context. The technical elites that dominated China since the 1990s could be divided into two groups: educated before the PRC and in the PRC system before Cultural Revolution. Jiang Zemin enrolled in the most prestigious National Central University in Nanjing and graduated from SJTU in Shanghai (1943-1947). His major was taught in English. Zhu Rongji graduated from “China’s MIT”, Tsinghua (1947-1951).

In the early years of the PRC, Mao did not oppose the transplantation of the Soviet higher education system to China. Tsinghua became a cradle of red technocrats: Hu Jintao (1959-1964), Wu Bangguo (1960-1967), Wu Guanzheng (1959-1968), Huang Ju (1956-1963), et al. Some studied in Eastern Bloc: Li Peng (1948-1955), Luo Gan (1954-1962), Li Tieying (1955-1961), et al.

With the Sino-Soviet Split since the late 1950s, Mao realized that as revolutionary merits cannot guarantee revolution, technocratic credentials cannot, either. In fact, it was exactly the system that caused the Soviet’s degeneration. These exclusive educational experiences were limited to a tiny few and distinguished the technocrats from the majority. Eventually, what happened in the Soviet Union, “socialist ownership...becomes ownership by a privileged class”⁵⁴⁶, would happen in China as well. To contain both technocrats and conservative [opposing or indifferent to Cultural Revolution] veterans, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to counter revisionism, during which he not only terminated the higher educational production mechanism of technocracy but also promoted the semi-literate Chen Yongui (1975-1980), Wu Guixian (1975-1977), and Sun Jian (1975-1978) to be Vice Premiers; he not only encouraged the young Red Guards to rebel against the conservative veterans with revolutionary merits, but also promoted the most active Red Guards such as Wang Hongwen to the CPC Central Committee, Politburo, and PSC.

As Joel Andreas concluded in *Rise of the Red Engineers* (2009), after Mao’s death, the conservative veterans (not necessarily well-educated) and the technocrats, based on revolutionary merits and cultural capital respectively, reversed Mao’s attempt to overthrow the inherent hierarchical system of communist party-state during Cultural Revolution. The direct reason of Mao’s failure was that his populist promotions of Red Guards, peasants, workers, etc., were all due to his own prestige, which was established on his own revolutionary merits. Once Mao died, Mao favored successors had to step down, and those with the most revolutionary merits came back in power. Only after the revolutionary merits died out in the 1990s had the CPC’s primary source of power become technocracy.

The restoration of the technocrats educated in the 1950s could be seen as a move back to the “17 years”, but as China’s marketization went further, the Chinese governance has, once again, deviated from the Soviet model. Business-related subjects have largely replaced STEM in the production of Chinese technocracy. Premier Zhu Rongji was also the founder and first Dean of the School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University. Meanwhile, those educated in the 1970s and later on who studied abroad overwhelmingly went to English-conducting institutions: Yang Jiechi, Liu He, Li Qiang et al.

The most prominent case would be the collaboration between the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University and China (School of Public Policy and Management of Tsinghua University, Development Research Center of the State Council, Organization Department of the

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

CPC Central Committee, etc.) since the late 1990s, which has provided selected high-ranking communist officials short-term professional programs. The incomplete list of the beneficiaries of the collaboration includes former Vice President of the PRC Li Yuanchao, 19th Politburo member Li Hongzhong (Secretary of the CPC's Tianjin Committee), former Secretary of the CPC's Shaanxi Committee Zhao Zhengyong, former Minister of Commerce of the PRC Chen Deming, Executive President of the Central Party School of the CPC Li Shulei...

What went hand in hand with the marketization of technocracy was the marketization of the representation of the CPC members. The political legacy of Jiang's rule from 1990 to 2005, theorized as the "Important Thought of Three Represents", was enshrined in the Party Constitution in 2002, and in the Constitution of the PRC in 2004. It claimed that the CPC should represent the "developmental requirement of the advanced productive forces in China", i.e., the political demands [developmental requirement] of the rising nouveau riche or private entrepreneurs [advance productive forces].

In light of the de facto "Jiangism", the 16th National Congress of the CPC amended the stipulation regarding the eligibility of CPC membership in its Constitution from "Chinese workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals, and *other revolutionaries*"⁵⁴⁷ to "Chinese workers, peasants, soldiers, intellectuals, and *advanced elements of other social classes*"⁵⁴⁸. Accordingly, the CPC's self-identification was changed from the "vanguard of the Chinese working class" to the "vanguard of the Chinese working class as well as the Chinese people and the Chinese nation" in the new Party Constitution. Jiang claimed in his political report for the Congress: "entrepreneurs and technicians of private technological enterprises, managers and technicians employed by foreign-invested enterprises, self-employed individuals, private business owners, employees of intermediary organizations, freelancers and *other social classes* that have emerged in social transformation are all builders of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics... We cannot simply take whether or not one has property and how much property one has as the criterion of one's political *advancement* and backwardness"⁵⁴⁹. For the first time, seven private entrepreneurs as representatives participated in the Congress. Since then, numerous CPC committees have been established in private enterprises. The numbers of peasants and workers "dropped from 63 percent of party members in 1994 to only 45 percent in 2002... from approximately 34 million to less than 30 million"⁵⁵⁰ respectively. The proportion of CPC members among executives in private enterprises has been much higher than 7%, the proportion of CPC members in the national population. Jack Ma, Wang Jianlin, Ren Zhengfei, and Lei Jun, the CEOs and/or founders of Alibaba, Wanda, Huawei, and Xiaomi, were all members of the CPC. Amongst the top ten wealthiest Chinese nationals in 2016, according to the Hurun Report, four were CPC members (Wang Jianlin, Jack Ma, Zong Qinghou, and Lu Zhiqiang), five were not CPC members but in the CPC-led United Front (Ma Huateng, Yao Zhenhua, Yan Hao [b. 1986], Robin Li Yanhong, and Zhang Jindong).

⁵⁴⁷ Article 1, Chapter 1, Constitution of the CPC (15th Congress Edition).

⁵⁴⁸ Article 1, Chapter 1, Constitution of the CPC (16th Congress Edition).

⁵⁴⁹ Jiang Zemin, *Political Report for the 16th National Congress of the CPC*, 2002.

⁵⁵⁰ Bruce J. Dickson, "Whom Does the Party Represent? From 'Three Revolutionary Classes' to 'Three Represents'," *American Asian Review* 21, no. 1 (2003): p. 9.

“The mistakes that occurred in the two decades after 1957 were mainly due to leftism...we shall be wary of the Right, but mainly avoid the Left...”

Jiang Zemin, *Report for the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 1992.

PARTY-STATE, NATION, AND HISTORICAL NARRATIVES

Deng and conservative veterans differed on the market, not the party’s leadership. Deng continued his formula in the 1980s that multiparty democracy would lead to Cultural Revolution. When meeting with Pierre Trudeau in July 1990, he basically rephrased what he said to George H. W. Bush in February 1989 and to Jimmy Carter in June 1987, adding more vivid elaborations: if the 1989 “turmoil” continued, “it would be more horrible than Cultural Revolution...it would be a full-scale civil war, if the party, the state power no longer works...one faction seizes some armed forces, and another faction seizes some armed forces...as soon as the so-called democratic warriors get power, they would fight against each other...a civil war is a river of blood...production declines, traffic is interrupted”⁵⁵¹.

These depictions were not Deng’s fantasies out of nothing. It is uncertain to what degree he was familiar with how an orderly, constitutional democracy functions, but he indeed knew what happened during the Robespierrean democracy or *Terreur*, i.e., Cultural Revolution, which these depictions came from. Mao was a firm supporter of homomorphic revenge, “if we do not give the enemy a fatal blow, the enemy would give us a fatal blow...after the fall of the Paris Commune, no less than 100,000 people were killed by the French capitalists, while the October Revolution killed only a few thousand people at most.”⁵⁵² The “collective violence, private jails, torture, executions, and even mass killings”⁵⁵³ occurred during Cultural Revolution can all found their archetypes in *Terreur*: Guillotine, Tribunal révolutionnaire, noyades à Nantes, guerre de Vendée, etc. In numerous cases of *Terreur*, Cultural Revolution, and Khmer Rouge, the persecuted were not the oppressors but were wrongly identified as “enemies” due to procedural injustice. An example was the Law of 22 Prairial, which simplified the judicial process and restricted the accused’s right to defense.

⁵⁵¹ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “China Will Never Allow Other Countries to Interfere in Its Domestic Affairs (11th July 1990).”

⁵⁵² Mao Zedong, “The Significance of Commemorating the Paris Commune (18th March 1926),” *Handouts of KMT Political Lectures*, reprinted in *Collected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993).

⁵⁵³ Andrew G. Walder, “Rebellion and Repression in China, 1966-1971,” *Social Science History* 38, no. 3-4 (2014): p. 513.

TABLE 2. *Distribution of casualties by event type*

<i>Event type</i>	<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Injuries</i>	<i>Victims</i>	<i>Number of events</i>
<i>Actions of Insurgents</i>	37,046	118,691	533,264	7,939
Armed conflict between insurgent factions	30,937	109,889	6,172	4,376
Insurgent attacks on military	625	1,955	51	1,638
Insurgent attacks on government offices	185	585	57	749
Unspecified events, victims of insurgents	5,299	6,262	526,984	1,176
<i>Actions of Authorities</i>	130,378	132,722	9,496,112	5,752
Suppression of insurgents	3,292	2,780	145,170	346
Cleansing of Class Ranks Campaign	96,109	84,006	5,685,192	2,015
One Strike, Three Anti Campaign	9,281	328	1,924,721	1,782
May 16 Elements Campaign	478	267	197,198	498
Unspecified events, victims of authorities	21,218	45,341	1,845,039	1,111
<i>Other events, identity of actors unclear</i>	8,802	8,421	350,230	482
Total	176,226	259,834	10,379,606	14,313

Source: Andrew G. Walder, p. 521.

The prospect that Deng depicted as democratic warriors fighting against each other in multiparty politics was referring to the “armed conflict between insurgent factions” (accusing each other of insurgent factions as “reactionary”) that accounted for the majority of civilian violence during the Cultural Revolution. If people acquired military weapons, which they did not during Cultural Revolution, Deng suggested that the scenario would be similar to a “civil war”, which he might be alluding to the Chinese Civil War. If that was the case, what Deng feared was that China would have to repeat a left-wing democratic revolution against a KMT-alike autocracy futilely.

A new trend in Deng’s defense of the Party after 1989 was *souverainisme*, i.e., national sovereignty “must always come first”⁵⁵⁴ before human rights. “Responsible foreign politicians would understand that China cannot be chaotic”⁵⁵⁵, especially those from the “Asia-Pacific region that is now the most promising [economically] in the world”⁵⁵⁶. The concern for “human rights and civil rights” was not comparable to a refugee crisis, “refugees would be not in millions or tens of millions, but hundreds of millions”⁵⁵⁷. The message Deng delivered was that if the G7 countries did not want a refugee crisis, they should lift their sanctions – Japan did not impose in the first place, respecting China’s sovereignty, especially the right to decide its “domestic affairs”.

Deng’s reaction to the G7 sanction after 1989 laid out the foundation of China’s “orderist” foreign policy since then. As a general principle, “if Western developed countries continue on interfering in other countries’ internal affairs and social systems...turmoil in underdeveloped countries of the third world would occur.”⁵⁵⁸ Order should be above the desirability of the political system of each country. For instance, “it is impossible for so many Islamic countries to implement American-style

⁵⁵⁴ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “National Sovereignty and Security Must always Come First (1st December 1989).”

⁵⁵⁵ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “China Will Never Allow Other Countries to Interfere in Its Domestic Affairs (11th July 1990).”

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

democracy, and the Muslim population accounts for one-fifth of the world's population."⁵⁵⁹ If Muslims were, as Deng suggested, "impossible" to live without autocracy and theocracy,⁵⁶⁰ they would be even less likely to have communism that is superior to liberal democracy.

Deng considered the condition for a democratic revolution in developing countries to be premature; their primary concern should be "a stable political environment to lift people from poverty", not revolutions that endanger order. Without "political instability, nobody has the energy to make a living, not to mention development."⁵⁶¹ "The main principle" of Deng's "new international order" was non-interference "in the internal affairs and social systems of other countries"⁵⁶². "Whether the American system is good or not, the Americans themselves judge, we do not"⁵⁶³. The principle, which explains why Deng stopped the Maoist program of exporting [communist] revolution in 1978, was targeting not only the United States' radicalism but also Mao's radicalism; it was not opposing liberalism from its left but its right. The Dengist defense of non-interference was consistent with the PAP's right-wing stance.

Yang Lan: "We often see in Western media there are some criticisms of Singapore, saying the "paternalistic democracy" implemented in Singapore...should be replaced by their political system. What do you think?"

Lee Hsien Loong: "I think we must follow our own path...Singapore cannot survive if we take America's freedom of press, partisan competition...they say we should do this or that, but can they take the responsibility? If we implement what they suggest and fail, can they issue three million visas to all Singaporeans to live in the United States?"⁵⁶⁴

Deng's principle of non-interference that he reiterated after 1989 could be traced back to 1978, so does his nationalism. In 1986, Mike Wallace asked him: "why is it necessary for Taiwan to unify with the mainland?"⁵⁶⁵ The CPC's "standard" answer to this question, or the PRC's justification of Chinese reunification according to left-wing nationalism before 1979, used to be that the democratic, progressive mainland should liberate the people in Taiwan from the KMT's dictatorship, that the proletarians of Taiwan should revolt against their feudalist, capitalist, fascist...oppressors. In contrast, Deng answered: "this is, first of all, of *nationalist* sentiment and emotion. All the descendants of the Chinese nation hope for a unified China; the current situation of division is in violation of the nation's will."⁵⁶⁶

Deng's nationalism was not about liberation but primordialism, which considers ethnicity as fixed, natural, and ancient. Deng was not interested in intervening in the "oppressive" sociopolitical system (by then not yet democratized) in Taiwan. He further proposed to "adopt the 'one country, two systems' approach", meaning "Taiwan's social system and way of life will not be changed"⁵⁶⁷. Furthermore, Taiwan would not become more similar to the mainland, but the opposite: "we have

⁵⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁰ It should be noted that one year after Deng's death in 1997, the most populous Muslim country Indonesia started its transition from right-wing dictatorship "Orde Baru" to liberal democracy.

⁵⁶¹ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "China Will Never Allow Other Countries to Interfere in Its Domestic Affairs (11th July 1990)."

⁵⁶² Ibid.

⁵⁶³ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "The China-U.S. Relations Have to Get Better in the End (10th December 1989)."

⁵⁶⁴ *Yang Lan One on One*, "Lee Hsien Loong: Asian Values (2002)," Shanghai Dragon Television.

⁵⁶⁵ *SWDXP*, vol. III, "Answers to Questions from American Journalist Mike Wallace (2nd September 1986)."

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid.

made some mistakes and delays since 1949. But according to our current policy...the economic gap in between would be narrowing.”⁵⁶⁸


Even though Deng so blatantly expressed his intention to imitate Taiwan’s developmental model, it was still impossible for him to derecognize the legitimacy of the 1949 Revolution and to recognize the KMT’s legitimacy in pre-1949 China. The source of his power, i.e., revolutionary merit, cannot sustain without recognizing the revolution per se. Moreover, to recognize the revolution, Mao, the greatest contributor of which, cannot be delegitimized as well. These bizarre entanglements and contradictions in post-1978 China led to a series of recreations in historical narratives. Defending Mao became a necessary condition of defending the ongoing Dengist political program, although the latter was what Mao had fought against until his last breath. Deconstructing Mao became a way of liberals delegitimizing the CPC’s concurrent leadership, although the latter, i.e., SwCC, is a denial of Maoism.

“Antihistorical nihilism” and the cult of the “Father of the Nation” are common features of conservatism in national historiographies: Washington, Churchill, Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, Lee Kuan Yew, Tunku Abdul Rahman, Isaias Afwerki, Franjo Tuđman, Kim Il-sung, John A. Macdonald, Ruhollah Khomeini, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Saparmurat Niyazov...Mao is no exception. However, Mao’s image in the public sphere has been subjected to an unbelievable twist: from revolutionary to the emperor, from the incarnation of rebellion to that of autocracy, from red terrorist to white terrorist, from Maximilien Robespierre to Louis XVI, from experimenter of Marxist political economy to custodian of sea ban and an autarkic command economy, from socialism to feudalism, from internationalist to Sinocentrist, from radical to conservative...in a word, from left to right. Such distortions happened to Lenin after Lenin and Sun Yat-sen after Sun Yat-sen⁵⁶⁹, too. In the sense that the revolutionaries eventually failed to live up to their radical promises, they were not entirely innocent of their distorted image posthumously.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁹ When the pro-democracy youths of Taiwan began to read Sun Yat-sen’s works, they were surprised by the republican ideas, which were the opposite of the existing autocracy the KMT defended in the name of Sun Yat-sen.

CHAPTER VI
REVIVAL OF CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY



“The Tiananmen generation, too, had been raised on the nationalist education of the early 1980s that already sought in nationalism as substitute for socialism. But this was still a nationalism that drew its logic from a century of revolution. The nationalist ideology that came to the fore in the 1990s turned for inspiration to the very traditions that the revolution had sought to overturn.”

Arif Dirlik, “June Fourth at 25: Forget Tiananmen, You Don’t Want to Hurt the Chinese People’s Feelings – and Miss Out on the Business of the New ‘New China!’” p. 307.

FOUNDATION IN THE 1982 CONSTITUTION

A pervasive narrative is that Chinese nationalism replaced proletarian internationalism after 1978, as Deng Xiaoping stopped exporting revolutions. It is generally correct but needs two supplements. First, the revival of Chinese nationalism became even farer-ranging after 1989. Second, proletarian internationalism was compatible with left-wing nationalism, and Chinese nationalism after 1978 has had two faces: liberal and conservative. On the other hand, the academic focus on the appreciable resurgence of Chinese nationalism during the early 1990s tends to neglect that Chinese nationalism is not something that suddenly emerged after 1989; its revival should be traced back to 1978, and its historical origins in modern China could be traced back to the late 19th century.

In terms of the spirit embodied in the texts, regardless of their actual implementations, the 1982 Constitution is arguably the most conservative in the PRC’s constitutional history. The 1982 Constitution abandoned the convention in 1954, 1975, and 1978 Constitutions that the Constitution is primarily for the “People’s Republic” as a present polity, not for “China” as a nation formed in history. The first sentences in the Preambles of all three Constitutions, despite minor syntactic differences, expressed one emancipatory narrative: after historic struggles, the Chinese people under the leadership of the CPC have finally won the revolutionary victory against the reactionary rule of feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism, and established the “People’s Republic” free from oppression and enslavement. The “People’s Republic” contained three-tiered emancipations: from feudalism (1911, victory over the Qing dynasty), from imperialism (1945, victory over Japanese fascism and revocations of unequal treaties with colonizers), and from bureaucratic capitalism (1949, victory over the KMT’s dictatorship). The establishment of the PRC proved the Chinese people to be a freedom-loving people and the Chinese nation to be a freedom-loving nation, and its Constitution should be dedicated to the significance of emancipation that China strived for over a century.

The 1982 Constitution, on the contrary, emphasized “China”, in the first sentence of its Preamble: “China is one of the nations with the oldest history in the world.”⁵⁷⁰ The fact that China has a rich history that stretches back thousands of years, is more important than the legitimacy of the polity “People’s Republic”. China’s centenary endeavor for the “People’s Republic” was only a part, not the whole, of its history.

⁵⁷⁰ Preamble, *Constitution of the People’s Republic of China*, 1982.

Another noticeable revision was about the political asylum for foreigners.

Article 99, 1954 Constitution: “The PRC grants the right of residence to any foreigner who is being persecuted for supporting just causes, participating in pacifist movements, or engaging in scientific works.”

Article 29, 1975 Constitution: “The PRC grants the right of residence to any foreigner who is being persecuted for supporting just causes, participating in *revolutionary* movements, or engaging in scientific works.”

Article 59, 1978 Constitution: Ditto as Article 29, 1975 Constitution.

Article 32, 1982 Constitution: “The PRC *may* grant the right of *asylum* to foreigners who *request* asylum for *political reasons*.”

Article 32 in the 1982 Constitution, compared with international practices, was by no means reactionary but standard. However, the polity of the “People’s Republic” in its Marxist-Leninist sense was not standard, but something more enlightened than merely “Republic”, the ideal of the bourgeois revolution. In the 1954, 1975, and 1978 Constitutions, the Articles concerning political asylum for people without the PRC’s citizenship were assigned under the Chapters of “Fundamental Rights and Obligations of Citizens”. Whereas Article 32 in the 1982 Constitution was assigned under the Chapter of “General Principles”, separating asylum from civil rights. The 1982 Constitution’s retreat from the principles of the universalist spirit of world revolution symbolized the end of China’s Jacobinism. It resembles the French Constitution of the Year III (1795) in many ways.

Notwithstanding, the 1982 Constitution, for its recognition of private property,⁵⁷¹ civil freedoms,⁵⁷² term limits for public office,⁵⁷³ and others, was widely regarded as incarnating constitutionalism and the rule of law. It “was enacted and enforced both to bring order out of chaos for China and to provide a constitutional structure for the policy of Reform and Opening-up...it takes on...the duet of...both revolution and de-revolution”⁵⁷⁴.

Within a few years, a number of nationalist songs of great artistic value replaced internationalist melodies: “I Love You, China” (1979)***⁵⁷⁵, “I Love You, Snow of the Northern Frontier” (1980)***, “On The Hopeful Field” (1981)***, “Song of Yangtze” (1983)***, “My Chinese Heart” (1983)***, “Unforgettable Night” (1984)*, “My People, My Country” (1984)***, “Pearl of the Orient” (1986)***, etc.

From the post-1989 point of view, the problem was that under the reformist triumvirate of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang, the spontaneous revival of Chinese nationalism amongst youth, students, and intellectuals during the 1980s embodied the ideals carried by the May Fourth Movement – democracy, science, subjectivity, humanism, Enlightenment, and rationality. This surging torrent of Chinese nationalism became a powerful driving force for the student movements in 1986 and 1989. Without a strong nationalist impulse, the 1989 protests could not have evolved to their extent. The Tiananmen nationalism, as an urgent desire to get rid of backwardness and

⁵⁷¹ Article 11, 13, 18, Chapter I, Idem.

⁵⁷² Article 33-41, Chapter II, Idem.

⁵⁷³ Article 61, 66, 79, 87, 92, Chapter III, Idem.

⁵⁷⁴ Gao Quanxi, “Revolution, Reform & Constitutionalism: The Evolution of China’s 1982 Constitution: An Interpretation Based on Political Constitutionalism,” *Peking University Law Journal* 2, no. 1 (2014): p. 28.

⁵⁷⁵ The single asterisk indicates that the song was listed in the “100 Patriotic Songs” by the Publicity Department and CGCBSC of the CPC in 2009; the double asterisk indicates that the song was listed in the “100 Excellent Songs to Celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China” (2019) [*People’s Daily*, 17th June 2019]; the triple asterisk indicates the song was listed in both.

realize modernization, was associated with economic liberalization (market), democratic politics (“political system reform”⁵⁷⁶), and sociocultural progress (*River Elegy*). In many ways, it resembled the nationalisms that appeared during the democratic revolutions that later swept Central, Southeast, and Eastern Europe.

For instance, the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKASPDMC) was established during the 1989 Tiananmen protests. As “Patriotic Democratic” indicates, it referred to both (a) Chinese nationalism, viz., a China of which Hong Kong is a part, and (b) liberal democracy, viz., a democracy that Hong Kong never experienced under the British rule. During the Concert For Democracy In China held on 27th May 1989, Chinese nationalist songs such as “Descendants of the Dragon”* (Hou Dejian) and “My Chinese Heart” were performed. Zhao Ziyang said in a famous speech: the students are all kindhearted for the good of our country”⁵⁷⁷.

The CPC’s conservative hardliners also acknowledged that the students protesting were “patriotic”. “The majority of students in the movement...have shown a patriotic spirit; they have put forward a lot of opinions and expressed their patriotic desires, but...everyone is hoping for a stable situation...our desire to rejuvenate China without stability...I think, is nothing but a wish.”⁵⁷⁸ “We have always affirmed that students’ patriotic enthusiasm and patriotic aspirations are good, many things have done right, and many of the opinions students put forward are also issues that our government hopes to solve.”⁵⁷⁹

Two things were obviously overlooked during the June 1989 upsurge of Chinese nationalism. The fundamental one was the question of whether a “radical” modernization could be achieved through a regime change, e.g., can China achieve economic catch-up, irreversible democracy, and sociocultural secularization within a short period as they imagined?⁵⁸⁰ Once the reality breaks the optimism, the ensuing question would be whether the nationalism would turn from liberal to conservative. When a British journalist went to Budapest right after the upheaval and asked Hungarians how long they expected it would take for Hungary to catch up with the Western living standards, the average answer was about five years.

⁵⁷⁶ Cf. Zhao Ziyang, *Political Report for the 13th National Congress of the CPC*, 1987.

⁵⁷⁷ Zhao Ziyang, “Addressing Students in Tiananmen Square,” 19th May 1989.

⁵⁷⁸ Li Tieying’s speech, “Li Peng and Others Met with Student Representatives of the Hunger Strike Petition.” *People’s Daily*, May 19th, 1989.

⁵⁷⁹ Li Peng’s speech, *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁰ According to the conservative logos of the analogy of the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen (Deng, Li Peng, et al.), the references of economic catch-up, irreversible democracy, and sociocultural secularization would be the Great Leap Forward, “radical democracy” (big talk, big release, big debate, big-character poster [four bigs]), and anti-Four Olds (old ideas, old culture, old habits, and old customs).

“Since the May Fourth Movement, liberalism and communism have become prevailing in China...imperialist cultural aggression became easy to succeed within this atmosphere...this is really the biggest crisis of foreign cultural invasion and the biggest hidden danger of our Volksgeist.”

Chiang Kai-shek, *The Destiny of China* (1943).

“The trend of bourgeois liberalization once flooded the ideological field, confusing amongst intellectuals...[those] dependent on overseas, hostile foreign forces...were the scum of intellectuals and the scum of the Chinese nation.”

Jiang Zemin, “Patriotism and the Mission of Our Nation’s Intellectuals” (1990).

PATRIOTIC EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

In 2001, an American Senator had “a discussion with about 40 graduate students”⁵⁸¹ at Fudan University, Shanghai. “There’s a question I’ve been meaning to ask students of China: the students of Tiananmen Square, were they patriots or traitors to the People’s Republic of China?”⁵⁸²

The Senator was Joe Biden. His question pointed to the ideological connotation of Chinese nationalism since the 1990s: liberal or conservative. It would be needless for him to ask the question in the 1980s because the answer that “patriots” was a descriptive, not normative. However, things had changed soon after the crackdown on 4th June 1989.

Under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, the CPC launched the so-called Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC). Suddenly, those who were identified as “patriots” even by hardliners such as Li Peng became “traitors”, who needed to be reeducated by “patriotism”. Apparently, there was no “lack”, but perhaps “excess” of patriotism that drove people to participate in public affairs instead of private businesses. Therefore, what the PEC intended was not indoctrinating nationalism but a new version of nationalism, in which democracy and patriotism were no longer compatible.

The PEC was classically defined as “a state-led nationalist movement, which redefined the legitimacy of the post-Tiananmen leadership in a way that would permit the Communist Party’s rule to continue on the basis of a non-Communist ideology.”⁵⁸³ The PEC’s main themes were two: “Chinese tradition and history” that had “almost nothing to do with Marxist tradition”, and “national unity and territorial integrity”⁵⁸⁴.

According to the *Outline for the Implementation of Patriotic Education* issued on 23rd August 1994, the contents of patriotic education should include the “rich history”⁵⁸⁵ and “excellent traditional

⁵⁸¹ Edward Wong, Michael Crowley, and Ana Swanson, “Joe Biden’s China Journey,” *The New York Times*, 6th September 2020.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Zhao Suisheng, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 31, no. 3 (1998): p. 288.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 296.

⁵⁸⁵ CPC Central Committee, *Outline for the Implementation of Patriotic Education* (23rd August 1994), Article 7.

culture”⁵⁸⁶ of the Chinese nation. “In the process of creating a splendid Chinese civilization, the Chinese nation has formed its traditional culture with strong vitality. Its content is broad and profound, [including] achievements in philosophy, social science, literature and art, science and technology...lofty Volksgeist, national integrity and good morals...countless outstanding politicians, thinkers, writers, scientists, educators, military strategists...a wealth of cultural relics, historical relics, and classic works. These rich cultural heritages are valuable resources for patriotic education.”⁵⁸⁷ “The natural scenery, cultural relics, and scenic spots in various places nationwide can arouse people’s love for the magnificent rivers, mountains, natural landscapes, rich history and culture of the motherland...The tour guides, written descriptions and publicity materials of tourist attractions and nature reserves should all include patriotic education content.”⁵⁸⁸ “FM stereo radio music programs should mainly introduce excellent musical works, especially the Chinese excellent folk musical works.”⁵⁸⁹ “We must carry forward the excellent cultural traditions of the Chinese nation.”⁵⁹⁰

The PEC aimed “primarily on the youth”⁵⁹¹. After all, instead of the elder, the young desperately rebelled against Chinese traditions during the Cultural Revolution and 1980s pro-democracy movements. “All types of colleges and universities must actively create conditions to offer elective courses in Chinese traditional cultures of history, literature, art, science and technology, etc.”⁵⁹² The Ministry of Education even issued a document titled *Opinions on Further Development of Patriotic Education and Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools* (1991).⁵⁹³

Nationalism requires symbols. The enactment of *The National Flag and the National Emblem Law of the Republic of China* (1928) declared a new order after the 1927 purge against communists. So did the enactments of *The National Flag Law of the People’s Republic of China* (1990) and *The National Emblem Law of the People’s Republic of China* (1991). Article 23 of the *National Flag Law* stipulated: “anyone who deliberately *desecrates* the national flag of the People’s Republic of China by burning, mutilating, scribbling, defacing or trampling in public places shall be investigated for criminal responsibility according to law.”

Coincidentally, one year earlier, a similar legal case (*Texas v. Gregory Lee Johnson*) was resolved in America. After burning the American national flag, Johnson was found guilty of “desecration of a venerated object”. Later, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned his conviction, citing Amendment I (freedom of [symbolic] speech). On 21st June 1989, the Supreme Court handed down a 5-4 decision supporting Johnson’s freedom: “the flag protects those who hold it in contempt”⁵⁹⁴. In contrast, the ROC’s national flag did not protect those who held it in contempt, nor would the PRC’s national flag.

Overall, the nationalism embodied in the PEC was – if it were situated in the American context, “redneck”. It was the opposite of the left-wing nationalism of the May Fourth intelligentsia living

⁵⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 8.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 23.

⁵⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 26.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 24.

⁵⁹¹ *Ibid.*, Article 15.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*, Article 16.

⁵⁹³ Ministry of Education of the PRC, *Opinions on Further Development of Patriotic Education and Activities in Primary and Secondary Schools*, 25th April 1991.

⁵⁹⁴ *Johnson*, 491 U.S. at 420-21 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

in coastal China, who cursed Chinese traditions and embraced cosmopolitan ideals abroad. In a 1990 speech to the intelligentsia, Jiang Zemin said: “we must firmly oppose the so-called elite politics...Only workers, peasants and intellectuals are united in one heart, could we continuously advance our cause.”⁵⁹⁵ Paradoxically, Jiang himself was, in every sense, an elite intellectual.

Voiceover: We reminded him that he himself had been a student demonstrated more than 50 years ago.

Wallace: You were a student protester in Shanghai.

Jiang: In Shanghai, that’s right [in English].

Wallace: At the time of the Nationalists [KMT], “we want freedom, we want democracy”; that was you.

Jiang: That’s right [in English].

Wallace: That’s what those people in Tiananmen Square [in 1989] was saying, “we want freedom, we want democracy”.⁵⁹⁶

Jiang was born in a wealthy family in Yangzhou (near the capital Nanjing). By 1943 when he was admitted to the National Central University in Nanjing, the education he received made him unattached to the “80% of illiterate Chinese” already. The English-taught education he received then at National Central University (later SJTU) was the most elitist in China at that time. His teachers included Zhu Wuhua (1902-1998, master and PhD at Harvard), Yu Hsiu Ku (1902-2002, bachelor, master, and PhD at MIT), et al. Jiang joined the CPC in 1946 and graduated the next year. For his generation, the CPC was a symbol of democracy.

Wallace: You studied the speeches of Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln, as a youngster, when you were learning English?

Jiang: When I was in Middle School, and later when I was a teacher, I used Lincoln’s *Gettysburg Address* in my course. Do you want me to quote some lines from it?

Wallace: I do, indeed.

Jiang: “Four score and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal” [in English].

Wallace: Why did you learn that by heart?

Jiang: I focused on the words “all men are created equal”.

Wallace: Right.

Jiang: Because this had a great influence on students when I was young...especially the last paragraph, “the government of the people, by the people, and for the people, never perish from the earth” [in English].⁵⁹⁷

Indeed, Chiang claimed “Tridemism” [of, by, and for the people], but his regime betrayed it. Thus, the 1949 Revolution was first and foremost to restore the republican polity of the 1911 Revolution. This was Jiang’s original motive for joining the CPC. Back then, he could not have expected that he would become someone he used to oppose when he was young, four decades later.

Jiang’s elitist purport remained unchanged. He seemingly enjoyed showing off his foreign language skills. Apart from countless speeches in English, he translated a Russian booklet *Reasonable Use of Electric Power in Machinery Manufacturing Plant* by his internship tutor Телехоф in

⁵⁹⁵ *SWJZM*, Vol. I, “Patriotism and the Mission of Our Nation’s Intellectuals (3rd May 1990).”

⁵⁹⁶ “60 Minutes: Jiang Zemin Interviewed by Mike Wallace,” CBS, 3rd September 2000.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Moscow back in 1955 and 1956.⁵⁹⁸ In 1998, he delivered a Russian speech in Novosibirsk, which consisted of vocabularies such as “deoxyribonucleic acid double helix”⁵⁹⁹. In 2001, he delivered a Spanish speech in Chile.⁶⁰⁰ In the 1970s, he was in charge of affairs with Romania and thus learned Romanian. Thanks to the phonetic characteristics and shared roman origin, he could learn how to pronounce Spanish quickly. Jiang’s personal artistic savors in ‘O sole mio, Aloha ‘Oe, Pushkin’s К *** Керн, Peking opera, Mihai Eminescu, Toselli Serenade, etc. all distinguished him from any “narrow-minded” nationalism of the less educated masses. The intellectual gap between Jiang and the vast majority of Chinese people was objectively huge.

What’s more, the PRC was no longer attempting to flatten this political hierarchy through egalitarian experiments (“socialism” on Mao’s account). Human differences or inequalities are natural, and any antinatural “social engineering” would fail. Therefore, political legitimacy should be based on the justification of hierarchy or “cultural hegemony” in Gramscian sense. For revolutionaries, exposing cultural hegemony leads to liberation. For conservatives, the status quo that people have being and are being deceived demonstrates the imperfection of humankind. To forcibly overthrow the status quo is antinatural and is doomed to failure.

The debate here boils down to the meta-divergence between optimism and pessimism toward human nature and to what Rousseau had unveiled long before Gramsci: the real founder of human civilization was the first man who occupied a piece of land, claimed he owned it, and had a cohort of people simple-minded enough to believe him (*Discourse on Inequality*). There is truth to the pervasive opinion that Chinese nationalism has filled the ideological vacuum left by communism since the 1990s. However, the cultural hegemonies of the two were based on opposing normative motives.

⁵⁹⁸ Cf. Телехофф, *Reasonable Use of Electric Power in Machinery Manufacturing Plant*, trans., Jiang Zemin (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, 2008).

⁵⁹⁹ *SWJZM*, Vol. II, “Speech at Novosibirsk Science City (24th November 1998).” See also another speech in Russian at Moscow State University, *SWJZM*, Vol. III, “Create a Bright Future for Sino-Russian Relations (17th July 2001).”

⁶⁰⁰ *SWJZM*, Vol. III, “Develop China-Latin America Relations and Promote South-South Cooperation (6th April 2001).”

“My friend, I believe that by that time, there will be active creations and rapid progress everywhere, joyous songs will replace lamentations, smiling faces will replace crying faces, wealth will replace poverty, health will replace suffering, wisdom will replace ignorance, friendship will replace vendetta, the joy of life will replace the sorrow of death, and the bright garden will replace the desolate wasteland!”

Fang Zhimin, “A Lovely China” (2nd May 1935).

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND MEMORY

Ding Guangen (1929-2012) may be seen as a miniature of the CPC’s “kmtization”. When studying at SJTU, Ding was also a student activist during the 1940s; but he was on the KMT side and even had direct confrontations with the CPC’s student wing in Shanghai. As a graduate of the prestigious SJTU, he was supposed to be someone the CPC looked for. However, due to his previous KMT background, he joined the CPC as late as 1956. Moreover, for over two decades since then, he had no other opportunity than to serve as a low-ranking technocrat.

After Mao, his political career leap. His academic qualifications and technical capabilities overwhelmed his “politics”. In 1985, he was appointed as the Minister of Railways. Involuntarily, his ministership stopped by a major railway safety accident in 1988. The most significant part of his political career started after 1989: Director of the CPC Central Publicity Department⁶⁰¹ and Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideology⁶⁰² from 1992 to 2002, and of the CGCBCS from 1997 to 2002.

Ding’s major at SJTU was transport engineering, and his working experiences afterwards had nothing to do with ideology, political theory, etc. His political career after 1989 might seem strange. However, why did he choose the KMT in the 1940s? Why was the KMT propaganda so appealing to him that he believed in autocracy over democracy and right-wing nationalism over left-wing nationalism? As mentioned previously, the pressing task for the CPC after 1989 was reeducating the “youth”. Ding knew best what he thought when he was a youngster.

Imperialism and Colonization

On the one hand, the generation of Chinese nationalism in the late 19th century was a replica of nationalism in modern Europe, demanding a Westphalian nation-state to replace the medieval Empire without clear borders and Rousseauian popular sovereignty to replace the autocratic legitimacy based on dynastic royalty. On the other hand, the conditions facing China were vastly different from those facing Europe where nationalism originated.

The narrative that China lagged behind the world in the 19th century is generally correct, but it shows an incomplete picture. It needs further specifications: according to what criteria China lagged behind and what the “world” refers to. The whole picture was that China, as a significant

⁶⁰¹ Ding’s predecessor Wang Renzhi (1987-1992) was revoked due to his pro-plan stance after Deng’s Southern Tour.

⁶⁰² Ding’s had two predecessors: Hu Qili (1988-1989), who was revoked due to his attitude against the crackdown and Li Ruihuan (1989-1992), who was still considered too liberal.

part of the majority of humankind (in terms of the proportion of the world population), lagged behind a minority of humankind (being seen as the “world”) who first materialized the technological accomplishment of the industrial revolutions. Without the Enlightenment historical progressivism that takes socioeconomic productivity as the benchmark of the degree of civilization, “lagging behind” could not make sense.

Within this context, China as a nation-state, Chinese as a nation, and Chinese nationalism as a nationalism were not recognized as equal to the Western (Russia included) ones; this was true for the majority of humankind that “lagged behind”. In the case of China, the most well-known byword of this 19th century mentality was “Dogs and Chinese No Admittance”; it could also be found in “Dogs and Indians not Allowed”, “No Niggers, No Jews, No Dogs”, etc. Considering this notion demeaned at least half of the world population, it could be hardly considered not against humanity.

The tangible results of this notion, such as discrimination, imperialism, colonization, trust territory, concession, unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, etc., were the descriptive conditions facing the majority of humankind. They cannot be taken in a granted normative manner: the responses to these conditions are not necessarily left-wing or right-wing. They must be examined case by case. For instance, Palestinian nationalism is shared by right-wing Hamas, which advocates for religious conservatism and left-wing Fatah, which advocates for secularism; the two diverge on a range of issues.

The 20th century Chinese authors cited “Dogs and Chinese No Admittance” across the political spectrum, from communists Cai Hesen, Fang Zhimin, republicans Sun Yat-sen, Chen Tianhua, to the conservatives. Chiang’s 1943 pamphlet *The Destiny of China*, the manifestation of right-wing Chinese nationalism in response to the unequal treatment China received, including the ongoing Japanese invasion, conceivably played a crucial role in the 1940s Ding Guangen’s allegiance to the KMT.

The historiography of modern China narrated in the PEC was incredibly similar to that of Chiang’s KMT. The core is “revivalism” (cf. GRCN): China was a great civilization for “5,000 years”, “the Chinese nation, compelled by the humiliation it suffered... must take an oath to restore and achieve its goal of rejuvenation.”⁶⁰³ The “revolution” emerged in a historical context of external and internal troubles. The Qing dynasty was incompetent at home.⁶⁰⁴ China faced “national humiliation [Guo Chi]”⁶⁰⁵ of “unequal treaties” imposed by foreign/Western “great powers [Lie Qiang]”⁶⁰⁶. “The failure in the Opium War was China’s first national humiliation that resulted in the [unequal] *Treaty of Nanking* (1842).”⁶⁰⁷ *The Destiny of China* detailed the unequal treaties China had signed since then – *Treaty of the Bogue* (1843), *Treaty of Whampoa* (1844), *Treaty of Canton* (1847), *Treaty of Kulja* (1851)...*Treaty of Shimonoseki* (1895), and *Boxer Protocol* (1901) undermined Chinese sovereignty and Volksgeist. Consequentially, “on Chinese territory, the imperialist military and police can arbitrarily fire at the Chinese military, police, businesspeople and civilians. The Chinese military and police cannot fight back but open their eyes and raise their hands. Otherwise, the imperialists intimidate them with war.”⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰³ Chiang Kai-shek, *The Destiny of China*, Chapter I.

⁶⁰⁴ The CPC has to blame both the Qing dynasty and the KMT.

⁶⁰⁵ *The Destiny of China*, Chapter II, Section I.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, Chapter II, Section II.

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter III, Section I.

Apart from imperialist coercion in Chinese politics and economy, “under the oppression of unequal treaties, the Chinese people succumbed to the Western culture”⁶⁰⁹. The pervasion of liberalism and communism in China was “imperialist cultural invasions”. Liberals and communists, intellectuals and students in general, “slandered the heritage of our inherent Chinese culture” and “lost the self-esteem and self-confidence...considering everything in the West true and everything in China not”⁶¹⁰. “The Chinese were unwilling to be slaves, so they learned Western culture, but as a result of which, they became slaves to foreign cultures unconsciously...the debate between liberalism and communism is nothing more than the debate between Anglo-American thought and Soviet-Russian thought. These political theories are inapplicable to China’s national economy and people’s livelihood, violating China’s inherent cultural spirit”; their advocates “fundamentally forget that they are Chinese and the stance of learning [foreign ideas] for China’s [instrumental] use [cf. “Sinicizing Marxism]”.⁶¹¹

All imperialisms, liberalism, and communism were enemies of Chiang’s right-wing nationalism. Liberals tend to “ignore China’s status under unequal treaties”, while communist economic policies were counterproductive, “capitals fled into concessions, aiding imperialist aggression”.⁶¹² Chiang criticized those who learned “Rousseau’s ‘natural rights’, advocating a Chinese revolution for freedom”, arguing that China’s revolution was not for individual freedom but for the nation’s freedom: “the Chinese nation must form a solid national defense organization like a rock so that individuals cannot enjoy the ‘freedom’ like a piece of loose sand.”⁶¹³ “China’s democracy must not be modeled on the Euromerican 19th century democratic systems based on individualism [liberalism] and class consciousness [communism]”.⁶¹⁴

In conclusion, the KMT’s mission was a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation “so that foreigners will no longer ridicule us as a backward country and an inferior nation”⁶¹⁵. Both liberalism and communism are harmful in achieving this goal; the “apparent reason of China’s inferiority” was in science and technology, not “foreign culture in general”.⁶¹⁶ “The KMT and its student wing are organizations that are united with the country and the nation”⁶¹⁷ that would lead to wiping out the humiliation [Xue Chi] China suffered; this was what convinced Ding Guangen in the 1940s and what the CPC used to narrate itself in the 1990s. Ding did not want to be like those youth whom Chiang described as “seeing freedom as personal lust, democracy as private interests, taking the law as shame, anti-order as honor”⁶¹⁸. Those youth included Jiang Zemin, Qiao Shi, Wu Xueqian, Qian Qichen, and others who chose the CPC.

Second Sino-Japanese War

The core controversy in the historiography of the Second Sino-Japanese War as part of the World Anti-Fascist War was the role of the CPC-led armed forces played in Chinese resistance. The CPC’s historical revisionism against its previous historiography of the Second Sino Japanese War

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid., Chapter III, Section V.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Ibid., Chapter IV, Section III.

⁶¹³ Ibid., Chapter VI, Section II.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid., Chapter V, Section II.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid., Chapter VII.

⁶¹⁶ Ibid., Chapter VIII.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid., Chapter VII.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid., Chapter VI, Section II.

has been confessed. For instance, a question of the national university entrance exam asked students to read the following text – the content on the Anti-Japanese War in China’s historical textbook for middle schools in 1960 and make revision suggestions for it and explain the reasons for revisions.

CHAPTER 20 The Beginning of the National War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression

CHAPTER 21 Two Lines, Two Battlefields

1. Two Lines in the Anti-Japanese War
2. The Great Retreat of the KMT Army
3. Pingxingguan Victory
4. The Establishment and Rapid Development of the Anti-Japanese Citadels behind the Enemies

CHAPTER 22 The Publication of Chairman Mao’s “On Protracted War” and the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th Central Committee of the CPC

CHAPTER 23 The Repulsion of the KMT’s Anticommunist Upsurge and the Publication of “On New Democracy”

CHAPTER 24 Japanese Imperialist Colonial Rule in Occupied Areas

CHAPTER 25 Consolidation and Development of Liberated Areas

CHAPTER 26 The Dark Rule of the KMT and the Development of the Democratic Movement

CHAPTER 27 The Final Victory of the Anti-Japanese War

1. The 7th National Congress of the CPC
2. The Military and Civilian Counter-Offensive in the Liberated Area and the Unconditional Surrender of the Japanese Invaders
3. The Great Historical Significance of the Victory of the Anti-Japanese War⁶¹⁹

In order to answer this question, students have to understand how the text is “outdated” vis-à-vis the current one. The anti-Japanese resistance was shared by the CPC and KMT, but the CPC was not merely a “nationalist” party; it was also “democratic”. During the Axis occupation of Greece, both the Greek government-in-exile and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) were against the invasion by Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria; however, the KKE was also against the autocratic Greek government-in-exile that overthrew the Second Hellenic Republic in 1935 by a right-wing coup d’état. The CPC was against both domestic [KMT] and foreign [Japan] “fascisms”.

According to right-wing nationalism, the Anti-Japanese War should be narrated as a war of the Chinese nation’s struggle for a rightful status amongst nations. In contrast, the political struggles at home are secondary. Jiang Zemin declared the CPC a party “of the whole people” regardless of economic situation. Chiang claimed as early as 1943: “China’s politics is the politics of the whole people, not the politics of classes”⁶²⁰. Therefore, there should be only “one line”, i.e., China vs. Japan, instead of “two lines” (chapter 21), i.e., CPC vs. KMT and CPC vs. Japan during the war. “The great retreat of the KMT army” (chapter 21, section 2) may be replaced with “the great resistance of the Chinese army”; the KMT’s “dark rule” and anticommunist oppressions and the CPC’s role as a democratic force (chapter 23, 26) may be removed. After making these revisions, the CPC’s and KMT’s historiographies of the Anti-Japanese War become almost the same.

Nanjing Massacre

⁶¹⁹ New Curriculum Standard National College Entrance Examination [Gaokao] Paper (Version I), Comprehensive Liberal Arts Test, 2014, no. 41.

⁶²⁰ *The Destiny of China*, Chapter V, Section I.

In terms of scale and intensity, the Nanjing Massacre from December 1937 to February 1938 was undoubtedly a barbaric and horrific war crime against humanity. Strangely, “for a long time since then, the Nanjing Massacre has almost disappeared from public discourse such as newspapers, film and television, and accounts of the Anti-Japanese War.”⁶²¹ The changing imagine of the Nanjing Massacre in the public sphere reflects how Chinese nationalism has transformed.

C6.1: Annual Distribution of Articles on the Nanjing Massacre in *People’s Daily*




图1 《人民日报》南京大屠杀纪念文章数量的年度分布（1949-2012年）

Source: Li H., Huang S., p. 42.

In the first three decades of the PRC (1949-1979), the Nanjing Massacre as a topic of socialization was negligible. The number of articles on the Nanjing Massacre was zero in the Cultural Revolution. “The disappearance of the Nanjing Massacre from China’s collective memory has to do with the prevailing progressive narratives and the universalist notion of friendship amongst peoples at that time.”⁶²² During the 1980s, the Nanjing Massacre began to play a role in shaping national memory. The number of articles on the Nanjing Massacre in *People’s Daily* increased significantly during the early 1990s and has remained at a high level, which was accompanied by the “Patriotic Education Campaign in the 1990s”⁶²³. Clearly, the PEC was not reiterating the Maoist, left-wing nationalism that chose “benevolent amnesia”⁶²⁴; it was reviving nationalism in the opposite direction.

The right-wing narration of the Nanjing Massacre has been based on a saying that “you will be beaten if you fall behind”⁶²⁵, i.e., the Law of the Jungle. The reason why the Chinese ‘had’ to

⁶²¹ Li Hongtao and Huang Shunming, “Remembering and Traumatizing the Nanjing Massacre: A Content Analysis of *People’s Daily*’s Commemorative Coverage, 1949-2012,” *Journalism & Communication*, no. 1 (2014): p. 37.

⁶²² Ibid., p. 39.

⁶²³ Ibid., p. 38.

⁶²⁴ James Reilly, “Remember History, not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of Resistance to Japan,” *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no. 2 (2011): p. 463.

⁶²⁵ Li Hongtao and Huang Shunming, p. 48.

suffer from Japanese fascist atrocities was that China was militarily, technologically, and economically weaker than Japan. Is it “necessary [for a people, ethnicity, culture] to suffer a massacre for backwardness [in terms of modernity]?”⁶²⁶ Essentially, “you will be beaten if you fall behind” justifies the anarchic assumption of the realist international order and refuses the possibility of liberal world regime.

This was what Deng meant by saying that “understanding some Chinese history is a spiritual driving force for China’s development.”⁶²⁷ The Chinese should understand that if they do not work hard to make China materially strong enough, they would be buried alive, raped, and massacred by the stronger. The Chinese must be equipped with shame, fear, the desire to compete, and the dare to be superior. The Nanjing Massacre has been narrated as one of the events of “national humiliation [Guo Chi]” since the late 19th century, which constructed the “official historiographical narrative with ‘humiliation-rejuvenation’ as its core”⁶²⁸.

In this context, the contradiction between the Japanese conservatives (LDP and *uyoku dantai*)’ diminution of the Massacre and the Chinese conservatives (CPC and radical folk groups)’ intensification of it is similar to the one between PiS and United Russia, Likud and Hamas, GOP and Iranian Principlists. Their contradiction is ethnic. The ideological one lies between them and the marginalized liberals, including Chinese who reflect on the official narrative since the 1990s, and Japanese intellectuals who highlight Japanese war crimes and politicians (Tomiichi Murayama, Yukio Hatoyama, et al.) who contributed to the Sino-Japanese reconciliation.

February 28 Incident and Taiwan

While right-wing nationalism returned to the Chinese mainland in the early 1990s, it was declining in Taiwan. The KMT’s one-party rule in post-WWII Taiwan was based on a Chinese nationalism ideology that sought to “retake” the mainland as an uncontrolled territory of the ROC. However, after Chiang Ching-kuo died in 1988 and Lee Teng-hui, who was born in Taiwan (as a Japanese colony), became the Chairman of the KMT, democratization and Taiwanese nationalism advanced side by side. In the 2000 Presidential Election, the KMT candidate was defeated by the center-left DPP candidate, ending its half-century rule.

The DPP’s agendas included rehabilitating the victims of the February 28 Incident in 1947, during which the KMT government suppressed the “riots” involved. The Incident was regarded as not only antidemocratic but also anti-Taiwanese. In Taiwanese nationalist historiography, Taiwan’s 1945 return to the ROC according to the Potsdam Declaration was not a “liberation” of Taiwan; it was China (ROC) replacing Japan as another “colonizer”. During Chiang’s dictatorship, Taiwanese nationalism was severely prohibited. The political demand of a “Republic of Taiwan” would invalidate the ROC and KMT regime.

Chiang’s accusation of the link between Taiwanese nationalism and communism was not out of nothing. Taiwanese nationalism was generated during the Japanese colonial rule and further developed during the KMT rule; it was naturally the antithesis of the Right. When the February 28 Incident occurred, the CPC praised it as an “uprising” against the KMT dictatorship. In this context, one of the CPC’s eight satellite parties Taimeng (Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League) was established on 12th November 1947. Su Beng (1918-2019), member of the CPC from 1943 to

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

⁶²⁷ *SWDXP*, Vol. III, “Revitalizing the Chinese Nation (7th April 1990).”

⁶²⁸ Li Hongtao and Huang Shunming, p. 48.

1949 and lifelong Marxist, who fought against Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War and attempted to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek, was known for his advocacy of Taiwanese nationalism.

For the post-1989 CPC that imitates Chiangism, its revolutionary legacy brought only awkwardness into the contemporary cross-strait relations. On the one hand, the CPC, together with the KMT, has been opposing the DPP's de-Sinicization, de-Chiangization, de-Confucianization...on the other hand, it used to be the strongest supporter of a "democratic, self-governed" Taiwan vis-à-vis the "fascist" KMT regime. In theory, Taiwanese nationalism could be right-wing, as Chinese nationalism could be left-wing. However, in reality, the CPC inherited the KMT's role in holding right-wing Chinese nationalism since the early 1990s, alongside the CPC's rapprochement with the center-right KMT and containment of the center-left DPP, the link between Taiwanese nationalism and the Left has only strengthened.

Damnatio Memoriae

Damnatio memoriae is a common technique of political legitimization in human society. Typically, it is used against individuals. In the PRC, communists Mao (partial), Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan et al. and liberals Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, Hu Qili, et al. have all been subjects of damnatio memoriae since the early 1990s. However, damnatio memoriae is not limited to politicians in official historiography but also other forms of collective memory that construct nationalism at the popular level.

One case is "Ode to the Motherland"****⁶²⁹ ("Ode to the Socialist Motherland" in its 1968 version). In the 1st verse, in "the five-star red flag flutters in the wind/how loud is the revolutionary song", "revolutionary" has been changed to "victorious"; in "ode to our socialist motherland/full of bright sunshine is everywhere", "socialist" has been changed to "dear", and "full of bright sunshine is everywhere" has been changed to "from now on to prosperity". The 2nd verse has been completely erased; the original "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution/opened a new chapter of Marxism-Leninism/The revolutionaries are vigorous/a new generation is thriving/follow Chairman Mao to be a revolutionary path-breaker/we will create a bright red world" has been entirely substituted with "the vast and beautiful land/is our dear homeland/the heroic people have stood up/our unity and friendship are as strong as steel". The word "revolution" seemingly became taboo. Similarly, in the 3rd verse, "with the motherland in mind/we look around the world/communism is our ideal" has been replaced by "we are hard-working/we are brave/independence and freedom are our ideals". Thus, proletarian (inter) nationalism has been replaced by the self-determination of the modern nation-state.

Another case is "We Walk on the Great Road"****⁶³⁰. Compared with its Cultural Revolution version, the 2nd verse "the working-class rules everything/700 million people with high fighting spirit" has been replaced by "we diligently build the magnificent rivers and mountains/vowing to turn the motherland into paradise"; the 3rd verse "the revolutionary storms are sweeping the world/the US imperialism and Soviet revisionism will certainly perish" has been replaced by "we are dedicated to this magnificent cause/with infinite happiness, infinite glory".

Both "Ode to the Motherland" (1951) and "We Walk on the Great Road" (1962) were created before the Cultural Revolution; their original lyrics, compared with their lyrics of the Cultural Revolution, were more moderate. It was this moderation that Mao saw as the downside of the "first

⁶²⁹ Wang Xin, "Ode to the Motherland (1951)".

⁶³⁰ Li Jiefu (composition), "We Walk on the Great Road (1962)".

seventeen years” (1949-1966), which fostered revisionism, conservatism, and derevolution. Both have had numerous versions of lyrics, being official or unofficial. The theme of Chinese nationalism has remained unchanged as the musical melody. However, the ideological connotation in the political spectrum embodied in the lyrics has changed from time to time. The continuous popularity of these songs in the public sphere, especially on the occasions of ceremonial politics, has created an illusion of historical continuity as if what Chinese nationalism refers to in the People’s Republic of China has always been what it does contemporaneously. It seems that the Chinese nationalism of the CPC has remained left-wing as it initially was. This is what *damnatio memoriae* is for.

Travail, Famille, Patrie

Hong Kong celebrity Jackie Chan (b. 1954)’s 2009 song “Guojia”⁶³¹ seems nothing different from those “mainstream patriotic songs” since the 1990s. In Chinese, the word “guojia” literally means “state” (guo) plus “family” (jia). The state-family integration could be traced back to the Zhou dynasty (ca. 1046-256 BC), which implemented a system that determined people’s political status based on how close they were to the Emperor by kinship. In this system, the state was literally an enlarged family in which hierarchy and patriarchy interlocked. Both possible correspondents to “guojia”, i.e., “country” and “nation” in English, overlook the kinship element.

What “guojia” refers to is “fatherland” (“patrie”), in which the loyalty towards the country is twofold in one: sociocultural “family values” plus political “patriotism”. This is what its lyrics demonstrate. “It is said that the country is huge/but is its actually a family/.../a family is the smallest country/a country is thousands of families/.../only with a powerful country/will there be a wealthy family/.../the country is the standing of honor/the family is the overflow of happiness/.../the country is my country/the family is my family/I love my country/I love my family”⁶³².

Jackie Chan has been supporting the conservatives in Hong Kong (pro-Beijing camp) for a long time. He disdains Taiwan’s democracy and even Hong Kong’s semi-democracy⁶³³, arguing that freedom leads to chaos and that the Chinese need to be managed. Since 2013, he has been a member of the CPPCC. Recently, he even expressed his willingness to join the CPC.

Compared with Jackie Chan’s “Guojia”, Zhang Di (b. 1942)’s eponymous song “Guojia” (1981) was less known. Partially, it was because the country Zhang Di referred to was the ROC instead of the PRC. However, the two songs were not only eponymous but also structurally similar in their lyrics. “There cannot be a family if there is no country/this is a saying passed down through the ages [it is the same words for all generations]/how many historical lessons have terrible it is to lose one’s country [when you set foot on someone else’s land/you would know you need it more]/the descendants of Yan and Huang⁶³⁴ used blood and sweat to take the root of the nation [make me confident in the wind and rain/this is my country]/how many martyrs have given their lives to cultivating the flower of freedom [raised me in suffering/this is also my country]/Guojia! Guojia!

⁶³¹ All Walks of Life in the Capital Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China Gala, Beijing, 1st October 2009.

⁶³² Jackie Chan and Liu Yuanyuan, “Guojia (2009)”.

⁶³³ According to the Economist Intelligence Unit’s *Democracy Index*, from 2006 to 2021, Hong Kong has been classified as a “flawed democracy” (above 6) for 9 times (2006; 2012-2019) and as a “hybrid regime” (below 6) for 5 times (2008; 2010-2011; 2020-2021).

⁶³⁴ In Chinese mythology, Yan Emperor and Yellow [Huang] Emperor were ancestors of the Chinese; “the descendants of Yan and Huang” stands for the Chinese people.

The Greater China I love/the Chinese all around the world are always under the blue sky and bright sun/Guojia! I love China”⁶³⁵.

It would be no surprise if Jackie Chan eventually joined the CPC. After all, Zhang Di was not only a member of Chiang’s KMT but also an awarded “patriotic artist” by the KMT Central Committee. In 1975, when Zhang was performing in Hong Kong, he only refused the audience’s request to sing Dongfanghong praising Mao but also started singing the National Flag Anthem of the ROC. In Zhang’s context, Chinese nationalism, KMT’s authoritarian rule, and anticommunism were all intertwined. As long as the “blue sky and bright sun” flag of the ROC in the lyrics of Zhang’s “Guojia” is replaced by the five stars flag of the PRC, the two songs are interchangeable. So are Chiang’s KMT and the post-1989 CPC, which share a Chinese nationalism of the same ideological kind!

⁶³⁵ Zhang Di, “Guojia (1981)”.

“I had heard that Strauss was popular there [in China], as was, to my surprise, Carl Schmitt, the Weimar anti-liberal (and anti-Semitic) legal theorist.”

Mark Lilla, “Reading Strauss in Beijing,” *New Republic*, 17th December 2010.

VOLKSGEIST UND ZEITGEIST

The intellectual travel from the Germansphere to China has never stopped since the late 19th century. What has changed was the purport of Chinese intellectuals from Marxism to the pre- and anti-Weimar (Konservative Revolution) genealogy of German conservatism: Novalis, Friedrich Schelling, Friedrich Schlegel, Hegel, Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, et al. Mark Lilla’s observation was accurate: “Chinese intellectuals who came of age in the decade and a half after Mao’s death were involved in intense debates over competing paths of modernization and took human rights seriously, and the period culminated in the Tiananmen movements of 1989. But, a few years later... intellectuals turned against the liberal political tradition.”⁶³⁶ Within “the decade and a half”, the “competing paths of modernization” were liberalism and conservatism; what Mao represented in his last two decades, Marxism as it was intellectually introduced to China in the early 20th century and as a path of modernization was ruled out. Fortunately, Germany is a land of ideas, which gave birth not only to Marx but also to many others. The Chinese intelligentsia’s fascination with German ideas did not cease with the conservative turn that abandoned Marx but instead flourished in another direction of explorations.

The “Schmitt Fever”⁶³⁷ amongst Chinese intelligentsia that is often considered a recent development could be traced back to “the 1930s, for example, Yao Baoxian⁶³⁸ disseminated Schmitt’s theory in the name of a more far-reaching system of one-party rule and dictatorship by Chiang Kai-shek”⁶³⁹. After half a century of silence, “few scholars in China knew of Carl Schmitt until the 1990s, when the prominent philosopher Liu Xiaofeng began publishing articles on him”⁶⁴⁰.

Liu was born in 1956; after studying German (Sichuan Int’l Studies University) and philosophy (PKU), he graduated from Universität Basel with a PhD (1993) in theology. The major works of Carl Schmitt were translated by him “from 2003 to 2012”⁶⁴¹. Professor Liu’s academic interests are not limited to Schmitt. His publications cover classics (Western and Chinese), Strauss, Heidegger, republicanism (1911 Revolution, Cambridge school), etc. “With the rise of China firmly outside the liberal context, yet characterized by a strong state, Schmitt’s account takes on a new importance as the explanation for this unexpected transformation, and its consequences.”⁶⁴²

⁶³⁶ Mark Lilla, “Reading Strauss in Beijing,” *New Republic*, 17th December 2010.

⁶³⁷ Xie Libin and Haig Patapan, “Schmitt Fever: The Use and Abuse of Carl Schmitt in Contemporary China,” *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 18, no. 1 (2020): p. 130.

⁶³⁸ “Yao Baoxian” might be a pseudonym of Yao Baoyou (1901-1951). During the Suppression of the Counterrevolutionary Movement, he was sentenced to death.

⁶³⁹ Ryan Mitchell, “Chinese Receptions of Carl Schmitt since 1929,” *Penn St. JL & Int’l Aff.* 8 (2020): p. 263.

⁶⁴⁰ Xie L. and H. Patapan, p. 132.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴² Liu Xiaofeng, “New China and the End of American ‘International Law’,” *American Affairs* 3, no. 3 (Fall 2019).

Jurist Jiang Shigong (b. 1967) is another proponent of Schmitt. “A Chinese government paper in 2014, which Professor Jiang is widely credited with helping write, asserted that Beijing had ‘comprehensive jurisdiction’ over Hong Kong, dismissing the idea that China should stay hands off. The framework that defined Hong Kong’s status was written in the 1980s, when China was still weak and under the sway of foreign liberal ideas, he later said.”⁶⁴³

The Chinese reception of Strauss is based on his counter-Enlightenment ideas. The ones who rule should have platonic virtues that distinguish them from the ordinary. Modernity replaced the distinction between good and bad with the distinction between progressive and reactionary, thus betraying the value judgments in Western classics (*Natural Right and History*). The trajectory of modern Chinese history is an accelerated version of this process: the 1911 Revolution, 1949 Revolution, and Cultural Revolution. Chinese Straussians scoffed at “radical democracy” (Q. Skinner, J. G. A. Pocock, et al.) and the New Left brought on by the Western version of the Cultural Revolution during the 1960s. “If we are to investigate the ideological fault of the Cultural Revolution, we will ultimately blame them on the Western Enlightenment.”⁶⁴⁴ Modernity reversed the premodern notion that the good equals the old, defining the good as the new; it follows the logos that “the newest is the best, so the youth must be better than the elders...thus the essence of modernity is inevitably a ‘never-ending revolution’”⁶⁴⁵ Both Liu Xiaofeng and Gan Yang personally suffered from the absurdity of Mao’s radical egalitarianism that led to the deconstruction of the intelligentsia as a social class.⁶⁴⁶

The Chinese reception of Schmitt’s anti-parliamentarian statism aims to answer two questions: “how a strong state should exercise its power over the economy and how its newfound power should be exercised in international affairs.”⁶⁴⁷ For Schmitt, the *Souverän* must be empowered to declare *Ausnahmezustand* that indefinitely suspends the legislations (*Die Diktatur*). “Schmitt assumed the priority of conflict: Man is a political creature, in the sense that his most defining characteristic is the ability to distinguish friend and adversary.”⁶⁴⁸

Jiang Shigong told his law students: “if the struggle for rights is the duty of [Chinese] lawyers, then the rights are not limited to those of individuals; they also include those of a country, and more importantly, of a civilization and of a nation.”⁶⁴⁹ He declared that “the old order is about to pass away, and the new order is about to be born. We are bound to face a Hobbesian world...this is not a struggle simply amongst people, but also amongst countries and amongst civilizations; this is not just a struggle for economic interests, but also a struggle between justice and law in the most fundamental sense.”⁶⁵⁰ Liu Xiaofeng wrote: “the primary lesson for China is that China must first be a truly sovereign state in order to be an equal participant [of European international law], and state sovereignty can only be obtained by military power.”⁶⁵¹ “If a country does not have complete

⁶⁴³ Chris Buckley, “‘Clean Up This Mess’: The Chinese Thinkers Behind Xi’s Hard Line,” *The New York Times*, 3rd August 2020.

⁶⁴⁴ Liu Xiaofeng, “How to Comprehend the Historical Connotations of the Republican Centenary,” *Open Times*, no. 5 (2013): p. 193.

⁶⁴⁵ Gan Yang, “Introduction,” *Political Philosopher Strauss*.

⁶⁴⁶ The 18-year-old Liu (1974) and Gan (1970) became peasants instead of going to college; Only after Deng’s return in 1978 did they begin their higher education.

⁶⁴⁷ Mark Lilla, “Reading Strauss in Beijing.”

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁹ Jiang Shigong, “Speech at the 2013 Graduation Ceremony of Peking University Law School,” 24th June 2013.

⁶⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵¹ Liu Xiaofeng, “New China and the End of American ‘International Law’.”

sovereignty, it is impossible for the basic human rights of its citizens to be guaranteed”⁶⁵², echoing Jiang Zemin’s words: “if a country cannot guarantee its own sovereignty, there is no human right at all.”⁶⁵³ These defenses in every sense depart from both nominal and actual Marxism. Those intellectuals maintain a delicate distance from the state apparatus, “Marxism is rarely cited; they are proponents of order, not revolution.”⁶⁵⁴

The reemergence of the political pragmatics of “Volksgeist” and “Zeitgeist” since the 1990s had no reference to Marx, either. The CPC’s theoreticians rediscovered them to sublimate the Chinese nationalism after 1989. The term “Volksgeist” appeared in the *Outline for the Implementation of Patriotic Education* (1994)⁶⁵⁵ and Jiang’s 1997 speech at Harvard: “the independent Volksgeist of the Chinese people is indestructible.”⁶⁵⁶ According to Jiang, the “great” Volksgeist is “on which a nation depends for its survival and development...without which a nation cannot stand on its own among the nations of the world...formed in more than five thousand years of the Chinese nation’s development”⁶⁵⁷. The Chinese Volksgeist “with patriotism at its core...must be incorporated into the whole process of national education”⁶⁵⁸. Few years later, the term “Zeitgeist” appeared, which was said to be “with reform and innovation at its core”.⁶⁵⁹ In 2004, the *Implementation Outline for Carrying Forward and Cultivating Volksgeist Education in Primary and Secondary Schools* was issued: “it is a very urgent task to continuously enhance the youth’s recognition and confidence in the excellent national culture, to stimulate the Volksgeist, and to gather national strength.”⁶⁶⁰

“Volksgeist” never appeared in the hysterical discursive landscape (“smashing the dog heads of Brezhnev and Kosygin”) of left-wing nationalism during the Cultural Revolution. In the 1980s, it was occasionally used by scholars but not in the CPC’s official discourse. Those literates of Jiang’s generation remember that the last time it was used as part of the official discourse in China was during Chiang’s regime. In 1933, the resolution on the education of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 4th Central Committee of the KMT proposed to “promote the Volksgeist...and restore the people’s national self-confidence, so as to achieve the goal of independence, freedom and equality of the Chinese nation.”⁶⁶¹ Chiang’s adaptation of “Volksgeist” was inspired by the anticommunist Young China Party and the sociocultural conservative Xue Heng school during the New Cultural Movement.⁶⁶² The term “Volksgeist”, initially borrowed from Japan in the late 19th century, thus became a synonym of right-wing nationalism in China. Nonetheless, Japan was not the birthplace of “Volksgeist”, either. Its German origin was associated with conservatives: Justus Möser, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, et al.

⁶⁵² Liu Xiaofeng, “How to Comprehend the Historical Connotations of the Republican Centenary,” p. 190.

⁶⁵³ *SWJZM*, Vol. III, “National Sovereignty Is the Premise and Guarantee for the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights by the People of a Country (7th September 2000).” See also “some Western countries use human rights...as a guise; in fact, they want to damage our national rights (*SWDXP*, Vol. III, 1st December 1989).”

⁶⁵⁴ Chris Buckley, “‘Clean Up This Mess’: The Chinese Thinkers Behind Xi’s Hard Line.”

⁶⁵⁵ Cf. Foreword, Article 2, 8, 26.

⁶⁵⁶ *SWJZM*, Vol. II, “Enhance Mutual Understanding and Strengthen Friendly Cooperation (1st November 1997).”

⁶⁵⁷ Jiang Zemin, *Report for the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 2002.

⁶⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁹ Hu Jintao, *Report for the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, 2007.


⁶⁶⁰ CPC Central Publicity Department, Ministry of Education of the PRC, *Implementation Outline for Carrying Forward and Cultivating Volksgeist Education in Primary and Secondary Schools* (2004), Article 2.

⁶⁶¹ Cited in Chiang Kai-shek, *The Destiny of China*.

⁶⁶² Zhao Bing, *The Ideological Genealogy of Volksgeist in Modern China (1895-1945)*, PhD Dissertation, East China Normal University, 2018, “Abstract”.

China is no exception to the profound contradictions between economic liberalism and national conservatism. The dilemma is between Dengist commitment to laissez-faire and its countertendency of state interventionism and economic nationalism in the contemporary Chinese context. For instance, what Jiang Shigong claimed, “this is not just a struggle for economic interests, but also a struggle between justice and law in the most fundamental sense”, was in contradiction with the Dengist prioritization of the profit-based economic development. The counter-Enlightenment, romanticist usage of “Volksgeist” is in contradiction with the apathetic market and technology. At least during its export-oriented phase, China must choose between reliable export markets and adversaries in Schmitt’s sense. Thus, the “Volksgeist” and the “Zeitgeist” reconciled, at least temporarily.

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS



“The trajectory of intellectual thought in China during the 1990s begins with the critique of so-called radicalism at the end of the 1980s and advances steadily into conservatism – even ultraconservatism...it also is likely to become China’s mainstream ideology in the twenty-first century.”

Gan Yang, “Debating Liberalism and Democracy in China in the 1990s,” *Whither China: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 79-81.

EARLY 1990S CHINA IN ITS 20TH CENTURY

REPOSITION OF CONSERVATISM IN MODERN CHINA

The authoritarianism professor and ambassador Tsiang Tingfu the 1930s advocated were nothing novel. As he acknowledged, it was a replica of Tudor, Bourbon, Romanov, Meiji, Kemal, and Peter I.⁶⁶³ These nations “accepted modern science, technology, and nationalism, therefore became rejuvenated, prosperous, and powerful.”⁶⁶⁴ Taking Japan that has been frequently compared with China as an example:

T7.1: Conservative Domination in Modern Japan

Period	Ruler	Government ⁶⁶⁵	Ideology	Position	
1853-1867	Edo	Edo	Monarchy	Right	
1868-1885	Meiji	Meiji	Monarchism		
1885-1912		Oligarchs	KST-RS		Constitutional Monarchism
1912-1924	RDK-RS				
1924-1927	Taishō	KSK	Conservatism	Centre-right	
1927-1929		RS			
1929-1931	Shōwa	CDP	Liberalism	Centre-left	
1931-1932		RS	Conservatism	Centre-right	
1933-1945		Military-IRAA	Fascism	Far Right	
1945-1947		GHQ/SCAP	JPP-LP	Liberal Conservatism	Centre-right
1947-1948	Socialist Party		Social Democracy	Centre-left	
1948-1952	Shōwa	DP-DLP-LP	Liberal Conservatism	Centre-right	
1953-1955		LP-JDP			
1955-1989		LDP			
1989-1993	Heisei	JNP-JRP	Neoliberal Conservatism	Centre-right	
1993-1994		Socialist Party	Social Democracy		Centre-left
1994-1996		LDP	Liberal Conservatism		Centre-right
1996-2009		Democratic Party	Liberal		Centre-left
2009-2012	Reiwa	LDP	Liberal Conservatism	Centre-right	
2012-2019 2019-		LDP	Liberal Conservatism	Centre-right	

Tabulation: author.

Even the four historic moments when liberalism prevailed ephemerally in modern Japan have been not inevitable; all of them were under exceptional circumstances: the Great Depression, the 1947

⁶⁶³ Tsiang Tingfu, *Outline of Modern Chinese History*, “General”.


⁶⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵ Cf. APPENDIX: Glossary of Abbreviations.

Constitution, the aftermath of the Japanese asset price bubble, and the Global Financial Crisis. Given the limited long-term impacts of these four interludes, there has been no autonomous liberal “ruling force”, but only liberal “accidents” as an undesirable alternative to conservative domination, although liberal oppositions have been acknowledged in modern Japan.

According to Tsiang, China in the 1930s was still at the stage of a “dynastic state” (similar to the Meiji Japan) – not yet a “nation-state”, during which the central mission of China was to frame the essentials of a modern state, and any kind of “revolution”, democratic/republican or socialist/communist, must be avoided because they would result in turmoil.⁶⁶⁶ This judgement was an explicit revision of Sun Yat-sen’s republicanism, alluding to a sort of monarchism (not monarchy). “Monarchy” refers to the thousand years old static conditions before 1842 in China and before 1853 in Japan, where monarchy was not even a subject of dispute, be for or against. While monarchism was a belief that monarchy is worth preserving in the course of modernization after China and Japan encountered modernity brought by foreign powers (1st Opium War and Perry Expedition). The Japanese monarchism until the fascist coup d’état in 1933 could also be divided into two stages: “primary” monarchism and constitutional monarchism. In the first stage, the objective was to achieve the material results of the first industrial revolution through industrialization;⁶⁶⁷ as a new industrial class emerged, their political demands of representation were being constitutionalized in order to accommodate the competing interests of nobility and bourgeoisie.⁶⁶⁸

In short, Japan demonstrated an extremely outperforming story of conservative modernization under a monarchy. The Qing dynasty also launched a Self-Strengthening Movement (c. 1861-1895), known as the Tongzhi Restoration, an attempt to develop a form of Chinese monarchism at almost the same time. However, not both restorations achieved equally positive results.




Charting: author. Source: *Maddison Project Database* (2020).⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁶ Tsiang Tingfu, “On Revolution and Dictatorship.”

⁶⁶⁷ The Meiji Restoration started from the Charter Oath promulgated on 6th April 1868.

⁶⁶⁸ Cf. Freedom and People’s Rights Movement (1874-) and its result in the Meiji Constitution [Constitution of the Empire of Japan] (1889) and the first cabinet [Itō Hirobumi] (1885-1888).

⁶⁶⁹ Collected in Maddison Project Database, version 2020. Bolt, Jutta and Jan Luiten van Zanden (2020). [China (1661-1933): Xu, Shi, van Leeuwen, Ni, Zhang, and Ma, “Chinese National Income, ca. 1661-1933,” *Australian Economic*



Charting: author. Source: *Maddison Project Database* (2020).

The failure of the Tongzhi Restoration vis-à-vis the Meiji Restoration was reflected in Japan's triumph over the First Sino-Japanese War and China's loss over Taiwan thereafter (1895). The success of the Meiji Restoration was later enshrined twice, first in Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1905) and second in Japan's annexation of Korea (1910), which used to be a tributary state of China.

Such a vivid contrast gave elites in China and Japan tremendously different perceptions: Japan believed it had already found monarchism the correct path for its modernization; this belief was later verified to a large extent. While the Chinese monarchists, including Sun Yat-sen, lost their confidence and patience with the House of Aisin-Gioro, which paved the revolutionary way for the first Republic in Asia. "For thousands of years, China was a first-class world power. Why has China declined to such a degree? Because we, the Chinese people, have been asleep. We the Chinese people must find a way to save ourselves."⁶⁷⁰ Sun "never believed in monarchy... He firmly believed that the Chinese people could surpass Japan and even Western capitalist countries in a relatively short period of time. Royalists like Liang Qichao insisting that the Chinese people can only imitate and follow the West... only showed their own short-sightedness, lack of courage, confidence, and sympathy for the people who are always demanding progress."⁶⁷¹

However, republicanism was by no means a guarantee but merely another risky experiment to modernize China. In fact, it did not succeed either, considering the 1930s rhetoric of restoring a "dynastic state" by Tsiang Tingfu, who was "disappointed" by the chaos following the 1911 republican revolution. Moreover, the failures of a republican experiment and a restoration of a "dynastic state" paved the even revolutionary road to the communist takeover and the first "people's republic" in Asia, which later was proved not to be a solution either and effectively died in the 1976 coup d'état.


This was a vicious circle in modern China: from 1911 Revolution, 1949 Revolution, to eventually Cultural Revolution, the Chinese revolution irresistibly got more and more radical each time. This

History Review, vol. 57, no. 3 (2016): 368-393; Broadberry, Guan and Li, "China, Europe and the Great Divergence: A Study in Historical National Accounting, 980-1850", *Journal of Economic History*, vol. 78, no. 4 (2018): 955-1000. Japan (724-1874): Bassino et al, "Japan and the Great Divergence, 730-1874," CEI Working Paper Series 2018-13, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. Japan (1874-1940): Fukao et al, *Regional Inequality and Industrial Structure in Japan: 1874-2008* (Tokyo: Maruzen Publishing, 2015).]


⁶⁷⁰ Sun Yat-sen, "Encouraging Our Compatriots," *China Daily* (Shanghai), 30th May 1924.

⁶⁷¹ Soong Ching-ling, "Sun Yat-sen: A Steadfast and Persevering Revolutionary," *People's Daily*, 13th November 1966.


ever-left trend was, in an understandable sense, driven by Chinese revolutionaries’ deathful antipathy toward the formidable premodern conditions – famine (sometimes cannibalism), superstition, oppression, etc., but ironically enough, all of them failed.



Charting: author. Source: Maddison.⁶⁷²



Charting: author. Source: Maddison.



Charting: author. Source: UN DESA; World Bank.

⁶⁷² China’s population accounts for the proportion of the world’s population (0-1998 A.D.) [1-1950]: see Table B-12; China’s GDP accounts for the proportion of the world’s GDP (0-1998 A.D.) [1-1950]: see Table B-20, in Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: OECD Development Centre, 2001).

HISTORICAL REVISIONISM

The conservative turn in the early 1990s China was so significant (though unobtrusive) that intellectuals sensed it almost immediately in the aftermath of 4th June 1989. Out of professional instinct, they interpreted this move within the historical framework of modern China, which from a revisionist perspective, was full of left-wing “mistakes” made by revolutionary elites and subsequent disasters, from which ordinary Chinese people severely suffered and the Chinese nation declined. Wang wrote: “in the past few decades, there have been too many social movements, [such as Cultural Revolution]...[which] have brought huge...quite a lot of negative effects, and even today China is still suffering from the consequences of these turbulences...”⁶⁷³

The first one was the 1911 Revolution. Republicans were proud that it made China the first “Republic” in Asia, but cannot China achieve prosperity and liberty within a (semi-) constitutional monarchy, and how can the ROC ensure its stability and irreversibility? Gu Hongming, a Chinese royalist, Confucian, and professor of English literature at PKU, wrote as follows originally in English: “look at China before this Revolution. There was more liberty among the Chinese people...because [they] knew how to behave themselves as good citizens. But now after this Revolution – there is less liberty in China...because the modern queueless, up-to-date Chinamen, the returned students⁶⁷⁴ have learnt from the people of Europe and America...to behave themselves not as good citizens, but as a mob...”⁶⁷⁵

“They” learned from not indiscriminately the “people” but to be precise, the liberals and leftists “of Europe and America”. Gu himself, who studied in Europe for 14 years, being fluent also in German, French, and Latin, was not affected by this Euromerican “immoralism”, or in Dostoevsky’s word, *Demons* [Бѣсы], at all. In fact, he compared Saint John Henry Newman’s Oxford Movement and Zhang Zhidong’s Self-Strengthening Movement [Tongzhi Restoration], noting their shared goal to resist the modern, materialistic civilization.⁶⁷⁶ Amongst liberal and leftist intellectuals at PKU, Gu was a dinosaur who still kept his Manchu queue, a very symbol of royalism. The queue on his head was visible, while the queues in Chinese minds were invisible; the abolition of the monarchy was not equivalent to the end of autocracy.

When the republican polity failed by the subsequent civil wars from 1912 to 1927 and by the subsequent Chiang’s right-wing dictatorship that brought up an authoritarian peace, the second “mistake” came into being: with the support of liberal intellectuals, the CPC-led “people’s democratic” revolution in 1949 succeeded, making China the first “People’s Republic” in Asia. Those intellectuals who kindly supported the CPC believed that the failure of the 1911 Revolution was because it, being republican, was not revolutionary *enough*. As the 1911 Revolution failed to make China either as developed or democratic as the U.S., the solution for China must be more progressive than merely American-style liberal democracy plus a free market. After all, “freedom is merely privilege extended unless enjoyed by one and all.”⁶⁷⁷

⁶⁷³ Wang Huning, *Political Life*, “25th June”.

⁶⁷⁴ “The ‘returned student’ is a definite category here, and if and when China gets on its feet, the American university will have a fair share of the glory to its credit.” John Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1920), p. 150.

⁶⁷⁵ Gu Hongming, *The Spirit of the Chinese People* (Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 1998) p. 19.

⁶⁷⁶ Cf. Gu Hongming, *The Story of a Chinese Oxford Movement* (Shanghai, 1910).

⁶⁷⁷ *The Internationale*, Billy Bragg version.

They did not consider it otherwise: possibly the failure of the 1911 Revolution was because it was *too* revolutionary. If Edmund Burke were alive at that point, he would have had the chance to extend his classic comparison of American and French societies⁶⁷⁸ to the case of China, a country with thousands of years of monarchical tradition, far more majestic than the Maison de Bourbon. Gan Yang summarized the discourses of Chinese intellectuals reaccepting Burke in the 1990s: “the English model represents gradual reform and is a worthy exemplar of modern development. The French model represents stands for radicalism, and consequently revolution, and is therefore completely inadequate as a model.”⁶⁷⁹

Regrettably, Chinese academia had given little place for royalists like Burke since the New Culture Movement from the 1910s to 1920s, during which liberalism, anarchism, Marxism, and other radical ideologies crashed China. It is hard to find any conservative among the most intelligent Chinese minds of the 20th century: Lu Xun, Ba Jin, Hu Shih, Cai Yuanpei, Guo Moruo et al. Chinese intellectuals were convinced that their homeland needed to be completely reborn in order to be modernized through whatever they can imagine: latinizing the Chinese language (viz., abolishing Chinese characters), eliminating Confucian doctrines and heritages, so on and so forth.

John Dewey observed during his stay in China from 1919 to 1921: “there seems to be no country in the world like China where students are so consistent and eager to pursue modern, new ideas, especially the social and economic ones. And it is rare to see a country like China where debates that could be used to maintain the established order and the status quo are not being taken seriously at all.”⁶⁸⁰

Mao, then a librarian at PKU, was such a student ecstatically absorbing those anarchist and Marxist literature newly introduced to China. His urgency could be expressed through a famous verse he wrote in 1963:⁶⁸¹

Things on the earth have always been
urgent.
Sun and moon roll-on, time hastens.
Ten thousand years is too far,
Seize the dawn and dusk.

多少事，從來急；
天地轉，光陰迫。
一萬年太久，
只爭朝夕。

Precisely because of such urgency, the novel foreign thought named Marxism cannot be rigorously examined before its implementation; the growing bourgeoisie cannot become mature before its abolition; the gradual progress departing from the monarchical, patriarchal, and hierarchical tradition cannot be endured before its immediate elimination in China. In 1991, Wang reflected this mentality: “the decline of Chinese traditional culture in modern times was not caused by rational and rigorous argumentation of its limitations but by Western culture and materialistic civilization that broke the door into China. Not having time to carefully screen and analyze this huge system,

⁶⁷⁸ Cf. Edmund Burke, “Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings in Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event: In a Letter Intended to Have Been Sent to a Gentleman in Paris (London, 1790),” Frank M. Turner, ed., *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

⁶⁷⁹ Gan Yang, “Debating Liberalism and Democracy China in the 1990s,” *Whither China: Intellectual Politics in Contemporary China* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001), p. 79.

⁶⁸⁰ Cited in Tse-tung Chow, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 219.

⁶⁸¹ Mao Zedong, “Man Jiang Hong: Reply to Comrade Guo Moruo (9th January 1963),” *Poems of Chairman Mao* (Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House, 1963). This poem was written in the fight against Soviet revisionism.

people were completely overwhelmed and crashed due to their subjective expectation that time and tide wait for no man.”⁶⁸²

This mentality that “dominated China since May Fourth Movement with its iconic expression ‘down with Confucianism’⁶⁸³”⁶⁸⁴ was the early 1920s intellectual origin of the third “mistake”, i.e., the Cultural Revolution, which interpreted the radical logic of the New Culture Movement to its extreme and made China the epicenter of the world revolution. If it was not temporarily abolished de facto, Chinese academia was purged to the point that almost every author, from Confucius to Aristotle, from Locke to Hegel, was denounced as “counter-revolutionary”, except Marx, Lenin, and Mao. Those intellectuals who, out of their negative perception of the inhumane Chiang regime and Rousseauian sympathy to their poor compatriots living in absolute poverty, decided not to leave the Chinese mainland to Taiwan, eventually paid the price of idealism: most lost faculty and went to rural labor camps, and a few suicided.

For Maoists, the fact that they were privileged enough to be well-educated was the best evidence of their bourgeois original sin; therefore, they should be “reeducated by the ‘poor and lower-middle peasants (PLMPs)’”⁶⁸⁵ who were for several millennia the most underprivileged class – use the present-day term of identity politics, “victims” within China’s monarchic, hierarchic, and patriarchic societal structure. Mao firmly believed that Cultural Revolution was a way to radically counter rising conservative revisionism within the CPC. He never thought about it otherwise: perhaps, the revisionism originated from the underdeveloped societal condition that did not and cannot meet his surrealistic political demand. Along with the course of modernization, the CPC cadres would inevitably become privileged. Regrettably, sociology as a “bourgeois” discipline was abolished in 1952; since then, Max Weber’s wise insight that modern bureaucracy inevitably leads to inequality was no longer available.

Thus, China, from 1911 to 1976, was an unstoppable, ever-leftist trio: the 1911 Revolution was a *liberal* resolution against monarchy, the 1949 Revolution was a *left-wing* resolution against the 1911 Revolution, and Cultural Revolution was a *far-left* resolution to the 17 years after the 1949 Revolution. Accordingly, the 1989 protest was merely another attempt at revolution⁶⁸⁶, but this time it failed. “Why, we wonder, did we choose revolution rather than reform? Why did we proceed radically rather than gradually?”⁶⁸⁷

THE OTHER SIDE OF UTOPIA

The Down to the Countryside Movement (DCM) was in light of a measure written in the *Communist Manifesto*: “gradual abolition of all the distinction between town and country by a more equitable distribution of the populace over the country”⁶⁸⁸. The 15-year-old Xi Jinping was amongst

⁶⁸² Wang Huning, “Creative Regeneration: The Future Status of Chinese Traditional Culture,” *Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)*, no. 3 (1991): p. 68.

⁶⁸³ This slogan was coined during May Fourth Movement, but before Cultural Revolution, it remained an intellectual, not a political, attack against Confucianism (cf. Maoist students were destroying the Four Olds [Old Ideas, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Customs] from June 1966 to December 1968).

⁶⁸⁴ Wang Huning, “Creative Regeneration: The Future Status of Chinese Traditional Culture,” p. 67.

⁶⁸⁵ The “Five Red Categories” include (1) revolutionary soldiers, (2) revolutionary cadres, (3) workers, (4) poor peasants, and (5) lower-middle peasants; the “Five Black Categories” include (1) landlords, (2) rich farmers, (3) counter-revolutionaries, (4) bad influencers, and (5) rightists.

⁶⁸⁶ Cf. Shen Tong and Marianne Yen, *Almost a Revolution* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990).

⁶⁸⁷ Gan Yang, “Debating Liberalism and Democracy China in the 1990s,” p. 80.

⁶⁸⁸ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, Chapter II. Proletarians and Communists.

the “educated youth” who went to China’s countryside, living and laboring as the locals. As the second son of then vice premier Xi Zhongxun, Xi Jinping was born, raised, and educated in Beijing. Xi’s privileged life vis-à-vis the PLMPs was true, from Mao’s egalitarian perspective, a breeding ground of revisionism.

To ensure that the proletarian CPC does not degenerate into a privileged, “anti-people” group like the CPSU or the KMT, Mao called for the educated youth to voluntarily or be trapped to experience the majoritarian lifestyle of Chinese people, namely, that of the PLMPs in the countryside. The living conditions in the remote village Liangjiahe frightened Xi, and so did the villagers, shocked by these educated youth. “I found the [half] bread left for too long and not fresh when cleaning my school bag...later I fed it to a dog at the door. The villagers asked what it was. I said it was bread. They had never eaten it before, nor had they ever seen it. Then the whole county knew about me ‘feeding dog with bread’...it seemed that we the educated youth were really prodigal.”⁶⁸⁹

Xi, as an educated youth, was supposed to labor alongside the peasants, but when he climbed to the top of the mountain where the field land was located, he was already “out of breath” and could not labor anymore, “the intensity of labor shocked me.”⁶⁹⁰ The peasants were curious about “what Beijing is like, they for the first time learned about the concept of ‘foreign’...wondered what people eat in Beijing...”⁶⁹¹ But for Xi, the experience was not interesting at all, physically and mentally. “The unwritten rule was that if you want to smoke, you can sit by and smoke a bag of cigarettes...this was exactly how we learned to smoke...by smoking, I could take a break.”⁶⁹² “The thing I can’t stand the most was fleas...my skin was very allergic. One bite could make a piece of red envelopes, which turn into blisters, and the blisters rot...it was so painful that I even wanted to end my life.”⁶⁹³ After three months of suffering, he surreptitiously fled back to Beijing – the son of vice premier ultimately cannot bear living as a peasant. However, Beijing in 1969, the epicenter of the epicenter of world revolution, had no room for a prince. Xi was immediately found and detained for six months, then he came back to Liangjiahe, and lived there for seven years, from 15 to 22.

The seven years of rural life transformed Xi’s identity; when he left Liangjiahe he felt he was a born peasant – out of human adaptability instinct. If Cultural Revolution were to be launched, as Mao allegedly suggested, regularly, then the CPC might really be a “people’s party” forever, under the leadership of which China would keep itself in an egalitarian but underdeveloped condition. Deng cancelled this prospect. Maoism reduced inequalities within China but deepened the gap between China and the world, thus, in effect, increasing inequalities within the world, which was the opposite of Mao’s expectation that the world revolution against the Soviet and American empires would come soon.

Mao predicted in 1966: “if a right-wing, anti-communist coup occurs in China, I reckon they would not be easy, and their regime would likely be short-lived, as the revolutionaries who represent the interests of more than 90% of the people will not tolerate it.”⁶⁹⁴ According to the Dengist axiom “practice is the sole criterion of testing truth”, to test if Mao’s prediction is correct, “practice” of a

⁶⁸⁹ Xi Jinping, “I am a Yan’anian (Interview),” Yan’an TV Station, 14th August 2004.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

⁶⁹² Ibid.

⁶⁹³ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁴ Cited in Zhou Enlai, *Report at the 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (1973).

coup of such kind is necessary! It turned out that Mao's concern that a right-wing, anti-communist coup may occur in China was not something out of nothing or driven by paranoia but prescient.

However, it also turned out that his overconfidence that a conservative regime cannot last has been proven to be blinded by his fundamental misperception of human society, where in reality, 10% (if not 1%, cf. Occupy Wall Street) determine history. Chinese intellectuals were literally traumatized. Who amongst them can imagine radical advocacy for latinizing the Chinese language in the 1920s could frantically end up with a Cultural Revolution as such? If Gu Hongming, who died in 1928, had the chance to witness Cultural Revolution, he would realize the republican "mobs" were nothing compared to the Maoist Red Guards.

Imagine no possessions
I wonder if you can
No need for greed or hunger
...
You may say I'm a dreamer
But I'm not the only one

The song "was virtually a Communist Manifesto,"⁶⁹⁵ said John Lennon, who was obviously "not the only one". Mao was not only a "dreamer" but also an actioner. Even Xi used to be a dreamer before knowing what "hunger" is: "When a villager comes, we [educated youth] ask the most important question: what is your background? If it was a PLMP, we smoke together; if it was a 'rich farmer', we say get out, and the same to those begging for food... If we treat them well, are not we treating the 'people' badly? [...] Then we got informed that a 'rich farmer' was one raising dozens of sheep...every family needs to beg for food, 'rich in January, poor in February, half-dead in March and April'⁶⁹⁶, when the grains were left for those who labor, and the women took the children out to beg for food."⁶⁹⁷

Even if all agree that equality is even more desirable than subsistence, these honorable efforts to maintain equality turned out to be reversible, therefore, futile. After graduating from Tsinghua in 1979,⁶⁹⁸ Xi became a secretary of Geng Biao, the minister of defense, also a close friend of Xi's father, who returned back to power with Deng's support. What a fairytale happy ending: leftist villains in the palace were cleared, and the prince was finally back in Beijing, this time

⁶⁹⁵ Cited in D. Fricke, "Imagine: Thirty Years after Its Release, John Lennon's Classic Became the Anthem of 2001," *Rolling Stone* 885/886, (2001-2002): p. 38.

⁶⁹⁶ January in the traditional Chinese calendar corresponds to February or March in *Calendarium Gregorianum*, so on and so forth.

⁶⁹⁷ Xi Jinping, "I am a Yan'anian (Interview)."


⁶⁹⁸ The National College Entrance Examination (NCEE) was abolished at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and replaced by an egalitarian selection process based on not academic performance, but the socioeconomic condition of the student (cf. "reverse discrimination" on rightist account or "affirmative action" on leftist account in Asian enrollment at Ivy League schools). Xi's privileged background made him impossible to get a tertiary education, "it was impossible for someone with a family background like me to be admitted at the time" (Xi, "I Am the Son of Loess"). However, "July, August, and September 1975 were the time of the so-called 'Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend'," (Ibid.) during which, Maoists Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi were temporarily replaced by "right-deviationist" Liu Bing at Tsinghua, who approved Xi's application to study as a "worker-peasant-soldier student", though he was neither. Soon after, Mao launched "Criticize Deng [Xiaoping], Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend", the last major movement in Cultural Revolution, Liu Bing's power was again deprived. In the 1976 Coup, Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi were detained. The NCEE was restored in 1977. Liu Bing was rehabilitated in 1978.

gloriously.⁶⁹⁹ Xi’s daughter (b. 1992) – his sole offspring due to the one-child policy – spent her youth at Harvard.⁷⁰⁰

China in 1978 faced tremendous uncertainties. Nobody can tell where this quarter of humankind was headed. Liberal and conservative literature, foreign and Chinese, became accessible again, “bourgeois” disciplines such as sociology and political science were restored in universities, and Wang Huning became a student of international politics at Fudan. The reality was harsh to the whole Chinese generation of leftism: it turned out that a hierarchical, unequal system could perform better, and that in a system that has respect for intellectuals and tolerance to inequality, everybody could be eventually benefited from the public good produced by those who are privileged enough to be educated.⁷⁰¹

Taiwan, under the “fascist” (on Maoist account), at least authoritarian (on liberal account) Chiang’s regime was thriving as an economy (not yet as a democracy). As if the CPC were ruthlessly suppressed before or after WWII – like in Spain and Greece – China would have been better, meaning not only higher living standard but also gradual democratization based on an accumulated middle [bourgeois] class from scratch. “The prevailing view nowadays is that the Maoist revolution was unnecessary. If the KMT continued to stay in power, the ‘modernization process’ would have produced the same socioeconomic results, and China would therefore have avoided the bloodshed and destruction caused by the revolution.”⁷⁰²

C7.6-7: Chinese Mainland vs. Taiwan (1960-2020), Nominal GDP pc




⁶⁹⁹ Cf. the *de facto* national anthem of Royaume de France (Bourbon Restoration) – “Le Retour des Princes français à Paris [The Return of the French Princes to Paris]”.

⁷⁰⁰ The same is true for other offspring of the Dengist CPC’s high-ranking officials; to name a few: Deng’s grandson Deng Zhuodi (b. 1986, LL.M. at Duke), Jiang’s grandson Jiang Zhicheng (b. 1986, Harvard and Colombia), former vice premier Bo Yibo’s grandson Bo Guagua (b. 1987, PPE at Oxford, MPA at Harvard, LL.D. at Colombia), former premier Wen Jiabao’s son Wen Yunsong (MBA at Kellogg, Northwestern), et al.

⁷⁰¹ This also applies to the internationally privileged; as Mao’s left-wing nationalism was removed, economic cooperation with both the capitalist and Soviet worlds (“exploitation” on the Maoist account) became possible.

⁷⁰² Maurice Jerome Meisner, *Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2005), “Preface to the Chinese Edition”.




Charting: author. Source: World Bank.

As Barrington Moore Jr. rightfully commented: “the lamentable part of reality is that no matter under capitalist or socialist condition, poor countries have paid the heaviest price for modernization. The only valid justification for this price is that without it, things would get even worse.”⁷⁰³

This supposition was for sure a painful contradiction to the liberals’ moral consciousness. However, when it comes to the whole picture of modern China since the mid-19th century, taking Japan as a reference, the reality only becomes even harsher: Japan gracefully avoided (a) republican revolution by the royalists-led Meiji Restoration, (b) communist revolution by the 1947 Constitution,⁷⁰⁴ and (c) cultural revolution by the LDP-led economic miracle, in a word, by persistently insisting conservatism, modern Japan since 1853 avoided every radicalism that since 1840 crashed over China. As an accumulated result, based on the same level of economic foundations in the mid-19th century, Japan’s nominal GDP per capita reached 8,821 USD, nearly 57 times that of China – 156 USD by 1978.⁷⁰⁵

C7.8: China/Japan GDP (PPP) pc, 1900-1978⁷⁰⁶



⁷⁰³ Cited in Maurice Jerome Meisner, Preface to the Chinese edition of *Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2005).

⁷⁰⁴ The early post-WWII era was also when the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and other leftists were the most active.

⁷⁰⁵ Source: World Bank.

⁷⁰⁶ For detailed data, see Appendix (d.), D1.

Charting: author. Source: *Maddison Project Database* (2020).

No need to depict how staggering this *economic* comparison was to anybody who self-identified as Chinese. What made things even worse was that the first “Republic” in Asia, the first “People’s Republic” in Asia, and the “epicenter of world revolution”, in a word, the seemingly most enlightened, emancipatory, pioneering, and romanticistic nation on earth failed to reserve any of these *political* honors after 1989. And this reality inevitably led to the conclusion Deng said to George H. W. Bush: “China is in the midst of a process that requires particular attention to develop its economy”; otherwise, “neither democracy nor economic development will be achieved”⁷⁰⁷.

Before arriving in China, John Dewey was in Japan. He saw Japan in 1919 as a country with a “heart of the old”⁷⁰⁸ under its modern appearance, while China, being relatively backward, had a vitality to strive for progress. History has spoken for itself. Paradoxically, the nation of trendy ideas and revolutionary movements, being open to antitraditional thoughts from abroad and daredevil to practice them, turned to be less modernized than the one that stuck to its traditions and refused revolutions. The same analogy also applies to the FATs.

Wang commented: “the post-WWII history of East Asia conquered the notion that Chinese traditional culture cannot promote materialistic prosperity...their rapid economic growth being occurred in the Confucian circle forced people to seriously reflect its negative perception since the 19th century.”⁷⁰⁹ Without exaggerations, this representative opinion amounted to an actual consensus in the early 1990s China and has been thoroughly verified in its practices afterwards.

AFTER 1989

The corpses lying in the Tiananmen Square under Mao’s iconic portrait mercilessly announced to the world that even the “bourgeois democracy” legacy of the “not revolutionary enough” 1911 Revolution turned out to be an illusion after 78 years, not to mention the radical ideas behind the left-wing 1949 Revolution and the far-left Cultural Revolution. It turned out that the Chinese, just like another three quarters of the human species, do not obtain an imagined revolutionary exceptionalism. *Tel Quel* attempted to figure out what made China so revolutionary by translating and interpreting ancient Chinese poems, but before they came out with anything conclusive, China had shifted to Dengism.⁷¹⁰ It turned out that the Chinese were not “Vandalists” and “slackers”, they would work diligently regardless being exploited by domestic and foreign capitalists, as long as a stable environment and a prospect of “tomorrow will be better” are given. The demonization and sanctification of the Chinese people are to a certain – to be precise, ca. 20-25% – extent, abuse and arrogance of humankind.

John King Fairbank was amongst the mainstream American liberal intellectuals who (no matter how temperately due to their “bourgeois nature”) sympathized with the CPC for its fight against the Chiang’s KMT. Amidst Cultural Revolution, he wrote: “the Maoist revolution is on the whole the best thing that has happened to the Chinese people in many centuries.”⁷¹¹ After Tiananmen, at the invitation of Harvard University Press, the 80-year-old Fairbank, conceivably with enormous

⁷⁰⁷ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “The Overriding Thing Is Stability (26th February 1989).”

⁷⁰⁸ John Dewey, p. 10.

⁷⁰⁹ Wang Huning, “Creative Regeneration: The Future Status of Chinese Traditional Culture,” p. 68.

⁷¹⁰ François Hourmant, “*Tel Quel* et Ses Volte-Face Politiques (1968-1978),” *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire*, no. 51 (1996): p. 120.

⁷¹¹ John King Fairbank, “The New China and the American Connection,” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 51, No. 1 (Oct. 1972), p. 36.

regret and pain, In *China: A New History*, which was published two days before his death,⁷¹² he defended the Chiang's dictatorship for the first and last time in his life: "Nanjing government might gradually have led the way in China's modernization...however, resisting Japan gave Mao and the CCP [sic] their chance to establish a new autocratic power in the countryside..."⁷¹³

It seemed like he was criticizing the CPC, but in fact, he was self-criticizing. These words may have reminded him of his rejected visa application to Japan, McCarthy's accusation, so on and so forth due to his pro-CPC standing.⁷¹⁴ Yu Ying-shih wrote in the Preface to the book: "American Sinologists tend to have a romantic and idealist interpretation of the CPC's rise", which Fairbank once described as "an inevitable revolution, as it embodied the liberation of peasants and ideals such as democracy and science since the May Fourth Movement"⁷¹⁵.

"However, in this book, Fairbank acknowledged...the CPC's rise was not irrepressible (p. 311)...he used to downplay the disasters the CPC has caused."⁷¹⁶ For instance, regarding the Great Leap Forward, Fairbank wrote: "malnutrition was widespread, and some people starved to death." (*The United States and China*, 1983, p. 414) While in *China: A New History*, he wrote: "between 1958 and 1960, 20 to 30 million people died of malnutrition and starvation due to the policies imposed by the CPC." (p. 386) It seemed like he was criticizing the CPC because of the Tiananmen crackdown, but to be precise, he was criticizing the Maoist CPC as well as defending the Nanjing government and by which also defending the post-1989 CPC that followed the Chiang's KMT, as 1989 ruled out both liberalism and communism as two alternatives vis-à-vis conservatism in China's modernization and overthrown what Fairbank in 1986 still referred to as "the great Chinese revolution (1800-1985)"⁷¹⁷.

⁷¹² "On the morning of 12th September 1991, he sent the original manuscript of the book to Harvard University Press. In the afternoon, he suffered a heart attack and died two days later." (Yu Ying-shih, "Preface to *China: A New History*.")

⁷¹³ John King Fairbank, *China: A New History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 311.

⁷¹⁴ To be precise, Fairbank was a liberal intellectual in favor of pro-CPC Chinese liberal intellectuals.

⁷¹⁵ Yu Ying-shih, "Preface to *China: A New History*."

⁷¹⁶ Ibid.

⁷¹⁷ Cf. John King Fairbank, *The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).


EARLY 1990S CHINA IN THE WORLD

The post-1848 Europe could be characterized as (a) oppressed revolutions and restored authoritarianisms, (b) unprecedented industrial developments at home, and (c) a peaceful international environment for more than half a century. All three features meet the condition across the post-1989 world beyond China; previously analyzed FATs and Japan experienced the same in the early post-WWII decades and even before.

JAPAN AND FATs

For the very first time since the mid-19th century, what modernization theory refers to as “convergence” has appeared in the developmental trajectories of China and Japan since 1978.

C7.9: Ratio of China’s GDP to Japan’s Nominal GDP pc, 1978-2020⁷¹⁸




Charting: author. Source: World Bank.

T7.2: Statistics of C7.10

Horizontal Axis	Japan	GDP pc	China	/
A	1960	\$475	1994	\$473
B (+5)	1965	\$929	1999	\$959
C (+5)	1970	\$2,056	2004	\$1,509
D (+5)	1975	\$4,674	2009	\$3,832
E (+5)	1980	\$9,463	2014	\$7,636
F (+5)	1985	\$11,577	2019	\$10,144

Tabulation: author. Source: World Bank.

C7.10: Mainland China vs. Japan, Nominal GDP pc during Economic Takeoff



Tabulation: author. Source: World Bank.

⁷¹⁸ For detailed data, see Appendix (d.), D2.


When it comes to the FATs, especially the two with considerable populations, viz., South Korea and Taiwan, which used to be Japan’s colonies, China’s trend to converge their developmental paths is also clear.

T7.3: Statistics of C7.11

Horizontal Axis	Taiwan	GDP pc	S. Korea	/	China	/
A	1951	\$154	1960	\$158	1978	\$156
B (+10)	1961	\$161	1970	\$279	1988	\$284
C (+10)	1971	\$451	1980	\$1,715	1998	\$829
D (+10)	1981	\$2,720	1990	\$6,610	2008	\$3,468
E (+10)	1991	\$9,125	2000	\$12,257	2018	\$9,977
F (+1)	1992	\$10,768	2001	\$11,561	2019	\$10,217

Tabulation: author. Sources: World Bank, DGBAS (Taiwan).

C7.11: Mainland China vs. Taiwan vs. S. Korea, Nominal GDP pc during Economic Takeoff




Charting: author. Sources: World Bank, DGBAS (Taiwan).

T7.4: Statistics of C7.12

Horizontal Axis	Hong Kong	GDP pc	Singapore	/	Mainland China	/
A	1960	\$429	1960	\$428	1990	\$318
B (+10)	1970	\$960	1970	\$926	2000	\$959
C (+10)	1980	\$5,700	1980	\$4,928	2010	\$4,550
D (+10)	1990	\$13,486	1990	\$11,862	2020	\$10,435

Tabulation: author. Source: World Bank.

C7.12: Mainland China vs. Hong Kong vs. Singapore, Nominal GDP pc during Economic Takeoff




Charting: author. Sources: World Bank.

TIGER CUB

Similar to the FATs, the Tiger Cub Economies (TCEs) refer to Indonesia [IDN] (former Dutch colony, Islamic), Malaysia [MYS] (former British colony, largely Islamic), Thailand [THA] (remained semi-independent between British Burma and French Indochina, Buddhist), and the Philippines [PHL] (former American colony, Catholic). “TCEs” was coined to describe the impressive economic performances since their independence after WWII.

C7.13-14: TCEs (1967-2020), Nominal GDP pc⁷¹⁹



Charting: author. Source: World Bank.

On the one hand, their economic stories were not as remarkable as those of the FATs; on the other hand, they were different from Indochina, where communism prevailed. The TCEs, alongside Singapore, were founding members of the anti-communist ASEAN and militarily aligned with the US. Like the FATs: they also used to be authoritarian capitalistic at home and transformed into (flawed) democracies after the Cold War, and they, viz., right-wing military-ruled monarchic Thailand, right-wing UMNO’s one-party rule in Malaysia, and Marcos’ and Suharto’s right-wing dictatorships, or “certain countries and regions in Southeast Asia”⁷²⁰ in Deng’s words, were also, though to less extent compared with the FATs, referred to as models in post-Maoist China.⁷²¹

⁷¹⁹ Horizontal (category) axis: year; vertical (value) axis: nominal GDP per capita in US dollars.

⁷²⁰ *SWDXP*, vol. III, “Speeches in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shanghai and Other Cities (1992).”

⁷²¹ Cf. Wang Huning, “Government Behavior Model and Economic Development in the Asia-Pacific Region,” *Academic Monthly*, no. 5 (1994): 34-40; 87.

T7.5: List of Prime Ministers of Malaysia

Period	Prime Minister	Coalition	Party	Position
1957-1970	T. A. Rahman	Alliance	UMNO	Right
1970-1976	A. R. Hussein	Alliance-Barisan Nasional		
1976-1981	H. Onn	Barisan Nasional		
1981-2003	Mahathir Mohamad			
2003-2009	A. A. Badawi			
2009-2018	M. N. A. Razak			
2018-2020	Mahathir Mohamad	Pakatan Harapan	PPBM	Centre
2020-2021	M. Yassin	Perikatan Nasional	UMNO	Centre Right Right
2021-	I. S. Yaakob	Barisan Nasional		

Tabulation: author.

The Kingdom of Thailand established a semi-constitutional monarchy in 1932. However, the un-democratic, right-wing military dominated the constitutional part of Thai polity through coups, particularly from 1933-1945, 1946-1973, 1976-1991, and since 2014. In contrast, the elected, civilian politicians and partisan politics only intermittently appeared. Even during the total six years when liberal prime ministers were in office, the parliamentary power was restrained by the monarchy.

T7.6: Power Transitions in Modern Thailand

Period	Prime Minister	Affiliation	Position
1932.6-1933.6	Monarchy		Right
1933.6-1945.8	Military		
1945.8-1946.1	T. B., S. B.	Free Thai Movement	/
1946.1-1946.3	Military		Right
1946.3-1946.8	P. B.	Free Thai Movement	/
1946.8-1973.10	Military		Right
1973.10-1975.2	S. T.	Independent	/
1975.2-1975.3	S. P.	Democratic Party	Centre Right
1975.3-1976.4	K. P.	Social Action Party	Centre Left
1976.4-1976.10	S. P.	Democratic Party	Centre Right
1976.10-1991.3	Military		Right
1991.3-1992.4	A. P.	Independent	/
1992.4-1992.5	Military		Right
1992.5-1992.9	M. R., A. P.	Independent	/
1992.9-1995.7	C. L.	Democratic Party	Centre Right
1995.7-1996.12	B. S.	Thai Nation Party	Right
1996.12-1997.11	C. Y.	New Aspiration Party	Centre
1997.11-2001.2	C. L.	Democratic Party	Centre Right
2001.2-2006.9	T. S.	Thai Rak Thai Party	
2006.9-2008.1	Military		
2008.1-2008.12	S. S., S. W.	People's Power Party	Centre
2008.12-2011.8	A. V.	Democratic Party	Centre Right
2011.8-2014.5	Y. S., N. B.	Pheu Thai Party	Centre
2014.5-	Military		Right

Tabulation: author.

T7.7: List of Presidents of the Philippines (1935-)

Period	President	Party	Position
1935.11-1944.8	M. L. Q.	Nacionalista	Centre Right
1944.8-1946.3	S. O.		
1946.3-1948.4	M. R.	Nacionalista/Liberal	/

1948.4-1953.12	E. Q.	Liberal/Democratic	/
1953.12-1957.3	P. B.	Nacionalista	Centre Right
1957.3-1961.12	C. P. G.		
1961.12-1965.12	D. M.	Liberal	Centre
1965.12-1986.2	Ferdinand Marcos ⁷²²	Nacionalista/KBL	Right
1986.2-1992.6	C. A.	UNIDO/Independent	Centre
1992.6-1998.6	F. V. R.	Lakas	Centre Right
1998.6-2001.1	J. E.	LAMMP	Centre Left
2001.1-2010.6	G. M. A.	Lakas/Lakas-Kampi	Centre Right
2010.6-2016.6	B. A. III	Liberal	Centre
2016.6-	R. D.	PDP-Laban	Disputable

Tabulation: author.

T7.8: List of Presidents of Indonesia

Period	President	Party	Position
1945-1967	Sukarno	Independent	/ ⁷²³
1968-1998 ⁷²⁴	Suharto	Golkar	Far Right
1998-1999	B. J. Habibie		Right
1999-2001 ⁷²⁵	A. Wahid	PKB	Centre Right
2001-2004	M. Sukarnoputri	PDI-P	Centre Left
2004-2014	S. B. Yudhoyono	Partai Demokrat	Centre Right
2014-	J. Widodo	PDI-P	Centre Left

Tabulation: author.

Unlike in Japan, the FATs and TCEs, where communism had never succeeded and conservative rulers are proud of being conservatives in the sense that order secures prosperity and freedom, self-claimed positions of political entities in the following post-communist cases are more discursive ambiguous – conservative rulers are, in varying degrees, unwilling to explicitly label themselves as right-wing. Instead, they tend to be a big tent, claiming to represent all people for respective reasons.

INDOCHINA

The Indochine française [Fédération indochinoise] included Vietnam [VNM], Laos [LAO], and Cambodia [KHM]. Unlike the anti-communist TCEs, including the monarchic Thailand and Malaysia, Indochina used to be a region of vigorous communist movements since 1930, when Hồ Chí Minh established the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP).

The trajectory in Cambodia was the clearest: under the leadership of Hun Sen, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) changed its name to Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and abandoned Marxism-Leninism as a whole in 1991. Two years later, the Cambodian monarchy was restored. The conservative CPP, as well as its bloc party, monarchist FUNCINPEC, are both members of the CDI and



Wang Huning Meets with Prime Minister Hun Sen of Cambodia, 27th April 2019. Xinhua.


⁷²² The period from September 1972 to February 1986 was known as Marcos' right-wing dictatorship.

⁷²³ Sukarno's presidency consisted of two periods: Demokrasi Liberal [Liberal Democracy] (1950-1959) and Demokrasi Terpimpin [Guided Democracy] (1959-1966). His civilian rule was based on a balance of power between the right-wing military and the Partai Komunis Indonesia.

⁷²⁴ This period was known as New Order [Orde Baru].

⁷²⁵ This period was known as Reformation [Reformasi].

have dominated Cambodia since 1991 – Hun Sen, after 5th July 1997 Coup, has been the prime minister of Cambodia since 1998.



Wang Huning Meets with Prime Minister Nguyễn Xuân Phúc of Vietnam, 25th April 2019. Xinhua.

Similar to Deng’s agendas, starting from the leaderships of Trường Chinh and Nguyễn Văn Linh, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has adopted economic liberalization, namely *Đổi Mới* [Renovation], since its 6th National Congress in December 1986, aiming to establish a “socialist-oriented market economy” (cf. “socialist market economy”). The same year, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), under the leadership of Kaysone Phomvihane, announced a “new economic mechanism” during its 4th National Congress. The CPV has defined Vietnam as not yet socialism but in the “transition to socialism” since its 7th National Congress in 1991 (cf. “primary stage of socialism”). It has been “laying more emphasis on nationalism, developmentalism and becoming the protector of tradition.”⁷²⁶ Its 10th Nation Congress held in 2006 allowed party members to engage in private businesses [cf. the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002].⁷²⁷ General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng acknowledged that in Vietnam’s GDP as of 2020, “the state-owned economy accounts for 27%, the collective economy for 4%; the self-employed economy accounts for 30%, the domestic private economy accounts for 10%; foreign investment accounts for 20%.”⁷²⁸




Wang Huning Meets with LPRP General Secretary Bounnhang Vorachit, 25th April 2019. Xinhua.

T7.9: Timeline of Indochina’s Accession to ASEAN

Country	Vietnam	Laos	Cambodia
Date	28 th July 1995	23 rd July 1997	30 th April 1999

Tabulation: author.

C7.15: Economic Performances of Indochina since the 1980s, Nominal GDP pc



Charting: author. Source: World Bank.

⁷²⁶ John Stanley Gillespie, *Transplanting Commercial Law Reform: Developing a ‘Rule of Law’ in Vietnam* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), pp. 91-92.

⁷²⁷ The 9th National Congress of the CPV was held in 2001.

⁷²⁸ Nguyễn Phú Trọng, “Several Issues in Theory and Practice of Socialism and Vietnam’s Path to Socialism,” *Nhân Dân*, 18th June 2021.


T7.10: Statistics of C7.16

Horizontal Axis	China	GDP pc	Vietnam	/
A	1978	\$156	1991	\$138
B (+10)	1988	\$284	2001	\$405
C (+10)	1998	\$829	2011	\$1,525
D (+10)	2008	\$3,468	2021	\$3,725

Tabulation: author. Source: World Bank.

The trajectories of Vietnam and Laos since the 1990s have been, de facto, more or less the same as the one of Cambodia. During the 1990s, all three Indochinese states had accessioned to the ASEAN, which was established against them in the 1960s when communism was once prevailing. The Indochinese economies also started to take off – as the TCEs in the 1960s. Vietnam, in particular, has been added to the group of the TCEs since the 2000s.

C7.16: China vs. Vietnam, Nominal GDP pc during Economic Takeoff



Charting: author. Sources: World Bank.

CENTRAL ASIA

T7.11: Democracy Index of Islamic States of the ex-USSR, 2006 vs. 2021

DI	Azerbaijan	Kazakhstan	Turkmenistan	Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan
2006	3.31	3.62	1.83	2.45	1.85	4.08
2021	2.68	3.08	1.66	1.94	2.12	3.62

Tabulation: author. Source: EIU.

The six Islamic Republics in the former Soviet Union, including (a) five Turkic states, i.e., Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan, and (b) the Persian Tajikistan, have been on a similar trajectory since their independence: (1) authoritarian or “statist” in one-party or one-man rule, (2) “secular” (vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran) but socioculturally conservative, (3) marketized, and (4) nationalist (associated with pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism).

The New Azerbaijan Party (NAP) that dominated Azerbaijan since 1993 under Heydar Aliyev (1993-2003) who served as the First Secretary of the Communist Party (FSCP) of Azerbaijan from 1969 to 1982 and his son Ilham Aliyev (2003-) has been a member of the CDI and self-identified

as “center-right”⁷²⁹. Though its proximity to the “center”, i.e., liberalism, is disputable given the authoritarian structure of Azerbaijani politics, there is no ambiguity about its right-wing direction.⁷³⁰ The party advocates for an (a) “independent, strong and powerful state”, (b) “legality”, (c) “Azerbaijanism” or “motherland loving”, (d) “heredity” that rejects “any changes brought by ‘revolutionary destructions’”, (e) “constructive cooperation” to “remove personal and group interests rejecting any confrontation for the sake of strengthening of the state system”, and (f) “socially directed economy”,⁷³¹ namely statism, orderism, nationalism, conservatism, corporatism, and capitalism.

Nursultan Nazarbayev, who used to be the FSCP of Kazakhstan, continued his rule from 1991 to 2019, before 1999 as independent and thereafter as the leader of Amanat. Although Amanat does not have any international affiliation, it has friendly relationships with NAP, CPC, CPV, United Russia, PAP, LDP, Justice and Development Party (Turkey), etc. Amanat does not explicitly position itself as right-wing but rather “centrist [центризм]”⁷³². However, what does this “centrism” mean? The party’s principal theoretician Саясат Нурбек unveiled the truth: “now there is, probably, an artificial combination of two incompatible things – economic liberalism and social conservatism, but we believe that within the existing political system, this is possible, so to speak, as it became possible in China, for example. There, too, seemingly incompatible things were combined; everything works quite well.”⁷³³

Similarly, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), which promotes “historical myth of Turkmen national superiority”⁷³⁴, has dominated Turkmenistan under the former FSCP of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov from 1991 to 2006, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow from 2007 to 2022, and his eldest son Serdar Berdimuhamedow (b. 1981).

In Tajikistan, the leader of the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDP), Emomali Rahmon, who, according to a propagandist text, “played an important role in the creation of a sovereign, democratic, *right-wing*, secular and socially-oriented Tajik state.”⁷³⁵ Of course, Tajikistan’s self-claimed “democracy” has been an illiberal one. Noticeably, from 1992 to 1994, Rahmon remained affiliated with the Communist Party of Tajikistan.

Islam Karimov, who used to be the FSCP of Uzbekistan, continued his rule from 1991 to his death in 2016. He shortly led the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (XDP) till 1996, then formed Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party (O‘zLiDeP) in 2003. O‘zLiDeP is a self-declared “center-right” party that combines economic liberalism and political authoritarianism, and an ally with the

⁷²⁹ New Azerbaijan Party, Tarixi arayış.

⁷³⁰ The author’s thanks go to his Azerbaijani colleague Algushad Gulaliyev (FSV UK).

⁷³¹ New Azerbaijan Party, *The Program of the New Azerbaijan Party* (Adopted in the I Congress of the NAP on December 21, 1999).

⁷³² Amanat, Доктрина Партии «Нур Отан» (принята на XV съезде партии, Астана, 18 октября 2013 года). This term, in the contemporary Russian-speaking sphere, has a particular implication; it is a variant of conservatism vis-à-vis the 1990s liberal conservatism: “[it] was not opposed to the overall course of liberal reforms, but was critical of the ‘shock-therapeutic’ mode of their implementation and advocated a more ‘gradual’, ‘balanced’ and ‘pragmatic’ strategy of reforms.” [Sergei Prozorov, “Russian Conservatism in the Putin Presidency: The Dispersion of a Hegemonic Discourse,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 2 (2005): p. 131.]

⁷³³ “Доктрина «Нур Отан»: механизмы и инструменты реализации,” АГ “Кипр”, 26th November 2013.

⁷³⁴ Yelena Nikolayevna Zabortseva, “Niyazov’s Ideology and its Symbolism: The Cult of the Leader, Nationalism and its Suppression of Critical Thinking,” *Politics, Religion & Ideology* 19, no. 4 (2018): p. 510.


⁷³⁵ Алохида Амоновна Холова, “Роль лидера нации в укреплении национального единства,” *Вестник Таджикского национального университета* 3 (2020): p. 129.

right-wing nationalist Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party, which Karimov’s successor Shavkat Mirziyoyev used to be affiliated with.

Kyrgyzstan is the exception amongst all six ex-Soviet Islamic states, which has attempted democratization, and resulted in a more hybrid regime. The then FSCP of Kyrgyzstan Absamat Masaliyev was supposed to follow the above-mentioned “pattern”, transforming this country from a premodern semi-colony to authoritarian capitalist sovereignty. Instead, the non-partisan Askar Akayev played this role from 1990 to 2005. The 2005 revolution only brought another person, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, to continue this unfinished mission, under a clearer ideological guidance. Bakiyev’s party Ak Jol and its successional party Ata-Zhurt were self-declared to be right-wing, the opposite of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan currently has a fragmented partisan landscape and an unstable political order; the hybrid regime’s future needs to be attentively observed.

UNION STATE

C7.17: Democracy Index of Union State, 2006-2020



Charting: author. Source: EIU.

74 years later, Russia went through another February Revolution, but this time what replaced the fragile republican order was not left-wing Leninism but a gradual process of right-wing autocratization that could be traced back to as early as 1996. Putin has no necessity to construct a “rhetoric” of conservatism, including a historical narrative to maintain a discursive coherence between his reign and Lenin. He advocates for an explicit conservatism rooted in Russia’s pre-1917 traditions – what Lenin attempted and failed to overthrow and failed.

“Putinism is a form of autocracy that is conservative, populist, and personalistic.”⁷³⁶ Putinist theoreticians include V. Y. Surkov (“sovereign democracy”), A. G. Dugin (Eurasianism), and think tanks such as Valdai Discussion Club, Izborskiy [Изборский] Club, Institute for Socioeconomic and Political Research (ИСЭПИ), etc. Following the forerunners Fyodor Dostoevsky, Nikolai Berdyaev, Nikolay Karamzin, Ivan Ilyin, Aleksei Losev, Sergey Uvarov, Mikhail Pogodin [“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality”] et al. in the Panthéon of Russian conservatism, Putinism is

⁷³⁶ M. Steven Fish, “The Kremlin Emboldened: What Is Putinism?” *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 4 (2017): p. 61.

grounded on autocracy, state interventionism under the condition of a market economy, sociocultural (especially Orthodox) traditionalism, and conservative nationalism.

Russian conservatism could be traced back to the pre-1917 era: “Alexander III, Nicolas II...Sergey Witte, Nikolay Bunge, Ivan Vyshnegradskiy, and Dmitriy Mendelejev at the end of the nineteenth century represent an example of conservative modernization, or – to use Witte’s exact terminology of the day – ‘modernized autocracy’.”⁷³⁷ “In 1907 Prime Minister Peter Stolypin succinctly described the struggle of Russian conservatism with the liberal and left-wing radicals by saying that ‘they are in need of great upheavals. We are in need of a great Russia’.”⁷³⁸ As the USSR was founded upon, initially, a Negation of Imperial Russia; many thus neglect the 20th century source of Russian conservatism: Soviet imperialism accused by the anti-revisionist left, including Mao. In fact, Soviet communism “had a strong conservative flavor...the Bolsheviks ceased to be globalist left radicals almost immediately upon assuming office. Their subsequent travails in constructing a world economic, military, technological, and nuclear superpower capable of adequately defending itself were evidence supporting Russia’s conservative course.”⁷³⁹ Tsiang Tingfu, after serving as the ROC ambassador to the USSR, also observed in 1938 that Stalin admired Peter I.⁷⁴⁰ Hence, it becomes understandable that contemporary Russian conservatism comprises soviet nostalgia and that the self-contradictory “‘left’ conservatism [vis-à-vis ‘liberal’]” in the early 2000s⁷⁴¹ and “socialist conservative” that calls for a “political alliance between the national bourgeoisie and left [sic] patriotic forces”⁷⁴² could exist.



Xi Jinping Meets with Putin on 5th September 2013, G20 Saint Petersburg Summit. Second from the Right: Wang Huning. CGTN.

Belarus’ early 1990s liberal experiment conducted by Stanislav Shushkevich was even shorter-lived than the one by Yeltsin. Lukashenko’s rule since 1994 has combined marketization while preserving state ownership [so-called “market socialism”]⁷⁴³, soviet nostalgia⁷⁴⁴, and paternalistic authoritarianism [“he is often unofficially referred to as бацька (daddy)”⁷⁴⁵]. The right-wing nature of Belaya Rus’ “quasi-socialism” or “still-socialism”⁷⁴⁶ is obvious, even though Lukashenko does explicitly affiliate himself with it, nor does he proclaim an explicit conservatism as United Russia.

BALKANS

T7.12: Democracy Index of the Balkans, 2006 vs. 2021

Country	Serb	Croat	BiH	ME	BG	N.M	RO	MD	Slovene
2006	6.62	7.04	5.78	6.57	7.10	6.33	7.06	6.50	7.96

⁷³⁷ Elena Chebankova, “Contemporary Russian Conservatism,” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 32, no. 1 (2016): p. 49.

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁷⁴⁰ Tsiang Tingfu, *Outline of Modern Chinese History*, “General”.

⁷⁴¹ Sergei Prozorov, “Russian Conservatism in the Putin Presidency: The Dispersion of a Hegemonic Discourse,” p. 121.

⁷⁴² “Contemporary Russian Conservatism,” p. 32.

⁷⁴³ Cf. Ronan Hervouet, “Market Socialism” in Lukashenko’s Belarus: Egalitarianism, Neo-patrimonialism, and External Dependency,” *Revue internationale de politique comparee* 20, no. 3 (2013): 97-113.

⁷⁴⁴ Cf. the coat of arms and national flag of Belarus adopted in 1995 referendum, and the Belarusian Republican Youth Union.


⁷⁴⁵ Luke March, “Populism in the post-Soviet States,” *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (2017): p. 224.

⁷⁴⁶ Cf. Emily J. Curtin, “Fitness Culture: Making New Persons in Quasi-Socialist Belarus (Dissertation),” “Abstract,” City University of New York, 2021.

2021	6.36	6.50	5.04	6.02	6.64	6.03	6.43	6.10	7.54
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Tabulation: author. Source: EIU.

The post-Cold War histories of Serbia, Croatia, BiH, and Montenegro were deeply intertwined, but the primary theme overlapped – nationalism. The right-wing HDZ ruled Croatia since 1990 except for 2000-2003 and 2011-2016, when social democrats took over. Similarly, HDZ BiH overwhelmingly dominated BiH House of Peoples' Croat delegates, and right-wing SDA dominated the Bosniak delegates. The discursive ambiguity of “socialism” occurred in the Serbian-speaking area, particularly the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and its branches, e.g., SNP in Montenegro and SNSD in BiH. All these rhetorically “socialist” and “social democratic” parties shared Serbian nationalism [“Greater Serbia”], social conservatism, and “social democracy” that the Socialist International does not recognize. Slobodan Milošević’s SPS was accused of being “fascist”⁷⁴⁷, but a more consistent 1990s replica of the interwar fascism would be the far-right, radical Serbian Radical Party (SRP), which SPS cooperated with. The deradicalized, conservative ((IDU member) Serbian Progressive Party that split from SRP in 2008 has dominated Serbia since 2012 under the leadership of Aleksandar Vučić, once the Minister of Information under the Milošević administration. Hence, Serbia has shaken off the inherited ambiguity of left-wing discourse and entered an Orbánist orbit.



Wang Huning Meets with Aleksandar Vučić on 25th April 2019. Xinhua.

In Bulgaria and North Macedonia, whenever conservatives are in power, democracy backslides. Boyko Borisov, who ruled Bulgaria from 2009 to 2021, admitted that the GERB’s right-wing domination was based on “a media empire and control over the judiciary”⁷⁴⁸. During Nikola Gruevski’s nine-years right-wing rule from 2006 to 2016, N. Macedonia’s DI dropped from 6.33 to 5.23, an all-time low. After being accused of illegal surveillance [on opposition] and election fraud, Gruevski was granted political asylum by the Orbán government. The Prespa Agreement, which Gruevski firmly opposed based on his irredentist idea of “antiquization”, paved the way for N. Macedonia’s road to the EU. However, even the EU membership cannot grantee a democracy’s irreversibility.

Slovenia, which does not deem itself as the orientalist “Balkan”, compared with other Balkan states, has indeed enjoyed exceptional liberalism, including liberal nationalism behind its independence since 1990. However, a conservative undercurrent could be traced back to Janez Janša’s first premiership from 2004 to 2008, which ended the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS)’s liberal domination. After a short-lived attempt (2012-2013) in the 2010s, Janša was reelected in 2020, becoming the first to have had three premierships in the history of the Republic of Slovenia.

VISEGRÁD AND EAST GERMANY

T7.13: Democracy Index of V4, 2006 vs. 2021

Year	Hungary	Poland	Slovakia	Czechia	World
2006	7.53	7.30	7.40	8.17	5.52
2021	6.50 (-1.03)	6.80 (-0.5)	7.03 (-0.37)	7.74 (-0.43)	5.28 (-0.24)

Tabulation: author. Source: EIU.

⁷⁴⁷ Bernt Hagtvet, “Right-wing Extremism in Europe,” *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no. 3 (1994): p. 246.

⁷⁴⁸ Cited in Luck Cooper, “Authoritarian Protectionism in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: Diversity, Commonality, and Resistance,” *LSE IDEAS* (June 2021): p. 17.

Hungary has been arguably the most prominent exemplar of the conservative trend within the “New Europe”. Since 2010 when Viktor Orbán came back in power, a de facto dominant-party system of the right-wing Fidesz has been established. Orbán government’s agendas included historical revisionism of the Treaty of Trianon and Miklós Horthy, the 2012 Fundamental Law that changed the country’s name from “Hungarian Republic” to “Hungary”, and political control over media, NGOs, education, banking, religious institutions, etc. Orbán himself was once amongst the Hungarian elites in the transformation towards the “universalist ideology of the liberal consensus”⁷⁴⁹, which turned out to be irrelevant to the “actual Hungarian realities...stratification, income distribution, poverty, gender roles, urban-rural cleavages, population movements”⁷⁵⁰. Fidesz represented a “Hungarian solution to Hungarian problems”⁷⁵¹, which inevitably led it to leave the mainstream EPP.

Since 2005, the electoral choice in Poland has been, in effect, limited to the center-right PO and the right-wing PiS. The latter represented an alternative to “modernization by Europeanization”, i.e., “conservative modernization”⁷⁵². However, “Europeanization” is a vague term, PiS is not against traditional European heritage that it promotes, but a *liberal* model that is not suitable for Poland’s current stage of development; to be precise, PiS is against “liberalization”. Jarosław Kaczyński abandoned the idea of a liberal state, or “night-watchman state”, instead, state should be understood as “an institution of...security...a moral quality...[and] national tradition.”⁷⁵³ Zdzisław Krasnodębski, a leading PiS ideologist, “liberal democracy, he has long argued, is a post-1989 elite project that led to the atomization of society, during which the Polish economy was taken over by foreign interests. A new Fourth Republic needs to be founded.”⁷⁵⁴ The “Fourth Republic” appears to be a Caesaropapism. In 2016, Poland declared Jesus Christ to be its King.⁷⁵⁵ Apart from religious conservatism, PiS has also implemented state interventionism in the economy, judiciary, and civil society.

Slovakia appears to be still on the track of the left-right partisan competition. However, it has also been “predominantly inclined to national populism, Christian-based conservatism, and the search for a strong and charismatic political leader as personified by former Prime Ministers Vladimír Mečiar and Robert Fico.”⁷⁵⁶ Unlike Fidesz and PiS, Fico’s SMER – sociálna demokracia rhetorically pretends to be “social democratic”, while “emphasizing Slovak folk traditions, mythicalizing the nation’s history, offering open and pragmatic support from its chairman Robert Fico to the Catholic bishops, and rejecting the rights of non-heterosexual minorities”⁷⁵⁷. The situation in Slovakia is evolving with the 2020 split to HLAS – sociálna demokracia, but its trajectory has been clear: either (1) the alternative right-wing represented by HZDS, SMER-SD, etc. that somehow

⁷⁴⁹ György Schöpflin, “Hungary: The Fidesz Project,” *Aspen Review* 1 (2013): p. 15.

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁷⁵² Krzysztof Jasiński, “‘Conservative Modernization’ and the Rise of Law and Justice in Poland,” in *New Conservatives in Russia and East Central Europe* (Routledge, 2018), p. 130.

⁷⁵³ Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 131. Jarosław Kaczyński, *Porozumienie przeciw monowładzy. Z dziejów PC* (Poznań: Zysk i S-ka, 2016).

⁷⁵⁴ Jacques Rupnik et Alexandra Lalo, « La démocratie illibérale en Europe centrale », *Esprit*, no. 6, 2017, p. 76.

⁷⁵⁵ Paweł Mączewski, “Jesus Christ Is Now Officially the King of Poland,” *VICE Poland*, 24th November 2016.

⁷⁵⁶ Marián Sekerák, “Towards Conservatism? Party Politics in Slovakia at the End of the 2010s,” *European View* 18, no. 2 (2019): p. 234.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

pretends to be left [self-contradictory “left-wing conservatism”] or “syncretic”⁷⁵⁸, or (b) the mainstream [EPP] center-right represented by SDKU, OLaNO, etc.⁷⁵⁹

The ideological evolution of Czechia since 1993 could be divided into three stages: Havel’s liberal consensus, Klaus’ liberal conservatism (primarily economic), and Zeman’s illiberal conservatism (social, national, and potentially political). Although the Czech presidential power is ceremonial, it does symbolize a sort of Zeitgeist. Whether Czechia will go further in this conservative direction probably lies on not Zeman, who has been in poor health, but on the future evolution of the ODS that initiated this process. Zeman’s “left-wing” rhetoric proved a societal need that the “Czech Thatcherism”⁷⁶⁰, i.e., Klausism has failed to fulfil.



Wang Huning Meets with Miloš Zeman on 28th April 2019 at the Great Hall of the People, Beijing. Xinhua.

Table 1: Positive response to the statement ‘Eastern Germans are second-class citizens’⁵

Region	All	AfD voters
Brandenburg	59%	77%
Saxony	66%	78%
Thuringia	70%	86%

Manès Weisskircher, “The Strength of Far-Right AfD in Eastern Germany: The East-West Divide and the Multiple Causes behind ‘Populism’,” *The Political Quarterly* 91, no. 3 (2020): p. 615.

Die neuen Bundesländer, i.e., former East Germany except for the metropolis Berlin, has reflected a similar trend. CDU dominated Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt (except SPD from 1994 to 2002). East Germans tend to vote for fringe parties, i.e., Linke and AfD. The far-right AfD has been based on its constituencies in East Germany since its establishment in 2013. An “East German nationalism”, or at least a regional nativism, has been formed, which resists “Germanization” in a way similar to PiS against “Europeanization”. Both processes have actually resulted in the opposite to their initial vision in 1989, i.e., to become equal with their counterparts through unification or integration. The shared sense of being inferior, deprived, humiliated, in a word, treated unfairly was the true source of collective political action against universalization.

“A majority of the region [CEE]’s strongest and most numerous conservative parties are national conservative – i.e., culturally conservative and national oriented.”⁷⁶¹ In fact, this applies to not only East Germans and Poles within NATO but also Serbs, Russian, Chinese, Persians, so on and so forth, only in different forms, to different degrees, of different scales, from different times.

DOMESTIC CLEAVAGES

The case of die neuen Bundesländer indicates that the ideological cleavage between conservatism and liberalism is not ethnonational as it might seem to be, but multifaceted. Recent election results in V4 countries also confirmed that the ideological cleavages reflected in regionality within one nation-state, between the developed, centered metropolis and the underdeveloped, marginalized rural areas.


⁷⁵⁸ A similar tendency could be found in Romania, where the Partidul Social Democrat also embraced social conservatism in recent years, which has put whether its nationalism is really left-wing in dispute.

⁷⁵⁹ The author’s thanks go to his Slovak colleague Damir Daniel Demovič (FHS UK).

⁷⁶⁰ Seán Hanley, “The New Right in the New Europe? Unravelling the Ideology of ‘Czech Thatcherism’,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 4, no. 2 (1999): p. 163.


⁷⁶¹ Elisabeth Bakke, “Central and East European Party Systems since 1989,” Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., *Central and South-east European Politics Since 1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): p. 79.

Results of 2018 Parliamentary Election of Hungary



Source: Nemzeti Választási Iroda (NVI).

Czechia and Slovakia follow a similar pattern as Hungary in recent two direct presidential elections; residents of Prague, Brno, Bratislava, and Košice voted for more liberal candidates. In Poland, the divergence is roughly in between Polska „A” i „B”, i.e., West and East of the Vistula, while the urban-rural distinction also applies to Warsaw I, Poznań, Gdańsk, etc.



Mapping: David G. D. Hecht.

As China lacks nationwide elections – even illiberal ones, its domestic cleavages can be alternatively quantified through ideological surveys. Jennifer Pan and Xu Yiqing analyzed the Chinese ideological spectrum during the 2010s⁷⁶², which showcases how liberalism and conservatism apply

⁷⁶² Jennifer Pan and Xu Yiqing, “China’s Ideological Spectrum (March 7, 2017),” pre-print version, SSRN (published in *The Journal of Politics* 80, no. 1 (2018): 254-273).


to contemporary China. In *Zuobiao* [spectrum] survey, interviewees were asked if and to what extent they agreed with 50 statements, for instance:

- [#1] “People should not have universal suffrage if they have not been educated about democracy.”⁷⁶³
- [#41] “Two adults should be free to engage in voluntary sexual behavior regardless of their marital status.”⁷⁶⁴
- [#26] “A high tariff should be imposed on imported goods that are also produced domestically to protect domestic industries.”⁷⁶⁵
- [#15] “If it has sufficient state capabilities, China has the right to take any action to defend its national interests.”⁷⁶⁶

Another measurement is the Asian Barometer Survey (ABS), which includes statements such as [No. 141] “Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions” and [No. 57] “Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher.”⁷⁶⁷


Large-scale opinion polls based on *Zuobiao* and ABS show correlations between political liberalism and (a) income per capita, (b) regional trade openness, (c) degree of urbanization, (d) educational level, and (e) generation gap in China.

Figure 12. Correlates of Provincial Ideological Measure




Source: “China’s Political Spectrum,” p. 30.

Figure 10. Education and Income



(a) *Zuobiao* Sample


⁷⁶³ Ibid., A-2.
⁷⁶⁴ Ibid., A-6.
⁷⁶⁵ Ibid., A-5.
⁷⁶⁶ Ibid., A-7.
⁷⁶⁷ Ibid., A-17.




(b) ABS Sample

Source: Ibid., p. 28.

Figure 11. Ideological Measures and Age




(a) Zuobiao Sample



(b) ABS Sample

Source: Ibid., p. 29.

In more developed Southeastern coastal provinces as such Jiangsu (GRP pc USD 18,988), Zhejiang (15,677), Fujian (16,558), Guangdong (13,771), and municipalities including Beijing (25,839) and Shanghai (24,379)⁷⁶⁸, residents would be in favor of further market-oriented reform and deepen law-based governance. Whereas, in China's vast inland area, residents are either satisfied with the status quo or in favor of the idyllic past. Hence, a tentative, to-be-verified picture of what would happen if China had a multi-party election nationwide may be drawn.



Source: Ibid. Mapping: author.

China's importance lies in the simple fact that its population is more than that of all these above-analyzed countries, from Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to Friedrichshain, Berlin combined. It was not China that *followed* the 1990s trajectory of conservatism in the world where communism ever prevailed, no matter how transitorily; instead, it was China that predominantly *represented* this trajectory. What the trajectory reflects is a structural disequilibrium in global development. In 1991, the dialogue between China and its former anticommunist enemy ASEAN was launched; in 1997, the China-ASEAN "10+1" Cooperation Mechanism was established. In 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was created based on the 1996 "Shanghai Five", i.e., China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The SCO has unprecedentedly expanded, stretching across

⁷⁶⁸ Population (The 7th National Population Census of the PRC) and GRP (National Bureau of Statistics of China) data of 2020; U.S. dollar to RMB exchange rate 1:6.38.

Eurasia, from Shanghai, through Tehran, to Minsk. In Merkel's 2008 visit to China, she changed her previous "ideology-oriented" attitude and adopted a "pragmatic" or "economy-driven" approach, marking the beginning of the Sino-German "golden decade"⁷⁶⁹. In 2012, Orbán pushed the China-CEE "16+1" Cooperation Mechanism to be established. Since the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and its European complications in 2010, the underdeveloped⁷⁷⁰ part of Europe has been clearly divided by two types of Euroscepticism. No matter whether Greece had become a "semi-colony" of Germany, Maoist⁷⁷¹ radical agendas such as "true democracy over fake election" and "distribution based on demand" have emerged. Orbán believes in the opposite – what is the best for the Hungarian nation is a form of backward capitalism accompanied by unfree election, limited public sphere, and patriarchal interventions in the national economy. Both were denounced as heretics by Brussels, just like both the Maoist China and the Dengist China were perceived problematic by Washington, but these political deviances, at least partially, were natural and inevitable results of the existing international system within unbearable economic inequality and the sense of deprivation whereupon.

⁷⁶⁹ Cf. Alison Smale, "Merkel Heads to China to Keep Alive 'Golden Decade' of Deals," *The New York Times*, July 4, 2014.

⁷⁷⁰ This trend can also be founded in recent French and American Presidential Elections.

⁷⁷¹ Cf. the "anti-revisionist" KOE (Κομμουνιστική Οργάνωση Ελλάδας) affiliated to the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), which was in power from 2015 to 2019; KOE is a member of the Maoist international partisan organization ICMLPO [International Conference of Marxist–Leninist Parties and Organizations (International Newsletter)].

“For more than half a century they [the May Fourth generation of Communist revolutionaries] had been the carriers of the most modern of revolutionary doctrines in the oldest of nations. Historians surely will record them among the most remarkable and illustrious of revolutionary intelligentsias, for they were the leaders of the greatest and most dynamic revolution in the history of the modern world...”

Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic*, p. 406.

“I sympathize with the poor and the weak, against bullying and oppression. In my mind, China should be a country full of fairness and justice, where there will always be respect for human minds, humanity and human nature, and there will always be a young, liberal, and striving temperament. I had shouted and fought for it.”

Wen Jiabao, “My Mother,” *Macau Herald*, 25th March-15th April 2021.

ENDOGENOUS CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY?

FAREWELL TO REVOLUTION

History recurs. China in 1911, being the first Republic in Asia, was destined to follow the trajectory of France, being the first Republic in Europe: fragile republican order, Gironde, war and civil war, strongman dictatorship, Montagne, Thermidor, reaction, and countless coups d'état. France was mostly under right-wing autocracies from the prise de la Bastille in 1789 to the lois constitutionnelles de 1875. Not only was la Terreur completely unnecessary, but even the prise de la Bastille was too hasty. If the prise de la Bastille has been postponed for a hundred years, the needless sacrifices, deaths, wars, coups and so on during the First Republic could have been avoided. At the bicentenary of the Révolution française, a revisionist ghost was also over the French intelligentsia. According to Michel Vovelle, “there was a widely accepted view in France and elsewhere that ‘revisionism’ trumped the ‘classical’ or ‘Jacobin’ history of revolutionary events.”⁷⁷² This historical revisionism was represented by François Furet’s conservative trilogy, *La Révolution française* (1965), *Penser la Révolution française* (1978), and *Le Passé d’une illusion, essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle* (1995).

“Farewell to revolution” also found its expression in America: Francis Fukuyama’s thesis “the end of history”. Fukuyama’s emphasis was not placed on the liberal democracy or “bourgeois democracy’s immediate accessibility, but on its replacement for leftist conceptions of democracy beyond his end of history. Fukuyama’s teacher Huntington’s warning during the Cold War that “the greatest need is not so much the creation of more liberal institutions as the successful defense of those which already exist”⁷⁷³ has been forgotten. The post-Cold War idea of realizing democracy worldwide by excising American military force, as Fukuyama noted, followed the radical logos of Leninism, which “was a tragedy in its Bolshevik version, and it has returned as farce when practiced

⁷⁷² Cited in Translator’s Preface, François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2020), Meng Ming trans.

⁷⁷³ Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” p. 472.

by the United States.”⁷⁷⁴ America should not incite republican revolutions in autocratic, underdeveloped countries. In contrast, for these countries, democratic capitalism is the sole end of history they progress towards. Thus, the recent emergence of “illiberal democracy” in various forms (Kremlin’s “managed democracy”, Erdoğan’s conservative democracy, etc.) is not against Fukuyama, as they have all been not yet at the end of history.

The historical revisionism that swept the 1980s Chinese intelligentsia questioned the 1949 Revolution, and the historical revisionism that swept the early 1990s Chinese intelligentsia further questioned the 1911 Revolution. In 1989, China found itself in the conditions of political autocracy, sociocultural conformity, and economic backwardness, everything opposite to what it dreamed of 78 years ago and had strived for since then. When the mainlanders looked around, they found Japan as an exemplar of modernization without revolution, Taiwan, which “missed” the 1911 Revolution due to Japanese colonization, and Hong Kong, which “missed” both the 1911 and 1949 Revolutions due to British colonization.

In China, the masterpiece was *Farewell to Revolution* (1995) by Li Zehou (1930-2021). “The first violent revolution in 20th century China was the 1911 Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen. At that time, China had two choices. One was a constitutional monarchy advocated by Kang [Youwei] and Liang [Qichao], and the other was a violent revolution advocated by Sun Yat-sen. It now appears that China would have been much better off choosing the reformist [royalist] path of Kang and Liang. That is to say, the 1911 Revolution was actually unnecessary.”⁷⁷⁵ “Of course, people may consider the [royalists’] ‘preparational period’ before the constitutionalization too long, but is five or seven years really a big deal? Did not Mr. Sun propose a ‘period of political discipline’ [before ‘constitutional politics’]? Did not Mr. Chiang ‘politically discipline’ China for decades?”⁷⁷⁶

“Many of the early nineteenth century conservatives – Görres, Gentz, Müller in Germany; Coleridge, Wordsworth, Southey in England – were initially enthusiasts for the French Revolution.”⁷⁷⁷ During the 1980s, Li Zehou was regarded as a liberal. In fact, he used to be not only liberal but also revolutionary. “I participated in the revolution [against Chiang]; therefore, I am qualified to say: ‘farewell to revolution’. In the 1940s, I participated in the student movement in Hunan, which endangered my life. I used to conceal the printed Maoist paper under my footwear. If the military police arrested me, I could have lost my life.”⁷⁷⁸ Li’s participation in the 1949 Revolution was out of “a belief of building a true democratic new China”⁷⁷⁹. During the Cultural Revolution, the belief was shaken: “I found that the Cultural Revolution was [a replica of] French Revolution.”⁷⁸⁰ In April 1989, he warned: “at present, there is a thorough antitraditional trend amongst the youth, which in some extent, is approximated with the Red Guards who were fiercely antitraditional...believing that a new culture must be removed from the old culture.”⁷⁸¹

⁷⁷⁴ Francis Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” *The New York Times Magazine*, 19th February 2006.

⁷⁷⁵ Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, *Farewell to Revolution: Reviewing the 20th Century China* (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2004), p. 103.

⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁷⁷⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, “Conservatism as an Ideology,” p. 470.

⁷⁷⁸ Li Zehou and Ma Guochuan, “Farewell to the 1911 Revolution,” *Xin Rui*, no. 6 (2011).

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸¹ “The Chinese Nation Needs Constructive Rationality: Li Zehou in the Middle of Two Generations,” *People’s Daily*, 8th April 1989.

Li's 1995 thesis of "farewell to revolution" was a logical development in his intellectual thoughts. For China after 1989, Li suggested that the first step is "economic development", the second step is to increase "individual freedoms", including the economic "freedoms of property, business, employment, migration, choice of work, and lifestyle" as well as the political "freedoms of speech and press".⁷⁸² These individual freedoms "should be realized gradually and cannot be achieved overnight."⁷⁸³ The third step is "social justice", and finally, the last step is "democracy".⁷⁸⁴

Likewise, Li Shulei, the Executive President⁷⁸⁵ of the Central Party School of the CPC, suggested that China's modernization must go through three steps: the first one "should be a high degree of social integration and the establishment of a nation-state"⁷⁸⁶; the second one should be market economy and economic development, corresponding to "Deng Xiaoping Theory"; and the third one should be "true autonomy and freedom"⁷⁸⁷, as results of modernization. Due to the insurmountability of the first and second stages, the attempt to realize liberation and nation-state simultaneously must fail. The victory of the 1911 Revolution that "enabled China to establish an institutional framework marked by parliamentary politics plus a free economy" was "to a considerable degree of falsehood"⁷⁸⁸ because these two goals were the signs of the "maturity"⁷⁸⁹ instead of the beginning of modernization.

What Li Shulei and Li Zehou "discovered" in the 1990s, representing the *third* wave of Chinese conservatism, was ultimately rephrasing what Tsiang Tingfu proposed in the 1930s *second* wave of Chinese conservatism. Furthermore, their – to use Burke's word – "reflections" on the 1911 Revolution, in the final analysis, were nothing substantially novel from the *first* wave of Chinese conservatism – royalism in the late 19th century. The royalists' "preparational period" before constitutionalization, the Chiangist "period of political discipline" (after military rule, before constitutional rule), and the SwCC's "primary stage of socialism" are all modernizations without democratization. After all, instead of being against modernization, conservatism is biasing towards its "materialistic" (economic, technological, and military) aspects based on reality instead of its sociocultural and political aspects based on ideals.

A 2001 paper published in the *Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC* reviewed three types of conservatism in the 1990s China: cultural conservatism ("Asian values"⁷⁹⁰), neoconservatism ("neoauthoritarianism"⁷⁹¹), and what it referred to as "conservative liberalism" (Farewell to Revolution)⁷⁹². The first "has undeniable positive significance"⁷⁹³. The second "shares a lot with the CPC's basic policies and lines...contemporary Chinese Marxism could seriously

⁷⁸² Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, *Farewell to Revolution: Reviewing the 20th Century China*, p. 22.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁵ The Presidency of the Central Party School of the CPC is part-time, ceremonial; the Executive President is actually in charge of the School.

⁷⁸⁶ Li Shulei, *1942: Towards the People* (1998; reprinted in Beijing: People's Literature Publishing House, 2017), "Preface".

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁰ Xie Wujun, "The Ideological Trend of Conservatism in the 1990s China," *Journal of the Party School of the Central Committee of the CPC*, vol. 5, no. 3 (2001): p. 105.

⁷⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁷⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 107.

⁷⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

learn something from neoconservatism.”⁷⁹⁴ Are not “neoauthoritarianism” and “contemporary Chinese Marxism” synonyms? The paper’s accusation of Farewell to Revolution of endangering the CPC’s rule was a misinterpretation. “It does not make sense...I think another revolution would be even more troublesome...government is much better than no government. The worst government is better than no government. Long-term anarchy is the most terrible.”⁷⁹⁵ In fact, the so-called three “types” were merely three aspects of one conservatism: sociocultural, political, and historical.

THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION

Chiang Kai-shek, Tsiang Tingfu, Deng Xiaoping, Wang Huning, Li Shulei...all acknowledged that conservatism is not stagnation; it is towards the end of history. The economic development is to “promote the gradual change of the political system.”⁷⁹⁶ “Farewell to Revolution” was for “improving gradually” through top-down “reforms done by those in power”⁷⁹⁷, instead of bottom-up “revolution”. Li Zehou suggested that the economic reforms, e.g., the implementation of the *Thirty-six Measures for the Non-Public Economy* (2005), would enable greater individual liberties and the rule of law. Alain Badiou even said in 2012: “I see no reason to fight for China to be democratic; I couldn’t care less. It will become democratic all by itself when it’s rich enough, that’s all. And that’s the history of capitalism itself; it’s not my history of it.”⁷⁹⁸

Contemporary Chinese liberals have appropriately developed a nostalgia for the 1980s, referring to Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, and Deng’s undefined “political system reform”. Some have joined the eight “democratic parties”. At least in a symbolic way, these functional satellite parties remind people that the PRC was established upon a pro-democracy coalition. Liberals within the CPC, who were marginalized since the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th National Congress in 1989, have evolved into two directions: those outspoken who remained as party members but were deprived of the chance to engage in substantial decision-making and those who practically avoiding public criticism of the regime who became high-ranking leaders – Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, Wang Yang, and even Zhu Rongji, Li Keqiang (more so of economic liberalism).

What makes liberalism enchanting is neither its desirability nor its feasibility. Liberalism is surely desirable, but it is not the most desirable within the human talent of imagination; it is certainly feasible, but nothing is more feasible than doing nothing to the status quo. The charm of liberalism lies in its comprise and pluralism. After reflecting on China’s centenary revolution, the enduring tenacity of liberalism still remains. After all, the fault was on the “radicalism” that has been proved futile, not on the liberalism that hardly ever existed. Why could not liberalism come to the fore in between the ongoing “primary stage of socialism” and the indefinite “communism”?

The Chinese Revolution originated in response to the Industrial Revolution, which brought about a drastic increase in both *productivity* and *inequality*. The inequality was not only the domestic class polarization within Britain that Marx was concerned about, but also the ethnic polarization worldwide, which led to the emergence of the third-world nationalisms – the self-consciousness as a nation in the deemed uncivilized world. Thus, “the aim of the generation of old revolutionaries

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 107.

⁷⁹⁵ Li Zehou and Ma Guochuan, “Farewell to the 1911 Revolution.”

⁷⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁸ Alain Badiou, Peter Engelmann, *Philosophy and the Idea of Communism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), trans., Susan Spitzer, pp. 54-55.

was to make China both modern [productivity]⁷⁹⁹ and socialist [equality].”⁸⁰⁰ Certainly, China would continue to strive for “those long-elusive and eminently nationalist goals of ‘wealth and power’ [productivity]. But whether post-Maoist leaders would continue to strive for a socialist [equality] future”⁸⁰¹ is uncertain. When Xi quoted Mao’s words⁸⁰², “the Chinese people are now organized; it is better not to offend them. If they were provoked, the situation would be unmanageable [prolonged thunderous applause]”⁸⁰³, the ideological implication was totally different, but China’s modernization indeed remains uncompleted.

According to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, modernity is reflexive. The self-consciousness to struggle for recognition, being K. Marx’s communist “class struggle”⁸⁰⁴ or G. Gentile’s fascist “national struggle”⁸⁰⁵, is the driving force towards the end of history. The struggles would not end until the realization of equality on all frontiers because the self-consciousness would not disappear as long as differences exist. “There is neither happiness nor misery in the world; there is only the comparison of one state with another, nothing more. He who has felt the deepest grief is best able to experience supreme happiness...The sum of all human wisdom will be contained in these two words: wait and hope.” (*Le Comte de Monte-Cristo*)

⁷⁹⁹ Mao also advocated for modernization and nationalism (“rich”, “strong”, “independent”, and “unified”), although his vision to achieve the goal of a modernized China was the opposite of Chiang’s authoritarian capitalism.

⁸⁰⁰ Maurice Meisner, *Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic*, p. 407.

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

⁸⁰² Mao Zedong, “The Great Victory of Resist U.S. and Aid Korea and the Tasks ahead: Speech at the 24th Meeting of the Central People’s Government Committee, 12th September 1953.” *Selected Works of Mao Zedong*, Vol. 5 (Beijing: People’s Press, 1977), pp. 101-106.

⁸⁰³ Xi Jinping, “Speech at the General Assembly Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the Chinese People’s Volunteers’ Fighting to Resist the U.S. and Aid Korea.” 23rd October 2020.

⁸⁰⁴ Cf. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Communist Manifesto.”

⁸⁰⁵ Cf. Benito Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism in the Living Age,” trans., Jane Soames, *Political Quarterly* (1933): 235-244.

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APPENDIX

LIST OF ROMANIZED NAMES

• CHINESE

BAN Biao 班彪
 BAN Gu 班固
 BAN Zhao 班昭
 BAO Huiseng 包惠僧
 BAO Tong 鲍彤
 BO Guagua 薄瓜瓜
 BO Gu 博古
 BO Xilai 薄熙来
 BO Yibo 薄一波
 CAI Hesen 蔡和森
 CAI Qi 蔡奇
 CAI Yuanpei 蔡元培
 CAO Gangchuan 曹刚川
 CHEN Boda 陈伯达
 CHEN Duxiu 陈独秀
 CHEN Gongbo 陈公博
 CHEN Liangyu 陈良宇
 CHEN Min'er 陈敏尔
 CHEN Quanguo 陈全国
 CHEN Shui-bian 陈水扁
 CHEN Tanqiu 陈潭秋
 CHEN Xilian 陈锡联
 CHEN Xitong 陈希同
 CHEN Xi 陈希
 CHEN Yonggui 陈永贵
 CHEN Yun 陈云
 CHI Haotian 迟浩田
 CHI Qun 迟群
 CHIANG Ching-kuo 蒋经国
 CHIANG Kai-shek 蒋介石
 DAI Jitao 戴季陶
 DENG Enming 邓恩铭
 DENG Liqun 邓力群
 DENG Xiaoping 邓小平
 DENG Zhuodi 邓卓棣
 DING Guangen 丁关根

DING Weifen 丁惟汾
DING Xuexiang 丁薛祥
DONG Biwu 董必武
DU Yaquan 杜亚泉
FAN Changlong 范长龙
FANG Lizhi 方励之
FANG Zhimin 方志敏
FU Rulin 傅汝霖
GAN Yang 甘阳
GOH Chok Tong 吴作栋
GUAN Weiyan 管惟炎
GUO Boxiong 郭伯雄
GUO Moruo 郭沫若
GUO Shengkun 郭声琨
HAN Zheng 韩正
HE Shuheng 何叔衡
HU Chunhua 胡春华
HU Jintao 胡锦涛
HU Qiaomu 胡乔木
HU Qili 胡启立
HU Yaobang 胡耀邦
HUA Guofeng 华国锋
HUANG Ju 黄菊
HUANG Kunming 黄坤明
HUANG Xing 黄兴
HUANG Zongxi 黄宗羲
HUI Liangyu 回良玉
JI Dengkui 纪登奎
JIA Qinglin 贾庆林
JIANG Chunyun 姜春云
JIANG Mianheng 江绵恒
JIANG Qing 江青
JIANG Shigong 强世功
JIANG Zemin 江泽民
JIANG Zhicheng 江志成
JU Zheng 居正
KANG Sheng 康生
KANG Youwei 康有为
LEE Hsien Loong 李显龙
LEE Kuan Yew 李光耀
LEE Teng-hui 李登辉

LI Changchun 李长春
LI Dazhao 李大钊
LI Da 李达
LI Hanjun 李汉俊
LI Hongzhong 李鸿忠
LI Jianguo 李建国
LI Lanqing 李岚清
LI Lisan 李立三
LI Minqi 李民琪
LI Peng 李鹏
LI Qiang 李强
LI Ruihuan 李瑞环
LI Rui 李锐
LI Shulei 李书磊
LI Tieying 李铁映
LI Xiannian 李先念
LI Xi 李希
LI Yuanchao 李源潮
LI Yuanhong 黎元洪
LI Zehou 李泽厚
LI Zhanshu 栗战书
LIANG Qichao 梁启超
LIAO Zhongkai 廖仲恺
LIN Biao 林彪
LIU Bing 刘冰
LIU De 刘德
LIU He 刘鹤
LIU Huaqing 刘华清
LIU Qibao 刘奇葆
LIU Qi 刘淇
LIU Renjing 刘仁静
LIU Shaoqi 刘少奇
LIU Xiaobo 刘晓波
LIU Xiaofeng 刘小枫
LIU Yandong 刘延东
LIU Yunshan 刘云山
LUO Kanglin 罗康林
LUO Gan 罗干
MA Kai 马凯
MA Ying-jeou 马英九
MAO Zedong 毛泽东

MENG Jianzhu 孟建柱
 MENG Ming 孟明
 QIAN Qichen 钱其琛
 QIAO Shi 乔石
 QU Qiubai 瞿秋白
 REN Zhongyi 任仲夷
 SHAO Yuanchong 邵元冲
 SHEN Tong 沈彤
 SHI Ying 石瑛
 SONG Jiaoren 宋教仁
 SOONG Ching-ling 宋庆龄
 SU Beng 史明
 SUN Chunlan 孙春兰
 SUN Yat-sen 孙中山
 SUN Zhengcai 孙政才
 TAN Pingshan 谭平山
 TIAN Jiyun 田纪云
 TSAI Ing-wen 蔡英文
 TSIANG Tingfu 蒋廷黻
 WANG Dongxing 汪东兴
 WANG Fuzhi 王夫之
 WANG Hongwen 王洪文
 WANG Hui 汪晖
 WANG Huning 王沪宁
 WANG Jingwei 汪精卫
 WANG Jinmei 王尽美
 WANG Ming 王明
 WANG Qishan 王岐山
 WANG Renzhi 王忍之
 WANG Yang 汪洋
 WANG Zhen 王震
 WEI Jianxing 尉健行
 WEI Yuan 魏源
 WEN Jiabao 温家宝
 WEN Yunsong 温云松
 WU Bangguo 吴邦国
 WU De 吴德
 WU Guanzheng 吴官正
 WU Yi 吴仪
 XI Jinping 习近平
 XI Zhongxun 习仲勋

XIANG Zhongfa 向忠发
 XIE Fei 谢非
 XIE Jingyi 谢静宜
 XIE Tao 谢韬
 XU Qiliang 许其亮
 YANG Baibing 杨白冰
 YANG Jiechi 杨洁篪
 YANG Shangkun 杨尚昆
 YANG Xiaodu 杨晓渡
 YAO Wenyuan 姚文元
 YAO Yilin 姚依林
 YE Jianying 叶剑英
 YE Wenfu 叶文福
 YEN Chia-kan 严家淦
 YIN Zhihao 殷之浩
 YING Da 英达
 YU Fangzhou 于方舟
 YU Shude 于树德
 YU Zhengsheng 俞正声
 ZENG Peiyan 曾培炎
 ZENG Qinghong 曾庆红
 ZHANG Chunqiu 张春桥
 ZHANG Chunxian 张春贤
 ZHANG Dejiang 张德江
 ZHANG Gaoli 张高丽
 ZHANG Guotao 张国焘
 ZHANG Lichang 张立昌
 ZHANG Wannian 张万年
 ZHANG Wentian 张闻天
 ZHANG Youxia 张又侠
 ZHANG Zhiben 张知本
 ZHANG Zhidong 张之洞
 ZHAO Leji 赵乐际
 ZHAO Ziyang 赵紫阳
 ZHENG Guanying 郑观应
 ZHOU Enlai 周恩来
 ZHOU Fohai 周佛海
 ZHOU Yongkang 周永康
 ZHU Rongji 朱镕基
 ZHU Zizun 朱自尊
 ZOU Jiahua 邹家华

ZOU Lu 邹鲁

- JAPANESE

Edo 江戸

Hajime KAWAKAMI 河上肇

Heisei 平成

ITŌ Hirobumi 伊藤博文

Meiji 明治

Reiwa 令和

SAKAI Toshihiko 堺利彦

Shōwa 昭和

Taishō 大正

- KOREAN

CHOI Kyu-hah 崔圭夏

CHUN Doo-hwan 全斗煥

KIM Dae-jung 金大中

KIM Young-sam 金泳三

LEE Myung-bak 李明博

MOON Jae-in 文在寅

PARK Chung-hee 朴正熙

PARK Geun-hye 朴槿惠

ROH Moo-hyun 盧武鉉

ROH Tae-woo 盧泰愚

Syngman RHEE 李承晚

YOON Suk-yeol 尹錫悅

YUN Posun 尹潽善

- RUSSIAN

Adolph Abramovich JOFFE (Адóльф Абра́мович Ио́ФФЕ)

Alexander Sergeyevich PUSHKIN (Алекса́ндр Серге́евич Пу́шкин)

Alexei Nikolayevich KOSYGIN (Алексе́й Никола́евич Косы́гин)

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Leonid Ilyich BREZHNEV (Леони́д Ильи́ч Бре́жнев)

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Mikhail Andreyevich SUSLOV (Михаи́л Андре́евич Су́слов)

Nikita Sergeevich KHRUSHCHEV (Никита Серге́евич Хру́щёв)

Sergey Viktorovich LAVROV (Серге́й Ви́кторович Лавро́в)

Vladimir Ilyich LENIN (Владимир Ильич ЛЕНИН)
 Vladimir Vladimirovich PUTIN (Владимир Владимирович ПУТИН)
 Wladimir Abramowitsch NEUMANN (Владимир Абрамович НЕЙМАН)

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABLC – Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign 反对资产阶级自由化运动
 APEC – Anti-Peaceful Evolution Campaign 反和平演变
 ASPC – Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaign 清除精神污染运动
 BSAF – Beijing Students’ Autonomous Federation 北京高校学生自治联合会
 BWAF – Beijing Workers’ Autonomous Federation 北京工人自治联合会
 CASS – Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 中国社会科学院
 CCTV – China Central Television 中国中央电视台
 CDP – Constitutional Democratic Party (Rikken Minseitō) 立宪民政党
 CEEC – Central and Eastern European Countries
 CGCBSC – Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization 中央精神文明建设
 指导委员会
 CMC – Central Military Commission (PRC, CPC) 中华人民共和国、中国共产党中央军事委员
 会
 CNKI – China National Knowledge Infrastructure 中国知网
 CPB – Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党中央政治局
 CPC – Communist Party of China 中国共产党
 CPP – Cambodian People’s Party
 CPPCC – Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 中国人民政治协商会议
 CPRO – Central Policy Research Office 中央政策研究室
 CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 CSB – Central Security Bureau 中央警卫局
 CW – Chemical Weapons
 DCM – Down to the Countryside Movement 上山下乡运动
 DGBAS (Taiwan) – Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan,
 R.O.C (Taiwan) 行政院主計總處
 DLP – Democratic Liberal Party (Japan) [Minshujiyūtō] 民主自由党
 DP – Democratic Party (Japan, 1947) [Minshutō] 民主党
 DPI-P – Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan [Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle]
 DPP – Democratic Progressive Party 民主进步党
 DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 朝鮮民主主義人民共和國
 FATs – Four Asian Tigers 东亚四小龙
 GDP – Gross Domestic Product
 GHQ/SCAP – General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
 Golkar – Partai Golongan Karya [Party of Functional Groups]
 GOP – Grand Old Party/Republican Party (US)
 GRCN – Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation 中华民族伟大复兴
 IDU – International Democrat Union

- ILMF* – *I Love My Family* 《我爱我家》
- IRAA – Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Japan) [Taisei Yokusankai] 大政翼贊會
- JCP – Japanese Communist Party 日本共產黨
- JDP – Japan Democratic Party (1954) [Nihon Minshutō] 日本民主黨
- JNP – Japan New Party [Nihon Shintō] 日本新黨
- JPP – Japan Progressive Party [Nihon Shinpotō] 日本進步黨
- JRP – Japan Renewal Party [Shinseitō] 新生黨
- KKE – Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (Communist Party of Greece)
- KMT – Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) 中國國民黨
- KSK – Kenseikai (Japan) [Constitutional Politics Association] 憲政會
- KST – Kenseitō (Japan) [Constitutional Party] 憲政黨
- LDP – Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) [Jiyū-Minshutō] 自由民主黨
- LP – Liberal Party (Japan, 1945) [Jiyūtō] 自由黨
- LRO, CPC – Literature Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 中國共產黨中央委員會文獻研究室
- MECW* – *Marx/Engels Collected Works*
- MESW* – *Marx/Engels Selected Works*
- MSYSU – Moscow Sun Yat-sen University 莫斯科中山大學
- NPC – National People's Congress 全國人民代表大會
- PEC – Patriotic Education Campaign 愛國主義教育運動
- PKB – Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [National Awakening Party]
- PKU – Peking University 北京大學
- PLA – People's Liberation Army 人民解放軍
- PLMPs – Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants 貧下中農
- PPBM – Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia [Malaysian United Indigenous Party]
- PPP – Purchasing Power Parity
- PRC – People's Republic of China 中華人民共和國
- PSC – Politburo Standing Committee (Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China) 中國共產黨中央政治局常務委員會
- QKP – Communist Party of Kazakhstan (Қазақстан Коммунистік партиясы; Qazaqstan Kommunistik Partiasy)
- RDK – Rikken-Dōshi Kai (Japan) [Association of Allies of the Constitution] 立憲同志會
- ROC – Republic of China 中華民國
- ROK – Republic of Korea 大韓民國
- RS – Rikken Seiyūkai (Japan) [Association of Friends of Constitutional Government] 立憲政友會
- SAR – Special Administrative Region (PRC) 中華人民共和國特別行政區
- SCMP* – *South China Morning Post* 《南華早報》
- SwCC – Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 中國特色社會主義
- SWCY* – *Selected Works of Chen Yun* 《陳雲文選》
- SWDXP* – *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* 《鄧小平文選》
- SWJZM* – *Selected Works of Jiang Zemin* 《江澤明文選》
- Taimeng – Taiwan democratic Self-Government League 台灣民主自治同盟

TCEs – Tiger Cub Economies 亚洲四小虎
 UMNO – United Malays National Organisation [Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu]
 UN – United Nations
 USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
 USTC – University of Science and Technology of China 中国科学技术大学

OTHER PROPER NOUNS

Capitalist Roader (CPC) 中国共产党走资派
 Conservative Faction (CPC) 中国共产党保守派
 Criticize Deng, Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal-of-Verdicts Trend 批邓、反击右倾翻案风
 Democratic Justice Party (S.K.) 韩国民主正義黨
 Democratic Party (S.K., 1955) 韩国民主黨 (1955)
 Democratic Party (S.K., 2000) 韩国民主黨 (2000)
 Democratic Republican Party (S.K.) 韩国民主共和黨
 Educated Youth 知识青年
 Fanshi Faction (CPC) 中国共产党凡是派
 Four Bigs (Big Talk, Big Release, Big Debate, Big-Character Poster) 四大 (大鸣、大放、大辩论、大字报)
 Four Olds (Old Ideas, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Customs) 四旧 (旧思想、旧文化、旧风俗、旧习惯)
 Freedom and People's Rights Movement [Jiyū Minken Undō] 自由民權運動
 Gang of Four (CPC) 中国共产党四人帮
 Liberal Faction (CPC) 中国共产党自由派
 Liberal Party (S.K.) 韩国自由黨
 Liberty Korea Party 自由韓國黨
 Meiji Restoration [Meiji Ishin] 明治維新
 New Korea Party 新韓國黨
 Perry Expedition [kurofune raikō] 黒船来航
 Qiushi Faction (CPC) 中国共产党求是派
 Reform and Opening Up 改革开放
 Reformist Faction (CPC) 中国共产党改革派
River Elegy 《河殤》
 Seek Truth from Facts 实事求是
 Self-Strengthening Movement 洋务运动
 Shanghai Clique (CPC) 中国共产党上海帮
 The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 中国共产党第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议
 Tongzhi Restoration 同光中兴
 Veteran Faction (CPC) 中国共产党元老派
 Worker-Peasant-Soldier Student 工农兵学员

Xue Heng School 学衡派
 Young China Party 中國青年黨
 Youth League Faction (CPC) 中国共产党团派

STATISTICS

D1: China vs. Japan, GDP (PPP) pc comparison (1900-1978), 2011 prices USD

Year	Japan	China	Pct.
1900	2,123	972	45.78%
1901	2,162		#VALUE!
1902	2,013		#VALUE!
1903	2,204		#VALUE!
1904	2,179		#VALUE!
1905	2,111		#VALUE!
1906	2,329		#VALUE!
1907	2,358		#VALUE!
1908	2,357		#VALUE!
1909	2,333		#VALUE!
1910	2,317		#VALUE!
1911	2,400	905	37.71%
1912	2,420		#VALUE!
1913	2,431	985	40.52%
1914	2,358		#VALUE!
1915	2,512		#VALUE!
1916	2,829		#VALUE!
1917	2,941		#VALUE!
1918	2,973		#VALUE!
1919	3,219		#VALUE!
1920	2,974		#VALUE!
1921	3,244		#VALUE!
1922	3,244		#VALUE!
1923	3,244		#VALUE!
1924	3,316		#VALUE!
1925	3,414		#VALUE!

1926	3,359		#VALUE!
1927	3,347		#VALUE!
1928	3,554		#VALUE!
1929	3,665	1,003	27.37%
1930	3,334	1,012	30.35%
1931	3,321	1,015	30.56%
1932	3,529	1,039	29.44%
1933	3,787	923	24.37%
1934	3,756	937	24.95%
1935	3,825	1,007	26.32%
1936	3,986	1,065	26.72%
1937	4,075	1,034	25.37%
1938	4,257	1,003	23.56%
1939	4,804		#VALUE!
1940	4,882		#VALUE!
1941	4,986		#VALUE!
1942	4,939		#VALUE!
1943	4,826		#VALUE!
1944	4,816		#VALUE!
1945	3,678		#VALUE!
1946	2,771		#VALUE!
1947	2,711		#VALUE!
1948	2,857		#VALUE!
1949	2,867		#VALUE!
1950	3,062	799	26.09%
1951	3,389	950	28.03%
1952	3,724	1,047	28.11%

1953	3,944	1,157	29.34%
1954	4,116	1,049	25.49%
1955	4,417	1,119	25.33%
1956	4,699	1,189	25.30%
1957	4,999	1,195	23.90%
1958	5,243	1,173	22.37%
1959	5,665	1,117	19.72%
1960	6,354	1,057	16.64%
1961	7,055	874	12.39%
1962	7,614	926	12.16%
1963	8,176	1,034	12.65%
1964	9,035	1,152	12.75%
1965	9,459	1,253	13.25%
1966	10,370	1,261	12.16%
1967	11,400	1,237	10.85%
1968	12,725	1,178	9.26%
1969	14,145	1,264	8.94%
1970	15,484	1,398	9.03%
1971	16,004	1,446	9.04%
1972	17,110	1,431	8.36%
1973	18,226	1,513	8.30%
1974	17,765	1,519	8.55%
1975	18,082	1,594	8.82%
1976	18,600	1,519	8.17%
1977	19,230	1,583	8.23%
1978	20,060	1,744	8.69%

D2: China vs. Japan, (Nominal) GDP pc Comparison (1978-2020), USD

Year	China	Japan	Pct.
1978	156	8,820	1.77%
1979	183	9,103	2.01%
1980	194	9,463	2.05%
1981	197	10,360	1.90%
1982	203	9,575	2.12%
1983	225	10,421	2.16%
1984	250	10,978	2.28%
1985	294	11,576	2.54%
1986	281	17,113	1.64%
1987	251	20,748	1.21%
1988	283	25,059	1.13%
1989	310	24,822	1.25%
1990	317	25,371	1.25%
1991	333	28,915	1.15%

1992	366	31,414	1.17%
1993	377	35,681	1.06%
1994	473	39,933	1.18%
1995	609	44,197	1.38%
1996	709	39,150	1.81%
1997	781	35,638	2.19%
1998	828	32,423	2.55%
1999	873	36,610	2.38%
2000	959	39,169	2.45%
2001	1,053	34,406	3.06%
2002	1,148	32,820	3.50%
2003	1,288	35,387	3.64%
2004	1,508	38,298	3.94%
2005	1,753	37,812	4.64%
2006	2,099	35,991	5.83%

2007	2,693	35,779	7.53%
2008	3,468	39,876	8.70%
2009	3,832	41,308	9.28%
2010	4,550	44,968	10.12%
2011	5,618	48,760	11.52%
2012	6,316	49,145	12.85%
2013	7,050	40,898	17.24%
2014	7,678	38,475	19.96%
2015	8,066	34,960	23.07%
2016	8,147	39,400	20.68%
2017	8,879	38,891	22.83%
2018	9,976	39,808	25.06%
2019	10,216	40,777	25.05%
2020	10,500	39,538	26.56%

D3: China vs. Taiwan vs. World, (Nominal) GDP pc Comparison (1960-2020), USD

Year	TW	CN	World
1960	163	90	456
1961	161	76	469
1962	172	71	494
1963	189	74	522

1964	214	85	560
1965	229	98	597
1966	249	104	635
1967	281	97	662
1968	319	91	700

1969	357	100	757
1970	397	113	811
1971	451	119	877
1972	530	132	991
1973	706	157	1,184

1974	934	160	1,339
1975	985	178	1,464
1976	1,158	165	1,565
1977	1,330	185	1,740
1978	1,606	156	2,015
1979	1,950	184	2,300
1980	2,389	195	2,546
1981	2,720	197	2,590
1982	2,699	203	2,520
1983	2,903	225	2,525
1984	3,224	251	2,574
1985	3,314	294	2,658
1986	4,036	282	3,087
1987	5,350	252	3,450
1988	6,370	284	3,791
1989	7,613	311	3,890

1990	8,205	318	4,307
1991	9,125	333	4,454
1992	10,768	366	4,665
1993	11,242	377	4,951
1994	12,150	473	4,951
1995	13,119	610	5,424
1996	13,641	709	5,463
1997	14,020	782	5,366
1998	12,820	829	5,280
1999	13,804	873	5,407
2000	14,908	959	5,512
2001	13,397	1,053	5,407
2002	13,686	1,149	5,542
2003	14,066	1,289	6,138
2004	15,317	1,509	6,829
2005	16,456	1,753	7,305

2006	16,934	2,099	7,819
2007	17,757	2,694	8,701
2008	18,081	3,468	9,431
2009	16,933	3,832	8,837
2010	19,197	4,550	9,559
2011	20,866	5,618	10,495
2012	21,295	6,317	10,610
2013	21,973	7,051	10,785
2014	22,874	7,679	10,952
2015	22,780	8,067	10,223
2016	23,091	8,148	10,268
2017	25,080	8,879	10,801
2018	25,838	9,977	11,345
2019	25,908	10,217	11,395
2020	28,383	10,500	10,909

D4: China vs. Taiwan vs. World, (Nominal) GDP pc Comparison (1960-2020), Percentage

Year	CN/TW	CN/World	TW/World
1960	55.2%	19.7%	35.7%
1961	47.2%	16.2%	34.3%
1962	41.3%	14.4%	34.8%
1963	39.2%	14.2%	36.2%
1964	39.7%	15.2%	38.2%
1965	42.8%	16.4%	38.4%
1966	41.8%	16.4%	39.2%
1967	34.5%	14.7%	42.4%
1968	28.5%	13.0%	45.6%
1969	28.0%	13.2%	47.2%
1970	28.5%	13.9%	49.0%
1971	26.4%	13.6%	51.4%
1972	24.9%	13.3%	53.5%
1973	22.2%	13.3%	59.6%
1974	17.1%	11.9%	69.8%
1975	18.1%	12.2%	67.3%
1976	14.2%	10.5%	74.0%
1977	13.9%	10.6%	76.4%
1978	9.7%	7.7%	79.7%
1979	9.4%	8.0%	84.8%

1980	8.2%	7.7%	93.8%
1981	7.2%	7.6%	105.0%
1982	7.5%	8.1%	107.1%
1983	7.8%	8.9%	115.0%
1984	7.8%	9.8%	125.3%
1985	8.9%	11.1%	124.7%
1986	7.0%	9.1%	130.7%
1987	4.7%	7.3%	155.1%
1988	4.5%	7.5%	168.0%
1989	4.1%	8.0%	195.7%
1990	3.9%	7.4%	190.5%
1991	3.6%	7.5%	204.9%
1992	3.4%	7.8%	230.8%
1993	3.4%	7.6%	227.1%
1994	3.9%	9.6%	245.4%
1995	4.6%	11.2%	241.9%
1996	5.2%	13.0%	249.7%
1997	5.6%	14.6%	261.3%
1998	6.5%	15.7%	242.8%
1999	6.3%	16.1%	255.3%
2000	6.4%	17.4%	270.5%

2001	7.9%	19.5%	247.8%
2002	8.4%	20.7%	247.0%
2003	9.2%	21.0%	229.2%
2004	9.9%	22.1%	224.3%
2005	10.7%	24.0%	225.3%
2006	12.4%	26.8%	216.6%
2007	15.2%	31.0%	204.1%
2008	19.2%	36.8%	191.7%
2009	22.6%	43.4%	191.6%
2010	23.7%	47.6%	200.8%
2011	26.9%	53.5%	198.8%
2012	29.7%	59.5%	200.7%
2013	32.1%	65.4%	203.7%
2014	33.6%	70.1%	208.9%
2015	35.4%	78.9%	222.8%
2016	35.3%	79.4%	224.9%
2017	35.4%	82.2%	232.2%
2018	38.6%	87.9%	227.7%
2019	39.4%	89.7%	227.4%
2020	37.0%	96.3%	260.2%

D5: China's Share in the World, Population and GDP (PPP) pc, 1820-2018

Year	World pp.	China pp.	CN/W. pp.	W. GDP pc	CN GDP pc	CN/W. GDP pc
1820	1,033,538	381,000	37%	1,102	882	80%
1850	1,180,734	412,000	35%	1,225	858	70%
1870	1,268,656	358,000	28%	1,498	945	63%
1900	1,539,644	400,000	26%	2,212	972	44%
1920	1,926,864	472,000	24%	2,241		
1940	2,231,776	518,770	23%	3,133		
1950	2,509,569	546,815	22%	3,351	799	24%
1960	3,020,174	667,070	22%	4,386	1,057	24%
1970	3,665,340	818,315	22%	5,952	1,398	23%
1980	4,407,728	981,235	22%	7,233	1,930	27%
1990	5,231,786	1,135,185	22%	8,222	2,982	36%
2000	6,038,252	1,258,401	21%	9,915	4,730	48%
2010	6,814,168	1,331,357	20%	13,179	9,658	73%
2016	7,287,862	1,372,860	19%	14,700	12,569	86%
2017	7,389,585	1,380,177	19%	14,944	12,734	85%
2018	7,469,568	1,385,439	19%	15,212	13,102	86%

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 T7.12: Democracy Index of the Balkans, 2006 vs. 2021
 T7.13: Democracy Index of V4, 2006 vs. 2021